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Polybius

Polybius, Immanuel Bekker



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POLYBIUS

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POLYBIUS

THE HISTORIES

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
W. R. PATON

IN SIX VOLUMES



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Quare historiae huius non postrema haec laus est, quod in parte versetur rerum Romanarum longe nobilissima, sive virorum virtutem spectes, sive publica instituta aut mores, sive gestorum magnitudinem. Cum autem inter excellentis historiae condiciones doctissimi veterum hanc cum primis ponant, ut certi intervallo temporis circumscribatur, et a notabili principio ad notabilem finem perducatur, hanc historiae legem, ut quidem illis placet, a Polybio mirifice esse observatam invenimus.

CASAUBON.

Polybius was born about 208 B.C. at Megalopolis in Arcadia. His father, Lycortas, who spent the greater part of his life—more especially the years 181–168 B.C.—in the service of the Achaean League, was a friend and supporter of Philopoemen; he went as ambassador to Rome in 189, to Ptolemy Epiphanes, king of Egypt, in 186 and again in 181; and he was Strategus of the League in 184. In his youth Polybius began to take part in public affairs. He seems to have served with the Romans in the campaign of 189 against the Gauls in Asia Minor; he carried the urn of Philopoemen to burial in 183; he was associated with his father Lycortas in the embassy to Egypt in 181; and he was Hipparchus of the Achaean League for the year 169–8.

Throughout the period (181–168) of political association with his father Polybius consistently maintained the view that the supremacy of Rome in Greece must be accepted, and that the Greek states must conduct their affairs, whether singly or collectively, and preserve their freedom, without giving any offence, or cause of complaint, to the Roman republic. But there was much intriguing, in Greece and at Rome, against this policy of legal independence; and the suspicions of the Romans were so far aroused

that they came to regard the independents with no less displeasure than the avowed enemies of the republic. Thus, though the Achaean League maintained correctly enough this policy of a strict legality during the third war between Rome and Macedon (172-168), its leaders were quickly brought to account after the defeat of King Perseus at Pydna (168 B.c.), and no less than a thousand Achaeans were transported to Italy to be tried for their alleged opposition to the sovereignty of Rome. Of this company was Polybius—we hear nothing more of his father Lycortas: he may have died about this time. Quartered in Italian cities, these Greeks waited for the trial which never came: and at last in 151 B.c., when after sixteen years liberty was given to them to return home, there were less than three hundred of the thousand left to go back.

Polybius was more fortunate than the rest. had become acquainted with Aemilius Paulus and his two sons during the campaign against Perseus and afterwards in Macedonia, and now in 167 he was allowed to remain in Rome in the house of Aemilius, to act as tutor to the two boys. This was the beginning of that famous friendship between Polybius and the younger son, who became by adoption Publius Scipio Aemilianus. Panaetius, the Stoic philosopher, was also an inmate of Aemilius Paulus' house about this time, exercising—perhaps in rivalry with Polybius—a tutorial influence upon the sons. Polybius had access through Aemilius Paulus to the best of Roman society during those sixteen years of expatriation in Italy, and he made good use of his opportunities. He studied the history and institutions of Rome, doubtless with a view to viii

the history that he meant to write himself; he observed Roman life and character, in the individual and in the state 1; he hunted the boar with the

vounger sportsmen.

The Romans appreciated the ability and the versatility of Polybius, and in 149 B.c.—less than two years after his return to Arcadia—invited his assistance in the diplomatic discussions that preceded the last Punic War. And when Publius Scipio rejoined the army before Carthage in 147 as commander-in-chief, Polybius was in close attendance, to advise on questions of siege operations, or to conduct explorations on the coast of Africa in ships officially supplied. He stood by Scipio's side while Carthage was burning (146 B.C.); and when that destruction was finished he returned to Greece, in time, if not to witness the sack of Corinth by Mummius, at any rate to modify the executions of the Romans and to rescue some of the treasures of art from destruction or deportation. And when the Roman commissioners withdrew from Greece, they left Polybius with authority to settle the details for the administration of each surviving city. Thus he came to be regarded as a public benefactor, for he had done his work well: and statues were raised to him in Megalopolis, Mantinea, Tegea, Olympia, and elsewhere.

Polybius lived for some twenty years after this work was done, but we know little or nothing about his employments. He may have joined Scipio during the siege of Numantia in Spain (134-132): he visited Egypt again: his travels in Europe, Asia, and perhaps in Africa, may have been continued and

1 Cf. vi. 56, on the moral tone of the Romans.



extended in this period; and his literary work—there were, in addition to the History, a Life of Philopoemen in three books, a Treatise on Tactics, and a History of the Numantine War—must have occupied much of his time. A sportsman to the last, he met his death at eighty-two by an accidental fall from his horse as he was returning from the country.

The project of writing a history of the age probably suggested itself to Polybius, and was certainly developed, during the years of his detention in Italy. Expatriation loosened the links with Greece. and tightened the connexion with Rome. original scheme was to record the rise of Rome to supremacy over the Mediterranean states in the vears 220-168 B.C., i.e. from the beginning of the Second Punic War to the end of the Third Macedonian War. He subsequently extended this scheme in order to include an account of events from the first expedition of the Romans outside Italy (i.e. from the beginning of the First Punic War, in 264 B.c., the point where the history of Timaeus had ended) and to continue the record to the year (146 B.C.) which witnessed the destruction of Carthage and of Corinth. In the end the History consisted of forty books, of which the first two were introductory (προκατασκευή), the next thirty dealt with the main subject, and the last eight with the corollary. Of the forty books the first five only are preserved complete: of the rest there are only sections and fragments-numerous, it is true, but of varying length and importance—gathered from epitomes and excerpts.

Polybius was keenly alive to the greatness of his subject: he never forgot it himself, and he did

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not allow his readers to forget it. "Fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet assuredly never before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed."1 "What man is so indifferent or so idle that he would not wish to know how and under what form of government almost all the inhabited world came under the single rule of the Romans in less than fifty-three years (220-168 B.C.)?" 2 Thus at the outset he stated the scheme of his work; several times in the earlier books 3 he repeated the formula, for such it was, explaining in due course the extension of the scheme 4 in order to provide a proper introduction and conclusion; and in the last surviving chapter of the last book 5 he acknowledged the completion of his purpose. Careful to observe throughout the proportion and the continuity of things, he composed his treatise (πραγματεία) to be at once "catholic" $(\kappa \alpha \theta' \delta \lambda o v)$ in its relation to the general history of the world, and "pragmatic" or "apodeictic" in its conscious demonstration of the principle of cause and effect.6 And so he made his work "perhaps the greatest universal history, or history of the civilized world, attempted in old times." 7 Was there ever a book, indeed, written so strictly according to plan, by a person so well qualified?

For indeed it seemed that destiny itself had called and trained Polybius to this task. The son of a statesman, he spent the first forty years of his life in actual connexion with politics, diplomacy, and war;

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¹ i. 4. ² i. 1. ³ e.g. iii. 1-3, 31, 32. ⁴ iii. 4. ⁵ xl. 14. ⁶ iii. 6-8. ⁷ Mahaffy, Greek Life and Thought, p. 556.

and he naturally came to regard it as an indispensable qualification of a historian that he should be able to record his own experiences of peace and war, describing from his own knowledge men and circumstances, events and localities. As a man of action himself, he felt the necessity of first-hand evidence wherever it was obtainable, and spared no pains to obtain it; and he had no opinion of stay-at-home historians (like Timaeus) who lived in libraries and wrote as bookmen. Nevertheless, in the technical preparation of his work Polybius was cautious and painstaking beyond all others: he was a practical man. but he did not despise theory. So for and with his travels, extensive and systematic 1 as they were, he made a special study of geography—embodying many of his observations in Book xxxiv., which is almost entirely geographical; and with his visits, official or unofficial, to various countries, he combined an examination of documents and records-and all. no doubt, to make his work correct, continuous, and complete. He may not have been a great general, or diplomat, or even topographer; but he was always careful, and generally right in his conclusions. was impelled and guided by a natural instinct for truth: "For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from history, what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale?"² Truth, he says elsewhere, is shown by nature to mankind as supreme in divinity and power: sooner or later, truth must prevail over all opposition.3

It is worth while to consider a little further what

² i. 14.

8 xiii. 5.

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 $^{^{1}}$ e.g. he crossed the Alps by the pass which Hannibal was believed to have used.

was the position of Polybius in Greece-for in a sense it was typical of his age—and what his point of view. He was a native of Megalopolis, a city whose very foundation in the fourth century had been an experiment in federal unity. By birth and instinct an aristocrat, he had no sympathy with democratic survivals or demagogic outbreaks. As a statesman he realized that the old Greek ideas of freedom and independence, centred in the citystate, were gone, nor ever likely to return, except so far as was possible under the suzerainty of Rome -or rather, in the reconciliation of Roman rule and Greek intellect. Early in his career he saw that the Roman power was inevitable and irresistible; and therefore he strove by skilful diplomacy to guide and keep the Achaean League, and the Greeks in general, in ways that were correct and unexceptionable. He was a Stoic, and he believed that the Roman order of things was part of a divine Providence that ruled the world. This belief, confirmed by his closer acquaintance with the Romans, and by their progress in conquest, he expounded in his History, with such detail of causes, circumstances, and consequences as to show that he understood the position and the prospects of the Romans in the Mediterranean world far more clearly than at that time they themselves were able to do.

Polybius lived in a self-conscious age, when criticism was mostly captious and destructive, and standards of right and wrong, of truth and falsehood, were unsteady and uncertain. In the *History* he himself criticizes other writers freely enough, often at great length ¹, and with a severity that became

1 e.g. Timaeus in Book xii.

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proverbial. Was he not nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος for his treatment of Timaeus in particular? He divides historians into three classes: those who write for pay-to suit the pleasure or the plans of kings and states; those who write for rhetorical display; those who write for truth, and for the good of mankind. He appreciates the power of rhetoric in history for good and ill; but he avoids such assistance in his own work, for fear that he may fail to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." He employs the vocabulary of ordinary usage; and though his statements are always clear, and generally adequate, the style is seldom remarkable or attractive. Yet in the opinion of a great historian "the narrative is a model of completeness, simplicity, and clearness "2: it is the concentration of intellect upon a task—a vital century in the history of Rome-for which something besides intellect was needed, something of moral judgement, of spiritual understanding. In this respectthe larger humanity, where a sense of imagination joins with a sense of humour to modify the mechanism of intellect—Polybius is certainly lacking; and his narrative, for all its simplicity and clearness, fails often to interest just because it is so uniformly correct, so invariably instructive.

The work of Polybius was valued in ancient times, and not least by the Romans. Was his *History* intended primarily for Roman readers? Possibly: but at first it would scarcely be comprehended by more than a few of them, such as the Scipionic circle.

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¹ xvi. 14.

² Mommsen, *History of Rome* (English Translation), vol. iii. p. 467.

And to many, if not most, of the Greeks of his own day he must have seemed something of a suspect, and no proper patriot, who could devote forty books to an outspoken appreciation of all things Roman. Yet. save for his lack of rhetoric, he was thought to have exemplified every virtue of history: his opinions were frequently quoted, his works were compressed into epitomes and reproduced in excerpts. The pity is that by such abridged editions we have been deprived of the means of forming a just estimate of his work as a whole. For what was chosen for survival in epitome or excerpt, because it appeared most interesting or important in the generations that followed his own, cannot give us the whole story as Polybius told it—the σχημα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος, we might almost say—nor reveal the whole mind of Polybius. Yet enough remains to establish his worth, as a historian who was generally right in point of fact and reasonable in point of view, who "accomplished what he had intended, a history to guide life, to proclaim truth, and in all sagacity to forecast the future from the past." 1

For the books (i.-v.) which are still extant in complete form the best Manuscript is A, Codex Vaticanus 124, of the eleventh century. Fragments of the lost books are to be seen in F, Codex Urbinas 102, of the eleventh century, in the Constantine Excerpts, and in M, Codex Vaticanus 73, of the tenth century, a palimpsest containing excerpts. The Constantine Excerpts, so called because they



¹ Wyttenbach, Praefatio ad selecta principum historicorum.

were made by direction of the Byzantine Emperor Constantine (A.D.912-959) as part of an Encyclopaedia of History and Political Science, give passages of Polybius arranged under various headings according to the subject matter.

H. J. EDWARDS.

The Translator died suddenly in 1921, and the Editors have seen the work through the press. The Introduction has been supplied by Colonel Edwards, C.B.

VOL. I

ΠΟΛΥΒΙΟΥ

ΙΣΤΟΡΙΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗ

1 Εἰ μὲν τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν ἀναγράφουσι τὰς πράξεις παραλελειφθαι συνέβαινε τον ύπερ αυτής τής ίστορίας έπαινον, ίσως άναγκαῖον ήν τὸ προτρέπεσθαι πάντας πρός την αίρεσιν και παραδοχήν τῶν τοιούτων ὑπομνημάτων, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν έτοιμοτέραν είναι τοις άνθρώποις διόρθωσιν της των 2 προγεγενημένων πράξεων επιστήμης. επεί δ' οὐ τινές οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ώς ἔπος εἰπεῖν άρχη καὶ τέλει κέχρηνται τούτω, φάσκοντες άληθινωτάτην μέν είναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρός τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν, έναργεστάτην δέ καὶ μόνην διδάσκαλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τὰς τῆς τύχης μεταβολὰς γενναίως ὑποφέρειν την των άλλοτρίων περιπετειών υπόμνησιν, δηλον 8 ώς οὐδενὶ μεν αν δόξαι καθήκειν περὶ τῶν καλῶς καὶ πολλοῖς εἰρημένων ταυτολογεῖν, ήκιστα δ' ἡμῖν. 4 αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ παράδοξον τῶν πράξεων, ὑπὲρ ὧν προηρήμεθα γράφειν, ίκανόν έστι προκαλέσασθαι καὶ παρορμήσαι πάντα καὶ νέον καὶ πρεσβύτερον 5 προς την έντευξιν της πραγματείας. τίς γαρ ούτως ύπάρχει φαῦλος ἢ ράθυμος ἀνθρώπων δς οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο γνῶναι πῶς καὶ τίνι γένει πολιτείας ἐπι-

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1. Had previous chroniclers neglected to speak in praise of History in general, it might perhaps have been necessary for me to recommend everyone to choose for study and welcome such treatises as the present, since there is no more ready corrective of conduct than knowledge of the past. But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of History, and that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune, is to recall the calamities of others. Evidently therefore no one, and least of all myself, would think it his duty at this day to repeat what has been so well and so often said. For the very element of unexpectedness in the events I have chosen as my theme will be sufficient to challenge and incite young and old alike to peruse these pages. For who is so worthless or indolent as not to wish to know by what means and under what system of polity the Romans in

κρατηθέντα σχεδον απαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην έν ούχ όλοις πεντήκοντα καὶ τρισὶν ἔτεσιν ὑπὸ μίαν άρχην έπεσε την 'Ρωμαίων, δ πρότερον ούχ 6 εύρίσκεται γεγονός, τίς δε πάλιν οὖτως ἐκπαθής πρός τι τῶν ἄλλων θεαμάτων ἢ μαθημάτων δς προυργιαίτερον αν τι ποιήσαιτο τησδε της

έμπειρίας;

'Ως δ' έστι παράδοξον καὶ μέγα τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν υπόθεσιν θεώρημα γένοιτ' αν ουτως μάλιστ' έμφανές, εί τὰς έλλογιμωτάτας τῶν προγεγενημένων δυναστειών, περί ας οί συγγραφείς τούς πλείστους διατέθεινται λόγους, παραβάλοιμεν καὶ συγκρίναι-2 μεν πρός την 'Ρωμαίων ύπερογήν. είσι δ' αι της παραβολής ἄξιαι καὶ συγκρίσεως αδται. Πέρσαι κατά τινας καιρούς μεγάλην άρχην κατεκτήσαντο

τούς της 'Ασίας όρους, οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ της ἀρχης, 3 άλλα και περί σφων εκινδύνευσαν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλούς αμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ύπερ της των Έλλήνων ήγεμονίας, επειδή ποτ' εκράτησαν, μόλις

καὶ δυναστείαν άλλ' όσάκις ετόλμησαν ύπερβηναι

4 έτη δώδεκα κατείχον αὐτὴν άδήριτον. Μακεδόνες της μεν Ευρώπης ήρξαν από των κατά τον 'Αδρίαν τόπων έως έπὶ τὸν Τστρον ποταμόν, δ βραχύ παντε-

δ λως αν φανείη μέρος της προειρημένης χώρας. μετά δέ ταθτα προσέλαβον την της 'Ασίας άρχην, καταλύσαντες την των Περσων δυναστείαν. άλλ' όμως οδτοι, πλείστων δόξαντες καὶ τόπων καὶ πραγμάτων γενέσθαι κύριοι, τὸ πολὺ μέρος ἀκμὴν ἀπέλιπον

6 της οικουμένης άλλότριον. Σικελίας μέν γάρ καὶ Σαρδοῦς καὶ Λιβύης οὐδ' ἐπεβάλοντο καθάπαξ ἀμφισβητεῖν, τῆς δ' Εὐρώπης τὰ μαχιμώτατα γένη των προσεσπερίων εθνων ίσχνως είπειν οὐδ' εγί-

BOOK I

less than fifty-three years have succeeded in subjecting nearly the whole inhabited world to their sole government—a thing unique in history? Or who again is there so passionately devoted to other spectacles or studies as to regard anything as of greater moment than the acquisition of this

knowledge?

2. How striking and grand is the spectacle presented by the period with which I purpose to deal, will be most clearly apparent if we set beside and compare with the Roman dominion the most famous empires of the past, those which have formed the chief theme of historians. Those worthy of being thus set beside it and compared are these. The Persians for a certain period possessed a great rule and dominion, but so often as they ventured to overstep the boundaries of Asia they imperilled not only the security of this empire, but their own existence. The Lacedaemonians, after having for many years disputed the hegemony of Greece, at length attained it but to hold it uncontested for scarce twelve years. The Macedonian rule in Europe extended but from the Adriatic to the Danube, which would appear a quite insignificant portion of the continent. Subsequently, by overthrowing the Persian empire they became supreme in Asia also. But though their empire was now regarded as the greatest in extent and power that had ever existed, they left the larger part of the inhabited world as yet outside it. For they never even made a single attempt on Sicily, Sardinia, or Africa, and the most warlike nations of Western Europe were, to speak the simple truth, unknown

7 νωσκον. 'Ρωμαῖοί γε μὴν οὐ τινὰ μέρη, σχεδὸν δὲ

πασαν πεποιημένοι την οίκουμένην υπήκοον αυτοις, . σιν, ανυπές ρβλητον δε καί > τοις επιγι-<υομένοις ύπερ >οχήν κα< τέχουσι τῆς αύτῶν > 8 δυναστ $<\epsilon$ ias . . . ϵ κ της γρα>φης. 1 σαφέστερον κατανοείν ομοίως δέ τοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκα συμβάλλεσθαι πέφυκε τοις φιλομαθούσιν ο της πραγματικής ίστορίας τρόπος. "Αρξει δε της πραγματείας ήμιν των μεν χρόνων ολυμπιας έκατοστή και τετταρακοστή, των δέ πράξεων παρά μέν τοις Ελλησιν ο προσαγορευθείς συμμαχικός πόλεμος, ον πρώτον εξήνεγκε μετ' 'Αχαιών πρός Αιτωλούς Φίλιππος, Δημητρίου μεν υίός, πατήρ δὲ Περσέως, παρά δὲ τοῖς τὴν 'Ασίαν κατοικοθσιν ό περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας, δυ 'Αντίοχος καὶ 2 Πτολεμαίος δ Φιλοπάτωρ επολέμησαν πρός άλλήλους έν δε τοις κατά την Ιταλίαν και Λιβύην

τόποις δ συστὰς 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις, δν οἱ πλεῖστοι προσαγορεύουσιν 'Αννιβιακόν. ταῦτα δ' ἔστι συνεχῆ τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς παρ' 'Αράτου ³ Σικυωνίου συντάξεως. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς πρὸ τούτων χρόνοις ὡς ἄν εἰ σποράδας εἶναι συνέβαινε τὰς τῆς οἰκουμένης πράξεις, διὰ τὸ καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολάς, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς συντελείας αὐτῶν ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τόπους ἀπέχειν ἔκαστα τῶν πεπραγμένων.

4 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν οἶον εἰ σωματοειδῆ συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι τὴν ἱστορίαν, συμπλέκεσθαί τε τὰς Ἰταλικὰς καὶ Λιβυκὰς πράξεις ταῖς τε κατὰ τὴν

6

¹ In this passage the MS. A is partly illegible. The English is only meant to show the probable sense of what is missing.

BOOK I

to them. But the Romans have subjected to their rule not portions, but nearly the whole of the world, and possess an empire which is not only immeasurably greater than any which preceded it, but need not fear rivalry in the future. In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible by what steps this power was acquired, and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.

3. The date from which I propose to begin is the 140th Olympiad [220-216 B.c.], and the events are the following: (1) in Greece the so-called Social War, the first waged against the Aetolians by the Achaeans in league with and under the leadership of Philip of Macedon, the son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, (2) in Asia the war for Coele-Syria between Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator, (3) in Italy, Africa, and the adjacent regions, the war between Rome and Carthage, usually known as the Hannibalic War. These events immediately succeed those related at the end of the work of Aratus of Sicyon. Previously the doings of the world had been, so to say, dispersed, as they were held together by no unity of initiative, results, or locality; but ever since this date history has been an organic whole, and the affairs of Italy and Africa have been inter-

'Ασίαν καὶ ταῖς 'Ελληνικαῖς καὶ πρὸς εν γίνεσθαι τέλος τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἀπάντων. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας ἀπὸ τούτων πεποιήμεθα τῶν καιρῶν. τῷ γὰρ προειρημένῳ πολέμῳ κρατήσαντες 'Ρωμαῖοι Καρχηδονίων, καὶ νομίσαντες τὸ κυριώτατον καὶ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτοῖς ἢνύσθαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐπιβολήν, οὖτως καὶ τότε πρῶτον ἐθάρσησαν ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰς χεῖρας ἐκτείνειν καὶ περαιοῦσθαι μετὰ δυνάμεως εἴς τε τὴν 'Ελλάδα καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν 'Ασίαν τόπους.
7 Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν ἢν συνήθη καὶ γνώριμα τὰ πολιτεύματα τὰ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητήσαντα, ἴσως οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμᾶς ἔδει περὶ τῶν πρὸ τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως

τοῦ γράφειν, ἀπὸ ποίας προθέσεως ἢ δυνάμεως όρμηθέντες ἐνεχείρησαν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τηλι8 κούτοις ἔργοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὕτε τοῦ 'Ρωμαίων οὕτε τοῦ Καρχηδονίων πολιτεύματος πρόχειρός ἐστι τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν 'Ελλήνων ἡ προγεγενημένη δύναμις οὐδ' αἱ πράξεις αὐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπελάβομεν εἶναι συντάξασθαι ταύτην καὶ τὴν ἐξῆς 9 βύβλον πρὸ τῆς ἱστορίας, ἴνα μηδεὶς ἐπιστὰς ἐπ'

9 βύβλον πρό της ἱστορίας, ίνα μηδείς ἐπιστάς ἐπ΄ αὐτην την τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξήγησιν τότε διαπορη καὶ ζητη ποίοις διαβουλίοις ἢ ποίαις δυνάμεσι καὶ χορηγίαις χρησάμενοι 'Ρωμαῖοι πρὸς ταύτας ὥρμησαν τὰς ἐπιβολάς, δι' ὧν καὶ τῆς γης καὶ τῆς θαλάττης τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἐγένοντο πάσης ἐγκρατεῖς, 10 ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτων τῶν βύβλων καὶ τῆς ἐν ταύταις

10 άλλ΄ έκ τούτων τῶν βύβλων καὶ τῆς έν ταύταις προκατασκευῆς δῆλον ἢ τοις ἐντυγχάνουσιν ὅτι καὶ λίαν εὐλόγοις ἀφορμαις χρησάμενοι πρός τε τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ὥρμησαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν ἐξ-4 ίκοντο τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας. τὸ

τικούτο της των ολών αρχης και ουναστείας. το γάρ της ήμετέρας πραγματείας ίδιον καὶ τὸ θαυ-

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linked with those of Greece and Asia, all leading up to one end. And this is my reason for beginning where I do. For it was owing to their defeat of the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War that the Romans, feeling that the chief and most essential step in their scheme of universal aggression had now been taken, were first emboldened to reach out their hands to grasp the rest and to cross with an army to Greece and Asia.

Now were we Greeks well acquainted with the two states which disputed the empire of the world, it would not perhaps have been necessary for me to deal at all with their previous history, or to narrate what purpose guided them, and on what sources of strength they relied, in entering upon such a vast undertaking. But as neither the former power nor the earlier history of Rome and Carthage is familiar to most of us, I thought it necessary to prefix this Book and the next to the actual history, in order that no one after becoming engrossed in the narrative may find himself at a loss, and ask by what counsel and trusting to what power and resources the Romans embarked on that enterprise which has made them lords over our land and our seas, but that from these Books and the preliminary sketch in them it may be clear to readers that they had quite adequate grounds for conceiving the ambition of a world-empire and adequate means for achieving their purpose. 4. For what gives my work its peculiar quality, and what is most remarkable in the present

μάσιον των καθ' ήμας καιρών τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅτι καθάπερ ή τύχη σχεδον άπαντα τὰ τῆς οἰκουμένης πράγματα πρὸς εν ἔκλινε μέρος καὶ τάντα νεύειν ἢνάγκασε πρὸς ενα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν σκοπόν, οὕτως 2 καὶ δεῖ διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας ὑπὸ μίαν σύνοψιν ἀγαγεῖν τοις εντυγχάνουσι τον χειρισμον της τύχης, ῷ κέ-χρηται προς την των όλων πραγμάτων συντέλειαν. καί γὰρ τὸ προκαλεσάμενον ἡμᾶς καὶ παρορμῆσαν πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς ἱστορίας μάλιστα τοῦτο γέγονε· σὺν δὲ τούτω καὶ τὸ μηδένα τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς επιβεβλησθαι τη τῶν καθόλου πραγμάτων συντάξει· πολύ γὰρ ἃν ἦττον ἔγωγε πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εἰκλοτιμήθην. νῦν δ' ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν κατὰ μέρος πολέμους καί τινας τῶν ἄμα τούτοις πράξεων καὶ πλείους πραγματευομένους, την δε καθόλου καὶ συλλήβδην οἰκονομίαν τῶν γεγονότων, πότε καὶ πόθεν ὡρμήθη καὶ πῶς ἔσχε τὴν συντέλειαν, ταύτην οὐδ' ἐπιβαλόμενον οὐδένα βασανίζειν, ὅσον γε 4 και ήμας είδεναι, παντελώς ύπελαβον άναγκαιον είναι το μη παραλιπειν μηδ' είασαι παρελθειν άνεπιστάτως το κάλλιστον αμα κωφελιμώτατον επιτή-5 δευμα τῆς τύχης. πολλὰ γὰρ αὖτη καινοποιοῦσα καὶ συνεχῶς ἐναγωνιζομένη τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίοις οὐδέπω τοιόνδ' άπλῶς οὕτ' εἰργάσατ' ἔργον οὖτ' ηγωνίσατ' ἀγώνισμα, οἶον τὸ καθ' ἡμᾶς. 6 οπερ εκ μεν των κατά μέρος γραφόντων τὰς ίστο-ρίας οὐχ οἶόν τε συνιδεῖν, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὰς ἐπιφανεστάτας πόλεις τις κατὰ μίαν έκάστην ἐπελθὼν ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία γεγραμμένας χωρὶς ἀλλήλων θεασάμενος εὐθέως ὑπολαμβάνει κατανενοηκέναι καὶ τὸ τῆς όλης οἰκουμένης σχήμα καὶ τὴν σύμπασαν αὐτῆς 7 θέσιν καὶ τάξιν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν οὐδαμῶς εἰκός. καθό-10

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age, is this. Fortune having guided almost all the affairs of the world in one direction and having forced them to incline towards one and the same end, a historian should bring before his readers under one synoptical view the operations by which she has accomplished her general purpose. Indeed it was this chiefly that invited and encouraged me to undertake my task; and secondarily the fact that none of my contemporaries have undertaken to write a general history, in which case I should have been much less eager to take this in hand. As it is, I observe that while several modern writers deal with particular wars and certain matters connected with them, no one, as far as I am aware, has even attempted to inquire critically when and whence the general and comprehensive scheme of events originated and how it led up to the end. I therefore thought it quite necessary not to leave unnoticed or allow to pass into oblivion this the finest and most beneficent of the performances of Fortune. For though she is ever producing something new and ever playing a part in the lives of men, she has not in a single instance ever accomplished such a work, ever achieved such a triumph, as in our own times. We can no more hope to perceive this from histories dealing with particular events than to get at once a notion of the form of the whole world, its disposition and order, by visiting, each in turn, the most famous cities, or indeed by looking at separate plans of each: a result by no means likely. He indeed who believes

λου μέν γάρ ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οἱ πεπεισμένοι διὰ της κατά μέρος ίστορίας μετρίως συνόψεσθαι τά ολα παραπλήσιόν τι πάσχειν, ώς αν εί τινες εμψύχου καὶ καλοῦ σώματος γεγονότος διερριμμένα τὰ μέρη θεώμενοι νομίζοιεν ίκανῶς αὐτόπται γίνεσθαι 8 της ένεργείας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ζώου καὶ καλλονης. εἰ γάρ τις αὐτίκα μάλα συνθεὶς καὶ τέλειον αὖθις ἀπεργασάμενος τὸ ζῷον τῷ τ' εἴδει καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχής εὐπρεπεία, κάπειτα πάλιν ἐπιδεικνύοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις, ταχέως ἂν οίμαι πάντας αὐτοὺς δμολογήσειν διότι καὶ λίαν πολύ τι της άληθείας άπελείποντο πρόσθεν καὶ παραπλήσιοι τοῖς ὀνειο ρώττουσιν ήσαν. ἔννοιαν μεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ὅλων δυνατόν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ γνώμην 10 ἀτρεκῆ σχεῖν ἀδύνατον. διὸ παντελῶς βραχύ τι νομιστέον συμβάλλεσθαι την κατά μέρος ίστορίαν 11 πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πίστιν. ἐκ μέντοι γε της απάντων πρός άλληλα συμπλοκής καὶ παραθέσεως, έτι δ' όμοιότητος καὶ διαφορας, μόνως αν τις εφίκοιτο και δυνηθείη κατοπτεύσας αμα καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ τὸ τερπνὸν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀναλαβεῖν. Υποθησόμεθα δὲ ταύτης ἀρχὴν τῆς βύβλου τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν ἐξ Ἰταλίας Ῥωμαίων. αὕτη δ' ἔστι συνεχὴς μὲν τοῖς ἀφ' ὧν Τίμαιος ἀπέλιπε, πίπτει δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνάτην καὶ εἰκοστὴν πρὸς ταῖς 2 έκατον ολυμπιάδα. διο καὶ ρητέον αν εἴη πῶς καὶ πότε συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τίσιν

πότε συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, καὶ τίσιν ἀφορμαῖς μετὰ ταῦτα χρησάμενοι, διαβαίνειν ὥρμησαν εἰς Σικελίαν· ταύτη γὰρ τῆ γῆ πρῶτον ἐπέ-3 βησαν τῶν ἐκτὸς τόπων τῆς Ἰταλίας. καὶ ρητέον αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς διαβάσεως αἰτίαν ψιλῶς, ἵνα μὴ τῆς

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that by studying isolated histories he can acquire a fairly just view of history as a whole, is, as it seems to me, much in the case of one, who, after having looked at the dissevered limbs of an animal once alive and beautiful, fancies he has been as good as an evewitness of the creature itself in all its action and grace. For could anyone put the creature together on the spot, restoring its form and the comeliness of life, and then show it to the same man, I think he would quickly avow that he was formerly very far away from the truth and more like one in a dream. For we can get some idea of a whole from a part. but never knowledge or exact opinion. histories therefore contribute very little to the knowledge of the whole and conviction of its truth. It is only indeed by study of the interconnexion of all the particulars, their resemblances and differences, that we are enabled at least to make a general survey, and thus derive both benefit and pleasure from history.

5. I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This follows immediately on the close of Timaeus' History and took place in the 129th Olympiad [264–261 B.C.]. Thus we must first state how and when the Romans established their position in Italy, and what prompted them afterwards to cross to Sicily, the first country outside Italy where they set foot. The actual cause of their crossing must be stated without comment; for if I were to seek the

αἰτίας αἰτίαν ἐπιζητούσης ἀνυπόστατος ἡ τῆς ὅλης 4 ὑποθέσεως ἀρχὴ γένηται καὶ θεωρία. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τοῖς καιροῖς ὁμολογουμένην καὶ γνωριζομένην ἀρχὴν παρ' ἄπασι, καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι δυναμένην αὐτὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς θεωρεῖσθαι, καν δέη τοῖς χρόνοις βραχὺ προσαναδραμόντας κεφαλαιώδη τῶν μεταξὺ 5 πράξεων ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν. τῆς γὰρ ἀρχῆς ἀγνοουμένης ἡ καὶ νὴ Δί' ἀμφισβητουμένης οὐδὲ τῶν ἔξῆς οὐδὲν οἶόν τε παραδοχῆς ἀξιωθῆναι καὶ πίστεως. ὅταν δ' ἡ περὶ ταύτης ὁμολογουμένη παρασκευασθῆ δόξα, τότ' ἤδη καὶ πῶς ὁ συνεχὴς λόγος ἀποδοχῆς τυγχάνει παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν.

6 "Έτος μὲν οὖν ἐνειστήκει μετὰ μὲν τὴν ἐν Αἰγὸς ποταμοῖς ναυμαχίαν ἐννεακαιδέκατον, πρὸ δὲ 2 τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης ἐκκαιδέκατον, ἐν ῷ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τὴν ἐπ' 'Ανταλκίδου λεγομένην εἰρήνην πρὸς βασιλέα τῶν Περσῶν ἐκύρωσαν καὶ πρεσβύτερος Διονύσιος τῆ περὶ τὸν 'Ελλέπορον ποταμὸν μάχη νενικηκὼς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν 'Ιταλίαν "Ελληνας ἐπολιόρκει 'Ρήγιον, Γαλάται δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐλόντες αὐτὴν τὴν 'Ρώμην κατεῖχον πλὴν τοῦ 8 Καπετωλίου. πρὸς οὖς ποιησάμενοι 'Ρωμαῖοι σπονδὰς καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Γαλάταις, καὶ γενόμενοι πάλιν ἀνελπίστως τῆς πατρίδος ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ λαβόντες οἷον ἀργὰν τῆς πυανξήσευς, ἐπολέ-

καὶ λαβόντες οἱον ἀρχὴν τῆς συναυξήσεως, ἐπολέμουν ἐν τοις έξῆς χρόνοις πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας. 4 γενόμενοι δ' ἐγκρατεις ἀπάντων τῶν Λατίνων διά τε τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὴν ἐν ταις μάχαις ἐπιτυχίαν, μετὰ ταιτ' ἐπολέμουν Τυρρηνοις, ἔπειτα Κελτοις, έξῆς δὲ Σαυνίταις, τοις πρός τε τὰς ἀνατολὰς καὶ τὰς ἄρκτους συντερμονοῦσι τῆ τῶν Λατίνων χώρα. 14

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cause of the cause and so on, my whole work would have no clear starting-point and principle. The starting-point must be an era generally agreed upon and recognized, and one self-apparent from the events, even if this involves my going back a little in point of date and giving a summary of intervening occurrences. For if readers are ignorant or indeed in any doubt as to what are the facts from which the work opens, it is impossible that what follows should meet with acceptance or credence; but once we produce in them a general agreement on this point they will give ear to all the subsequent narrative.

6. It was then the nineteenth year after the \$87-886 battle of Aegospotami and the sixteenth before that of Leuctra, the year in which the Spartans made the peace known as that of Antalcidas with the King of Persia, that in which also Dionysius the Elder, after defeating the Italiot Greeks in the battle at the river Elleporos, was besieging Rhegium, and that in which the Gauls, after taking Rome itself by assault, occupied the whole of that city except the Capitol. The Romans, after making a truce on conditions satisfactory to the Gauls and being thus contrary to their expectation reinstated in their home and as it were now started on the road of aggrandizement, continued in the following years to wage war on their neighbours. After subduing all the Latins by their valour and the fortune of war they fought first against the Etruscans, then against the Celts, and next against the Samnites, whose territory was conterminous with that of the Latins on the East

5 μετά δέ τινα χρόνον Ταραντίνων διά την είς τούς πρεσβευτάς 'Ρωμαίων ἀσέλγειαν καὶ τὸν διὰ ταῦτα φόβον επισπασαμένων Πύρρον τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς τῶν Γαλατῶν ἐφόδου τῶν τε περὶ Δελφοὺς φθαρέν-6 των καὶ περαιωθέντων εἰς τὴν 'Ασίαν, 'Ρωμαῖοι Τυρρηνούς μέν καὶ Σαυνίτας ύφ' αύτούς πεποιημένοι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κελτοὺς πολλαῖς μάχαις ήδη νενικηκότες, τότε πρώτον έπὶ τὰ λοιπά μέρη της Ίταλίας ώρμησαν, ούχ ώς ύπερ οθνείων, έπὶ δὲ τὸ πλείον ώς ὑπὲρ ἰδίων ήδη καὶ καθηκόν-των σφίσι πολεμήσοντες, ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ των κατά τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων ἐκ των πρὸς τοὺς 7 Σαυνίτας καὶ Κελτούς ἀγώνων. ὑποστάντες δὲ γενναίως τον πόλεμον τοῦτον, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον τάς τε δυνάμεις καὶ Πύρρον ἐκβαλόντες ἐκ τῆς 'Ιταλίας, αθθις επολέμουν και κατεστρέφοντο τους 8 κοινωνήσαντας Πύρρω τῶν πραγμάτων. γενόμενοι δὲ παραδόξως ἀπάντων ἐγκρατεῖς, καὶ ποιησάμενοι τούς την 'Ιταλίαν οἰκοῦντας ύφ' αύτους πλην Κελτων, μετά ταῦτα πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν τοὺς τότε κατ-έχοντας τὸ 'Ρήγιον 'Ρωμαίους. 7 Ιδιον γάρ τι συνέβη και παραπλήσιον έκατέραις ταις περί τον πορθμον έκτισμέναις πόλεσιν είσι δ'

2 αὖται Μεσσήνη καὶ 'Ρήγιον. Μεσσήνην μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολλοῖς ἀνώτερον χρόνοις τῶν νῦν λεγομένων καιρῶν Καμπανοὶ παρ' Αγαθοκλεῖ μισθοφοροῦντες, καὶ πάλαι περὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῆς πόλεως ὀφθαλμιῶντες, ἄμα τῷ λαβεῖν καιρὸν εὐθὺς ἐπεχείρησαν παρασπονδεῖν· παρεισελθόντες δ' ὡς φίλιοι, καὶ κατασχόντες τὴν πόλιν, οὖς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν, οὖς δ' ἀπ-4 ἐσφαξαν. πράξαντες δὲ ταῦτα, τὰς μὲν γυναῖκας

and North. After some time the Tarentines, fearing the consequences of their insolence to the Roman envoys, begged for the intervention of Pyrrhus. (This was in the year preceding the expedi- 280 B.C. tion of those Gauls who met with the reverse at Delphi and then crossed to Asia.) The Romans had ere this reduced the Etruscans and Samnites and had vanguished the Italian Celts in many battles, and they now for the first time attacked the rest of Italy not as if it were a foreign country, but as if it rightfully belonged to them. Their struggle with the Sampites and Celts had made them veritable masters in the art of war, and after bravely supporting this war with Pyrrhus and finally expelling himself and 274 B.C. his army from Italy, they continued to fight with and subdue those who had sided with him. When, with extraordinary good fortune, they had reduced all these peoples and had made all the inhabitants of Italy their subjects excepting the Celts, they undertook the siege of Rhegium now held by certain of their compatriots.

7. For very much the same fortune had befallen the two cities on the Straits, Messene and Rhegium. Certain Campanians serving under Agathocles had long cast covetous eyes on the beauty and prosperity of Messene; and not long before the events I am speaking of they availed themselves of the first opportunity to capture it by treachery. After being admitted as friends and occupying the city, they first expelled or massacred the citizens and took

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καὶ τὰ τέκνα τῶν ἠκληρηκότων, ὧς ποθ' ἡ τύχη διένειμε παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς παρανομίας καιρὸν έκάστοις, οὕτως ἔσχον· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς βίους καὶ 5 την χώραν μετά ταθτα διελόμενοι κατείχον. ταχύ δὲ καὶ ραδίως καλῆς χώρας καὶ πόλεως ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι, παρὰ πόδας εθρον μιμητὰς τῆς πράξεως. 6 Ἡηγῖνοι γάρ, καθ' δν καιρὸν Πύρρος εἰς Ἰταλίαν ἐπεραιοθτο, καταπλαγεῖς γενόμενοι τὴν ἔφοδον αὐ-τοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ καὶ Καρχηδονίους θαλαττοκρατοῦντας, ἐπεσπάσαντο φυλακὴν ἄμα καὶ βοήθειαν 7 παρὰ 'Ρωμαίων. οἱ δ' εἰσελθόντες χρόνον μέν τινα διετήρουν την πόλιν και την έαυτων πίστιν, όντες τετρακισχίλιοι τον αριθμόν, ων ήγειτο Δέκιος Καμ-8 πανός τέλος δε ζηλώσαντες τους Μαμερτίνους, αμα δέ καὶ συνεργούς λαβόντες αὐτούς, παρεσπόνδησαν τους 'Ρηγίνους, εκπαθεις όντες επί τε τη της πόλεως εὐκαιρία καὶ τῆ τῶν 'Ρηγίνων περὶ τοὺς ἰδίους βίους εὐδαιμονία καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκβαλόντες, τοὺς δ' ἀποσφάξαντες τῶν πολιτῶν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τοις Καμπανοις κατέσχον την πόλιν. οι δέ 9 'Ρωμαῖοι βαρέως μὲν ἔφερον τὸ γεγονός· οὐ μὴν εἶχόν γε ποιεῖν οὐδὲν διὰ τὸ συνέχεσθαι τοῖς προ-10 ειρημένοις πολέμοις. έπει δ' από τούτων εγένοντο, συγκλείσαντες αὐτοὺς ἐπολιόρκουν τὸ 'Ρήγιον, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον. κρατήσαντες δὲ τοὺς 11 μεν πλείστους εν αὐτῆ τῆ καταλήψει διέφθειραν, εκθύμως ἀμυνομένους διὰ τὸ προορασθαι τὸ μέλλον, ζωγρία δ' εκυρίευσαν πλειόνων ἢ τριακοσίων. ὧν 12 αναπεμφθέντων είς την 'Ρώμην, οί στρατηγοί προαγαγόντες είς τὴν ἀγορὰν καὶ μαστιγώσαντες ἄπαντας κατὰ τὸ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθος ἐπελέκισαν, βουλόμενοι διὰ τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους τιμωρίας, καθ' ὅσον 18

possession of the wives and families of their unhappy victims, just as chance assigned them at the time of the outrage. They next divided among themselves the land and all other property. Having thus possessed themselves so quickly and easily of a fine city and territory, they were not long in finding imitators of their exploit. For the people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus crossed to Italy, dreading an attack by him and fearing also the Carthaginians who commanded the sea, begged from the Romans a garrison and support. The force which was sent, four thousand in number and under the command of Decius, a Campanian, kept the city and their faith for some time, but at length, anxious to rival the Mamertines and with their co-operation, played the people of Rhegium false, and eagerly coveting a city so favourably situated and containing so much private wealth, expelled or massacred the citizens and possessed themselves of the city in the same manner as the Campanians had done. The Romans were highly displeased, yet could do nothing at the time, as they were occupied with the wars I have already men-But when they had a free hand they shut up the culprits in the city and proceeded to lay siege to it as I have stated above. When Rhegium fell, most of the besieged were slain in the actual assault, having defended themselves desperately, as they knew what awaited them, but more than three hundred were captured. When they were sent to 271 B.C. Rome the Consuls had them all conducted to the forum and there, according to the Roman custom, scourged and beheaded; their object being to recover as far as possible by this punishment their reputation

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οδοί τ' ήσαν, διορθοῦσθαι παρά τοῖς συμμάχοις τὴν 13 αὐτῶν πίστιν. τὴν δὲ χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν παρα-χρῆμα τοῖς 'Ρηγίνοις ἀπέδοσαν.

8 Οί δε Μαμερτίνοι, τοῦτο γάρ τοὔνομα κυριεύσαντες οἱ Καμπανοὶ τῆς Μεσσήνης προσηγόρευσαν σφας αὐτούς, έως μεν συνεχρωντο τῆ των 'Ρω-μαίων συμμαχία των τὸ 'Ρήγιον κατασχόντων, οὐ μόνον τῆς εαυτων πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἀσφαλως κατεκράτουν, άλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς συνορούσης οὐχ ώς έτυχε παρηνώχλουν τοις τε Καρχηδονίοις καί τοις Συρακοσίοις, καὶ πολλά μέρη τῆς Σικελίας ἐφορο-2 λόγουν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστερήθησαν τῆς προειρημένης ἐπικουρίας, συγκλεισθέντων τῶν τὸ ዮήγιον κατεχόντων εἰς τὴν πολιορκίαν, παρὰ πόδας ὑπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων αὐτοὶ πάλιν συνεδιώχθησαν εἰς τὴν 3 πόλιν διά τινας τοιαύτας αἰτίας. χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον αι δυνάμεις των Συρακοσίων διενεχθείσαι προς τους εν τη πόλει, και διατρίβουσαι περί την Μεργάνην, κατέστησαν έξ αύτῶν ἄρχοντας, 'Αρτεμίδωρόν τε καὶ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα βασιλεύσαντα τῶν Συρακοσίων Ίέρωνα, νέον μεν όντα κομιδή, πρός δέ τι γένος εὐφυή βασιλικής καὶ πραγματικής οἰκο-4 νομίας. δ δε παραλαβών την άρχην καὶ παρεισελθών είς την πόλιν διά τινων οἰκείων καὶ κύριος γενόμενος των αντιπολιτευομένων, ουτως έχρήσατο πράως καὶ μεγαλοψύχως τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὧστε τοὺς Συρακοσίους, καίπερ οὐδαμῶς εὐδοκουμένους ἐπὶ ταίς των στρατιωτών άρχαιρεσίαις, τότε πάντας όμοθυμαδον εὐδοκῆσαι στρατηγον αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν τοῦς Τέρωνα. δε ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἐπινοημάτων εὐθέως δῆλος ἦν τοῦς ὀρθῶς σκοπουμένοις μειζόνων ὀρεγόμενος έλπίδων η κατά την στρατηγίαν. θεωρών 20

for good faith with the allies. The city and territory of Rhegium they at once restored to the citizens.

8. The Mamertines (for this was the name adopted by the Campanians after their seizure of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Romans who had occupied Rhegium, not only remained in secure possession of their own city and territory but caused no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans about the adjacent territories, levying tribute from many parts of Sicily. When, however, they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now closely invested, they were at once in their turn driven to take refuge in their city by the Syracusans owing to the following causes. Not many years before the Syracusan army had quarrelled with those in the city. They were then posted near Mergane and appointed two magistrates chosen from their own body, Artemidorus and Hiero, who was subsequently king of Syracuse. He was still quite young 275 B.O. but naturally qualified to be a ruler and statesman of a kind. Having accepted the command, he gained admittance to the city through certain relatives, and after overpowering the opposite party, administered affairs with such mildness and magnanimity that the Syracusans, though by no means inclined to approve camp elections, on this occasion unanimously accepted him as their general. From his first measures it was evident at once to all capable of judging that his ambition was not limited to a mere command

9 γάρ τους Συρακοσίους, επειδάν εκπεμψωσι τάς δυνάμεις καὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων, αὐτοὺς έν αύτοις στασιάζοντας και καινοτομούντας αιεί τι. 2 τὸν δὲ Λεπτίνην εἰδώς καὶ τῆ προστασία καὶ τῆ πίστει πολύ διαφέροντα των άλλων πολιτών, εὐδοκιμοθντα δέ καὶ παρά τῷ πλήθει διαφερόντως, συνάπτεται κηδείαν πρός αὐτόν, βουλόμενος οἷον έφεδρείαν απολιπειν έν τη πόλει τοῦτον, ὅτ' αὐτὸν 3 εξιέναι δέοι μετά των δυνάμεων επί τας πράξεις. γήμας δε την θυγατέρα τοῦ προειρημένου, καὶ συνθεωρών τους άρχαίους μισθοφόρους καγέκτας όντας καὶ κινητικούς, εξάγει στρατείαν ώς επὶ τοὺς 4 βαρβάρους τοὺς τὴν Μεσσήνην κατασχόντας. ἀντιστρατοπεδεύσας δε περί Κεντόριπα, και παραταξάμενος περί τὸν Κυαμόσωρον ποταμόν, τοὺς μὲν πολιτικούς ίππεις και πεζούς αὐτός εν αποστήματι συνείχεν, ώς κατ' άλλον τόπον τοίς πολεμίοις συμμίξων, τους δε ξένους προβαλόμενος είασε 5 πάντας ύπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων διαφθαρῆναι κατὰ δὲ τὸν τῆς ἐκείνων τροπῆς καιρὸν ἀσφαλῶς αὐτὸς α απεγώρησε μετά των πολιτων είς τὰς Συρακούσας. συντελεσάμενος δε το προκείμενον πραγματικώς, και παρηρηκώς παν το κινητικόν και στασιώδες της δυνάμεως, ξενολογήσας δι' αύτοῦ πληθος ίκανὸν μισθοφόρων, ἀσφαλῶς ήδη τὰ κατὰ τὴν τ ἀργὴν διεξηγε. θεωρών δὲ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκ τοῦ προτερήματος θρασέως καὶ προπετώς ἀναστρεφομένους, καθοπλίσας καὶ γυμνάσας ἐνεργῶς τὰς πολιτικάς δυνάμεις έξηγε, καὶ συμβάλλει τοῖς πολεμίοις εν τῷ Μυλαίῳ πεδίῳ περὶ τὸν Λογγανὸν 8 καλούμενον ποταμόν. τροπην δε ποιήσας αὐτῶν ισχυράν, και των ήγεμόνων έγκρατης γενόμενος 22

BOOK 1

9. For observing that the Syracusans, every time they dispatch their forces on an expedition accompanied by their supreme magistrates, begin quarrelling among themselves and introducing continual changes, and knowing that Leptines had a wider circle of dependents and enjoyed more credit than any other burgher and had an especially high name among the common people, he allied himself with him by marriage, so that whenever he had to take the field himself he might leave him behind as a sort of reserve force. He married, then, the daughter of this Leptines, and finding that the veteran mercenaries were disaffected and turbulent, he marched out in force professedly against the foreigners who had occupied Messene. He met the enemy near Centuripa and offered battle near the river Cyamosorus. He held back the citizen cavalry and infantry at a distance under his personal command as if he meant to attack on another side, but advancing the mercenaries he allowed them all to be cut up by the Campanians. During their rout he himself retired safely to Syracuse with the citizens. Having thus efficiently accomplished his purpose and purged the army of its turbulent and seditious element, he himself enlisted a considerable number of mercenaries and henceforth continued to rule in safety. Observing that the Mamertines, owing to their success, were behaving in a bold and reckless manner, he efficiently armed and trained the urban levies and leading them out engaged the enemy in the Mylaean plain near the river Longanus, and inflicted a severe defeat on 268 B.C.

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ζωγρία, τὴν μὲν τῶν βαρβάρων κατέπαυσε τόλμαν, αὐτὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας βασιλεύς ύπὸ πάντων προσηγορεύθη τῶν συμμάχων. Οί δὲ Μαμερτίνοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐστερημένοι της έπικουρίας της έκ τοῦ 'Ρηγίου, καθάπερ ἀνώ-τερον είπον, τότε δὲ τοῖς ιδίοις πράγμασιν έπταικότες όλοσχερως διά τάς νθν ρηθείσας αιτίας, οί μέν ἐπὶ Καρχηδονίους κατέφευγον, καὶ τούτοις έν-2 εχείριζον σφας αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἄκραν, οἱ δὲ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐπρέσβευον, παραδιδόντες τὴν πόλιν καὶ δεόμενοι βοηθήσειν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς δμοφύλοις ὑπάρ-8 χουσι. 'Ρωμαΐοι δέ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρησαν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν ἐξόφθαλμον είναι τὴν ἀλογίαν τῆς 4 βοηθείας. τὸ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον τοὺς ἰδίους πολίτας μετά της μεγίστης άνηρηκότας τιμωρίας, ότι ' Ρηγίνους παρεσπόνδησαν, παραχρημα Μαμερτίνοις βοηθείν ζητείν τοις τὰ παραπλήσια πεποιηκόσιν οὐ μόνον είς την Μεσσηνίων, άλλά και την 'Ρηγίνων 5 πόλιν, δυσαπολόγητον εξχε την άμαρτίαν. οὐ μην άγνοοῦντές γε τούτων οὐδέν, θεωροῦντες δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς 'Ιβηρίας ὑπήκοα πολλά μέρη πεποιημένους, έτι δε τῶν νήσων ἀπασῶν ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας των κατά το Σαρδόνιον και Τυρρηνικόν πέλαγος, β ήγωνίων, εί Σικελίας έτι κυριεύσαιεν, μη λίαν βαρείς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοίς ὑπάρχοιεν, κύκλω σφας περιέχοντες καὶ πασι τοῖς της Ἰταλίας μέρεσιν 7 επικείμενοι. διότι δε ταχέως ύφ' αύτους ποιήσονται τὴν Σικελίαν, μὴ τυχόντων ἐπικουρίας τῶν 8 Μαμερτίνων, προφανὲς ἢν. κρατήσαντες γὰρ ἐγχειριζομένης αὐτοῖς της Μεσσήνης έμελλον έν ολίγω χρόνω τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπανελέσθαι διὰ τὸ πάσης 24

them, capturing their leaders. This put an end to the audacity of the Mamertines, and on his return to Syracuse he was with one voice proclaimed king by all the allies.

10. The Mamertines had previously, as I above narrated, lost their support from Rhegium and had now suffered complete disaster at home for the reasons I have just stated. Some of them appealed to the Carthaginians, proposing to put themselves and the citadel into their hands, while others sent an embassy to Rome, offering to surrender the city and begging for assistance as a kindred people. The Romans were long at a loss, the succour demanded being so obviously unjustifiable. For they had just inflicted on their own fellowcitizens the highest penalty for their treachery to the people of Rhegium, and now to try to help the Mamertines, who had been guilty of like offence not only at Messene but at Rhegium also, was a piece of injustice very difficult to excuse. But fully aware as they were of this, they yet saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbours, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy. That they would soon be supreme in Sicily, if the Mamertines were not helped, was evident; for once Messene had fallen into their hands, they would shortly subdue Syracuse also, as they were

ο σχεδον δεσπόζειν της άλλης Σικελίας. δ προορώμενοι 'Ρωμαῖοι, καὶ νομίζοντες ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι σφίσι τὸ μή προέσθαι την Μεσσήνην, μηδ' έασαι Καρχηδο-νίους οίον εί γεφυρώσαι την είς 'Ιταλίαν αύτοις 11 διάβασιν, πολύν μέν χρόνον έβουλεύσαντο, καὶ τὸ μεν συνέδριον οὐδ' εἰς τέλος ἐκύρωσε τὴν γνώμην διὰ τὰς ἄρτι ῥηθείσας αἰτίας. ἐδόκει γὰρ τὰ περὶ την άλογίαν της τοις Μαμερτίνοις επικουρίας 2 ίσορροπείν τοις έκ της βοηθείας συμφέρουσιν. οί δὲ πολλοί, τετρυμένοι μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν προγεγονότων πολέμων και προσδεόμενοι παντοδαπης έπανορθώσεως, αμα δὲ τοῖς άρτι ἡηθεῖσι περὶ τοῦ κοινῆ συμφέρειν τὸν πόλεμον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστοις ώφελείας προδήλους και μεγάλας υποδεικνυόντων 3 τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἔκριναν βοηθεῖν. κυρωθέντος δὲ τοῦ δόγματος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, προχειρισάμενοι τὸν ἔτερον τῶν ὑπάτων στρατηγὸν "Αππιον Κλαύδιον έξαπέστειλαν, κελεύσαντες βοηθείν καὶ διαβαίνειν 4 εἰς Μεσσήνην. οἱ δὲ Μαμερτίνοι τὸν μὲν τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν, ἤδη κατέχοντα τὴν ἄκραν, ἐξέβαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληξάμενοι, τὰ δὲ παραλογισάμενοι τον δ' Αππιον έπεσπώντο, και τούτω 5 την πόλιν ενεχείριζον. Καρχηδόνιοι δε τον μεν στρατηγόν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίσαντες αὐτὸν άβούλως, αμα δ' ἀνάνδρως, προέσθαι την ἀκρόπολιν 6 αὐτοὶ δὲ τῆ μὲν ναυτικῆ δυνάμει περὶ Πελωριάδα στρατοπεδεύσαντες, τῷ δὲ πεζῷ στρατεύματι περὶ τάς Σύνεις καλουμένας, ένεργως προσέκειντο τή 7 Μεσσήνη. κατά δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ἱέρων, νομίσας εὐφυῶς ἔχειν τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὸ τοὺς βαρβάρους τους την Μεσσήνην κατέχοντας όλοσχερώς εκβαλείν εκ της Σικελίας, τίθεται πρός τούς 26

absolute lords of almost all the rest of Sicily. The Romans, foreseeing this and viewing it as a necessity for themselves not to abandon Messene and thus allow the Carthaginians as it were to build a bridge over to Italy, debated the matter for long, (11) and, even at the end, the Senate did not sanction the proposal for the reason given above, considering that the objection on the score of inconsistency was equal in weight to the advantage to be derived from intervention. The commons however, worn out as they were by the recent wars and in need of any and every kind of restorative, listened readily to the military commanders, who, besides giving the reasons above stated for the general advantageousness of the war, pointed out the great benefit in the wav of plunder which each and every one would evidently derive from it. They were therefore in favour of consenting: and when the measure had been passed by the people they appointed to the command one of the Consuls, Appius Claudius, who was ordered to 264 B.C. cross to Messene. The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgement and of courage in abandoning the citadel. Acting for themselves they stationed their fleet in the neighbourhood of Cape Pelorias, and with their land forces pressed Messene close in the direction of Hiero now, thinking that present circumstances were favourable for expelling from Sicily entirely the foreigners who occupied Messene, made

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Καρχηδονίους συνθήκας. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἀναζεύξας 8 ἐκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν ἐποιεῖτο τὴν πορείαν ἐπὶ τὴν προειρημένην πόλιν καταστρατοπεδεύσας δ' έκ θατέρου μέρους περί το Χαλκιδικον όρος καλούμενον ἀπέκλεισε καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐξόδου τοὺς ἐν τῆ πόλει. 9 ο δε στρατηγός των 'Ρωμαίων "Αππιος νυκτός καὶ παραβόλως περαιωθείς τὸν πορθμὸν ἡκεν εἰς τὴν 10 Μεσσήνην. ὁρῶν δὲ πανταχόθεν ἐνεργῶς προσηρεικότας τους πολεμίους, και συλλογισάμενος αμα μέν αισχράν, άμα δ' ἐπισφαλη γίνεσθαι την πολιορ-11 κίαν αὐτῷ, τῆς τε γῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπικρατούντων καὶ τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διεπρεσβεύετο πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, βουλόμενος ἐξελέσθαι 12 τοῦ πολέμου τοὺς Μαμερτίνους· οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ, τέλος ἐπαναγκαζόμενος ἔκρινε προσεχοντος αυτώ, τέλος επαναγκαζόμενος εκρινε 13 διακινδυνεύειν καὶ πρώτον έγχειρεῖν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. ἐξαγαγὼν δὲ τὴν δύναμιν παρέταξε πρὸς μάχην, ἐτοίμως εἰς τὸν ἀγῶνα συγκαταβάντος 14 αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦ τῶν Συρακοσίων βασιλέως· ἐπὶ πολὺν δὲ χρόνον διαγωνισάμενος ἐπεκράτησε τῶν πολεμίων, καὶ κατεδίωξε τοὺς ὑπεναντίους ἔως εἰς 15 τὸν χάρακα πάντας. ᾿Αππιος μὲν οὖν σκυλέσσας τους νεκρούς επανηλθε πάλιν είς την Μεσσήνην. ό δ' Ί έρων, όττευσάμενός τι περί τῶν όλων πραγμά-των, ἐπιγενομένης τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνεχώρησε κατὰ 12 σπουδήν εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας. τῆ δὲ κατὰ πόδας ήμέρα γνοὺς "Αππιος τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ γενόμενος εὐθαρσής, ἔκρινε μὴ μέλλειν, 2 άλλ' έγχειρεῖν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. παραγγείλας οῦν τοις στρατιώταις ἐν ὥρα γίνεσθαι τὴν θεραπείαν, 8 ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ τὴν ἔξοδον ἐποιείτο. συμβαλὼν δὲ τοις ὑπεναντίοις πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε,

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an alliance with the Carthaginians, and quitting Syracuse with his army marched towards that city. Pitching his camp near the Chalcidian mountain on the side opposite to the Carthaginians he cut off this means of exit from the city as well. Appius, the Roman consul, at the same time succeeded at great risk in crossing the Straits by night and entering the city. Finding that the enemy had strictly invested Messene on all sides and regarding it as both inglorious and perilous for himself to be besieged, as they commanded both land and sea, he at first tried to negotiate with both, desiring to deliver the Mamertines from the war. But when neither paid any attention to him, he decided perforce to risk an engagement and in the first place to attack the Syracusans. Leading out his forces he drew them up in order of battle, the king of Syracuse readily accepting the challenge. After a prolonged struggle Appius was victorious and drove the whole hostile force back to their camp. After despoiling the dead he returned to Hiero, divining the final issue of the whole conflict, retreated in haste after nightfall to Syracuse. 12. On the following day Appius, learning of his retirement and encouraged thereby, decided not to delay but to attack the Carthaginians. He ordered his troops to be in readiness early and sallied forth at break of day. Engaging the enemy he slew many of them and compelled the rest to

τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασε φυγεῖν προτροπάδην εἰς 4 τὰς παρακειμένας πόλεις. χρησάμενος δὲ τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι τούτοις καὶ λύσας τὴν πολιορκίαν, λοιπὸν ἐπιπορευόμενος ἀδεῶς ἐπόρθει τήν τε τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ τὴν τῶν συμμαχούντων αὐτοῖς χώραν, οὐδενὸς ἀντιποιουμένου τῶν ὑπαίθρων· τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον προσκαθίσας αὐτὰς ἐπεβάλετο πολιορκεῖν τὰς Συρακούσας.

έξης, εάν που προσανατρέχωμεν τοις χρόνοις περί επίν επιφανεστάτων πολιτευμάτων. τοῦτο γὰρ ποιήσομεν χάριν τοῦ λαμβάνειν ἀρχὰς τοιαύτας, εξ ὧν ἔσται σαφῶς κατανοεῖν ἐκ τίνων ἔκαστοι καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς ὁρμηθέντες εἰς ταύτας παρεγένοντο τὰς διαθέσεις, ἐν αἶς ὑπάρχουσι νῦν. ὁ δὴ καὶ περὶ

'Ρωμαίων άρτι πεποιήκαμεν.

13 'Αφεμένους δὲ τούτων λέγειν ὥρα περὶ τῶν προκειμένων, ἐπὶ βραχὺ καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς προεκ-2 θεμένους τὰς ἐν τῆ προκατασκευῆ πράξεις. ὧν εἰσι
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retreat in disorder to the neighbouring cities. Having raised the siege by these successes, he advanced fearlessly, devastating the territory of the Syracusans and of their allies, no one disputing the open country with him. Finally he sat down before

Syracuse and commenced to besiege it.

Such then was the occasion and motive of this the first crossing of the Romans from Italy with an armed force, an event which I take to be the most natural starting-point of this whole work. I have therefore made it my serious base, but went also somewhat further back in order to leave no possible obscurity in my statements of general causes. To follow out this previous history-how and when the Romans after the disaster to Rome itself began their progress to better fortunes, and again how and when after conquering Italy they entered on the path of foreign enterprise—seems to me necessary for anyone who hopes to gain a proper general survey of their present supremacy. readers need not therefore be surprised if, in the further course of this work, I occasionally give them in addition some of the earlier history of the most famous states: for I shall do so in order to establish such a fundamental view as will make it clear in the sequel starting from what origins and how and when they severally reached their present position. This is exactly what I have just done about the Romans.

13. Enough of such explanations. It is now time to come to my subject after a brief summary of the events included in these introductory Books. To

πρώται κατά την τάξιν αί γενόμεναι 'Ρωμαίοις καί 3 Καρχηδονίοις έν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμω. ταύταις συνεχής ο Λιβυκός πόλεμος ω συνάπτει τὰ κατ' 'Ιβηρίαν 'Αμίλκα, μετά δὲ τοῦτον 'Ασδρούβα 4 πραχθέντα καὶ Καρχηδονίοις. οίς εγένετο κατά τον αὐτὸν καιρὸν ἡ πρώτη 'Ρωμαίων διάβασις εἰς τὴν 'Ιλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἐπὶ δὲ τοις προειρημένοις οι πρός τους έν Ίταλία Κελτους 5 άγωνες. τούτοις δε κατά τον αὐτον καιρον παρά τοις Ελλησιν ο Κλεομενικός καλούμενος ένηργείτο πόλεμος, είς δυ καὶ τὴν καταστροφὴν ἐποιησάμεθα της όλης κατασκευης και της δευτέρας βύβλου. 6 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι τὰ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ τῶν προειρημένων πράξεων οὐδὲν οὕθὶ ἡμῖν ἀναγ-7 καΐον ούτε τοῖς ἀκούουσι χρήσιμον. οὐ γὰρ ίστορεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν προτιθέμεθα, μνησθῆναι δὲ κεφαλαιωδώς προαιρούμεθα χάριν της προκατασκευης των μελλουσων υφ' ήμων ίστορεισθαι πράξεων. 8 διόπερ επὶ κεφαλαίων ψαύοντες κατά τὸ συνεχες των προειρημένων πειρασόμεθα συνάψαι την τελευτήν τῆς προκατασκευῆς τῆ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας 9 ἀρχῆ καὶ προθέσει. τοῦτον γὰρ τὸν τρόπον συνεχοῦς γινομένης τῆς διηγήσεως, ἡμεῖς τε δόξομεν εὐλόγως ἐφάπτεσθαι τῶν ήδη προϊστορημένων ἐτέροις, τοῖς τε φιλομαθοῦσιν ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης οἰκονομίας εὐμαθῆ καὶ ῥαδίαν ἐπὶ τὰ μέλλοντα ῥηθή-10 σεσθαι παρασκευάσομεν την έφοδον. βραχὺ δ' ἐπιμελέστερον πειρασόμεθα διελθεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ πρώτου συστάντος πολέμου 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις 11 περὶ Σικελίας. οὖτε γὰρ πολυχρονιώτερον τούτου πόλεμον εύρειν ράδιον ούτε παρασκευας όλοσχερε-

take them in order we have first the incidents of the war between Rome and Carthage for Sicily. Next follows the war in Libya and next the achievements of the Carthaginians in Spain under Hamilcar and afterwards under Hasdrubal. At the same time occurred the first crossing of the Romans to Illyria and these parts of Europe, and subsequently to the preceding events their struggle with the Italian Celts. Contemporary with this the so-called Cleomenic war was proceeding in Greece, and with this war I wind up my Introduction as a whole and my second Book.

Now to recount all these events in detail is neither incumbent on me nor would it be useful to my readers; for it is not my purpose to write their history but to mention them summarily as introductory to the events which are my real theme. therefore attempt by such summary treatment of them in their proper order to fit in the end of the Introduction to the beginning of the actual History. Thus there will be no break in the narrative and it will be seen that I have been justified in touching on events which have been previously narrated by others, while this arrangement will render the approach to what follows intelligible and easy for students. I shall, however, attempt to narrate somewhat more carefully the first war between Rome and Carthage for the possession of Sicily; since it is not easy to name any war which lasted longer, nor one which exhibited on both sides more extensive preparations,

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στέρας οὖτε συνεχεστέρας πράξεις οὖτε πλείους άγωνας ούτε περιπετείας μείζους των έν τω προειρη-12 μένω πολέμω συμβάντων έκατέροις. αὐτά τε τὰ πολιτεύματα κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἀκμὴν ἀκέραια μὲν ἦν τοῖς ἐθισμοῖς, μέτρια δὲ ταῖς τύχαις, 18 πάρισα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι. διὸ καὶ τοῖς βουλομένοις καλώς συνθεάσασθαι την έκατέρου τοῦ πολιτεύματος ίδιότητα καὶ δύναμιν ούχ ούτως ἐκ τῶν ἐπιγενομένων πολέμων ώς έκ τούτου ποιητέον την σύγκρισιν. 14 Οὐχ ἦττον δὲ τῶν προειρημένων παρωξύνθην ἐπιστῆσαι τούτῳ τῷ πολέμω καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἐμπειρότατα δοκοῦντας γράφειν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Φιλῖνον καὶ Φάβιον, μη δεόντως ήμιν απηγγελκέναι την αλή-2 θειαν. έκόντας μεν οὖν εψεῦσθαι τοὺς ἄνδρας οὖχ ύπολαμβάνω, στοχαζόμενος έκ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς αίρέσεως αὐτῶν · δοκοῦσι δέ μοι πεπονθέναι τι παρα-3 πλήσιον τοῖς ἐρῶσι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην εὔνοιαν Φιλίνω μὲν πάντα δοκοῦσιν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι πεπραχθαί φρονίμως, καλώς, ανδρωδώς, οί δε 'Ρωμαιοι τάναντία, Φαβίω δε τουμπαλιν τού-4 των. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ λοίπῷ βίῷ τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπι-είκειαν ἴσως οὐκ ἄν τις ἐκβάλλοι· καὶ γὰρ φιλόφιλον είναι δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόπατριν καὶ συμμισείν τοίς φίλοις τούς έχθρούς και συναγαπάν 5 τους φίλους· όταν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ήθος ἀναλαμβάνη τις, ἐπιλαθέσθαι χρή πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν εὐλογεῖν καὶ κοσμεῖν τοῖς μεγίστοις ἐπαίνοις τοὺς ἐχθρούς, ὅταν αἱ πράξεις ἀπαιτῶσι τοῦτο, πολλάκις δ' ἐλέγχειν καὶ ψέγειν ἐπονειδίστως τους αναγκαιοτάτους, όταν αι των έπιτη-6 δευμάτων άμαρτίαι τοῦθ' ὑποδεικνύωσιν. ὥσπέρ γαρ ζώου των όψεων αφαιρεθεισων αγρειούται το 34

more unintermittent activity, more battles, and greater changes of fortune. The two states were also at this period still uncorrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength, so that a better estimate of the peculiar qualities and gifts of each can be formed by comparing their conduct in this war than in any subsequent one.

14. An equally powerful motive with me for paving particular attention to this war is that the truth has not been adequately stated by those historians who are reputed to be the best authorities on it, Philinus and Fabius. I do not indeed accuse them of intentional falsehood. in view of their character and principles, but they seem to me to have been much in the case of lovers; for owing to his convictions and constant partiality Philinus will have it that the Carthaginians in every case acted wisely, well, and bravely, and the Romans otherwise, whilst Fabius takes the precisely opposite view. In other relations of life we should not perhaps exclude all such favouritism; for a good man should love his friends and his country, he should share the hatreds and attachments of his friends; but he who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort, and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him. For just as a living creature which has lost its

όλον, οὖτως ἐξ ἱστορίας ἀναιρεθείσης τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀνωφελὲς γίνεται δι
η ήγημα. διόπερ οὖτε τῶν φίλων κατηγορεῖν οὖτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐπαινεῖν ὀκνητέον, οὖτε δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ψέγειν, ποτὲ δ' ἐγκωμιάζειν εὐλαβητέον, ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἐν πράγμασιν ἀναστρεφομένους οὖτ' εὐστοχεῖν αἰεὶ 8 δυνατὸν οὖθ' ἁμαρτάνειν συνεχῶς εἰκός. ἀποστάντας οὖν τῶν πραττόντων αὐτοῖς τοῖς πραττομένοις ἐφαρμοστέον τὰς πρεπούσας ἀποφάσεις καὶ διαλήψεις ἐν

9 τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν. 15 'Ως δ' ἔστιν ἀληθη τὰ νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένα σκοπεῖν ἐκ τούτων πάρεστιν. ὁ γὰρ Φιλῖνος ἀρχόμενος ἄμα τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τῆς δευτέρας βύβλου φησὶ προσκαθησθαι τῆ Μεσσήνη πολεμοῦν-2 τας τούς τε Καρχηδονίους καὶ τοὺς Συρακοσίους, παραγενομένους δὲ τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους κατὰ θάλατταν είς την πόλιν ευθύς έξελθειν έπι τους Συρακοσίους. λαβόντας δὲ πολλὰς πληγὰς ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην αὖθις δ' ἐπὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους έκπορευθέντας ου μόνον πληγάς λαβεῖν, άλλά καί ζωγρία των στρατιωτών ίκανους αποβαλείν. ταθτα 3 δ' εἰπὼν τὸν μὲν Ἱέρωνά φησι μετὰ τὴν γενομένην συμπλοκὴν οὕτως ἔξω γενέσθαι τοῦ φρονεῖν ὧστε μή μόνον παραχρημα τον χάρακα καί τὰς σκηνάς έμπρήσαντα φυγεῖν νυκτὸς εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φρούρια πάντα καταλιπεῖν τὰ κείμενα κατά της των Μεσσηνίων χώρας δμοίως δέ καί ατούς Καρχηδονίους μετὰ τὴν μάχην εὐθέως ἐκλιπόντας τὸν χάρακα διελεῖν σφᾶς εἰς τὰς πόλεις, τῶν δ' ὑπαίθρων οὐδ' ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τολμᾶν ἔτι· διὸ καὶ συνθεωρήσαντας τοὺς ἡγουμένους αὐτῶν ἀπο-δεδειλιακότας τοὺς ὄχλους βουλεύσασθαι μὴ κρίνειν 36

eyesight is wholly incapacitated, so if History is stripped of her truth all that is left is but an idle tale. We should therefore not shrink from accusing our friends or praising our enemies; nor need we be shy of sometimes praising and sometimes blaming the same people, since it is neither possible that men in the actual business of life should always be in the right, nor is it probable that they should be always mistaken. We must therefore disregard the actors in our narrative and apply to the actions such terms and such criticism as they deserve.

15. The truth of what I have just said is evident from what follows. Philinus, in commencing his narrative at the outset of his second Book, tells us that the Carthaginians and Syracusans were besieging Messene, that the Romans reaching the city by sea, at once marched out against the Syracusans, but after being severely handled returned to Messene. They next sallied out against the Carthaginians and were not only worsted but lost a considerable number of prisoners. After making these statements he says that Hiero after the engagement so far lost his wits as not only to burn his camp and tents and take flight to Syracuse the same night, but to withdraw all his garrisons from the forts which menaced the territory of Messene. Carthaginians, likewise, he tells us, after the battle at once quitted their camp and distributed themselves among the towns, not even daring to dispute the open country further: their leaders, he says, seeing how dispirited the ranks were, resolved not to risk a

5 διὰ μάχης τὰ πράγματα· τοὺς δὲ 'Ρωμαίους έπομένους αὐτοῖς οὐ μόνον τὴν χώραν πορθεῖν των Καρχηδονίων καὶ Συρακοσίων, άλλὰ καὶ τὰς Συρακούσας αὐτὰς προσκαθίσαντας ἐπιβαλέσθαι 6 πολιορκείν. ταθτα δ', ώς έμοὶ δοκεί, τής πάσης έστιν άλογίας πλήρη, και διαστολής οὐ προσδειται 7 τὸ παράπαν. οθς μέν γὰρ πολιορκοθντας τὴν Μεσσήνην καὶ νικώντας έν ταις συμπλοκαις ύπέθετο. τούτους φεύγοντας καὶ τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἐκχωροῦντας καὶ τέλος πολιορκουμένους καὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἀποδε-8 δειλιακότας ἀπέφηνεν ους δ' ήττωμένους και πολιορκουμένους ύπεστήσατο, τούτους διώκοντας καί παραχρήμα κρατούντας των ύπαίθρων καὶ τέλος 9 πολιορκοῦντας τὰς Συρακούσας ἀπέδειξε. ταῦτα δὲ συνάδειν άλλήλοις οὐδαμῶς δύναται πῶς γάρ; άλλ' άναγκαῖον η τὰς ὑποθέσεις είναι τὰς πρώτας ψευδεις ή τὰς ὑπὲρ τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀποφάσεις. 10 είσι δ' αθται μεν άληθεις και γαρ εξεχώρησαν οί Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ Συρακόσιοι τῶν ὑπαίθρων, καὶ τὰς Συρακούσας ἐπολιόρκουν οἱ 'Ρωμαῖοι κατὰ πόδας, ώς δ' οδτός φησι, καὶ τὴν Ἐχέτλαν, ἐν μέση κειμένην τῆ τῶν Συρακοσίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων 11 έπαρχία. λοιπον ἀνάγκη συγχωρεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις εἶναι ψευδεῖς, καὶ νικώντων εὐθέως των 'Ρωμαίων έν ταίς περί την Μεσσήνην συμπλοκαις ήττημένους αὐτοὺς ἡμιν ὑπὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως

ἀπηγγέλθαι.
12 Φιλίνον μεν οὖν παρ' ὅλην ἄν τις τὴν πραγματείαν εὕροι τοιοῦτον ὅντα, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ Φάβιον, ὡς ἐπ' αὐτῶν δειχθήσεται τῶν καιρῶν.
13 ἡμεῖς δ' ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας πεποιήμεθα λόγους

13 ήμεις δ΄ ἐπειδὴ τοὺς ἁρμόζοντας πεποιήμεθα λόγους ὑπὲρ τῆς παρεκβάσεως, ἐπανελθόντες ἐπὶ τὰς πρά-38

decisive engagement, and the Romans following up the enemy not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but sat down before Syracuse and undertook its siege. This account is. it seems to me, full of inconsistencies and does not require a lengthy discussion. For those whom he introduced as besieging Messene and victorious in the engagements, he now represents as in flight and abandoning the open country and finally besieged and dispirited, while whose who were defeated and besieged are now stated to be in pursuit of their foes, and at once commanding the open country and finally besieging Syracuse. It is absolutely impossible to reconcile the two assertions, and either his initial statements or his account of what followed must be false. But the latter is true: for as a fact the Carthaginians and Syracusans abandoned the open country, and the Romans at once began to lay siege to Syracuse and, as he says, even to Echetla too, which lies between the Syracusan and Carthaginian provinces. We must therefore concede that Philinus's initial statements are false, and that, while the Romans were victorious in the engagements before Messene, this author announces that they were worsted.

We can trace indeed the same fault throughout the whole work of Philinus and alike through that of Fabius, as I shall show when occasion arises. Now that I have said what is fitting on the subject of this digression, I will return to facts and attempt in a

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ξεις πειρασόμεθα προστιθέντες αξί τον έξης λόγον είς αληθινάς έννοίας αγειν δια βραχέων τους έντυγχάνοντας υπέρ του προειρημένου πολέμου.

τυγχάνοντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου.

16 Προσπεσόντων γὰρ εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην ἐκ τῆς Σικελίας τῶν περὶ τὸν "Αππιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα προτερημάτων, καταστήσαντες ύπάτους Μάνιον 'Οτακίλιον και Μάνιον Οὐαλέριον τάς τε δυνάμεις άπάσας έξαπέστελλον καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀμφοτέ-2 ρους είς τὴν Σικελίαν. ἔστι δὲ παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις τὰ πάντα τέτταρα στρατόπεδα 'Ρωμαϊκά χωρίς τῶν συμμάχων, ἃ κατ' ένιαυτὸν προχειρίζονται τούτων εκαστον ανά τετρακισχιλίους πεζούς, ίππεις δέ 3 τριακοσίους. ὧν παραγενομένων ἀπό τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων αι πλείους άφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσ-4 ετίθεντο τοις 'Ρωμαίοις από τε των Συρακοσίων. ό δ' Ίέρων θεωρών την διατροπήν και κατάπληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἄμα δὲ τὸ πληθος καὶ τὸ βάρος των 'Ρωμαϊκών στρατοπέδων, έκ πάντων συνέλονίζετο τούτων επικυδεστέρας είναι τας των 'Ρωμαίων 5 η τας των Καρχηδονίων έλπίδας. διόπερ έπι τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δρμήσας τοῖς λογισμοῖς διεπέμπετο πρὸς τούς στρατηγούς, ύπερ είρήνης και φιλίας ποιού-6 μενος τους λόγους. οι δε 'Ρωμαιοι προσεδέξαντο, 7 καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς χορηγίας· θαλαττοκρατούντων γαρ των Καρχηδονίων εὐλαβοῦντο μὴ πανταχόθεν άποκλεισθώσι των άναγκαίων, διά τὸ καὶ περὶ τὰ πρό τοῦ διαβάντα στρατόπεδα πολλην ένδειαν γε-8 γονέναι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. διόπερ ὑπολαβόντες τὸν Ιέρωνα μεγάλην είς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος αὐτοῖς παρ-9 έξεσθαι χρείαν ἀσμένως προσεδέξαντο την φιλίαν. ποιησάμενοι δε συνθήκας εφ' ῷ τὰ μεν αἰχμάλωτα χωρὶς λύτρων ἀποδοῦναι τὸν βασιλέα 'Ρωμαίοις, 40

narrative that strictly follows the order of events to guide my readers by a short road to a true notion of this war.

16. When news of the successes of Appius and 268 B.C. his legions reached Rome, they elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and dispatched their whole armed force and both commanders to Sicily. The Romans have four legions of Roman citizens in all apart from the allies. These they enrol annually, each legion comprising four thousand foot and three hundred horse. On their arrival in Sicily most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans. Hiero, observing both the confusion and consternation of the Sicilians, and at the same time the numbers and powerful nature of the Roman forces, reached from all this the conclusion that the prospects of the Romans were more brilliant than those of the Carthaginians. His conviction therefore impelling him to side with the Romans, he sent several messages to the Consuls with proposals for peace and alliance. The Romans accepted his overtures, especially for the sake of their supplies; for since the Carthaginians commanded the sea they were apprehensive lest they should be cut off on all sides from the necessities of life, in view of the fact that the armies which had previously crossed to Sicily had run very short of provisions. Therefore, supposing that Hiero would be of great service to them in this respect, they readily accepted his friendly advances. Having made a treaty by which the king bound himself to give up his prisoners to the Romans without ransom, and in addition to this

άργυρίου δὲ προσθεῖναι τάλαντα τούτοις έκατόν, λοιπὸν ήδη 'Ρωμαῖοι μὲν ὡς φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις 10 ἐχρῶντο τοῖς Συρακοσίοις. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς 'Ιέρων ὑποστείλας ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ τὴν 'Ρωμαίων σκέπην, καὶ χορηγῶν ἀεὶ τούτοις εἰς τὰ κατεπείγοντα τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀδεῶς ἐβασίλευε τῶν Συρακοσίων τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον, φιλοστεφανῶν καὶ φιλοδοξῶν 11 εἰς τοὺς 'Ελληνας. ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ δὴ πάντων

1 εἰς τοὺς ελληνας. ἐπιφανέστατος γὰρ δὴ πάντων οὖτος δοκεῖ καὶ πλεῖστον χρόνον ἀπολελαυκέναι τῆς ἰδίας εὐβουλίας ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς

καθόλου πράγμασιν.

17 Ἐπανενεχθεισῶν δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην, καὶ προσδεξαμένου τοῦ δήμου καὶ κυρώσαντος τὰς πρὸς Ἱέρωνα διαλύσεις, λοιπὸν οὐκέτι πάσας ἔκρινον ἐξαποστέλλειν οἱ 'Ρωμαῖοι τὰς δυνάσεις)

2 μεις, άλλὰ δύο μόνον στρατόπεδα, νομίζοντες ἄμα μὲν κεκουφίσθαι τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς προσκεχωρηκότος τοῦ βασιλέως, ἄμα δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπολαμβάνοντες

- 8 ούτως εὐπορήσειν τὰς δύναμεις τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες τὸν μὲν Ἱέρωνα πολέμιον αὐτοῖς γεγονότα, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους όλοσχερέστερον ἐμπλεκομένους εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν, ὑπέλαβον βαρυτέρας προσδεῖσθαι παρασκευῆς, δι ἡς ἀντοφθαλμεῖν δυνήσονται τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ 4 συνέχειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. διὸ καὶ ξενολογή-
- σαντες έκ της άντιπέρας χώρας πολλούς μεν Λιγυστίνους και Κελτούς, έτι δε πλείους τούτων δ' Ιβηρας, άπαντας είς την Σικελίαν άπέστειλαν.
- 5 Ίβηρας, ἄπαντας είς τὴν Σικελίαν άπέστειλαν.
 δρῶντες δὲ τὴν τῶν ᾿Ακραγαντίνων πόλιν εὐφυεστάτην οῦσαν πρὸς τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ βαρυτάτην
 ἄμα τῆς αὐτῶν ἐπαρχίας, εἰς ταύτην συνήθροισαν
 τά τε χορήγια καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, δρμητηρίω
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to pay them a hundred talents, the Romans henceforth treated the Syracusans as allies and friends. King Hiero having placed himself under the protection of the Romans, continued to furnish them with the resources of which they stood in urgent need, and ruled over Syracuse henceforth in security, treating the Greeks in such a way as to win from them crowns and other honours. We may, indeed, regard him as the most illustrious of princes and the one who reaped longest the fruits of his own wisdom

in particular cases and in general policy.

17. When the terms of the treaty were referred to Rome, and when the people had accepted and ratified this agreement with Hiero, the Romans decided not to continue to employ all their forces in the expedition, but only two legions, thinking on the one hand that, now the king had joined them, the war had become a lighter task and calculating that their forces would thus be better off for supplies. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, when they saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were becoming more deeply involved in the enterprise in Sicily, considered that they themselves required stronger forces in order to be able to confront their enemies and control Sicilian affairs. They therefore enlisted foreign mercenaries from the opposite coasts, many of them Ligurians, Celts, and still more Iberians, and dispatched them all to Sicily. Perceiving that the city of Agrigentum had the greatest natural advantages for making their preparations, it being also the most important city in their province, they collected their troops and

6 κρίνοντες χρησθαι ταύτη τη πόλει πρός τὸν

πόλεμον.

Τῶν δὲ 'Ρωμαίων οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὸν 'Ιέρωνα ποιησάμενοι στρατηγοί τὰς συνθήκας ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν οί . δὲ μετὰ τούτους κατασταθέντες Λεύκιος Ποστούμιος καὶ Κόιντος Μαμίλιος ήκον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν μετά

- 7 των στρατοπέδων. θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν των Καρχηδονίων ἐπιβολὴν καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν ᾿Ακράγαντα παρασκευάς έγνωσαν τολμηρότερον έγχειρείν τοίς πράγ-
- 8 μασι· διὸ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μέρη τοῦ πολέμου παρηκαν, φέροντες δε παντί τῷ στρατεύματι προς αὐτὸν 'Ακράγαντα προσήρεισαν' καὶ στρατοπεδεύσαντες εν οκτώ σταδίοις από της πόλεως συνέκλει-9 σαν έντος τειχών τους Καρχηδονίους. άκμαζούσης
- δέ της του σίτου συναγωγής, και προφαινομένης γρονίου πολιορκίας, ώρμησαν εκθυμότερον τοῦ
- 10 δέοντος οί στρατιώται πρός το σιτολογείν. οί δέ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τους πολεμίους έσκεδασμένους κατά της χώρας, έξελθόντες έπέθεντο τοις σιτολογοῦσι. τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ραδίως οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ την του χάρακος άρπαγην ώρμησαν, οί δ' έπι τας
- 11 έφεδρείας. άλλ' ή των έθισμων διαφορά καὶ τότε καὶ πολλάκις ήδη σέσωκε τὰ 'Ρωμαίων πράγματα. τὸ γὰρ πρόστιμον παρ' αὐτοῖς θάνατός ἐστι τῷ προ-εμένῳ τὸν τόπον καὶ φυγόντι τὸ παράπαν ἐξ ἐφ-
- 12 εδρείας. διὸ καὶ τότε πολλαπλασίους όντας τοὺς ύπεναντίους ύποστάντες γενναίως πολλούς μέν τῶν ιδίων ἀπέβαλον, ἔτι δὲ πλείους τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀπ-
- 13 έκτειναν. τέλος δὲ κυκλώσαντες τοὺς πολεμίους οσον ούπω διασπώντας τον χάρακα, τους μέν αὐτῶν διέφθειραν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἐπικείμενοι καὶ φονεύοντες συνεδίωξαν είς την πόλιν.

supplies there and decided to use it as a base in the war.

Meanwhile the Roman Consuls who had made 262 B.C. the treaty with Hiero had left, and their successors. Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, had arrived in Sicily with their legions. On taking note of the plan of the Carthaginians, and their activity at Agrigentum, they decided on a bolder initiative. Abandoning therefore other operations they brought all their forces to bear on Agrigentum itself, and encamping at a distance of eight stades from the city, shut the Carthaginians up within the walls. was the height of the harvest, and as a long siege was anticipated, the soldiers began gathering corn with more venturesomeness than was advisable. The Carthaginians, observing that the enemy were dispersed about the country, made a sortie and attacked the foragers. Having easily put these to flight, some of them pressed on to plunder the fortified camp while others advanced on the covering force. But on this occasion and often on previous ones it is the excellence of their institutions which has saved the situation for the Romans: for with them death is the penalty incurred by a man who deserts the post or takes flight in any way from such a supporting force. Therefore on this occasion as on others they gallantly faced opponents who largely outnumbered them, and, though they suffered heavy loss, killed still more of the enemy. Finally surrounding them as they were on the point of tearing up the palisade, they dispatched some on the spot and pressing hard on the rest pursued them with slaughter to the city.

18 Μετά δε ταῦτα συνέβη τοὺς μεν Καρχηδονίους εὐλαβέστερον διακεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθέσεις, τοὺς δε 'Ρωμαίους φυλακτικώτερον χρησθαι ταις προ-2 νομαις. επείδ' οὐκ ἀντεξήεσαν οι Καρχηδόνιοι πλην έως ακροβολισμοῦ, διελόντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Ῥωμαίων είς δύο μέρη την δύναμιν τῷ μεν ένὶ περὶ τὸ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως 'Ασκληπιεῖον ἔμενον, θατέρῳ δὲ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς 'Ηράκλειαν κεκλι-3 μένοις μέρεσι τῆς πόλεως. τὰ δὲ μεταξύ τῶν στρατοπέδων έξ έκατέρου τοῦ μέρους τῆς πόλεως ώχυρώσαντο, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐντὸς αὐτῶν τάφρον προυβάλοντο χάριν της πρός τους έξιόντας έκ της πόλεως ἀσφαλείας, την δ' ἐκτὸς αὐτῶν περιεβάλοντο, φυλακήν ποιούμενοι των έξωθεν επιθέσεων καὶ τῶν παρεισάγεσθαι καὶ παρεισπίπτειν εἰωθότων 4 είς τὰς πολιορκουμένας πόλεις. τὰ δὲ μεταξύ τῶν τάφρων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων διαστήματα φυλακαῖς διέλαβον, οχυροποιησάμενοι τους ευκαίρους των κ τόπων εν διαστάσει. τὰ δὲ χορήγια καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευήν οί μεν άλλοι σύμμαχοι πάντες ήθροιζον αὐτοις καί παρηγον είς Ερβησόν, αὐτοι δ' έκ ταύτης της πόλεως ου μακράν υπαρχούσης άγοντες καὶ φέροντες συνεχώς τὰς ἀγορὰς δαψιλη τάναγκαῖα β σφίσι παρεσκεύαζον. πέντε μέν οῦν ἴσως μῆνας ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν διέμενον, οὐδὲν όλοσχερὲς προτέρημα δυνάμενοι λαβείν κατ' άλλήλων πλην τών έν αὐ-7 τοις τοις ακροβολισμοις συμβαινόντων. συναγομένων δὲ τῷ λιμῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων διὰ τὸ πληθος των έν τη πόλει συγκεκλεισμένων ανδρών, οὐ γάρ έλάττους πέντε μυριάδων ύπηρχον, δυσχρηστούμενος 'Αννίβας ήδη τοις πράγμασιν, ό τεταγμένος έπὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων δυνάμεων, διεπέμπετο συν-46

18. After this the Carthaginians were more inclined to be cautious in taking the offensive, while the Romans were more on their guard in foraging. As the Carthaginians did not advance beyond skirmishing range, the Roman generals divided their force into two bodies, remaining with one near the temple of Asclepius outside the walls and encamping with the other on that side of the city that is turned towards They fortified the ground between their Heraclea. camps on each side of the city, protecting themselves by the inner trench from sallies from within and encircling themselves with an outer one to guard against attacks from outside, and to prevent that secret introduction of supplies and men which is usual in the case of beleaguered cities. On the spaces between the trenches and their camps they placed pickets, fortifying suitable places at some distance from each other. Their supplies and other material were collected for them by all the other members of the alliance, and brought to Herbesus, and they themselves constantly fetching in live stock and provisions from this city which was at no great distance, kept themselves abundantly supplied with what they required. So for five months or so matters were at a standstill, neither side being able to score any decisive advantage, nothing in fact beyond incidental success in their exchange of shots; but when the Carthaginians began to be pressed by famine owing to the number of people cooped up in the city-fifty thousand at least in number-Hannibal, the commander of the besieged forces, found himself in a difficult situation and sent

εγώς είς την Καρχηδόνα τήν τε περίστασιν δια-8 σαφών καὶ βοηθεῖν παρακαλών. οἱ δ' ἐν τῆ Καρχηδόνι τῶν ἐπισυνηγμένων στρατιωτῶν καὶ θηρίων γεμίσαντες τὰς ναθς έξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν ο πρός "Αννωνα τον έτερον στρατηγόν. δε συναγαγων τὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ δυνάμεις εἰς Ἡράκλειαν, πρώτον μέν πραξικοπήσας κατέσχε την τών Έρβησέων πόλιν, καὶ παρείλετο τὰς ἀγορὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν άναγκαίων χορηγίαν τοῖς τῶν ὑπεναντίων στρατο-10 πέδοις. έξ οδ συνέβη τους 'Ρωμαίους έπ' ἴσου πολιορκεῖν καὶ πολιορκεῖσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν. εἰς γὰρ τοθτο συνήγοντο τῆ σιτοδεία καὶ σπάνει τῶν ἀνανκαίων ώστε πολλάκις βουλεύεσθαι περί τοῦ λύειν 11 τὴν πολιορκίαν. ὁ δὴ καὶ τέλος ἂν ἐποίησαν, εἰ μή πασαν σπουδήν καὶ μηχανήν προσφερόμενος 'Ιέρων τὰ μέτρια καὶ τάναγκαῖα σφίσι παρεσκεύαζε 19 των χορηγίων. μετά δὲ ταῦτα θεωρων ὁ προειρη-μένος ἀνὴρ τοὺς μὲν 'Ρωμαίους ὑπό τε τῆς νόσου καὶ τῆς ἐνδείας ἀσθενῶς διακειμένους διὰ τὸ λοιμικήν είναι παρ' αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν, τὰ δὲ σφέτερα στρατόπεδα νομίζων άξιόχρεα πρὸς μάχην ὑπάρχειν, 2 αναλαβών τα τε θηρία περί πεντήκοντα τον αριθμον όντα και την λοιπην δύναμιν απασαν προηνε κατὰ σπουδήν ἐκ τῆς Ἡρακλείας, παραγγείλας τοῖς Νομαδικοις ίππεθσι προπορεύεσθαι, και συνεγγίσασι τω χάρακι των εναντίων ερεθίζειν και πειράσθαι τους ίππεις αυτών εκκαλεισθαι, κάπειτα πάλιν εκκλίνασιν άποχωρείν, έως αν αὐτῷ συμμίξωσι. 3 πραξάντων δε το συνταχθέν των Νομάδων καὶ προσμιξάντων θατέρω των στρατοπέδων, εὐθὺς οί τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἱππεῖς ἐξεχέοντο καὶ θρασέως ἐπ-4 έκειντο τοῖς Νομάσιν. οἱ δὲ Λίβυες ὑπεχώρουν 48

constant messages to Carthage explaining his position and begging for reinforcements. The Carthaginian government shipped the troops they had collected and their elephants and sent them to Sicily to Hanno their other general. Hanno concentrated his troops and material of war at Heraclea and in the first place surprised and occupied Herbesus, cutting off the enemy's camps from their provisions and necessary supplies. The result of this was that the Romans were as a fact both besieged and besiegers at the same time; for they were so hard pressed by want of food and scarcity of the necessities of life, that they often contemplated raising the siege, and would in the end have done so, had not Hiero, by using every effort and every device, provided them with a moderate amount of strictly necessary supplies. 19. In the next place Hanno, perceiving that the Romans were weakened by disease and privation, owing to an epidemic having broken out among them, and thinking that his own troops were in fit fighting condition, took with him all his elephants, about fifty in number, and all the rest of his force, and advanced rapidly from Heraclea. He had ordered the Numidian horse to precede him. and approaching the enemy's fortified camp to provoke him and attempt to draw his cavalry out, after which they were to give way and retire until they rejoined himself. The Numidians acting on these orders advanced up to one of the camps, and the Roman cavalry at once issued forth and boldly attacked them. The Africans retreated as they had been

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κατά τὸ παράγγελμα, μέχρι συνέμιξαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν "Αννωνα λοιπόν τ' έκ μεταβολής περιχυθέντες έπέκειντο τοις πολεμίοις, και πολλούς μέν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἔως εἰς τὸν χάρακα 5 συνεδίωξαν. γενομένων δε τούτων επεστρατοπέδευσαν οί περὶ τὸν "Αννωνα τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις, καταλαβόμενοι τὸν λόφον τὸν καλούμενον Τόρον, ώς δέκα 6 σταδίους απέχοντες των ύπεναντίων. και δύο μεν μηνας έμενον επί των υποκειμένων, οὐδεν όλοσχερες πράττοντες πλην ακροβολιζόμενοι καθ' έκά-7 στην ημέραν. τοῦ δ' Αννίβου διαπυρσευομένου καὶ διαπεμπομένου συνεχώς έκ της πόλεως πρός τὸν *Αννωνα, καὶ δηλοῦντος ὅτι τὰ πλήθη τὸν λιμὸν ούχ ύπομένει, πολλοί δέ και πρός τούς πολεμίους αὐτομολοῦσι διὰ τὴν ἔνδειαν, ἔγνω διακινδυνεύειν ό τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, οὐχ ἦττον ἐπὶ τοῦτο φερομένων καὶ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων διὰ τὰς προειρημένας 8 αίτίας. διόπερ έξαγαγόντες αμφότεροι τας δυνάμεις είς τὸν μεταξύ τόπον τῶν στρατοπέδων συν-9 έβαλλον άλλήλοις. ἐπὶ πολύν δὲ χρόνον γενομένης τῆς μάχης τέλος ἐτρέψαντο τοὺς προκινδυνεύσαντας 10 μισθοφόρους των Καρχηδονίων οι 'Ρωμαΐοι. τούτων δὲ πεσόντων εἰς τὰ θηρία καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς τάξεις τας έφεστηκυίας συνέβη παν συνταραχθήναι το 11 τῶν Φοινίκων στρατόπεδον. γενομένου δ' ἐγκλίματος όλοσχερους οι μεν πλειστοι διεφθάρησαν αὐτών, τινες δ' εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀπεχώρησαν οι δε 'Ρωμαΐοι τῶν τε πλείστων ἐκυρίευσαν θηρίων καὶ 12 της έπισκευης άπάσης. έπινενομένης δε της νυκτός. καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν κατορθωμάτων χαρὰν καὶ διὰ τον κόπον ραθυμότερον ταις φυλακαίς αὐτῶν χρησαμένων, ἀπελπίσας 'Αννίβας τὰ πράγματα, καὶ νο-50

ordered until they joined Hanno's army and then, wheeling round and encircling the enemy, they attacked them, killing many and pursuing the rest as far as the camp. After this Hanno encamped opposite the Romans, occupying the hill called Torus, at a distance of about ten stades from the enemy. For two months they remained stationary, without any action more decisive than shooting at each other every day; but as Hannibal kept on announcing to Hanno by fire-signals and messengers that the population could not support the famine, and that deserters to the enemy were numerous owing to privation, the Carthaginian general decided to risk battle, the Romans being no less eager for this owing to the reasons I stated above. Both therefore led out their forces to the space between the camps and engaged. The battle lasted for long, but at the end the Romans put to flight the advanced line of Carthaginian mercenaries, and as the latter fell back on the elephants and the other divisions in their rear, the whole Phoenician army was thrown into disorder. A complete rout ensued, and most of them were put to the sword, some escaping to The Romans captured most of the Heraclea. elephants and all the baggage. But after nightfall, while the Romans, partly from joy at their success and partly from fatigue, had relaxed the vigilance of their watch, Hannibal, regarding his situation as desperate, and thinking for the above reasons that

μίσας ἔχειν εὐφυῆ καιρὸν πρὸς σωτηρίαν διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ὥρμησε περὶ μέσας νύκτας ἐκ 13 τῆς πόλεως, ἔχων τὰς ξενικὰς δυνάμεις. χώσας δὲ φορμοῖς ἀχύρων σεσαγμένοις τὰς τάφρους ἔλαθε τοὺς πολεμίους ἀπαγαγὼν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν δύναμιν. 14 οἱ δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπελθούσης συνέντες τὸ γεγονός, καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας τῆς τῶν περὶ τὸν 'Αννίβαν ἐπὶ βραχὺ καθαψάμενοι, μετὰ ταῦτα πάντες 15 ὥρμησαν πρὸς τὰς πύλας. οὐδενὸς δὶ ἐμποδὼν αὐτοῖς ἱσταμένου παρεισπεσόντες διήρπασαν τὴν πόλιν, καὶ πολλῶν μὲν σωμάτων, πολλῆς δὲ καὶ παντοδαπῆς ἐγένοντο κατασκευῆς ἐγκρατεῖς. 20 Τῆς δὶ ἀγγελίας ἀφικομένης εἰς τὴν σύγκλητον τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ὑπὲρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν 'Ακράγαντα, περιχαρεῖς γενόμενοι καὶ ταῖς διανοίαις ἐπαρθέντες οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν, οὐδὶ ἡρκοῦντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ 2 αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ώφελείαις, ἐλπίσαν-

οὐκ ἔμενον ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λογισμῶν, οὐδ' ἠρκοῦντο σεσωκέναι τοὺς Μαμερτίνους οὐδὲ ταῖς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πολέμου γενομέναις ἀφελείαις, ἐλπίσαντες δὲ καθόλου δυνατὸν εἶναι τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς νήσου, τούτου δὲ γενομένου μεγάλην ἐπίδοσιν αὐτῶν λήψεσθαι τὰ πράγματα, πρὸς τούτοις ἦσαν τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ ταῖς περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἐπινοίαις. τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις ἐώρων κατὰ λόγον σφίσι προχωροῦντα· μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς τὸν ᾿Ακράγαντα πολιορκήσαντας οἱ κατασταθέντες στρατηγοὶ Λεύκιος Οὐαλέριος καὶ Τίτος ᾿Οτακίλιος ἐδόκουν ἐνδεχομένως χειρίζειν τὰ κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν. τῆς δὲ θαλάττης ἀκονιτὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατούντων ἐζυγοστατεῖτ' αὐτοῖς ὁ πόδλεμος· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἑξῆς χρόνοις, κατεχόντων αὐτῶν ἤδη τὸν ᾿Ακράγαντα, πολλαὶ μὲν πόλεις προσετίθεντο τῶν μεσογαίων τοῖς ՝ Ῥωμαίοις, ἀγωνιῶσαι

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this was a fine opportunity for saving himself, broke out of the city about midnight with his mercenaries. By filling up the trenches with baskets packed tightly with straw he managed to withdraw his force in safety unperceived by the enemy. When day broke the Romans became aware of what had happened, and, after slightly molesting Hannibal's rear-guard, advanced with their whole force to the gates. Finding nobody to oppose them they entered the city and plundered it, possessing themselves of many slaves and a quantity of booty of every

description.

20. When the news of what had occurred at Agrigentum reached the Roman Senate, in their joy and elation they no longer confined themselves to their original designs and were no longer satisfied with having saved the Mamertines and with what they had gained in the war itself, but, hoping that it would be possible to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island and that if this were done their own power would be much augmented, they directed their attention to this project and to plans that would serve their purpose. As regards their military force at least they noted that all progressed satisfactorily; for the Consuls appointed after those who had reduced Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, seemed to be managing Sicilian affairs as well as possible; but as the Carthaginians maintained without any trouble the command of the sea the fortunes of the war continued to hang in the balance. For in the 261 B.C. period that followed, now that Agrigentum was in their hands, while many inland cities joined the

τάς πεζικάς δυνάμεις, έτι δε πλείους άφίσταντο τών παραθαλαττίων, καταπεπληγμέναι τὸν τῶν Καρχη-7 δονίων στόλον. ὅθεν ὁρῶντες αἰεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐκάτερα τὰ μέρη ῥοπὰς λαμβάνοντα τὸν πόλεμον διὰ τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας, ἔτι δὲ τὴν μὲν Ἰταλίαν πορθουμένην πολλάκις ύπο της ναυτικής δυνάμεως, την δε Λιβύην είς τέλος άβλαβη διαμένουσαν, ώρμησαν έπὶ τὸ συνεμβαίνειν τοῖς Καρχηδο-8 νίοις είς την θάλατταν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ούχ ηκιστά με παρώρμησε ποιήσασθαι μνήμην έπὶ πλείον τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου, χάριν τοῦ μηδέ ταύτην άγνοεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχήν, πῶς καὶ πότε καὶ δι' åς αιτίας πρώτον ενέβησαν είς θάλατταν 'Ρωμαίοι. 9 Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοῖς τριβὴν λαμβάνοντα, τότε πρώτον ἐπεβάλοντο ναυπηγεῖσθαι σκά-10 φη, πεντηρικά μέν έκατόν, είκοσι δε τριήρεις. των δε ναυπηγών είς τέλος ἀπείρων ὄντων τῆς περὶ τὰς πεντήρεις ναυπηγίας διὰ τὸ μηδένα τότε τῶν κατὰ την Ίταλίαν κεχρησθαι τοιούτοις σκάφεσι, πολλην 11 αὐτοῖς παρεῖχε τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δυσχέρειαν. ἐξ ὧν καὶ μάλιστα συνίδοι τις αν τὸ μεγαλόψυχον καὶ 12 παράβολον της 'Ρωμαίων αίρέσεως. οὐ γὰρ οίον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχοντες, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀφορμὰς καθάπαξ, οὐδ' ἐπίνοιαν οὐδέποτε ποιησάμενοι τῆς θαλάττης, τότε δη πρώτον έν νω λαμβάνοντες ούτως τολμηρώς ένεχείρησαν ώστε πρὶν ἡ πειραθή-ναι τοῦ πράγματος, εὐθὺς ἐπιβαλέσθαι Καρχηδονίοις ναυμαχείν τοις εκ προγόνων έχουσι την κατά θάλατ-13 ταν ήγεμονίαν άδήριτον. μαρτυρίω δ' αν τις χρήσαιτο προς την άλήθειαν των νῦν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ λέγομένων και πρός το παράδοξον αὐτῶν τῆς τόλμης. ότε γαρ το πρώτον επεχείρησαν διαβιβάζειν είς την 54

Romans from dread of their military forces, still more seaboard cities deserted their cause in terror of the Carthaginian fleet. Hence when they saw that the balance of the war tended more and more to shift to this side or that for the above reason, and that while Italy was frequently ravaged by the fleet, Libya remained entirely free from damage, they took urgent steps to get on the sea like the Carthaginians. And one of the reasons which induced me to narrate the history of this war at some length is just this, that my readers should, in this case too, not be kept in ignorance of the beginning of how, when, and for what reasons the Romans first took to the sea.

When they saw that the war was dragging on. they undertook for the first time to build ships, a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. As their shipwrights were absolutely inexperienced in building quinqueremes, such ships never having been in use in Italy, the matter caused them much difficulty, and this fact shows us better than anything else how spirited and daring the Romans are when they are determined to do a thing. It was not that they had fairly good resources for it, but they had none whatever, nor had they ever given a thought to the sea; yet when they once had conceived the project, they took it in hand so boldly, that before gaining any experience in the matter they at once engaged the Carthaginians who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea. Evidence of the truth of what I am saying and of their incredible pluck is this. When they first undertook to send their

Μεσσήνην τὰς δυνάμεις, οὐχ οἶον κατάφρακτος αὐτοις ύπηρχε ναυς, άλλ' οὐδὲ καθόλου μακρὸν πλοιον 14 οὐδὲ λέμβος οὐδ' είς, ἀλλὰ παρὰ Ταραντίνων καὶ Λοκρών έτι δ' 'Ελεατών καὶ Νεαπολιτών συγγρησάμενοι πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τριήρεις έπὶ τούτων 15 παραβόλως διεκόμισαν τους ἄνδρας. Εν ὧ δη καιρῶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατὰ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐπαναχθέντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ μιᾶς νεώς καταφράκτου διὰ τὴν προθυμίαν προπεσούσης, ώστ' εποκείλασαν γενέσθαι τοις 'Ρωμαίοις ύποχείριον, ταύτη παραδείγματι χρώμενοι τότε πρός ταύτην εποιούντο την τού 16 παντός στόλου ναυπηγίαν, ώς εί μη τοῦτο συνέβη γενέσθαι, δήλον ώς διά την απειρίαν είς τέλος αν 21 ἐκωλύθησαν τῆς ἐπιβολῆς. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' οἶς μὲν ἐπιμελὲς ἦν τῆς ναυπηγίας, ἐγίνοντο περὶ τὴν τῶν πλοίων κατασκευήν, οι δε τὰ πληρώματα συναθροίσαντες εδίδασκον εν τη γη κωπηλατείν τον τρόπον 2 τοῦτον. καθίσαντες ἐπὶ τῶν εἰρεσιῶν ἐν τῆ χέρσω τούς άνδρας την αὐτην έχοντας τάξιν ταῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν των πλοίων καθέδραις, μέσον δ' έν αὐτοῖς στήσαντες τον κελευστήν, αμα πάντας αναπίπτειν εφ' αύτους άγοντας τὰς χειρας, καὶ πάλιν προνεύειν έξωθοῦντας ταύτας συνείθιζον άρχεσθαί τε καὶ λήγειν τῶν κινήσεων πρός τὰ τοῦ κελευστοῦ παραγγέλματα. 3 προκατασκευασθέντων δε τούτων αμα τῶ συντελεσθήναι τὰς ναῦς καθελκύσαντες, καὶ βραχὺν χρόνον επ' αὐτης της άληθείας εν θαλάττη πειραθέντες, επλεον παρά την Ίταλίαν κατά το πρόσταγμα 4 τοῦ στρατηγοῦ. ὁ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως 56

forces across to Messene not only had they not any decked ships, but no long ships at all, not even a single boat, and borrowing fifty-oared boats and triremes from the Tarentines and Locrians, and also from the people of Elea and Naples they took their troops across in these at great hazard. On this occasion the Carthaginians put to sea to attack them as they were crossing, and one of their decked ships advanced too far in its eagerness to overtake them and running aground fell into the hands of the Romans. This ship they now used as a model, and built their whole fleet on its pattern; so that it is evident that if this had not occurred they would have been entirely prevented from carrying out their design by lack of practical knowledge. 21. Now. however, those to whom the construction of the ships was committed were busy in getting them ready, and those who had collected the crews were teaching them to row on shore in the following fashion. Making the men sit on rowers' benches on dry land, in the same order as on the benches of the ships themselves, and stationing the fugle-man in the middle, they accustomed them to fall back all at once bringing their hands up to them, and again to come forward stretching out their hands, and to begin and finish these movements at the word of command of the fugle-man. When the crews had been trained, they launched the ships as soon as they were completed, and having practised for a brief time actual rowing at sea, they sailed a along the coast of Italy as their commander had ordered. For the Consul appointed by the Romans to the command 260 B.C.

^a It is often necessary to use the word "sail," but it should be borne in mind that the ships were propelled chiefly by oars.

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τεταγμένος τοις 'Ρωμαίοις Γνάιος Κορνήλιος, ολίγαις ημέραις πρότερον, συντάξας τοις ναυάρχοις, επειδάν καταρτίσωσι τὸν στόλον, πλεῖν ώς ἐπὶ τὸν πορθμόν, αὐτὸς ἀναχθεὶς μετὰ νεῶν ἐπτακαίδεκα προκατέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὴν Μεσσήνην, σπουδάζων τὰ κατεπείγοντα πρός την χρείαν παρασκευάσαι τῶ δ στόλω. προσπεσούσης δ' αὐτῷ πράξεως ἐκεῖ περὶ τῆς τῶν Λιπαραίων πόλεως, δεξάμενος τὴν ἐλπίδα προχειρότερον τοῦ δέοντος ἔπλει ταῖς προειρημέναις 6 ναυσὶ καὶ καθωρμίσθη πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς 'Αννίβας, ἀκούσας ἐν τῷ Πανόρμω τὸ γεγονός, έξαποστέλλει Βοώδη τῆς γε-7 ρουσίας ὑπάρχοντα, ναῦς εἴκοσι δούς. δς ἐπιπλεύσας νυκτός εν τῷ λιμένι συνέκλεισε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Γνάιον. ἡμέρας δ' ἐπιγενομένης τὰ μὲν πληρώματα πρός φυγήν ώρμησεν είς την γην, ό δε Γνάιος εκπλαγης γενόμενος καὶ ποιεῖν έχων οὐδὲν τέλος παρέδω-8 κεν αύτον τοις πολεμίοις. οι δε Καρχηδόνιοι τάς τε ναθς καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων ὑποχείο ριον έχοντες παραχρημα πρός τον 'Αννίβαν απηραν. μετ' οὐ πολλὰς δ' ἡμέρας, οὕτως ἐναργοῦς ὅντος καὶ προσφάτου τοῦ περὶ τὸν Γνάιον ἀτυχήματος, παρ' ολίγον αὐτὸς 'Αννίβας εἰς τὸ παραπλήσιον άμάρ-10 τημα προφανώς ενέπεσεν. άκούσας γάρ τον των 'Ρωμαίων στόλον κομιζόμενον παρά τὴν 'Ιταλίαν σύνεγγυς είναι, κατιδεῖν βουλόμενος τό τε πληθος καὶ τὴν ὅλην σύνταξιν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λαβών πεν-11 τήκοντα ναῦς ἐπιπλεῖ. κάμπτων δὲ περὶ τὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀκρωτήριον ἐμπίπτει τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν κόσμω καὶ τάξει ποιουμένοις τὸν πλοῦν, καὶ τὰς μεν πλείους απέβαλε των νεών, αὐτὸς δε μετά των ύπολειφθεισων άνελπίστως και παραδόξως διέφυνεν. 58

of their naval force, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, had a few days previously given orders to the captains to sail in the direction of the Straits whenever the fleet was ready, while he himself, putting to sea with seventeen ships, preceded them to Messene, being anxious to provide for all the urgent needs of the fleet. While there a proposal happened to be made to him with regard to the city of Lipara, and embracing the prospect with undue eagerness he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. The Carthaginian general Hannibal, hearing at Panormus what had happened, sent off Boödes, a member of the Senate, giving him twenty ships. Boodes sailed up to Lipara at night and shut up Gnaeus in the harbour. When day dawned the Roman crews hastily took refuge on land, and Gnaeus, falling into a state of terror and being unable to do anything, finally surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians now set off at once to rejoin Hannibal with the captured ships and commander. But a few days later, though Gnaeus' disaster was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself came very near falling into the same error with his eyes open. For hearing that the Roman fleet which was sailing along the coast of Italy was near at hand, and wishing to get a glimpse of the numbers and general disposition of the enemy, he sailed towards them with fifty ships. As he was rounding the Cape of Italy he came upon the enemy sailing in good order and trim. He lost most of his ships and escaped himself with the remainder, which was more than he expected or hoped.

22 Οί δε 'Ρωμαίοι μετά ταθτα συνεγγίσαντες τοίς κατά την Σικελίαν τόποις, καὶ συνέντες τὸ γεγονός σύμπτωμα περί τον Γνάιον, παραυτίκα μέν διεπέμποντο πρὸς Γάιον Βίλιον τὸν ἡγούμενον τῆς 2 πεζῆς δυνάμεως, καὶ τοῦτον ἀνέμενον, ἄμα δ' ακούοντες οὐ μακράν είναι τὸν τῶν πολεμίων στόλον, εγίνοντο πρός παρασκευήν τοῦ ναυμαχεῖν. 3 ὄντων δὲ τῶν πλοίων φαύλων ταις κατασκευαις καὶ δυσκινήτων, ύποτίθεται τις αὐτοῖς βοήθημα πρὸς την μάχην τους επικληθέντας μετά ταθτα κόρακας 4 ών συνέβαινε την κατασκευην είναι τοιαύτην. στῦλος έν πρώρρα στρογγύλος είστήκει, μήκος μέν όργυιών τεττάρων, κατά δὲ τὸ πλάτος τριών παλαιδ στων έχων την διάμετρον. οῦτος αὐτὸς μεν ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφης τροχιλίαν είχε, περιετίθετο δ' αὐτῷ κλιμαξ επικαρσίαις σανίσι καθηλωμένη, πλάτος μέν 6 ποδών τεττάρων, τὸ δὲ μῆκος εξ ὀργυιών. τὸ δὲ τρημα του σανιδώματος ήν παράμηκες και περιέβαινε περί τὸν στῦλον μετὰ τὰς πρώτας εὐθέως τῆς κλίμακος δύ' οργυιάς. είχε δε καὶ δρύφακτον αυτη παρ' έκατέραν την επιμήκη πλευράν είς γόνυ τό 7 βάθος. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ πέρατος αὐτοῦ προσήρμοστο σιδηροῦν ο ίον ὕπερον ἀπωξυσμένον, ἔχον δακτύλιον ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς, ὡς τὸ ὅλον φαίνεσθαι παραπλή-8 σιον ταῖς σιτοποιικαῖς μηχανήσεσιν. εἰς δὲ τοῦτον τον δακτύλιον ένεδέδετο κάλως, ώ κατά τάς έμβολας των πλοίων έξαίροντες τους κόρακας δια της ἐν τῷ στύλῳ τροχιλίας ἀφίεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ κατάστρωμα τῆς ἀλλοτρίας νεὼς ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ πρῶρραν, ποτὲ δ' άντιπεριάγοντες ζείς > 1 τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων

22. After this the Romans approached the coastof Sicily and learning of the disaster that had befallen Gnaeus, at once communicated with Gaius Duilius, the commander of the land forces, and awaited his arrival. At the same time, hearing that the enemy's fleet was not far distant, they began to get ready for battle. As their ships were ill-built and slow in their movements, someone suggested to them as a help in fighting the engines which afterwards came to be called "ravens." They were constructed as follows: On the prow stood a round pole four fathoms in height and three palms in diameter. This pole had a pulley at the summit and round it was put a gangway made of cross planks attached by nails, four feet in width and six fathoms in length. In this gangway was an oblong hole, and it went round the pole at a distance of two fathoms from its near end. The gangway also had a railing on each of its long sides as high as a man's knee. At its extremity was fastened an iron object like a pestle pointed at one end and with a ring at the other end, so that the whole looked like the machine for pounding corn. To this ring was attached a rope with which, when the ship charged an enemy, they raised the ravens by means of the pulley on the pole and let them down on the enemy's deck, sometimes from the prow and sometimes bringing them round when the ships collided

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a The gangway (36 feet long) was composed of two parts united by a joint, the near part (12 feet long), which always remained horizontal, and the far part (24 feet long) which could be drawn up at right angles to the near part, thus reaching the top of the pole (also 24 feet long) and remaining vertical until lowered. The whole could be moved round the pole which pierced it at the junction of the two parts,

9 προσπιπτούσας ἐμβολάς. ὅτε δὲ ταῖς σανίσι τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἐμπαγέντες οἱ κόρακες ὁμοῦ συνδήσαιεν τὰς ναῦς, εἰ μὲν πλάγιαι παραβάλοιεν ἀλλήλαις, πανταχόθεν ἐπεπήδων, εἰ δὲ κατὰ πρῶρραν, δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος ἐπὶ δύο συνεχεῖς ἐποιοῦν-10 το τὴν ἔφοδον· ὧν οἱ μὲν ἡγούμενοι τὴν κατὰ πρόσωπον ἐπιφάνειαν ἐσκέπαζον ταῖς τῶν θυρεῶν προβολαῖς, οἱ δ' ἐπόμενοι τὰς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων ἠσφάλιζον πλευρὰς ὑπὲρ τὸν δρύφακτον ὑπερτιθέ-11 μενοι τὰς ἴτυς τῶν ὅπλων. οὖτοι μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κεχρημένοι παρασκευῆ καιρὸν ἐπετήρουν πρὸς ναυμαχίαν.

23 'Ο δὲ Γάιος Βίλιος ὡς θᾶττων ἔγνω τὴν περιπέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡνουμένου.

πέτειαν τοῦ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως ἡγουμένου, παραδούς τὰ πεζικὰ στρατόπεδα τοῖς χιλιάρχοις 2 αὐτὸς διεκομίσθη πρὸς τὸν στόλον. πυθόμενος δὲ τους πολεμίους πορθείν την Μυλαΐτιν χώραν, επιπλεί 3 στόλω παντί. συνιδόντες δ' οι Καρχηδόνιοι μετά γαρας και σπουδης ανήγοντο ναυσίν έκατον και τριάκοντα, καταφρονοῦντες τῆς ἀπειρίας τῶν 'Ρω-μαίων, καὶ πάντες ἔπλεον ἀντίπρωρροι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδὲ τάξεως καταξιώσαντες τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλ' 4 ως έπι λείαν τινά πρόδηλον. ήγειτο δ' 'Αννίβας αὐτων—οῦτος δ' ήν ό τὰς δυνάμεις ἐκκλέψας νυκτὸς έκ της των 'Ακραγαντίνων πόλεως-έχων έπτήρη 5 την γενομένην Πύρρου τοῦ βασιλέως. ἄμα δὲ τῷ πλησιάζειν συνθεωροῦντες ανανενευκότας τους κόρακας έν ταις έκάστων πρώρραις, έπι ποσον μέν ηπόρουν οι Καρχηδόνιοι, ξενιζόμενοι ταις των όργάνων κατασκευαῖς· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τελέως κατεγνωκότες τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνέβαλον οἱ πρῶτοι 6 πλέοντες τετολμηκότως. των δε συμπλεκομένων 62

broadsides. Once the ravens were fixed in the planks of the enemy's deck and grappled the ships together, if they were broadside on, they boarded from all sides, but if they had charged with the prow, they attacked by passing over the gangway of the raven itself two abreast. The leading pair protected the front by holding up their shields, and those who followed secured the two flanks by resting the rims of their shields on the top of the railing. Having, then, adopted this device, they awaited an oppor-

tunity for going into action.

23. As for Gaius Duilius, no sooner had he learnt of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the naval forces than handing over his legions to the military tribunes he proceeded to the fleet. Learning that the enemy were ravaging the territory of Mylae, he sailed against them with his whole force. The Carthaginians on sighting him put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, quite overjoyed and eager, as they despised the inexperience of the Romans. They all sailed straight on the enemy, not even thinking it worth while to maintain order in the attack, but just as if they were falling on a prey that was obviously theirs. They were commanded by Hannibal—the same who stole out of Agrigentum by night with his army—in the sevenbanked galley that was formerly King Pyrrhus'. On . approaching and seeing the ravens hauled up on the prow of each ship, the Carthaginians were at first nonplussed, being surprised at the construction of the engines. However, as they entirely gave the enemy up for lost, the front ships attacked daringly. But when the ships that came into collision were in

σκαφῶν ἀεὶ δεδεμένων τοῖς ὀργάνοις, καὶ τῶν

ανδρών εύθυς επιπορευομένων δι' αύτοῦ τοῦ κόρακος καὶ συμπλεκομένων ἐπὶ τοῖς καταστρώμασιν, οἱ μὲν ἐφονεύοντο τῶν Καρχηδονίων, οἱ δὲ παρεδίδοσαν ἑαυτοὺς ἐκπληττόμενοι τὸ γινόμενον παραπλήσιον 7 γὰρ πεζομαχίας συνέβαινε τὸν κίνδυνον ἀποτελεῖσθαι. διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τὰς πρώτας συμβαλούσας ναῦς αὐτάνδρους ἀπέβαλον, σὺν αἶς ἐγένετ' αἰχμάλωτον καὶ τὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πλοῖον ' Αννίβας δ' ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραβόλως αὐτὸς ἐν τῆ σκάφη 8 διέφυγε. τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐποιεῖτο μὲν τὸν ἐπίπλουν ώς εἰς ἐμβολήν, ἐν δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν θεωροῦντες τὸ συμβεβηκὸς περὶ τὰς προπλεούσας ναῦς, ἐξέκλινον καὶ διένευον τὰς τῶν 9 ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν,

ο ὀργάνων ἐπιβολάς. πιστεύοντες δὲ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν,
οἱ μὲν ἐκ πλαγίων, οἱ δὲ κατὰ πρύμναν ἐκπεριπλέοντες ἀσφαλῶς ἥλπιζον ποιήσασθαι τὰς ἐμβολάς.

10 πάντη δὲ καὶ πάντως ἀντιπεριισταμένων καὶ συνδιανευόντων τῶν ὀργάνων οὕτως ὥστε κατ' ἀνάγκην τοὺς ἐγγίσαντας συνδεδέσθαι, τέλος ἐγκλίναντες ἔφυγον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καταπλαγέντες τὴν καινοτομίαν τοῦ συμβαίνοντος, πεντήκοντα ναῦς ἀποβαλόντες.

24 Οἱ δὲ Ὑωμαῖοι παραδόξως ἀντιπεποιημένοι τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν ἐλπίδος, διπλασίως ἐπερρώσθησαν 2 ταῖς ὁρμαῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον. τότε μὲν οὖν προσσχόντες τῆ Σικελία τήν τ' Αἰγεσταίων ἔλυσαν πολιορκίαν, ἐσχάτως αὐτῶν ἤδη διακειμένων, κατά τε τὴν ἐκ τῆς Αἰγέστης ἀναχώρησιν Μάκελλαν πόλιν κατὰ κράτος εἶλον.

3 Μετὰ δὲ τὴν ναυμαχίαν 'Αμίλκας ὁ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγὸς ὁ τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῶν πεζικῶν

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every case held fast by the machines, and the Roman crews boarded by means of the ravens and attacked them hand to hand on deck, some of the Carthaginians were cut down and others surrendered from dismay at what was happening, the battle having become just like a fight on land. So the first thirty ships that engaged were taken with all their crews, including the commander's galley, Hannibal himself managing to escape beyond his hopes by a miracle in the jolly-boat. The rest of the Carthaginian force was bearing up as if to charge the enemy, but seeing, as they approached, the fate of the advanced ships they turned aside and avoided the blows of the engines. Trusting in their swiftness, they veered round the enemy in the hope of being able to strike him in safety either on the broadside or on the stern, but when the ravens swung round and shifted in all directions and in all manner of ways so that those who approached them were of necessity grappled, they finally gave way and took to flight, terror-stricken by this novel experience and with the loss of fifty ships.

24. When the Romans had thus, contrary to all expectation, gained the prospect of success at sea their determination to prosecute the war became twice as strong. On this occasion they put in on the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta which was in the last stage of distress, and in leaving Segesta took the city of Macella by assault.

After the battle at sea Hamilcar, the Carthaginian commander of their land forces, who was quartered

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δυνάμεων, διατρίβων περὶ Πάνορμον, γνοὺς ἐν τοῖς 'Ρωμαϊκοῖς στρατοπέδοις στασιάζοντας τοὺς συμμάχους πρὸς τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πρωτείων, καὶ πυνθανόμενος στρατοπεδεύειν αὐτοὺς καθ' ἐαυτοὺς τοὺς συμμάχους μεταξὺ τοῦ Παρώπου καὶ τῶν Θερμῶν τῶν 'Ιμεραίων, ἐπιπεσὼν αὐτοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἀναστρατοπεδεύουσι μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως σχεδὸν εἰς τετρακισχιλίους ἀπέκτεινε. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν ὁ μὲν 'Αννίβας ἔχων τὰς διασωθείσας ναῦς ἀπέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, μετ' οὐ πολὺ δ' ἐκεῖθεν εἰς Σαρδόνα διῆρε, προσλαβὼν ναῦς καὶ τινας τῶν ἐνδόξων τριηράρχων. Καρόνοις δ' οὐ πολλοῖς κατόπιν ἐν τῆ Σαρδόνι συγκλεισθεὶς ὑπὸ 'Ρωμαίων ἔν τινι λιμένι καὶ πολλὰς ἀποβαλὼν τῶν νεῶν, παραυτίκα συλληφθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδονίων ἀνεσταυρώθη. 'Ρωμαῖοι γὰρ ἄμα τῆς θαλάττης ῆψαντο καὶ τῶν

7 Ρωμαιοι γαρ αμα της θαλαττης ηψαντο και των κατά Σαρδόνα πραγμάτων εὐθέως ἀντείχοντο.
8 Τὰ δ' ἐν τῆ Σικελία στρατόπεδα τῶν 'Ρωμαίων

259 B.C. κατὰ μὲν τὸν έξῆς ἐνιαυτὸν οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἔπραξαν 9 λόγου, τότε δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς ἐπικαθεσταμέ258 B.C. νους ἄρχοντας Αὖλον ᾿Ατίλιον καὶ Γάιον Σουλπίκιον ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸν Πάνορμον διὰ τὸ τὰς τῶν

10 Καρχηδονίων δυνάμεις έκει παραχειμάζειν. οι δε στρατηγοί συνεγγίσαντες τη πόλει μετά πάσης της δυνάμεως παρετάξαντο. των δε πολεμίων ουκ άντεξιόντων, πάλιν έντεῦθεν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐπὶ

11 πόλιν Ίππάναν, καὶ ταύτην μὲν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος ἔλαβον, είλον δὲ καὶ τὸ Μυττίστρατον, πολλούς χρόνους ὑπομεμενηκὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν διὰ τὴν

12 δχυρότητα τοῦ τόπου. τὴν δέ Καμαριναίων πόλιν, μικρῷ πρότερον ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἀποστᾶσαν, τότε προσ-

in the neighbourhood of Panormus, heard that in the Roman camp the allies and the Romans were at variance as to which had most distinguished themselves in the battles, and that the allies were encamped by themselves between the Paropus and the Hot Springs of Himera. Suddenly falling on them with his whole force as they were breaking up their camp he killed about four thousand. After this action Hannibal with the ships that escaped sailed away to Carthage and shortly after crossed from there to Sardinia, taking with him additional ships and some of the most celebrated naval officers. Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbours of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. The Romans, I should explain, from the moment they concerned themselves with the sea, began to entertain designs on Sardinia.

The Roman troops in Sicily did nothing worthy of note during the following year; but at its close when they had received their new commanders the Consuls of that year, Aulus Atilius and Gaius 258 B.C. Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus, because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. Consuls, when they got close up to the city, offered battle with their whole forces, but as the enemy did not come out to meet them they left Panormus and went off to attack Hippana. This city they took by assault and they also took Myttistratum which withstood the siege for long owing to its strong situation. They then occupied Camarina which had lately deserted their cause, bringing up a siege battery and

ενέγκαντες έργα καὶ καταβαλόντες τὰ τείχη κατέσχον· δμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν "Ενναν καὶ ἔτερα πλείω 13 πολισμάτια τῶν Καρχηδονίων. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων γε-

νόμενοι Λιπαραίους έπεχείρησαν πολιορκείν. 25 Τῷ δ' έξῆς ένιαυτῷ Γάιος ᾿Ατίλιος ὁ στρατηγὸς 257 Β.ο. τῶν Ἡωμαίων πρὸς Τυνδαρίδα καθορμισθείς, καὶ συνθεασάμενος ατάκτως παραπλέοντα τον των Καρχηδονίων στόλον, παραγγείλας τοις ίδίοις πληρώμασιν επεσθαι τοις ήγουμένοις, αὐτὸς ὥρμησε 2 πρό τῶν ἄλλων, ἔχων δέκα ναῦς δμοπλοούσας. οί δε Καρχηδόνιοι, συνιδόντες των υπεναντίων τους μεν ακμήν εμβαίνοντας, τους δ' αναγομένους, τους δὲ πρώτους πολύ προειληφότας τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπι-3 στρέψαντες αὐτοῖς ἀπήντων. καὶ κυκλώσαντες τὰς μέν άλλας διέφθειραν, την δέ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ναῦν παρ' ολίγον αΰτανδρον έλαβον. οὐ μὴν άλλ' αὕτη μέν ταις ύπηρεσίαις έξηρτυμένη και ταχυναυτούσα 4 διέφυγε παραδόξως τον κίνδυνον, αί δε λοιπαί των 'Ρωμαίων επιπλέουσαι κατά βραχύ συνηθροίζοντο. γενόμεναι δ' έν μετώπω συνέβαλλον τοις πολεμίοις, και δέκα μεν αὐτάνδρους ναῦς ἔλαβον, οκτώ δε κατέδυσαν. αι δε λοιπαί των Καρχηδονίων άπεχώρησαν είς τὰς Λιπαραίας καλουμένας νήσους. 5 'Εκ δέ ταύτης της ναυμαχίας αμφότεροι νομίζοντες εφάμιλλον πεποιησθαι τον κίνδυνον, ώρμησαν όλοσχερέστερον έπὶ τὸ συνίστασθαι ναυτικάς δυνάβ μεις καὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ἀντέχεσθαι πραγμάτων. αί δὲ πεζικαὶ δυνάμεις ἐν τοῖς κατὰ ταῦτα καιροῖς οὐδὲν ἔπραξαν ἄξιον μνήμης, ἀλλὰ περὶ μικρὰς καὶ η τὰς τυχούσας πράξεις κατέτριψαν τοὺς χρόνους. 256 Β.Ο. διὸ παρασκευασάμενοι, καθάπερ εἶπον, εἰς τὴν

έπιφερομένην θερείαν ανήχθησαν 'Ρωμαΐοι μέν 68

making a breach in the wall. They similarly took Enna and several other small places belonging to the Carthaginians, and when they had finished with these operations they undertook the siege of Lipara.

25. Next year Gaius Atilius Regulus the Roman 257 B.C. Consul, while anchored off Tyndaris, caught sight of the Carthaginian fleet sailing past in disorder. Ordering his crews to follow the leaders, he dashed out before the rest with ten ships sailing together. The Carthaginians, observing that some of the enemy were still embarking, and some just getting under weigh, while those in the van had much outstripped the others, turned and met them. Surrounding them they sunk the rest of the ten, and came very near to taking the admiral's ship with its crew. However, as it was well manned and swift, it foiled their expectation and got out of danger. The rest of the Roman fleet sailed up and gradually got into close order. As soon as they faced the enemy, they bore down on them and took ten ships with their crews, sinking eight. The rest of the Carthaginian fleet withdrew to the islands known as Liparaean.

The result of this battle was that both sides thought that they had fought now on equal terms, and both threw themselves more thoroughly into the task of organizing a navy and disputing the command of the sea, while in the mean time the land forces accomplished nothing worthy of mention, but spent their time in minor operations of no significance. The Romans, therefore, after making 256 B.C. preparations for the coming summer, set to sea with

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τριάκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις μακραῖς ναυσὶ καταφρά-8 κτοις, καὶ κατέσχον εἰς Μεσσήνην. ὅθεν ἀναχθέντες έπλεον δεξιάν έχοντες την Σικελίαν, κάμψαντες δέ τον Πάχυνον ὑπερῆραν εἰς εκνομον διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ η πεζὸν στράτευμα περὶ τούτους αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τόπους. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἀναπλεύσαντες Λιλυβαίω προσέσχον, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ πρὸς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν 26 Μινώαν καθωρμίσθησαν. ἦν δὲ τῶν μὲν Ῥωμαίων πρόθεσις είς την Λιβύην πλείν και τον πόλεμον έκεί περισπαν, ΐνα τοις Καρχηδονίοις μη περι Σικελίας, άλλα περι σφων αὐτων και της ιδίας χώρας δ 2 κίνδυνος γίνηται. τοῖς δὲ Καρχηδονίοις τάναντία τούτων έδόκει συνιδόντες γὰρ ώς εὐέφοδός ἐστιν ή Λιβύη καὶ πᾶς ὁ κατὰ τὴν χώραν λαὸς εὐχείρωτος τοῖς ἄπαξ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμβαλοῦσιν, οὐχ οἶοί τ' ἦσαν 3 ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ διακινδυνεύειν καὶ ναυμαχεῖν ἔσπευδον. ὄντων δὲ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ κωλύειν, τῶν δέ προς το βιάζεσθαι, προφανής ήν ο μέλλων άγων 4 εκ της εκατέρων συνίστασθαι φιλοτιμίας. οι μεν οὖν 'Ρωμαῖοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα τὴν παρασκευὴν ἀρμόζουσαν ἐποιοῦντο, πρός τε τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν 5 χρείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόβασιν τὴν εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν. διόπερ επιλέξαντες εκ των πεζικών στρατοπέδων τας άρίστας χειρας διειλον την πασαν δύναμιν, ην 6 ημελλον αναλαμβάνειν, είς τέτταρα μέρη. τὸ δὲ μέρος εκαστον διττάς είχε προσηγορίας πρώτον μέν γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο στρατόπεδον καὶ πρῶτος στόλος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ κατὰ λόγον. τὸ δὲ τέταρτον καὶ τρίτην έπωνυμίαν έτι προσειλήφει τριάριοι γάρ ωνομάη ζοντο κατά τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις συνήθειαν. καὶ τὸ μὲν σύμπαν ἡν στράτευμα 70

a fleet of three hundred and thirty decked ships of war and put in to Messene. Starting again from there they sailed with Sicily on their right hand, and doubling Cape Pachynus they came round to Ecnomus, because their land forces too happened to be just in that neighbourhood. The Carthaginians, setting sail with three hundred and fifty decked vessels, touched at Lilybaeum, and proceeding thence came to anchor off Heraclea Minoa. 26. The plan of the Romans was to sail to Africa and deflect the war to that country, so that the Carthaginians might find no longer Sicily but themselves and their own territory in danger. The Carthaginians were resolved on just the opposite course, for, aware as they were that Africa is easily accessible, and that all the people in the country would be easily subdued by anyone who had once invaded it, they were unable to allow this, and were anxious to run the risk of a sea-battle. The object of the one side being to prevent and that of the other to force a crossing, it was clear that their rival aims would result in the struggle which followed. The Romans had made suitable preparations for both contingencies—for an action at sea and for a landing in the enemy's country. For the latter purpose, selecting the best men from their land forces, they divided into four corps the total force they were about to embark. Each corps had two names; it was called either the First Legion or the First Squadron, and the others accordingly. The fourth had a third name in addition; they were called triarii after the usage in the land forces. The whole body embarked on the ships numbered about a

τούτων της ναυτικής δυνάμεως περί τέτταρας καί δέκα μυριάδας, ώς αν έκάστης νεώς λαμβανούσης 8 έρέτας μεν τριακοσίους, επιβάτας δ' έκατον είκοσιν. οί δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλείον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ήρμόζοντο πρός τον κατά θάλατταν κίνδυνον τό γε μην πληθος αὐτῶν ἦν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ 9 τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον. ἐφ' οἶς οὐχ οἶον ἄν τις παρὼν καὶ θεώμενος ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ κᾶν ἀκούων καταπλαγείη τὸ τοῦ κινδύνου μέγεθος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολιτευμάτων αμφοτέρων μεγαλομερίαν καὶ δύναμιν, στοχαζόμενος έκ τε τοῦ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τοῦ τῶν νεῶν πλήθους. 10 Οί δε 'Ρωμαΐοι συλλογιζόμενοι διότι τον μεν πλοῦν είναι συμβαίνει πελάγιον, τους δε πολεμίους ταχυναυτείν, πανταχόθεν επειρώντο ποιείσθαι την 11 τάξιν ἀσφαλη καὶ δυσπρόσοδον. τὰς μὲν οὖν εξήρεις δύ' οὖσας, εφ' ὧν ἔπλεον οἱ στρατηγοὶ Μάρκος 'Ατίλιος καὶ Λεύκιος Μάλιος, πρώτας έν μετώπω παραλλήλους έταξαν. τούτων δ' έκατέρα 12 συνεχεις κατά μίαν ναῦν ἐπιτάττοντες τῆ μὲν τὸν πρώτον, τη δέ τὸν δεύτερον στόλον ἐπέστησαν, ἀεὶ καθ' έκάστην ναθν έκατέρου τοθ στόλου μείζον τὸ

13 ἔξω νεύοντα τὰ σκάφη τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοις εἶχεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ἀπλῶς εἰς ἔμβολον ἔταξαν, ἐπέβαλον τούτοις ἐπὶ μίαν ναῦν ἐν μετώπω τὸ τρίτον στρατόπεδον· ὧν 14 ἐπιστάντων ἀπετελέσθη τρίγωνον τὸ πῶν εἶδος τῆς τάξεως. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἐπέστησαν τὰς ἱππηγούς, ῥύματα δόντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ταῖς τοῦ τρίτου στόλου

μεταξύ ποιούντες διάστημα. ταις δε πρώρραις



^a This can only mean that the prow of each ship was 72

hundred and forty thousand, each ship holding three hundred rowers and a hundred and twenty soldiers. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their . preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above one hundred and fifty thousand. These are figures calculated to strike not only one present and with the forces under his eyes but even a hearer with amazement at the magnitude of the struggle and at that lavish outlay and vast power of the two states, which may be estimated from the number of men

and ships.

The Romans taking into consideration that the voyage was across the open sea and that the enemy were their superiors in speed, tried by every means to range their fleet in an order which would render it secure and difficult to attack. Accordingly, they stationed their two six-banked galleys, on which the commanders, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius Manlius, were sailing, in front and in line with each other. Behind each of these they placed ships in single file, the first squadron behind the one and the second behind the other, so arranging them that the distance between each pair of ships in the two squadrons grew ever greater. The ships were stationed in column with their prows directed outwards.4 Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in the form of a simple wedge, they stationed the third in a single line at the base, so that when these ships had taken their places the resulting form of the whole was a triangle. Behind these ships at the base they stationed the horsetransports, attaching them by towing-lines to the directed to the open sea and not to the ship in front of it; i.e. they were in echelon.

15 ναυσί. ταύταις δε κατόπιν επέβαλον τον τέταρτον στόλον, τούς τριαρίους κληθέντας, έπὶ μίαν παρεκτείναντες ναθν, ώς ὑπερτείνειν ἐξ ἐκατέρου τοθ μέρους

16 τοὺς πρὸ ἐαυτῶν. καὶ συναρμοσθέντων πάντων κατά τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, τὸ μὲν ὅλον ἀπετελέσθη σχήμα τής τάξεως ἔμβολον, οὖ τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν μέρος ἦν κοῖλον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῆ βάσει στερεόν, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν ἐνεργὸν καὶ πρακτικόν. αμα δὲ καὶ δυσδιάλυτον.

27 Οί δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγοί κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρον παρακαλέσαντες τὰ πλήθη διὰ βραχέων, καὶ συνυποδείξαντες αὐτοῖς ὅτι νικήσαντες μέν τῆ ναυμαχία περί Σικελίας ποιήσονται τον πόλεμον, ήττηθέντες δὲ περὶ τῆς σφετέρας πατρίδος κινδυνεύσουσι 2 καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, οὕτως αὐτοῖς παρήγγειλαν εμβαίνειν εἰς τὰς ναῦς. προθύμως δὲ πάντων ποιούντων τὸ παραγγελλόμενον διὰ τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ

μέλλον έκ των είρημένων, εύθαρσως ανήγοντο καί 3 καταπληκτικώς. Θεωροῦντες δὲ τὴν τῶν πολεμίων τάξιν οἱ στρατηγοί, καὶ πρὸς ταύτην άρμοζόμενοι, τὰ μεν τρία μέρη της αύτων δυνάμεως επί μίαν έταττον ναῦν, πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ἀνατείναντες τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας, ώς κυκλώσοντες τους υπεναντίους, πάσας ίστάντες άντιπρώρρους τὰς ναθς τοίς πολεμίοις.

4 τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εὐώνυμον τῆς ὅλης τάξεως ἐποίουν,

5 εν επικαμπίω νεθον πρός την γην. ήγοθντο δε των Καρχηδονίων, τοθ μεν δεξιοθ κέρως, έχων επίπλους καὶ πεντήρεις τὰς μάλιστα ταχυναυτούσας πρὸς τὴν ύπερκέρασιν, "Αννων ο περὶ τὸν 'Ακράγαντα δ λειφθεὶς τῆ παρατάξει τῶν δ' εὐωνύμων είχε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν 'Αμίλκας ο περὶ τὴν Τυνδαρίδα ναυμα-

χήσας δς τότε κατά μέσην την τάξιν ποιούμενος 74

vessels of the third squadron. Finally, behind these they stationed the fourth squadron, known as triarii, placing each ship at a greater distance from the next so that the line overlapped that in front of it at each extremity. When all had been put together in the manner I have described, the whole arrangement had the form of a wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact, and the whole effective

and practical, while also difficult to break up.

27. About the same time the Carthaginian commanders briefly addressed their forces. They pointed out to them that in the event of victory in the battle they would be fighting afterwards for Sicily, but that if defeated they would have to fight for their own country and their homes, and bade them take this to heart and embark. When all readily did as they were ordered, as their general's words had made clear to them the issues at stake, they set to sea in a confident and menacing spirit. The commanders when they saw the enemy's order adapted their own Three-quarters of their force they drew up in a single line, extending their right wing to the open sea for the purpose of encircling the enemy and with all their ships facing the Romans. The remaining quarter of their force formed the left wing of their whole line, and reached shoreward at an angle with the rest. Their right wing was under the command of the same Hanno who had been worsted in the engagement near Agrigentum. had vessels for charging and also the swiftest quinqueremes for the outflanking movement. The left wing was in charge of Hamilcar, the one who commanded in the sea-battle at Tyndaris, and he, fighting as he was in the centre of the whole line.

7 τὸν κίνδυνον ἐχρήσατό τινι στρατηγήματι κατά τὸν άγωνα τοιώδε. των γάρ 'Ρωμαίων συνθεασαμένων έπὶ λεπτον εκτεταμένους τους Καρχηδονίους, καὶ ποιησαμένων την δρμην έπι μέσους, την μεν άρχην 8 ο κίνδυνος έλαβε τοιαύτην. ταχύ δε των περί τὰ μέσα Καρχηδονίων έκ παραγγέλματος κλινάντων πρός φυγήν χάριν τοῦ διασπάσαι την τῶν 'Ρωμαίων τάξιν, οδτοί μεν υπεχώρουν μετά σπουδής, οί δε 9 'Ρωμαιοι κατόπιν ήκολούθουν εκθύμως. ο μεν οὖν πρώτος καὶ δεύτερος στόλος ἐπέκειτο τοῖς φεύγουσι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον καὶ τὸ τέταρτον στρατόπεδον απεσπάτο, των μεν ρυμουλκούντων τας ίππηγούς 10 ναθς, των δε τριαρίων συμμενόντων και συνεφεδρευόντων τούτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον στόλον ίκανὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἐδόκουν ἀπεσπακέναι τόπον οί Καρχηδόνιοι, συνθήματος άρθέντος έκ της 'Αμίλκου νεώς μετεβάλοντο πάντες αμα καὶ συνέβα-11 λον τοις έπικειμένοις. άγωνος δε συστάντος καρτεροῦ, τῷ μὲν ταχυναυτεῖν ἐκπεριπλέοντες καὶ ραδίως μεν προσιόντες, οξέως δ' αποχωροῦντες, πολύ περι-12 ησαν οί Καρχηδόνιοι, τῷ δὲ βιαιομαχεῖν κατά τὰς συμπλοκάς και συνδείν τοίς κόραξι τούς απαξ έγγίσαντας, αμα δέ καὶ τῷ συναγωνιζομένων άμφοτέρων των στρατηγών έν όψει των ήγουμένων ποιεισθαι τον κίνδυνον, ούχ ήττον επικυδεστέρας είχον οι 'Ρωμαΐοι των Καρχηδονίων τας έλπίδας. 13 ή μεν οὖν κατὰ τούτους μάχη τοιαύτην εἶχε διάθεσιν. 28 κατὰ δε τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν τὸ μεν δεξιὸν κέρας ἔχων *Αννων, τὸ μεῖναν ἐν ἀποστάσει κατὰ τὴν πρώτην συμβολήν, τό τε πέλαγος ύπεράρας ενέβαλε ταις τῶν τριαρίων ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὴν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε 2 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ παρὰ τὴν γῆν 76

made use of the following stratagem. The battle was begun by the Romans who, noticing that the Carthaginian line was thin owing to its great extent, delivered an attack on the centre. The Carthaginian centre had received Hamilcar's orders to fall back at once with the view of breaking the order of the Romans, and, as they hastily retreated, the Romans pursued them vigorously. While the first and second squadrons thus pressed on the flying enemy, the third and fourth were separated from them, the third squadron towing the horse-transports, and the triarii remaining with them as a supporting force. When the Carthaginians thought they had drawn off the first and second squadrons far enough from the others, they all, on receiving a signal from Hamilcar's ship, turned simultaneously and attacked their pursuers. The engagement that followed was a very hot one, the superior speed of the Carthaginians enabling them to move round the enemy's flank as well as to approach easily and retire rapidly. while the Romans, relying on their sheer strength when they closed with the enemy, grappling with the ravens every ship as soon as it approached, fighting also, as they were, under the very eves of both the Consuls, who were personally taking part in the combat, had no less high hopes of success. then was the state of the battle in this quarter. 28. At one and the same time Hanno with the right wing, which had held its distance in the first attack, sailed across the open sea and fell upon the ships of the triarii, causing them great embarrassment and distress. Meanwhile that part of the Carthaginian

τεταγμένοι των Καρχηδονίων, παραγεγονότες είς μέτωπον έκ της προϋπαρχούσης τάξεως, καὶ ποιήσαντες ἀντιπρώρρους τὰς ναῦς, ἐνέβαλον τοῖς ρυμουλκοῦσι τὰς ἱππηγούς· οἱ δ' ἀφέμενοι τὰ ούματα συνεπλέκοντο και διηγωνίζοντο τοις πολε-3 μίοις. ην δε τρία μέρη της δλης συμπλοκης καὶ τρεῖς ναυμαχίαι συνέστησαν πολύ κεχωρισμέναι 4 τοῖς τόποις ἀλλήλων· τῷ δ' έκατέρων πάρισα τὰ μέρη γενέσθαι κατά τὸν έξ ἀρχῆς χειρισμὸν έφάμιλλον είναι συνέβαινε καὶ τὸν κίνδυνον. οὐ 5 μην άλλα το κατα λόγον εν εκάστοις επετελειτο περὶ τὴν μάχην, ὅπερ εἰκὸς ὅταν ἡ παραπλήσια 8 πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων, οἱ γὰρ πρῶτοι <κιν-δυνεύσαντες πρῶτοι > καὶ διεκρίθησαν: τέλος γὰρ έκβιασθέντες οι περί τον 'Αμίλκαν είς φυγήν ώρμη-7 σαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος ἀνεδεῖτο τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς δό δὲ Μάρκος, συνορών τὸν περὶ τοὺς τριαρίους καὶ τὰς ἱππηγοὺς ἀγῶνα, κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐβοήθει τούτοις, έχων τοῦ δευτέρου στόλου τὰς ἀκεραίους 8 ναθς. συνάψαντος δέ καὶ προσμίξαντος αὐτοθ τοθς περί τον "Αννωνα, ταχέως άναθαρρήσαντες οί τριάριοι, καίπερ ήδη κακώς απαλλάττοντες, πάλιν έπερ-9 ρώσθησαν πρός τὸν κίνδυνον. οι δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι. των μεν κατά πρόσωπον αὐτοῖς προσμαχομένων, των δε κατά νώτου προσπιπτόντων, δυσχρηστούμενοι, καὶ παραδόξως ὑπὸ τῶν βοηθησάντων κυκλούμενοι, κλίναντες πελαγίαν εποιούντο την ύπο-10 χώρησιν. κατά δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν ὅ τε Λεύκιος, έπαναπλέων ήδη καὶ θεωρών συγκεκλεισμένον πρὸς τῆ γῆ τὸν τρίτον στόλον ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων εὐωνύμου κέρατος, ὅ τε Μάρκος, ἐν ἀσφαλεῖ καταλιπών τὰς ἱππηγούς καὶ τούς τριαρίους, ώρμη-78

force which was posted near the shore, changing their former formation and deploying into line with their prows facing the enemy, attacked the vessels which were towing the horse-transports. Letting go their tow-lines this squadron met and engaged the enemy. Thus the whole conflict consisted of three parts, and three battles were going on at a wide distance from each other. respective forces were in each case of equal strength owing to their disposition at the outset, the battle also was fought on equal terms. However, in each case things fell out as one would expect, when the forces engaged are so equally matched. Those who had commenced the battle were the first to be separated. for Hamilcar's division was finally forced back and took to flight. Lucius was now occupied in taking the prizes in tow, and Marcus, observing the struggle in which the triarii and horse-transports were involved, hastened to their assistance with such of the ships of the second squadron as were undamaged. When he reached Hanno's division and came into conflict with it, the triarii at once took heart, though they had had much the worst of it, and recovered their fighting spirit. The Carthaginians, attacked both in front and in the rear, were in difficulties, finding themselves surrounded, to their surprise, by the relieving force, and giving way, they began to retreat out to sea. Meanwhile both Lucius, who was by this time sailing up and observed that the third squadron was shut in close to the shore by the Carthaginian left wing, and Marcus, who had now left the horse-transports and triarii in

11 σαν ἀμφότεροι βοηθεῖν τοῖς κινδυνεύουσι. παραπλήσιον γὰρ ἦν ἦδη τὸ γινόμενον πολιορκία: καὶ
πάντες αν ἀπολώλεισαν οὖτοί γε προφανῶς, εἰ μὴ
δεδιότες τοὺς κόρακας οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι περιφράξαντες
μὲν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τῆ γῆ συνεῖχον, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐμβολὰς διὰ τὴν συμπλοκὴν εὐλαβῶς ἔχοντες οὐ προσ-

12 ήεσαν. ταχέως δ' ἐπιγενόμενοι καὶ κυκλώσαντες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους αὐτάνδρους μὲν ἔλαβον πεντήκοντα ναῦς τῶν πολεμίων, ὀλίγαι δέ τι-

13 νες παρά τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξασαι διέφυγον. ὁ μὲν οὖν κατὰ μέρος κίνδυνος τοιαύτην ἔσχε τὴν διάθεσιν, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάσης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατα

14 τους 'Ρωμαίους. διεφθάρη δε τούτων μεν είκοσι και τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δε Καρχηδονίων ὑπερ τριάκοντα. ναῦς δε τῶν μεν 'Ρωμαίων αὔτανδρος οὐδεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις εγένεθ' ὑποχείριος, τῶν δε

Καρχηδονίων έξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.

29 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι προσεπισιτισάμενοι καὶ τὰς αἰχμαλώτους ναῦς καταρτίσαντες, έτι δè τὴν άρμόζουσαν τοῖς προτερήμασιν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιησάμενοι των πληρωμάτων, ανήγοντο 2 ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην. προσσχόντες δε ταις πρώταις πλεούσαις ναυσίν ύπο την άκραν την Ερμαίαν έπονομαζομένην, η πρό παντός τοῦ περί τὴν Καρχηδόνα κόλπου κειμένη προτείνει πελάγιος ώς πρός την Σικελίαν, και προσδεξάμενοι τὰς ἐπιπλεούσας ἐνταῦθα ναῦς, καὶ πάντα συναθροίσαντες τὸν στόλον, ἔπλεον παρὰ τὴν χώραν, έως έπι την 'Ασπίδα καλουμένην πόλιν άφίκοντο. 3 ποιησάμενοι δε την ἀπόβασιν ένταῦθα καὶ νεωλκήσαντες, έτι δε τάφρω και χάρακι περιλαβόντες τάς ναθς, εγίνοντο πρός το πολιορκείν αθτήν, ου βου-80

safety, hastened together to the relief of this force which was in grave peril; for the state of matters now was just like a siege, and they all would evidently have been lost if the Carthaginians had not been afraid of the ravens and simply hedged them in and held them close to the land instead of charging. apprehensive as they were of coming to close quarters. The Consuls, coming up rapidly and surrounding the Carthaginians, captured fifty ships with their crews, a few managing to slip out along shore and escape. The separate encounters fell out as I have described, and the final result of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. The latter lost twenty-four sail sunk and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty-four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

29. After this the Romans, laying in a further supply of provisions, repairing the captured ships, and bestowing on their men the attention which their success deserved, put to sea and sailed towards Africa, reaching the shore with their advanced ships under the promontory known as the Hermaeum which lies in front of the whole Gulf of Carthage and stretches out to sea in the direction of Sicily. Having waited there until their other ships came up, and having united their whole fleet, they sailed along the coast till they reached the city of Aspis. Landing there and beaching their ships, which they surrounded with a trench and palisade, they set themselves to lay siege to the town, the garrison of

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λομένων έκουσίως σφίσι προσχωρήσαι των κατ-4 εχόντων την πόλιν. οί δε διαφυγόντες εκ τοῦ κατὰ την ναυμαχίαν κινδύνου τῶν Καρχηδονίων κατα-πλεύσαντες, καὶ πεπεισμένοι τοὺς ὑπεναντίους εκ τοῦ γεγονότος προτερήματος ἐπαρθέντας εὐθέως ποιήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρετήρουν ταις πεζικαις και ναυτικαις δυνά-5 μεσι τοὺς προκειμένους τῆς πόλεως τόπους. ἐπιγνόντες δὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἀσφαλῶς ἀποβεβηκότας καὶ πολιορκοῦντας τὴν ᾿Ασπίδα, τοῦ μὲν παραφυλάττειν τον επίπλουν απέγνωσαν, συνήθροιζον δε τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ περὶ φυλακὴν εγίνοντο τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τῆς χώρας. οἱ δε Ῥωμαῖοι κυριεύσαντες της 'Ασπίδος καὶ φυλακήν ἀπολιπόντες της 6 πόλεως καὶ χώρας, ἔτι δὲ πρεσβευτάς εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πέμψαντες τοὺς ἀπαγγελοῦντας μὲν περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἐρησομένους δὲ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων, τί δεῖ ποιεῖν καὶ πῶς χρησθαι τοῖς πράγμασι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάση τῆ δυνάμει κατὰ σπουδὴν ἀναζεύ-7 ξαντες, ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὐδενὸς δ' ἐμποδὼν ἱσταμένου, πολλὰς μὲν οἰκήσεις περιττῶς κατεσκευασμένας διέφθειραν, πολύ δέ πληθός της τετραπόδου λείας περιεβάλοντο σώματα δε πλείω 8 των δισμυρίων έπὶ τὰς ναθς ἀνήγαγον. ἐν δὲ τούτω τῷ καιρῷ παρῆσαν ἐκ τῆς Ῥώμης οἱ διασαφοῦντες ὅτι δεῖ τὸν μὲν ἔνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μένειν έχοντα δυνάμεις τὰς ἀρκούσας, τὸν δ' έτερον ἀπο-9 κομίζειν εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην τὸν στόλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μάρκος ἔμενεν, ὑπολειπόμενος ναῦς τετταράκοντα καὶ πεζοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ 10 πεντακοσίους · ό δὲ Λεύκιος ἀναλαβών τὰ πληρώματα καὶ τὸ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πληθος, καὶ κομι-82

which refused to surrender voluntarily. Those Carthaginians who made good their escape from the naval battle sailed home, and being convinced that the enemy, elated by their recent success, would at once attack Carthage itself from the sea, kept watch at different points over the approaches to the city with their land and sea forces. But when they learnt that the Romans had safely landed and were laying siege to Aspis, they abandoned the measures taken to guard against an attack from the sea, and uniting their forces devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs. The Romans, after making themselves masters of Aspis, where they left a garrison to hold the town and district, sent a mission to Rome to report on recent events, and to inquire what they should do in future and how they were to deal with the whole situation. They then hastily advanced with their whole force and set about plundering the country. As nobody tried to prevent them, they destroyed a number of handsome and luxuriously furnished dwelling-houses, possessed themselves of a quantity of cattle, and captured more than twenty thousand slaves, taking them back to their ships. Messengers from Rome now arrived with instructions for one of the Consuls to remain on the spot with an adequate force and for the other to bring the fleet back to Rome. Marcus Regulus, therefore, remained, retaining forty ships and a force of fifteen thousand infantry and five hundred horse, while Lucius, taking with him the ship's crews and all

σθείς παρά τὴν Σικελίαν ἀσφαλώς, ἦκεν είς τὴν

'Ρώμην.

30 Οί δε Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες την των πολεμίων παρασκευήν χρονιωτέραν οδσαν, πρώτον μέν στρατηγούς έαυτων είλοντο δύο, τόν τ' "Αννωνος Ασδρούβαν καὶ Βώσταρον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν 'Αμίλκαν ἔπεμπον εἰς τὴν 'Ηράκλειαν, καλοῦντες 2 κατά τάγος αὐτόν. ὁ δ' ἀναλαβών ἱππεῖς πεντακοσίους και πεζούς πεντακισχιλίους παρην είς την Καρχηδόνα καὶ κατασταθείς στρατηγός τρίτος, έβουλεύετο μετά των περί τον 'Ασδρούβαν πως δεί 3 χρησθαι τοίς παρούσιν. έδοξεν οθν αὐτοίς βοηθείν τῆ χώρα καὶ μὴ περιοράν αὐτὴν άδεῶς πορθουμέ-4 νην. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος μετά τινας ἡμέρας ἐπεπορεύετο, τὰ μεν ἀτείχιστα των ερυμάτων εξ εφόδου διαρ-5 πάζων, τὰ δὲ τετειχισμένα πολιορκῶν. ἀφικόμενος δὲ πρὸς πόλιν 'Αδύν ἀξιόχρεω, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ταύτην συνίστατο μετά σπουδης έργα καὶ πολιορ-6 κίαν. οι δε Καρχηδόνιοι τῆ τε πόλει σπουδάζοντες βοηθήσαι και των υπαίθρων αντιποιείσθαι κρί-7 νοντες έξηγον την δύναμιν. καὶ καταλαβόμενοι λόφον ύπερδέξιον μεν των πολεμίων, άφυη δε ταις έαυτῶν δυνάμεσιν, εν τούτω κατεστρατοπέδευσαν. 8 λοιπον έχοντες μέν τας πλείστας ελπίδας εν τοις ίππεῦσι καὶ τοῖς θηρίοις, ἀφέμενοι δὲ τῶν ἐπιπέδων χωρίων καὶ συγκλείσαντες σφας αὐτοὺς εἰς τόπους έρυμνούς και δυσβάτους, έμελλον διδάξειν τους πολεμίους ο δέον ήν πράττειν κατ' αὐτῶν. ο ο δη καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. συννοήσαντες γάρ οἱ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ήγεμόνες έμπείρως ὅτι τὸ πρακτικώτατον καὶ φοβερώτατον τῆς τῶν ὑπεναντίων δυνάμεως

the prisoners, passed safely along the coast of Sicily and reached Rome.

30. The Carthaginians, observing that the Romans 255 B.C. were preparing for a long occupation, in the first place elected two generals from among themselves, Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno, and Bostarus, and next sent to Heraclea to Hamilcar. ordering him to return instantly. Taking with him five hundred horse and five thousand foot, he came to Carthage where, being appointed third general, he held a consultation with Hasdrubal and his staff as to what steps should be taken. decided on marching to the assistance of the country and no longer looking on while it was plundered with immunity. A few days later Regulus began to advance, taking by assault and pillaging the unwalled places and laying siege to those which had walls. On reaching Adys, a town of some importance, he encamped about it and busied himself with raising works to besiege it. The Carthaginians, being anxious to relieve the town, and having decided to attempt to regain the command of the open country, led out their forces. They took possession of a hill which, while overlooking the enemy, was not a favourable position for their own army and there they encamped. In this manner, though their best hope lay in their cavalry and elephants, yet by quitting the level country and shutting themselves up in a precipitous place, difficult of access, they were sure to make it plain to their adversaries how best to attack them, and this is exactly what did happen. For the Roman commanders, perceiving from their experience of war that the most efficient and formidable part of the

ηχρείωται διὰ τοὺς τόπους, οὐκ ἀνέμειναν ἔως ἐκεῖ-10 νοι καταβάντες είς τὰ πεδία παρετάξαντο, χρώμενοι δέ τοις ίδίοις καιροις αμα τῷ φωτί προσέβαινον έξ 11 έκατέρου τοῦ μέρους πρὸς τὸν λόφον. οἱ μὲν οὖν ίππεις και τὰ θηρία τοις Καρχηδονίοις ήν άχρηστα τελέως οι δε μισθοφόροι πάνυ γενναίως και προθύμως ἐκβοηθήσαντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον στρατόπεδον 12 ἢνάγκασαν ἐκκλῖναι καὶ φυγεῖν· ἐπεὶ δὲ προπεσόντες καὶ κυκλωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ θατέρου μέρους προσβαινόντων έτράπησαν, μετά ταθτα πάντες εὐ-13 θύς έκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας έξέπεσον, τὰ μὲν οὖν θηρία μετά τῶν ἱππέων, ἐπεὶ τάχιστα τῶν ὁμαλῶν ηψατο, μετ' ἀσφαλείας έποιοῦντο την ἀποχώρησιν 14 οἱ δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι τοὺς πεζοὺς βραχὺν ἐπιδιώξαντες τόπον καὶ τὸν χάρακα διαρπάσαντες, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πασαν επιπορευόμενοι την χώραν και τας πόλεις 15 άδεως ἐπόρθουν. γενόμενοι δὲ τῆς προσαγορευομένης πόλεως Τύνητος εγκρατείς, εὐφυοῦς ὑπαρχούσης πρὸς τὰς προκειμένας ἐπιβολάς, ἔτι δὲ κειμένης εὐκαίρως κατά τε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τῆς σύνεγγυς ταύτη χώρας, κατεστρατοπέδευσαν είς αὐτήν. 31 Οι δε Καρχηδόνιοι μικρῷ μεν πρότερον κατὰ θάλατταν, τότε δε κατὰ γῆν ἐπταικότες, οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνανδρίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων άβουλίαν, κατά πάντα τρόπον ένεπεπτώκεισαν 2 είς δυσχερή διάθεσιν. ἄμα γὰρ τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τὸ τῶν Νομάδων ἔθνος συνεπιτιθέμενον αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττω, πλείω δὲ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων εἰργάζετο κακὰ 3 τὴν χώραν. ἐξ ὧν διὰ τὸν φόβον συμφευγόντων εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας δυσθυμία καὶ λιμὸς ἦν ὁλοσχερής, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος, τὰ δὲ

enemy's force was rendered unserviceable by their position, did not wait for the Carthaginians to come down and offer battle on the plain, but, seizing on their own opportunity, advanced at daybreak on the hill from both sides. And so their elephants and cavalry were absolutely useless to the Carthaginians, but their mercenaries sallying out with great gallantry and dash compelled the first legion to give way and take to flight; but on their advancing too far and being surrounded and driven back by the force that was attacking on the other side, the whole Carthaginian army abandoned their camp. elephants and cavalry, as soon as they reached level ground, effected their retreat in safety, and the Romans, after pursuing the infantry for a short distance and destroying the camp, henceforth overran and plundered the country and its towns unmolested. Having made themselves masters of the town named Tunis, which was a suitable base for these raids, and also well situated for operations against the capital and its immediate environs, they established themselves there.

31. The Carthaginians, having thus been twice defeated, shortly before at sea and now on land, in both cases owing to no lack of bravery in their troops, but owing to the incompetence of their commanders, were now in a thoroughly difficult position. For, in addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians, attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter. The terror-stricken inhabitants took refuge in the city of Carthage where utter despondency and extreme famine prevailed, the latter owing to overcrowding and the former

4 διὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τῆς πολιορκίας. ὁ δὲ Μάρκος όρων τους Καρχηδονίους και κατά γην και κατά θάλατταν ἐσφαλμένους, καὶ νομίζων ὅσον οὖπω κρατήσειν τῆς πόλεως, ἀγωνιῶν δὲ μὴ συμβῆ τὸν έπιπαραγινόμενον στρατηγόν έκ της 'Ρώμης φθάσαντα την έπιγραφην των πραγμάτων λαβείν, πρου-5 καλείτο τους Καρχηδονίους είς διαλύσεις. οί δ' ασμένως ακούσαντες εξέπεμψαν αύτων τούς πρώτους ἄνδρας: οἱ καὶ συμμίξαντες αὐτῷ τοσοῦτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ ῥέπειν ταῖς γνώμαις ἐπὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τι τῶν λεγομένων ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀκούοντες ὑπομένειν ἐδύε ναντο τὸ βάρος τῶν ἐπιταγμάτων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μάρκος, ώς ήδη κεκρατηκώς των όλων, ό τι ποτέ συνεχώρει, παν ὤετο δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐν χάριτι καὶ δωρεα η λαμβάνειν οι δε Καρχηδόνιοι θεωροῦντες ότι καὶ γενομένοις αὐτοῖς ὑποχειρίοις οὐδεν ἂν συνεξακολουθήσαι βαρύτερον τῶν τότε προσταγμάτων, οὐ μόνον δυσαρεστήσαντες τοις προτεινομένοις έπανηλθον, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσκόψαντες τῆ βαρύτητι τοῦ Μάρ-8 κου. το δε συνέδριον των Καρχηδονίων διακουσαν τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων, καίπερ σχεδον απεγνωκός τας της σωτηρίας έλπίδας, όμως ούτως ἀνδρωδως ἔστη καὶ γενναίως ὥστε παν ύπομένειν είλετο καὶ παντός έργου καὶ καιροῦ πειραν λαμβάνειν, εφ' ω μηδέν άγεννες μηδ' άνάξιον των πρό τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομεῖναι.

32 Περὶ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους καταπλεῖ τις εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα ξενολόγος τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων εἰς τὴν 'Ελλάδα πρότερον [εἰς τὴν Καρχηδονίων], ἄγων στρατιώτας πλείστους, ἐν οἰς καὶ Ξάνθιππόν τινα Λακεδαιμόνιον, ἄνδρα τῆς Λακωνικῆς ἀγωγῆς μετ-

owing to the expectation of a siege. perceiving that the Carthaginians were utterly worsted both by land and sea and expecting to capture the city in a very short time, was yet apprehensive lest his successor in the Consulate should arrive from Rome before Carthage fell and receive the credit of the success, and he therefore invited the enemy to enter into negotiations. The Carthaginians gave a ready ear to these advances, and sent out an embassy of their leading citizens. On meeting Regulus, however, the envoys were so far from being inclined to yield to the conditions he proposed that they could not even bear listening to the severity of his demands. For, imagining himself to be complete master of the situation, he considered they ought to regard any concessions on his part as gifts and acts of grace. As it was evident to the Carthaginians that even if they became subject to the Romans, they could be in no worse case than if they yielded to the present demands, they returned not only dissatisfied with the conditions proposed but offended by Regulus's harshness. The attitude of the Carthaginian Senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every extremity.

32. Just about this time there arrived at Carthage one of the recruiting-officers they had formerly dispatched to Greece, bringing a considerable number of soldiers and among them a certain Xanthippus of Lacedaemon, a man who had been

εσχηκότα καὶ τριβὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἔχοντα 2 σύμμετρον. δς διακούσας τὸ γεγονὸς ἐλάττωμα καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ γέγονε, καὶ συνθεωρήσας τάς τε λοιπὰς παρασκευὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πλήθος των ίππέων καὶ των ἐλεφάντων, παραυτίκα συνελογίσατο καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους ἐνεφάνισε διότι συμβαίνει τοὺς Καρχηδονίους οὐχ ὑπὸ 'Ρωμαίων, αὐτοὺς δ' ὑφ' αὐτών ἡττᾶσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν 3 των ήγουμένων. ταχύ δὲ διὰ τὴν περίστασιν των τοῦ Ξανθίππου λόγων διαδοθέντων εἰς τὰ πλήθη καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ προεστῶτες ἀνα-4 καλεῖσθαι καὶ πεῖραν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνειν. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος είς τὰς χείρας έφερε τοις ἄρχουσι τοὺς άπολογισμούς καὶ παρά τί νῦν σφαλείησαν, καὶ διότι πεισθέντες αὐτῷ καὶ χρησάμενοι τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις των τόπων έν τε ταις πορείαις και στρατοπεδείαις καὶ παρατάξεσιν εὐγερῶς έαυτοῖς τε τὴν άσφάλειαν δυνήσονται παρασκευάζειν καὶ τοὺς ὑπ-5 εναντίους νικάν. οι δε στρατηγοί δεξάμενοι τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ πεισθέντες αὐτῷ παραχρῆμα τὰς δυ-6 νάμεις ενεχείρισαν. ήν μεν οδυ καί κατά ταύτην την παρά του Εανθίππου διαδιδομένην φωνήν δ θροῦς καὶ λαλιά τις εὔελπις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς. η ώς δ' έξαγαγών πρό της πόλεως την δύναμιν έν κόσμω παρενέβαλε καί τι καὶ κινεῖν τῶν μερῶν ἐν τάξει καὶ παραγγέλλειν κατὰ νόμους ήρξατο, τηλικαύτην ἐποίει διαφορὰν παρὰ τὴν τῶν πρότερον στρατηγών ἀπειρίαν ώστε μετά κραυγής ἐπισημαίνεσθαι τους πολλούς και σπεύδειν ώς τάχιστα συμβαλείν τοίς πολεμίοις, πεπεισμένους μηδέν αν 8 παθείν δεινον ήγουμένου Ξανθίππου, τούτων δε

brought up in the Spartan discipline, and had had a fair amount of military experience. On hearing of the recent reverse and how and in what way it occurred, and on taking a comprehensive view of the remaining resources of the Carthaginians and their strength in cavalry and elephants, he at once reached the conclusion and communicated it to friends that the Carthaginians owed their defeat not to the Romans but to themselves, through the inexperience of their generals. Owing to the critical situation Xanthippus's remarks soon got abroad and reached the ears of the generals, whereupon the government decided to summon him before He presented himself them and examine him. before them and communicated to them his estimate of the situation, pointing out why they were now being worsted, and urging that if they would take his advice and avail themselves of the level country for marching, encamping and offering battle they could easily not only secure their own safety, but defeat the enemy. The generals, accepting what he said and resolving to follow his advice, at once entrusted their forces to him. Now even when the original utterance of Xanthippus got abroad, it had caused considerable rumour and more or less sanguine talk among the populace, but on his leading the army out and drawing it up in good order before the city and even beginning to manœuvre some portions of it correctly and give the word of command in the orthodox military terms, the contrast to the incompetency of the former generals was so striking that the soldiery expressed their approval by cheers and were eager to engage the enemy, feeling sure that if Xanthippus was in command no disaster could

γινομένων οι στρατηγοί συνιδόντες τοὺς ὅχλους ἀνατεθαρρηκότας παραδόξως ταις ψυχαις, παρακαλέσαντες αὐτοὺς τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ, μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὥρμησαν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν. αὕτη δ' ἦν πεζοὶ μὲν εἰς μυρίους καὶ δισχιλίους, ἱππεις δὲ τετρακισχίλιοι, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἐλεφάντων πλῆθος

έγγιστά που των έκατόν. 33 Οί δε 'Ρωμαΐοι θεωροῦντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τάς τε πορείας ποιουμένους δια των δμαλών τόπων καὶ τὰς στρατοπεδείας τιθέντας εν τοῖς επιπέδοις των χωρίων, κατ' αὐτὸ μὲν τοῦτο ξενιζόμενοι διετρέποντο, τοις γε μην όλοις έσπευδον έγγίσαι τοις 2 πολεμίοις. συνάψαντες δε την μεν πρώτην ημέραν κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ώς δέκα σταδίους αποσχόντες 8 των ύπεναντίων. τη δε κατά πόδας οι μεν προεστῶτες τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐβουλεύοντο πῶς καὶ τί 4 πρακτέον είη κατά τὸ παρόν οι δὲ πολλοὶ προθύμως έχοντες πρός τον κίνδυνον, συστρεφόμενοι κατὰ μέρη καὶ κατ' ὅνομα τὸν Ξάνθιππον ἀναβοῶν-5 τες ἐξάγειν σφᾶς ὤοντο δεῖν τὴν ταχίστην. οἱ δὲ στρατηγοί τήν τε των όχλων όρμην και προθυμίαν θεωροθντες, αμα δε καὶ τοθ Ξανθίππου διαμαρτυρομένου μὴ παριέναι τὸν καιρόν, παρήγγειλαν τῷ μὲν πλήθει διασκευάζεσθαι, τῷ δὲ Ξανθίππῳ χρῆσθαι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπέτρεψαν ὧς ποτ' αὐτῷ δοκέῖ 6 συμφέρειν. ὁ δὲ λαβών τὴν ἐξουσίαν, τοὺς μὲν ἐλέφαντας ἐξαγαγών ἐφ' ἕνα πρὸ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως εν μετώπω κατέστησε, την δε φάλαγγα των Καρχηδονίων εν αποστήματι συμμέτρω τούτοις κατη όπιν επέστησε. των δε μισθοφόρων τους μεν επί τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας παρενέβαλε, τοὺς δ' εὐκινητοτάτους δμοῦ τοῖς ἱππεῦσιν ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος προέστη-92

befall them. Upon this the generals, seeing the extraordinary recovery of courage among the troops, addressed them in words suitable to the occasion and after a few days took the field with their forces. These consisted of twelve thousand foot, four thousand

horse and very nearly a hundred elephants.

33. When the Romans saw that the Carthaginians were marching through the flat country and pitching their camps on level ground, they were surprised indeed and somewhat disturbed by this in particular, but yet were anxious on the whole to get into contact with the enemy. On coming into touch they encamped on the first day at a distance of about ten stades from him. On the following day the Carthaginian government held a council to discuss what should be done for the present and the means thereto. But the troops, eager as they were for a battle, collecting in groups and calling on Xanthippus by name, clearly indicated their opinion that he should lead them forward at once. The generals when they saw the enthusiasm and keenness of the soldiers, Xanthippus at the same time imploring them not to let the opportunity slip, ordered the troops to get ready and gave Xanthippus authority to conduct operations as he himself thought most advantageous. Acting on this authority he sent the elephants forward and drew them up in a single line in front of the whole force, placing the Carthaginian phalanx at a suitable distance behind them. of the mercenaries he stationed on the right wing, while the most active he placed together with the cavalry in front of both wings. The Romans, seeing

8 σεν. οί δε 'Ρωμαΐοι συνιδόντες παραταττομένους ο τούς ύπεναντίους άντεξήεσαν έτοίμως. καταπληττόμενοι δε καὶ προορώμενοι τὴν τῶν ελεφάντων έφοδον, προθέμενοι τούς γροσφομάχους πολλάς έπ' άλλήλαις κατόπιν ίστασαν σημείας, τους δ' ίππεις 10 εμέρισαν εφ' εκάτερον τὸ κέρας. την δε σύμπασαν τάξιν βραχυτέραν μεν ἢ πρόσθεν, βαθυτέραν δὲ ποιήσαντες, τῆς μεν πρὸς τὰ θηρία μάχης δεόντως ήσαν έστοχασμένοι, της δέ πρός τους ίππεις, πολλαπλασίους όντας των παρ' αὐτοῖς, όλοσχερως ήστό-11 χησαν. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφότεροι κατὰ τὰς ἐαυτῶν προαιρέσεις και καθόλου και κατά μέρος έκάστους έθηκαν είς τὰς ἁρμοζούσας τάξεις, ἔμενον ἐν κόσμῳ, καραδοκούντες τον καιρον της αλλήλων επιθέσεως. 34 ἄμα δὲ τῷ τὸν Ξάνθιππον τοῖς μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων παραγγείλαι προάγειν και διασπάν τὰς τών ύπεναντίων τάξεις, τοῖς δ' ἱππεῦσιν ἐφ' ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος κυκλοῦν καὶ προσβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμί-2 οις, τότε δη καὶ τὸ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατόπεδον κατὰ τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἔθη συνεψόφησαν τοῖς ὅπλοις καὶ 3 συναλαλάξαντες ώρμησαν έπὶ τοὺς πολεμίους. οί μεν οδν ίππεις των 'Ρωμαίων ταχέως άφ' έκατέρων των κεράτων έφυγον, διά το πολλαπλασίους είναι 4 τους Καρχηδονίους. των δέ πεζων οι ταχθέντες έπὶ τοῦ λαιοῦ κέρως, ἄμα μὲν ἐκκλίνοντες τὴν τῶν θηρίων έφοδον, αμα δὲ καταφρονοῦντες τῶν μισθοφόρων, ωρμησαν έπὶ τὸ δεξιὸν κέρας τῶν Καρχηδονίων τρεψάμενοι δὲ τούτους ἐπέκειντο καὶ κατεδίωκον 5 αὐτοὺς ἔως εἰς τὸν χάρακα. τῶν δὲ κατὰ τοὺς έλέφαντας ταχθέντων οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι συμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τῶν ζώων ἐξωθούμενοι καὶ καταπατούμενοι σωρηδον έν χειρών νόμω διεφθείροντο, 94

the enemy drawn up to offer battle, issued forth to meet them with alacrity. Alarmed at the prospect of the elephants' charge, they stationed the velites in the van and behind them the legions many maniples deep, dividing the cavalry between the two wings. In thus making their whole line shorter and deeper than before they had been correct enough in so far as concerned the coming encounter with the elephants, but as to that with the cavalry, which largely outnumbered theirs, they were very wide of the mark. When both sides had made that general and detailed disposition of their forces that best suited their plan, they remained drawn up in order, each awaiting a favourable opportunity to attack. 34. No sooner had Xanthippus ordered the elephantdrivers to advance and break the enemy's line and the cavalry on each wing to execute a turning movement and charge, than the Roman army, clashing their shields and spears together, as is their custom, and uttering their battle-cry, advanced to the attack. As for the Roman cavalry on both wings it was speedily put to flight owing to the superior numbers of the Carthaginians; while of the infantry, the left wing, partly to avoid the onset of the elephants, and partly owing to the contempt they felt for the mercenary force, fell upon the Carthaginian right wing, and having broken it, pressed on and pursued it as far as the camp. But the first ranks of those who were stationed opposite the elephants, pushed back when they encountered them and trodden under foot by the strength of the animals, fell in heaps in the mêlée, while the formation of the



της γε μην όλης τάξεως τὸ σύστημα διὰ τὸ βάθος τῶν ἐφεστώτων εως τινὸς ἀδιάσπαστον εμεινεν. 6 έπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν τὰς ἐσχάτας ἔχοντες τάξεις κυκλούμενοι πανταχόθεν ύπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἢναγκάζοντο πρός τούτους στρεφόμενοι κινδυνεύειν, οί δε διά μέσων των ελεφάντων είς το πρόσθεν εκβιαζόμενοι καὶ κατὰ νώτου παριστάμενοι τῶν θηρίων εἰς ἀκέραιον καὶ συντεταγμένην έμπίπτοντες την των Καρ-7 χηδονίων φάλαγγα διεφθείροντο, τότε δή πανταχόθεν πονοθντες, οἱ μὲν πλείστοι τῶν Ῥωμαίων συνεπατήθησαν ύπὸ της ύπερφυοῦς βίας τῶν ζώων, οί δε λοιποί συνηκοντίσθησαν ύπο τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ίππέων ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ, τελέως 8 δέ τινες ὀλίγοι πρὸς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. οὐσῶν δὲ πεδινῶν τῶν ὑποχωρήσεων, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ των θηρίων καὶ των ίππέων απώλλυντο, πεντακόσιοι δ' ἴσως οἱ μετὰ Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ φυγόντες μετ' ολίγον υποχείριοι γενόμενοι σύν αὐτῷ 9 κείνω πάντες εζωγρήθησαν. των μεν οὖν παρά τοις Καρχηδονίοις μισθοφόρων έπεσον είς όκτα-κοσίους οι κατά τὸ λαιὸν τῶν Ῥωμαίων ταχθέντες, των δε 'Ρωμαίων εσώθησαν μεν είς δισχιλίους οί κατά τὸ δίωγμα τῶν προειρημένων ἐκτὸς γενόμενοι 10 τοῦ κινδύνου, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πληθος διεφθάρη πλην Μάρκου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄμα τούτω φυγόν-11 των. αί μεν οθν σημαίαι των 'Ρωμαίων αί σωθεί-12 σαι διέπεσον είς την 'Ασπίδα παραδόξως οί δε Καρχηδόνιοι τους νεκρούς σκυλεύσαντες και τον στρατηγον αμα μετά τών αιγμαλώτων άγοντες έπανηλθον περιχαρείς τοίς παρούσιν είς την πόλιν.

35 ΄ Έν ῷ΄ καιρῷ πολλά τις ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐπισημαινόμενος εὖροι πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν τοῦ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 96

main body, owing to the depths of the ranks behind. remained for a time unbroken. At length, however, those in the rear were surrounded on all sides by the cavalry and obliged to face round and fight them, while those who had managed to force a passage through the elephants and collect in the rear of those beasts, encountered the Carthaginian phalanx quite fresh and in good order and were cut to pieces. Henceforth the Romans were in sore straits on all sides, the greater number were trampled to death by the vast weight of the elephants, while the remainder were shot down by the numerous cavalry in their ranks as they stood. Only quite a small body tried to effect their escape, and of these, as their line of retreat was over level ground, some were dispatched by the elephants and cavalry, and about five hundred who got away with their general Regulus shortly afterwards fell into the enemy's hands and were made prisoners, himself included. It resulted that in this battle the Carthaginians lost about eight hundred of the mercenaries, who had faced the Roman left wing, while of the Romans there were saved but about two thousand, whom the pursuit of the mercenaries I mentioned above carried out of the main battle. All the rest perished with the exception of the general Regulus and those who took to flight together The maniples which escaped got through by extraordinary luck to Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Consul and the other captives, returned to the city in high glee at the turn of affairs.

35. In these events there will be found by one who notes them aright much to contribute to

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2 βίου συντελεσθέντα. καὶ γὰρ τὸ διαπιστεῖν τῇ τύχῃ, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τὰς εὐπραγίας, ἐναργέστατον έφάνη πασι τότε δια των Μάρκου συμπτωμάτων 3 δ΄ γὰρ μικρῷ πρότερον οὐ διδούς ἔλεον οὐδὲ συγγνώμην τοις πταίουσι παρά πόδας αὐτὸς ήγετο δεη-4 σόμενος τούτων περί της έαυτοῦ σωτηρίας. καὶ μην τὸ παρ' Εὐριπίδη πάλαι καλῶς εἰρησθαι δοκοῦν ὡς "ἐν σοφὸν βούλευμα τὰς πολλὰς χέρας νικᾳ " τότε δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἔλαβε τὴν πίστιν. δ είς γαρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ μία γνώμη τὰ μὲν ἀήττητα πλήθη καὶ πραγματικά δοκοῦντ' εἶναι καθείλε, τὸ δὲ προφανῶς πεπτωκὸς ἄρδην πολίτευμα καὶ τὰς άπηλγηκυίας ψυχάς των δυνάμεων έπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον 6 ήγαγεν. εγώ δε τούτων επεμνήσθην χάριν της των η έντυγχανόντων τοις ύπομνήμασι διορθώσεως. δυείν γαρ όντων τρόπων πασιν ανθρώποις της έπὶ τὸ βέλτιον μεταθέσεως, τοῦ τε διὰ τῶν ιδίων συμπτωμάτων καὶ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἐναργέστερον μέν είναι συμβαίνει τὸν διὰ τῶν οἰκείων περιπετειών, αβλαβέστερον δε τον δια των αλλοτρίων. 8 διὸ τὸν μὲν οὐδέποθ' έκουσίως αίρετέον, ἐπεὶ μετὰ μεγάλων πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ποιεῖ τὴν διόρθωσιν, τον δ' ἀεὶ θηρευτέον, ἐπεὶ χωρὶς βλάβης ἔστι συν-9 ιδεῖν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιον. ἐξ ὧν συνιδόντι καλλίστην παιδείαν ήγητέον πρὸς ἀληθινὸν βίον τὴν ἐκ της πραγματικής ιστορίας περιγινομένην έμπειρίαν 10 μόνη γάρ αυτή χωρίς βλάβης ἐπὶ παντός καιροῦ καὶ περιστάσεως κριτάς άληθινούς άποτελεῖ τοῦ βελτίονος. ταθτα μέν οδν ήμιν έπι τοσοθτον ειρήσθω.

36 Καρχηδόνιοι δέ, κατὰ νοῦν ἀπάντων σφίσι κεχωρηκότων, ὑπερβολὴν χαρᾶς οὐκ ἀπέλιπον διά τε 98

the better conduct of life. For the precept to distrust Fortune, and especially when we are enjoying success, was most clearly enforced on all by Regulus's misfortunes. He who so short a time previously had refused to pity or take mercy on those in distress was now, almost immediately afterwards, being led captive to implore pity and mercy in order to save his own life. And again Euripides' words, so long recognized as just, that "one wise counsel conquers many hands" were then confirmed by the actual facts. For one man and one brain laid low that host which seemed so invincible and efficient, and restored the fortunes of a state which in the eyes of all was utterly fallen and the deadened spirit of its soldiers. This I mention for the sake of the improvement of the readers of this history. For there are two ways by which all men can reform themselves, the one through their own mischances, the other through those of others, and of these the former is the more impressive, but the latter the Therefore we should never choose the less burtful. first method if we can help it, as it corrects by means of great pain and peril, but ever pursue the other, since by it we can discern what is best without suffering hurt. Reflecting on this we should regard as the best discipline for actual life the experience that accrues from serious history; for this alone makes us, without inflicting any harm on us, the most competent judges of what is best at every time and in every circumstance. Well, on this subject I have said enough.

36. All having now fallen out with the Carthaginians as they could best desire, there was no extravagance of rejoicing in which they did not

τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐχαριστίας καὶ διὰ τῆς μετ' 2 ἀλλήλων φιλοφροσύνης. Ξάνθιππος δὲ τηλικαύτην ἐπίδοσιν καὶ ροπὴν ποιήσας τοῖς Καρχηδονίων πράγμασι μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἀπέπλευσε πάλιν, φρο- 3 νίμως καὶ συνετῶς βουλευσάμενος. αἱ γὰρ ἐπιφανεῖς καὶ παράδοξοι πράξεις βαρεῖς μὲν τοὺς φθόνους, ὀξείας δὲ τὰς διαβολὰς γεννῶσιν· ἃς οἱ μὲν ἐγχώριοι διά τε τὰς συγγενείας καὶ τὸ τῶν φίλων πλῆθος οἱοί τ' ἄν < εἶεν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον > ἀναφέρειν, οἱ δὲ ξένοι ταχέως ὑφ' ἐκατέρων τούτων 4 ἡττῶνται καὶ κινδυνεύουσι. λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἔτερος ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τῆς Ξανθίπου λόγος, ὃν πειρασόμεθα διασαφεῖν οἰκειότερον λαβόντες τοῦ παρόντος καιρόν.

5 'Ρωμαΐοι δέ, προσπεσόντων σφίσι παρ' ἐλπίδα τῶν ἐν Λιβύη συμβεβηκότων, εὐθέως ἐγίνοντο πρὸς τὸ καταρτίζειν τὸν στόλον καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐξαι-

6 ρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐν τῆ Λιβύη διασεσωσμένους. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ ταῦτα στρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐπολιόρκουν τὴν ᾿Ασπίδα, σπουδάζοντες ἐγκρατεῖς γε 7 νέσθαι τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης διαφυγόντων. διὰ δὲ τὴν γενναιότητα καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐδαμῶς

έλειν δυνάμενοι τέλος ἀπέστησαν τής πολιορκίας. 8 προσπεσόντος δ' αὐτοις έξαρτύειν τον στόλον τους Ῥωμαίους, και μέλλειν αῦθις ἐπὶ τὴν Λιβύην ποι-

εῖσθαι τὸν πλοῦν, τὰ μὲν ἐπεσκεύαζον σκάφη, τὰ δὸ ἐκ καταβολῆς ἐναυπηγοῦντο. ταχὰ δὲ συμπληρώσαντες ναῦς διακοσίας ἀνήχθησαν καὶ παρεφύλαττον τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων.

10 Οἱ δὲ Ὑωμαῖοι τῆς θερείας ἀρχομένης καθελκύσαντες τριακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἐπιστήσαντες Μάρκον Αἰμίλιον καὶ 100

indulge, paying thank-offerings to the gods and giving congratulatory entertainments. But Xanthippus, to whom this revolution and notable advance in the fortunes of Carthage was due, after a little time left again for home, and this was a very prudent and sensible decision on his part; for brilliant and exceptional achievements are wont to breed the deepest jealousy and most bitter slander. Natives of a place, supported as they are by their kinsmen and having many friends, may possibly be able to hold their own against those for some time, but foreigners when exposed to either speedily succumb and find themselves in peril. There is another account given of Xanthippus's departure which I will endeavour to set forth on an occasion more suitable than the present.

The Romans, who had never expected to receive such bad news from Africa, at once directed their efforts to fitting out their fleet and rescuing their surviving troops there. The Carthaginians after the battle encamped before Aspis and laid siege to it with the object of capturing these survivors, but as they had no success owing to the gallantry and daring of the defenders they at length abandoned the siege. When news reached them that the Romans were preparing their fleet and were about to sail again for Africa, they set to repairing the ships they had and building other entirely new ones, and having soon manned a fleet of two hundred sail, they put to sea and remained

on the watch for the enemy.

In the early summer the Romans, having launched 255 s.c. three hundred and fifty ships, sent them off under the command of Marcus Aemilius and Servius

Σερούιον Φόλουιον έξαπέστελλον. οί δ' αναχθέντες 11 έπλεον παρά την Σικελίαν ώς έπὶ της Λιβύης. συμμίξαντες δέ περὶ τὴν Ερμαίαν τῷ τῶν Καρχηδονίων στόλω, τούτους μεν έξ εφόδου καὶ ραδίως 12 τρεψάμενοι ναῦς ἔλαβον αὐτάνδρους έκατὸν δεκατέτταρας τους δ' εν Λιβύη διαμείναντας νεανίσκους άναλαβόντες έκ τῆς 'Ασπίδος ἔπλεον αὖθις ἐπὶ τῆς 37 Σικελίας. διάραντες δε τον πόρον ἀσφαλώς καὶ προσμίξαντες τη των Καμαριναίων χώρα, τηλικούτω περιέπεσον χειμώνι και τηλικαύταις συμφοραίς ώστε μηδ' αν είπειν άξίως δύνασθαι διά την ύπερ-2 βολήν τοῦ συμβάντος. τῶν γὰρ έξήκοντα καὶ τεττάρων πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις ναυσὶν ὀγδοήκοντα μόνον συνέβη περιλειφθηναι σκάφη, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν τὰ μὲν ὑποβρύχια γενέσθαι, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς ραχίας πρός ταις σπιλάσι και τοις ακρωτηρίοις καταγνύ-3 μενα πλήρη ποιήσαι σωμάτων την παραλίαν καὶ ναυαγίων. ταύτης δε μείζω περιπέτειαν εν ενὶ καιρῷ κατὰ θάλατταν οὐδ' ἱστορῆσθαι συμβέβηκεν. 4 ης την αιτίαν ουχ ούτως είς την τύχην ώς είς τους ήγεμόνας επανοιστέον πολλά γάρ τῶν κυβερνητῶν διαμαρτυραμένων μη πλείν παρά την έξω πλευράν της Σικελίας την πρός το Λιβυκον πέλαγος έστραμμένην, διὰ τὸ τραχεῖαν είναι καὶ δυσπροσόρμιστον, αμα δε και την μεν ουδέπω καταλήγειν επισημασίαν, τὴν δ' ἐπιφέρεσθαι· μεταξύ γὰρ ἐποιοῦντο τὸν πλοῦν δ της 'Ωρίωνος καὶ κυνὸς ἐπιτολης· οὐθενὶ προσσχόντες τῶν λεγομένων ἔπλεον ἔξω πελάγιοι, σπουδάζοντές τινας των έν τω παράπλω πόλεις τη του γε-6 γονότος εὐτυχήματος φαντασία καταπληξάμενοι προσλαβέσθαι. πλην οδτοι μεν μικρών έλπίδων ένεκα μεγάλοις περιτυχόντες άτυχήμασι τότε την

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Fulvius, who proceeded along the coast of Sicily making for Africa. Encountering the Carthaginian fleet near the Hermaeum they fell on them and easily routed them, capturing one hundred and fourteen ships with their crews. Then having taken on board at Aspis the lads who remained in Africa they set sail again for Sicily. 37. They had crossed the strait in safety and were off the territory of Camarina when they were overtaken by so fierce a storm and so terrible a disaster that it is difficult adequately to describe it owing to its surpassing magnitude. For of their three hundred and sixty-four ships only eighty were saved; the rest either foundered or were dashed by the waves against the rocks and headlands and broken to pieces, covering the shore with corpses and wreckage. History tells of no greater catastrophe at sea taking place at one time. The blame must be laid not so much on ill-fortune as on the commanders; for the captains had repeatedly urged them not to sail along the outer coast of Sicily, that turned towards the Libyan sea, as it was very rugged and had few safe anchorages: they also warned them that one of the dangerous astral periods was not over and another just approaching (for it was between the rising of Orion and that of Sirius a that they undertook the voyage). commanders, however, paid no attention to single word they said, and there they were in the open sea thinking to strike terror into some of the cities they passed by the brilliancy of their recent success and thus win them over. But now, all for the sake of such meagre expectations, they exposed themselves to this great disaster, and were obliged

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^a Sirius rises in July, Orion early in December.

7 αύτῶν ἀβουλίαν ἔγνωσαν. καθόλου δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι πρὸς πάντα χρώμενοι τῆ βία, καὶ τὸ προτεθὲν οἰόμενοι δεῖν κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐπιτελεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἀδύνατον εἶναι σφίσι τῶν ἄπαξ δοξάντων, ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁρμήν, ἐν τισὶ δὲ προφανώς σφάλλονται, και μάλιστ' έν τοις κατά 8 θάλατταν. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς γῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τὰ τούτων έργα ποιούμενοι τὰς επιβολὰς τὰ μέν πολλά κατορθοῦσι διὰ τὸ πρὸς παραπλησίους δυνάμεις χρησθαι τη βία, ποτέ δε και σπανίως απο-9 τυγχάνουσι πρός δε την θάλατταν καὶ πρός τὸ περιέχον όταν παραβάλλωνται καὶ βιαιομαχώσι, 10 μεγάλοις έλαττώμασι περιπίπτουσιν. δ καὶ τότε καὶ πλεονάκις αὐτοῖς ἤδή συνέβη καὶ συμβήσεται πάσχειν, έως αν ποτε διορθώσωνται την τοιαύτην τόλμαν καὶ βίαν, καθ' ἣν οἴονται δεῖν αὑτοῖς πάντα

καιρον είναι πλωτον και πορευτόν.

38 Οί δε Καρχηδόνιοι, συνέντες τον γεγονότα φθόοον τοῦ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στόλου, καὶ νομίσαντες κατὰ μεν γην αξιόχρεως σφας είναι διά το προγεγονός εὐτύχημα, κατὰ δὲ θάλατταν διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην τῶν 'Ρωμαίων περιπέτειαν, ώρμησαν προθυμότερον ἐπί 2 τε τὰς ναυτικὰς καὶ πεζικὰς παρασκευάς. καὶ τὸν μεν Ασδρούβαν εὐθὺς εξαπέστελλον εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, δόντες αὐτῷ τούς τε προϋπάρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ἐκ της 'Ηρακλείας παραγεγονότας στρατιώτας, αμα δέ 3 τούτοις ελέφαντας έκατον καὶ τετταράκοντα. τοῦτον δ' ἐκπέμψαντες διακοσίας κατεσκευάζοντο ναῦς καὶ 4 τάλλα τὰ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦν ἡτοίμαζον. ὁ δ' 'Ασδρούβας διακομισθείς είς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ἀσφαλῶς τά

to acknowledge their lack of judgement. The Romans, to speak generally, rely on force in all their enterprises, and think it is incumbent on them to carry out their projects in spite of all, and that nothing is impossible when they have once decided on it. They owe their success in many cases to this spirit, but sometimes they conspicuously fail by reason of it and especially at sea. For on land they are attacking men and the works of man and are usually successful, as there they are employing force against forces of the same nature, although even here they have in some rare instances failed. But when they come to encounter the sea and the atmosphere and choose to fight them by force they meet with signal defeats. It was so on this occasion and on many others, and it will always continue to be so, until they correct this fault of daring and violence which makes them think they can sail and travel where they will at no matter what season.

38. The Carthaginians, on hearing of the destruction of the Roman fleet, conceiving themselves to be now a match for the Romans both on land owing to their recent success and at sea owing to this disaster, were encouraged to make more extensive military and naval preparations. They at once dispatched Hasdrubal to Sicily, giving him the troops they previously had and a force which had joined them from Heraclea, together with a hundred and forty elephants. After dispatching him they began to get ready for sea two hundred ships and to make all other preparations for a naval expedition. Hasdrubal having crossed in safety to Lilybaeum occupied himself in drilling unopposed

τε θηρία καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἐγύμναζε, καὶ δηλος ήν

δ άντιποιησόμενος των υπαίθρων.

'Ρωμαίοι δὲ τῶν ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας ἀνακομισθέντων διακούσαντες τὸ κατὰ μέρος, βαρέως μὲν ἦνεγκαν τὸ γεγονός οὐ βουλόμενοι δὲ καθάπαξ εἴκειν, αὖθις έγνωσαν έκ δρυόχων είκοσι καὶ διακόσια ναυπηγεί-6 σθαι σκάφη. τούτων δε την συντέλειαν εν τριμήνω λαβόντων, όπερ οὐδὲ πιστεῦσαι ράδιον, εὐθέως οί κατασταθέντες άργοντες Αύλος 'Ατίλιος καὶ Γνάιος 7 Κορνήλιος καταρτίσαντες τὸν στόλον ἀνήχθησαν, καὶ πλεύσαντες διὰ πορθμοῦ προσέλαβον ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης τὰ διασωθέντα τῶν πλοίων ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας, καὶ κατάραντες εἰς Πάνορμον τῆς Σικελίας τριακοσίαις ναυσίν, ήπερ ήν βαρυτάτη πόλις της 8 Καρχηδονίων έπαρχίας, ένεχείρησαν αὐτὴν πολιορκείν. συστησάμενοι δέ κατά διττούς τόπους έργα 9 καὶ τάλλα παρασκευασάμενοι, προσήγαγον τὰς μηχανάς. ραδίως δε τοῦ παρά θάλατταν πύργου πεσόντος, καὶ βιασαμένων ταύτη τῶν στρατιωτῶν, ή μεν καλουμένη Νέα πόλις εαλώκει κατά κράτος. ή δε Παλαιά προσαγορευομένη τούτου συμβάντος 10 έκινδύνευσε. διὸ καὶ ταχέως ἐνέδωκαν αὐτὴν οί κατοικοῦντες, γενόμενοι δ' έγκρατεῖς οὖτοι μὲν ἀπέπλευσαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, ἀπολιπόντες φυλακὴν της πόλεως.

39 Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῆς θερείας ἐπιγενομένης οἰ κατασταθέντες άρχοντες Γνάιος Σερουίλιος καὶ Γάιος Σεμπρώνιος ἀνέπλευσαν παντί τῷ στόλω, καὶ 2 διάραντες είς την Σικελίαν άφώρμησαν έντευθεν είς την Λιβύην. κομιζόμενοι δε παρά την χώραν έποιοθντο καὶ πλείστας ἀποβάσεις. ἐν αἶς οὐδὲν άξιόλογον πράττοντες παρεγίνοντο πρός την των 106



his elephants and the rest of his force, and plainly intended to dispute the possession of the open country.

The Romans, on receiving full information about the disaster from the survivors of the shipwreck, were deeply grieved, but being resolved on no account to give in, they decided to put on the stocks a fresh fleet of two hundred and twenty ships. In three months they were completed—a thing difficult to believe—and the new Consuls, Aulus 254 B.C. Atilius and Gnaeus Cornelius, having fitted out the fleet, put to sea, and passing the straits picked up at Messene the ships that had escaped shipwreck. Descending with their total fleet of three hundred sail on Panormus, the most important city in the Carthaginian province, they undertook its siege. They threw up works in two places and after making the other necessary preparations brought up their battering-rams. The tower on the sea shore was easily knocked down, and, the soldiers pressing in through this breach, the so-called New Town was stormed, and the part known as the Old Town being now in imminent danger, its inhabitants surrendered Having taken possession of it the Consuls sailed back to Rome leaving a garrison in the town.

39. Their successors, Gnaeus Servilius and Gaius 258 B.C. Sempronius, put to sea with their whole fleet as soon as it was summer and after crossing to Sicily proceeded thence to Africa, and sailing along the coast, made a number of descents in which they accomplished nothing of importance, and finally

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Λωτοφάγων νήσον, ή καλείται μέν Μήνιγξ, οὐ 3 μακράν δ' ἀπέχει της μικράς Σύρτεως. ἐν ή προσπεσόντες είς τινα βραχέα διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, γενομένης 4 αμπώτεως καὶ καθισάντων τῶν πλοίων εἰς πασαν ήλθον ἀπορίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἀνελπίστως μετά τινα χρόνον επενεχθείσης της θαλάττης, έκρίψαντες έκ των πλοίων πάντα τὰ βάρη μόλις 5 εκούφισαν τὰς ναθς. οδ γενομένου φυγή παραπλήσιον εποιήσαντο τον απόπλουν. άψάμενοι δε 6 της Σικελίας και κάμψαντες το Λιλύβαιον καθωρμίσθησαν είς Πάνορμον. έντεῦθεν δὲ ποιούμενοι παραβόλως καὶ διὰ πόρου τὸν πλοῦν εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην πάλιν περιέπεσον χειμωνι τηλικούτω το μέγεθος ώστε πλείω των έκατον και πεντήκοντα πλοίων ἀποβαλεῖν. 7 Οί δ' έν τῆ 'Ρώμη τούτων συμβάντων, καίπερ όντες εν παντί φιλότιμοι διαφερόντως, όμως τότε διά 8 πραγμάτων ἀπέστησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι

το μέγεθος καὶ το πλήθος τῶν συμπτωμάτων τοῦ μὲν ἔτι στόλον άθροίζειν ἀναγκασθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν 8 πραγμάτων ἀπέστησαν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πεζικαῖς δυνάμεσι τὰς ὑπολοίπους ἔχοντες ἐλπίδας, τοὺς μὲν στρατηγοὺς ἀπέστελλον Λεύκιον Καικέλιον καὶ Γάιον Φούριον καὶ στρατόπεδα μετὰ τούτων εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν, ἐξήκοντα δὲ μόνον ἐπλήρωσαν ναῦς χάριν τοῦ τὰς 9 ἀγορὰς κομίζειν τοῖς στρατοπέδοις. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων περιπετειῶν συνέβη πάλιν ἐπικυδέστερα γενέ-10 σθαι τὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων πράγματα. τῆς μὲν γὰρ θαλάττης ἀδεῶς ἐπεκράτουν ἐκκεχωρηκότων τῶν

'Ρωμαίων, εν δε ταις πεζικαις δυνάμεσι μεγάλας 11 είχον ελπίδας. και τουτ' επασχον οὐκ ἀλόγως· οἱ γὰρ 'Ρωμαιοι, διαδοθείσης φήμης περὶ τῆς εν τῆ Λιβύη μάχης ὅτι τὰ θηρία τάς τε τάξεις αὐτῶν 108

reached the isle of the lotos-eaters, which is called Menix and is not far distant from the lesser Syrtis. Here, owing to their ignorance of these seas, they ran on to some shoals, and, on the tide retreating and the ships grounding fast, they were in a most difficult position. However, as the tide unexpectedly rose again after some time, they managed with difficulty to lighten their ships by throwing overboard all heavy objects. Their departure now was so hasty as to resemble a flight, and having made Sicily and rounded Cape Lilybaeum they anchored at Panormus. As they were rashly crossing the open sea on the way hence to Rome they again encountered such a terrific storm that they lost

more than a hundred and fifty ships.

The Roman Government upon this, although in all matters they are exceedingly ambitious of success, still on the present occasion, owing to the magnitude and frequency of the disasters they met with, were obliged by the force of circumstances to renounce the project of getting another fleet together. Relying now solely on their military forces, they 251 B.C. dispatched to Sicily with some legions the Consuls Lucius Caecilius and Gaius Furius and only manned sixty ships to revictual the legions. The above disasters resulted in the prospects of the Carthaginians becoming once more brighter; for they had now undisturbed command of the sea, the Romans having retired from it, and they had great hopes of their army. These hopes were not unjustified, for the Romans, when the report circulated regarding the battle in Africa that their ranks were broken and

διασπάσαι καὶ τοὺς πλείστους διαφθείραι τῶν ἀν12 δρῶν, οὖτως ἦσαν κατάφοβοι τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ὡς ἐπὶ δύ' ἐνιαυτοὺς τοὺς ἔξῆς τῶν προειρημένων καιρῶν πολλάκις μὲν ἐν τῆ Λιλυβαιίτιδι χώρα, πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῆ Σελινουντία παραταττόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐν ἔξ καὶ πέντε σταδίοις οὐκ ἐθάρρησαν οὐδέποτε κατάρξαι τῆς μάχης οὐδ' εἰς τοὺς ὁμαλοὺς καθόλου συγκαταβῆναι τόπους, δεδιότες τὴν τῶν ἐλεφάντων 13 ἔφοδον. Θέρμαν δὲ μόνον καὶ Λιπάραν ἐξεπολιόρκησαν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς, ἀντεχόμενοι τῶν

κησαν εν τουτοις τοις καιροις, αντεχομενοι των 14 όρεινων καὶ δυσδιαβάτων τόπων. διὸ καὶ θεωροῦν- τες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν ἐν τοῖς πεζικοῖς στρατοπέδοις πτοίαν καὶ δυσελπιστίαν, αδθις ἔγνωσαν ἐκ μετα-

15 μελείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς θαλάττης. καὶ καταστήσαντες στρατηγούς Γάιον ᾿Ατίλιον καὶ Λεύκιον Μάλιον ναυπηγούνται πεντήκοντα σκάφη, καὶ κατ

έγραφον καὶ συνήθροιζον στόλον ἐνεργῶς.

40 'O δὲ προεστὼς τῶν Καρχηδονίων 'Ασδρούβας, όρῶν ἀποδειλιῶντας τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους ἐν ταῖς προγεγενημέναις παρατάξεσι, πυθόμενος τὸν μὲν ἔνα τῶν στρατηγῶν μετὰ τῆς ἡμισείας δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν 'Ιταλίαν ἀπηλλάχθαι, τὸν δὲ Καικέλιον ἐν τῷ Πανόρμῳ διατρίβειν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος ἔχοντα τῆς στρατιᾶς, βουλόμενον ἐφεδρεῦσαι τοῖς τῶν συμμάχων καρ2 ποῖς, ἀκμαζούσης τῆς συγκομιδῆς, ἀναλαβὼν ἐκ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου τὴν δύναμιν ὥρμησε καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸς τοῖς ὄροις τῆς χώρας τῆς Πανορμίτιδος.

3 ο δε Καικέλιος, θεωρών αὐτον κατατεθαρρηκότα, καὶ σπουδάζων εκκαλεισθαι την ορμήν αὐτοῦ, συν-

4 είχε τοὺς στρατιώτας έντος τῶν πυλῶν. οἱς ἐπαιρόμενος ᾿Ασδρούβας, ὡς οὐ τολμῶντος ἀντεξιέναι τοῦ Καικελίου, θρασέως ὁρμήσας παντὶ τῷ στρα-

the most of those who fell killed by the elephants, grew so afraid of these that for the two following years, though often both in the district of Lilybaeum and in that of Selinus they were drawn up at a distance of five or six stades from the enemy, they never began to attack, and in fact never would come down at all to meet the enemy on flat ground, so much did they dread a charge of the elephants. During this period all they accomplished was the reduction by siege of Therma and Lipara, keeping as they did to mountainous and difficult country. Consequently the Government, observing the timidity and despondency that prevailed in their land forces, changed their minds and decided to try their fortunes at sea again. In the consulship of Gaius Atilius and 250 B.C. Lucius Manlius we find them building fifty ships and actively enrolling sailors and getting a fleet together.

40. The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, Hasdrubal, had noted the lack of courage which the Romans exhibited, on the occasions when they were in presence of the enemy, and when he learnt that while one of the Consuls with half the whole force had left for Italy, Caecilius and the rest of the army remained at Panormus with the object of protecting the corn of the allies—it now being the height of the harvest-removed his forces from Lilybaeum and encamped on the frontier of the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, observing Hasdrubal's aggressive spirit and wishing to provoke him to attack, kept his own soldiers within the gates. Hasdrubal gained fresh confidence from this, thinking that Caecilius did not venture to come out, and boldly advancing with his

τεύματι κατήρε διά των στενών είς την Πανορ-5 μιτιν. φθείροντος δε τους καρπους αυτου μέχρι της πόλεως, έμενεν επί της υποκειμένης γνώμης δ Καικέλιος, έως αὐτὸν έξεκαλέσατο διαβηναι τὸν πρὸ 8 της πόλεως ποταμόν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ θηρία διεβίβασαν οί Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, τὸ τηνικαῦτα δὲ τούς εὐζώνους έξαποστέλλων ἡρέθιζε, μέχρι πῶν 7 αὐτοὺς ἐκτάξαι τὸ στρατόπεδον ἢνάγκασε. συνθεα-σάμενος δὲ γινόμενον ὁ προύθετο, τινὰς μὲν τῶν εὐκινήτων πρό τοῦ τείχους καὶ τάφρου παρενέβαλε, προστάξας, αν έγγίζη τὰ θηρία πρὸς αὐτούς, 8 χρησθαι τοῦς βέλεσιν ἀφθόνως, ὅταν δ' ἐκπιέζωνται, καταφεύγειν είς την τάφρον, και πάλιν έκ ταύτης δρμωμένους είσακοντίζειν είς τὰ προσπίπτοντα 9 των ζώων τοις δ' έκ της αγορας βαναύσοις φέρειν προσέταξε τὰ βέλη, καὶ παραβάλλειν έξω παρὰ 10 τον θεμέλιον τοῦ τείχους. αὐτὸς δὲ τὰς σημαίας έχων έπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὸ λαιὸν κέρας τῶν ὑπεναντίων κειμένης πύλης έφειστήκει, πλείους αεί και πλείους 11 ἐπαποστέλλων τοῖς ἀκροβολιζομένοις. ἄμα δὲ τῷ τούτων όλοσχερεστέραν γενέσθαι τὴν συμπλοκὴν αντιφιλοδοξοῦντες οἱ τῶν ἐλεφάντων ἐπιστάται πρὸς τὸν 'Ασδρούβαν, καὶ βουλόμενοι δι' αύτῶν ποιῆσαι τὸ προτέρημα, πάντες ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τοὺς προκινδυνεύοντας τρεψάμενοι δε τούτους ραδίως συνεδίω-12 ξαν είς τὴν τάφρον. προσπεσόντων δὲ τῶν θηρίων, καὶ τιτρωσκομένων μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ τείχους τοξευόντων, συνακοντιζομένων δ' ένεργοις καὶ πυκνοίς τοίς ύσσοίς καὶ τοίς γρόσφοις ύπ' ἀκεραίων 13 τῶν πρὸ τῆς τάφρου διατεταγμένων, συμβελῆ γινόμενα καὶ κατατραυματιζόμενα ταχέως διεταράχθη, καὶ στραφέντα κατὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐφέρετο, τοὺς μέν 112

whole force, descended through the pass on the territory of Panormus. Caecilius, adhering to his original plan, let him ravage the crops up to the walls, until he had led him on to cross the river that runs in front of the town. Once the Carthaginians had got their elephants and other forces across, he kept sending out light-armed troops to molest them, until he had compelled them to deploy their whole force. When he saw that what he had designed was taking place he stationed some of his light troops before the wall and the trench, ordering them, if the elephants approached, not to spare their missiles, and when driven from their position, they were to take refuge in the trench and sallying from it again shoot at those elephants they met. Ordering the lower classes of the civil population to bring the missiles and arrange them outside at the foot of the wall, he himself with his maniples took up his position at the gate which faced the enemy's left wing and kept sending constant reinforcements to those engaged in shooting. When this latter force more generally engaged with the enemy, the drivers of the elephants, anxious to exhibit their prowess to Hasdrubal and wishing the victory to be due to themselves, all charged those of the enemy who were in advance and putting them easily to flight pursued them to the trench. When the elephants reached the trench and began to be wounded by those who were shooting from the wall, while at the same time a rapid shower of javelins and darts fell on them from the fresh troops drawn up before the trench, they very soon, finding themselves hit and hurt in many places, were thrown into confusion and turned on their own troops,

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ανδρας καταπατούντα καὶ διαφθείροντα, τὰς δὲ τά-14 ξεις συγγέοντα καὶ κατασπώντα τὰς αὐτών. ἃ καὶ κατιδών ὁ Καικέλιος έξηγε την δύναμιν ἐνεργῶς καὶ συμπεσών ἐκ πλαγίου κατὰ κέρας τεταραγμένοις τοις πολεμίοις, ακεραίους έχων και συντεταγμένους, τροπήν ἐποίει τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἰσχυράν, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτεινε, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς 15 ηνάγκασε φεύγειν προτροπάδην. θηρία δὲ σὺν αὐτοις μεν 'Ινδοις ελαβε δέκα, των δε λοιπών τους 'Ινδούς ἀπερριφότων, μετὰ τὴν μάχην περιελασάμε-16 νος εκυρίευσε πάντων. ταθτα δ' επιτελεσάμενος όμολογουμένως αίτιος έδόκει γεγονέναι τοις 'Ρω-

μαίων πράγμασι τοῦ πάλιν ἀναθαρρησαι τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ κρατήσαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων.

41 Τοῦ δὲ προτερήματος τούτου προσπεσόντος εἰς την 'Ρώμην, περιχαρείς ήσαν ούχ ούτως ἐπὶ τῷ τοὺς πολεμίους ήλαττῶσθαι τῶν θηρίων ἐστερημένους, ώς έπὶ τῷ τοὺς ιδίους τεθαρρηκέναι τῶν ἐλεφάν-2 των κεκρατηκότας. διὸ καὶ πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν διὰ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν εἰς τὸ μετὰ στόλου καὶ ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἐπὶ τας πράξεις εκπέμπειν, σπουδάζοντες είς δύναμιν 3 πέρας έπιθειναι τῷ πολέμω. παρασκευασθέντων δὲ

των ἐπιτηδείων πρὸς τὴν ἐξαποστολὴν ἔπλεον οί στρατηγοί διακοσίαις ναυσίν ώς έπι της Σικελίας.

4 έτος δ' ήν τῷ πολέμῳ τετταρεσκαιδέκατον. καθορμισθέντες δέ πρός το Λιλύβαιον, αμα καὶ τῶν πεζικῶν ἐκεῖ στρατοπέδων αὐτοῖς ἀπηντηκότων, ἐνεχείρουν πολιορκεῖν, ὅτι κρατήσαντες ταύτης ῥαδίως τα μεταβιβάσουσι τὸν πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. σχε-

δον δε περί γε τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων οί προεστώτες ώμοδόξουν καὶ τοὺς αὐ-114

trampling down and killing the men and disturbing and breaking the ranks. Caecilius, on seeing this, made a vigorous sally and falling on the flank of the enemy, who were now in disorder, with his own fresh and well-ordered troops inflicted a severe defeat on them, killing many and compelling the rest to quit the field in headlong flight. He took ten elephants with their mahouts, and after the battle, having penned up the others who had thrown their mahouts, he captured them all. By this exploit he was universally acknowledged to have caused the Roman land forces to pluck up courage again and gain the command of the open country.

41. When news of this success reached Rome it caused great rejoicing, not so much because of the enemy being weakened by the loss of their elephants as because of the confidence which the capture of these gave to their own troops. They were consequently encouraged to revert to their original plan of sending out the Consuls to the campaign with a fleet and naval force; for they were eager by all means in their power to put an end to the war. When all that was required for the expedition was ready, the Consuls set sail for Sicily with two hundred ships. This was in the fourteenth year of the war. Anchor- 250 B.C. ing off Lilybaeum, where they were joined by their land forces, they undertook its siege, thinking that if it fell into their possession it would be easy for them to transfer the war to Africa. On this matter at least the Carthaginian Government agreed more

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6 τοὺς εἶχον λογισμοὺς τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις. διὸ καὶ τἄλλα πάρεργα ποιησάμενοι περὶ τὸ βοηθεῖν ἐγίνοντο καὶ παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὑπομένειν ὑπὲρ τῆς προειρημένης πόλεως διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν καταλείπεσθαι σφίσι, πάσης δὲ τῆς ἄλλης Σικελίας ἐπικοστεῖν 'Ρωμαίους πλὸν Λοςπάνων

λείπεσθαι σφίσι, πάσης δε της άλλης Σικελίας έπικρατείν 'Ρωμαίους πλην Δρεπάνων. "Ινα δὲ μή τοῖς ἀγνοοῦσι τοὺς τόπους ἀσαφή τὰ λεγόμενα γίνηται, πειρασόμεθα διά βραχέων άγαγείν είς έννοιαν της ευκαιρίας και θέσεως αυτών 42 τους εντυγχάνοντας. την μεν ουν σύμπασαν Σικελίαν τη θέσει τετάχθαι συμβαίνει πρός την Ίταλίαν καὶ τάκείνης πέρατα παραπλησίως τῆ τῆς Πελοπον-2 νήσου θέσει πρὸς τὴν λοιπὴν Ελλάδα καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἄκρα, τούτω δ' αὐτῷ διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων, ή κείνη μεν χερρόνησός ζέστιν, αυτη δε νήσος >. ης μεν γάρ δ μεταξύ τόπος εστί πορευτός, ης δε 3 πλωτός. το δε σχημα της Σικελίας εστί μεν τρίγωνον, αι δε κορυφαί των γωνιών εκάστης 4 άκρωτηρίων λαμβάνουσι τάξεις, ών το μεν προς μεσημβρίαν νεῦον, εἰς δὲ τὸ Σικελικὸν πέλαγος 5 άνατείνου, Πάχυνος καλείται, τὸ δ' εἰς τὰς ἄρκτους κεκλιμένον δρίζει μέν τοῦ πορθμοῦ τὸ πρὸς δύσεις μέρος, ἀπέχει δὲ τῆς Ἰταλίας ὡς δεκαδύο στάδια, β προσαγορεύεται δε Πελωριάς. το δε τρίτον τέτραπται μέν είς αὐτὴν τὴν Λιβύην, ἐπίκειται δὲ τοῖς προκειμένοις της Καρχηδόνος ακρωτηρίοις εὐκαίρως, διέχον ώς χιλίους σταδίους, νεύει δ' είς χειμερινάς δύσεις, διαιρεί δέ τὸ Λιβυκὸν καὶ τὸ Σαρη δώον πέλαγος, προσαγορεύεται δε Λιλύβαιον. επί δε τούτω πόλις δμώνυμος κείται τῶ τόπω, περὶ ην τότε συνέβαινε τους 'Ρωμαίους συνίστασθαι την πολιορκίαν, τείχεσί τε διαφερόντως ησφαλισμένην καὶ 116

or less with the Romans, sharing their estimate of the place's value; so that, shelving all other projects, they devoted their whole attention to the relief of this city and were ready to undertake every risk and burden for this purpose; for if it fell, no base was left for them, as the Romans were masters of all the rest

of Sicily except Drepana.

To prevent my narrative from being obscure to readers owing to their ignorance of the geography, I will try to convey briefly to them an idea of the natural advantages and exact position of the places referred to. 42. Sicily, then, as a whole occupies the same position with regard to Italy and its extremity that the Peloponnese occupies with regard to the rest of Greece and its extremity, the difference lying in this, that the Peloponnese is a peninsula whereas Sicily is an island, the communication being in the one case by land and in the other by sea. Sicily is triangular in shape, the apices of all three angles being formed by capes. The cape that looks to the south and stretches out into the Sicilian Sea is called Pachynus, that on the north forms the extremity of the western coast of the Strait; it is about twelve stades distant from Italy and is called Pelorias. third looks towards Africa itself, and is favourably situated as a base for attacking the promontories in front of Carthage, from which it is distant about one thousand stades. It is turned to the south-west. separating the Libyan from the Sardinian Sea, and its name is Lilybaeum. On the cape stands the city of the same name, of which the Romans were now opening the siege. It is excellently defended both by walls and by a deep moat all round, and on the

πέριξ τάφρω βαθεία καὶ τενάγεσιν ἐκ θαλάττης, δι' ὧν ἐστιν εἰς τοὺς λιμένας εἴσπλους πολλῆς δεό-

μενος έμπειρίας καὶ συνηθείας.

8 Ταύτη δὲ προσστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἐξ ἐκατέρου μέρους οἱ 'Ρωμαῖοι, καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων τάφρω καὶ χάρακι καὶ τείχει διαλαβόντες, ἤρξαντο προσάγειν ἔργα κατὰ τὸν ἔγγιστα κείμενον 9 τῆς θαλάττης πύργον ὡς πρὸς τὸ Λιβυκὸν πέλαγος. προσκατασκευάζοντες δ' ἀεὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ

προσκατασκευάζοντες δ' ἀεὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις καὶ παρεκτείνοντες τῶν ἔργων τὰς κατασκευάς, τέλος εξ πύργους τοὺς συνεχεῖς τῷ προειρημένῳ κατ-

10 έβαλον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας ἄμα κριοκοπεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν. γινομένης δ' ἐνεργοῦ καὶ καταπληκτικῆς τῆς πολιορκίας, καὶ τῶν πύργων τῶν μὲν πονούντων ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν, τῶν δ' ἐρειπομένων, ἄμα δὲ 11 καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιβαινόντων ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντὸς

11 καὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπιβαινόντων ἀεὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντὸς τῆς πόλεως, ἦν ἰσχυρὰ διατροπὴ καὶ κατάπληξις παρὰ τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις, καίπερ ὄντων ἐν τῆ πόλει χωρὶς τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν τῶν

12 μισθοφόρων εἰς μυρίους. οὐ μὴν άλλ' ὅ γε στρατηγός αὐτῶν Ἰμίλκων οὐδὲν παρέλειπε τῶν δυνατῶν, άλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἀντοικοδομῶν, τὰ δ' ἀντιμεταλλεύων οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἀπορίαν παρεῖχε τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις.

13 ἔτι δὲ καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐπιπορευόμενος καὶ τοις ἔργοις ἐγχειρῶν, εἴ πως δύναιτο πῦρ ἐμβαλεῖν, πολλοὺς ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ μέρους καὶ παραβόλους ἀγῶνας δὴ συνίστατο καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν καὶ νύκτωρ, ὥστε πλείους ἐνίοτε γίνεσθαι νεκροὺς ἐν ταις τοιαύταις συμπλοκαις τῶν εἰωθότων πίπτειν ἐν ταις παρατάξεσι.

43 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους τῶν ἡγεμόνων τινὲς τῶν τὰς μεγίστας χώρας ἐχόντων ἐν τοῖς μι-

side facing the sea by shoaly water, the passage through which into the harbour requires great skill and practice.

The Romans encamped on either side of the city, fortifying the space between their camps with a trench, a stockade, and a wall. They then began to throw up works against the tower that lay nearest the sea on the Libyan side, and, gradually advancing from the base thus acquired and extending their works, they succeeded at last in knocking down the six adjacent towers, and attacked all the others at once with battering rams. The siege was now so vigorously pursued and so terrifying, each day seeing some of the towers shaken or demolished and the enemy's works advancing further and further into the city, that the besieged were thrown into a state of utter confusion and panic, although, besides the civil population, there were nearly ten thousand mercenaries in the town. Their general, Himilco, however, omitted no means of resistance in his power, and by counter-building and counter-mining caused the enemy no little difficulty. Every day he would advance and make attempts on the siege works, trying to succeed in setting them on fire, and with this object was indeed engaged by night and day in combats of so desperate a character, that at times more men fell in these encounters than usually fall in a pitched battle.

43. About this time some of the superior officers in the mercenary force, after talking the

σθοφόροις, συλλαλήσαντες έαυτοις ύπερ του την πόλιν ενδοῦναι τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ πεπεισμένοι πειθαρχήσειν σφίσι τοὺς ὑποτεταγμένους, ἐξεπήδησαν νυκτός έκ της πόλεως έπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ διελέγοντο τῶ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατηγῶ περὶ τού-2 των. όδ' 'Αχαιὸς 'Αλέξων, ό καὶ τοῖς 'Ακραγαντίνοις κατά τούς επάνω χρόνους αίτιος γενόμενος της σωτηρίας, καθ' δυ καιρου επεβάλουτο παρασπουδεῖν αὐτοὺς οἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων μισθοφόροι, καὶ τότε πρώτος συνείς την πράξιν ανήγγειλε τῷ στρα-3 τηγώ των Καρχηδονίων. ο δε διακούσας παραχρημα συνηγε τους καταλειπομένους των ήγεμόνων, καὶ παρεκάλει μετὰ δεήσεως, μεγάλας δωρεὰς καὶ χάριτας ὑπισχνούμενος, ἐὰν ἐμμείνωσι τῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν πίστει καὶ μὴ κοινωνήσωσι τοῖς ἐξεληλυθόσι 4 της επιβολης. δεχομένων δε προθύμως τους λόγους, εὐθέως μετ' αὐτῶν ἀπέστειλε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς Κελτούς 'Αννίβαν τὸν υίὸν τὸν 'Αννίβου τοῦ μεταλλάξαντος εν Σαρδόνι διά την προγεγενημένην εν τῆ στρατεία πρὸς αὐτοὺς συνήθειαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς άλλους μισθοφόρους 'Αλέξωνα διὰ τὴν παρ' ἐκεί-5 νοις αποδοχήν αὐτοῦ καὶ πίστιν· οι καὶ συναγαγόντες τὰ πλήθη καὶ παρακαλέσαντες, ἔτι δὲ πιστωσάμενοι τὰς προτεινομένας έκάστοις δωρεὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, ραδίως ἔπεισαν αὐτοὺς μένειν ἐπὶ 6 των ύποκειμένων. διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα, των ἐκπηδησάντων < έκ τοῦ προφανοῦς έρχομένων > πρὸς τὰ τείχη, καὶ βουλομένων παρακαλεῖν καὶ λέγειν τι περὶ της των 'Ρωμαίων επαγγελίας, ούχ οξον προσείχον αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς οὐδ' ἀκούειν ήξίουν, βάλλοντες δὲ τοῖς λίθοις καὶ συνακοντίζοντες ἀπεδίωξαν ἀπὸ 7 τοῦ τείχους. Καρχηδόνιοι μέν οὖν διὰ τὰς προειρη-120

matter over among themselves and in the full conviction that their subordinates would obey them, escaped from the town by night to the Roman camp and made proposals to the Consul for the surrender of the city. But the Achaean Alexon, who had on a former occasion saved the Agrigentines, when the Syracusan mercenaries had formed a project of breaking faith with them, was now too the first to get wind of what was going on and informed the Carthaginian general. Himilco on hearing of it at once summoned the remaining officers and urgently implored their aid, promising them lavish gifts and favours if they remained loyal to him and refused to participate in the plot of those who had left the city. On their readily consenting, he bade them return at once to their troops, sending with them to the Celts Hannibal, the son of that Hannibal who died in Sardinia, as they had served under him and were well acquainted with him, while to the other mercenaries he sent Alexon, owing to his popularity and credit with them. They called a meeting of the soldiery and partly by entreating them, partly moreover by assuring them that each man would receive the bounty the general had offered, easily persuaded them to bide by their engagements. So, afterwards, when the officers who had quitted the city advanced openly to the walls and attempted to entreat them and tell them of the promises made by the Romans, not only did they pay no attention but would not lend ear to them at all, and chased them away from the wall with stones and other missiles. The Carthaginians, then, for the above reasons very

μένας αἰτίας παρὰ μικρὸν ἦλθον ἀπολέσαι τὰ πράγ-8 ματα, παρασπονδηθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων· ᾿Αλέξων δὲ πρότερον ᾿Ακραγαντίνοις ἔσωσε διὰ τὴν πίστιν οὐ μόνον τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, τότε δὲ Καρχηδονίοις αἴτιος ἐγένετο τοῦ μὴ σφαλῆναι τοῖς ὅλοις.

44 Οί δ' εν τῆ Καρχηδόνι τούτων μεν οὐδεν είδότες, συλλογιζόμενοι δε τας εν ταις πολιορκίαις χρείας, πληρώσαντες στρατιωτών πεντήκοντα ναῦς, καὶ παρακαλέσαντες τοῖς άρμόζουσι λόγοις τῆς πράξεως, τον έπὶ τούτοις τεταγμένον 'Αννίβαν, ος ήν Αμίλκου μεν υίός, τριήραρχος δε και φίλος 'Ατάρβου πρώτος, εξαπέστειλαν κατά σπουδήν, εντειλάμενοι μή καταμελλήσαι, χρησάμενον δε συν καιρώ 2 τῆ τόλμη βοηθήσαι τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις. ὁ δ' ἀναχθείς μετά μυρίων στρατιωτών, και καθορμισθείς έν ταις καλουμέναις Αίγούσσαις, μεταξύ δε κειμέvais Λιλυβαίου καὶ Καρχηδόνος, ἐπετήρει τὸν πλοῦν. 3 λαβών δ' ούριον καὶ λαμπρον ἄνεμον, ἐκπετάσας πασι τοις αρμένοις και κατουρώσας έπ' αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν, ἔχων καθωπλισμένους καὶ πρὸς μάχην έτοίμους τοῦς ἄνδρας 4 επὶ τῶν καταστρωμάτων. οι δὲ Ῥωμαιοι, τὰ μὲν αἰφνιδίου γενομένης τῆς ἐπιφανείας, τὰ δὲ φοβούμενοι μή σὺν τοῖς πολεμίοις ὑπὸ τῆς βίας τοῦ

πνεύματος συγκατενεχθωσιν είς τὸν λιμένα των πνεύματος συγκατενεχθωσιν είς τὸν λιμένα των ὑπεναντίων, τὸ μὲν διακωλύειν τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῆς βοηθείας ἀπέγνωσαν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θαλάττης ἔστησαν 5 καταπεπληγμένοι τὴν των πολεμίων τόλμαν. τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος ἡθροισμένον ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη πῶν ἄμα μὲν ἡγωνία τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἄμα δ' ἐπὶ 122

narrowly escaped a complete disaster due to the treachery of their mercenaries, and Alexon, who had previously saved by his loyalty not only the city and district but the laws and liberties of Agrigentum, now was the cause of the Carthaginians being saved from total ruin.

44. The Carthaginian government knew thing of all this, but calculating the requirements of a besieged town, they filled fifty ships with troops. After addressing the soldiers in terms befitting the enterprise, they sent them off at once under the command of Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, trierarch and most intimate friend of Adherbal, with orders not to delay, but at the first opportunity to make a bold attempt to relieve the besieged. Setting sail with ten thousand troops on board, he came to anchor off the islands called Aegusae, which lie between Lilybaeum and Carthage, and there awaited favourable weather. As soon as he had a fine stern breeze he hoisted all sail and running before the wind sailed straight for the mouth of the harbour, his men drawn up on deck armed ready for action. The Romans, partly owing to the suddenness of the fleet's appearance and partly because they feared being carried into the hostile harbour by the force of the wind together with their enemies, made no effort to prevent the entrance of the relieving force, but stood out at sea amazed at the audacity of the Carthaginians. The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of

τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὑπερχαρὲς ὑπάρχον μετὰ κρότου καὶ κραυγῆς παρεκάλει τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας.
8 ᾿Αννίβας δὲ παραβόλως καὶ τεθαρρηκότως εἰσδραμὼν καὶ καθορμισθεὶς εἰς τὸν λιμένα μετ' ἀσφα7 λείας ἀπεβίβασε τοὺς στρατιώτας. οἱ δ' ἐν τῆ πόλει πάντες οὐχ οὕτως ἡσαν ἐπὶ τῆ τῆς βοηθείας παρουσία περιχαρεῖς, καίπερ μεγάλην ἐλπίδα καὶ χεῖρα προσειληφότες, ὡς ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ τετολμηκέναι τοὺς Ὑρωμαίους κωλῦσαι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν

Καρχηδονίων.

45 'Ιμίλκων δ' ό τεταγμένος ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγός, θεωρῶν τὴν όρμὴν καὶ προθυμίαν τῶν μὲν ἐν τῆ πόλει διὰ τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς βοηθείας, τῶν δὲ παραγεγονότων διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν περιεστώ-2 των κακῶν, βουλόμενος ἀκεραίοις ἀποχρήσασθαι

των κακών, βουλόμενος άκεραίοις άποχρήσασθαι ταις έκατέρων όρμαις πρός την διά τοῦ πυρὸς ἐπίθεσιν τοις ἔργοις, συνήγε πάντας εἰς ἐκκλησίαν

3 παρακαλέσας δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τὰ πρέποντα διὰ πλειόνων, καὶ παραστήσας δρμὴν ὑπερβάλλουσαν διά τε τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν τοῖς κατ' ἰδίαν ἀνδραγαθήσασι καὶ τὰς κατὰ κοινὸν ἐσομένας χάριτας

4 αὐτοῖς καὶ δωρεὰς παρὰ Καρχηδονίων, ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπισημαινομένων καὶ βοώντων μὴ μέλλειν, ἀλλ' ἄγειν αὐτούς, τότε μὲν ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν προθυμίαν ἀφῆκε, παραγγείλας ἀναπαύεσθαι

5 καθ' ώραν καὶ πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἡγουμένοις μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ συγκαλέσας τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν διένειμε τοὺς άρμόζοντας πρὸς τὴν ἐπίθεσιν ἐκάστοις τόπους, καὶ τὸ σύνθημα καὶ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἐπιθέσεως ἐδήλωσε, καὶ παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἡγεμόσι μετὰ πάντων τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων ἐπὶ τοῖς τόποις

succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands. Hannibal, having entered the harbour in this hazardous and daring manner, anchored and disembarked his troops in security. All those in the city were delighted not so much at the arrival of the relief, although their prospects were much improved and their force increased thereby, as at the fact that the Romans had not ventured to try to prevent the

Carthaginians from sailing in.

45. Himilco, the commander of the garrison, seeing that all were full of spirit and confidence, the original garrison owing to the arrival of relief, and the newcomers owing to their ignorance as yet of the perilous situation, desired to avail himself of this fresh spirit in the ranks and make another attempt to fire the enemy's works. He therefore summoned the soldiers to a general assembly, and addressing them at some length in words suitable to the occasion, roused them to great enthusiasm by his lavish promises of reward to those who distinguished themselves personally, and his assurance that the force as a whole would be duly recompensed by the Government. On their all applauding him and shouting to him not to delay but to lead them on at once, he dismissed them for the present after praising them and expressing his pleasure at their eagerness, ordering them to retire to rest early and obey their officers. Soon afterwards he summoned the commanding officers and assigned to each his proper place in the assault, giving them the watchword and informing them of the hour. He ordered all the commanders with the whole of their forces to be on the spot at the morning

 δ έωθινης εἶναι φυλακης. τῶν δὲ πειθαρχησάντων,
 ἐξαγαγὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ κατὰ πλείους 7 τόπους ενεχείρει τοις έργοις. οι δε 'Ρωμαίοι διά τὸ προορᾶσθαι τὸ μέλλον οὐκ ἀργῶς οὐδ' ἀπαρα-σκεύως εἶχον, ἀλλ' ἐτοίμως ἐβοήθουν πρὸς τὸ δεόμενον καὶ διεμάχοντο τοῖς πολεμίοις έρρωμένως. 8 πάντων δ' ἐν βραχεῖ χρόνῳ συμπεσόντων ἀλλήλοις ην αγών παράβολος πέριξ τοῦ τείχους οι μεν γάρ έκ της πόλεως ήσαν ουκ ελάττους δισμυρίων, οί 9 δ' έξωθεν έτι πλείους τούτων. όσω δε συνέβαινε τους άνδρας εκτός τάξεως ποιείσθαι την μάχην άναμὶξ κατά τὰς αὐτῶν προαιρέσεις, τοσούτω λαμπρότερος ήν ο κίνδυνος, ώς αν έκ τοσούτου πλήθους κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ ζυγὸν οίον εἰ μονομαχικής συνεστώσης περί τους άγωνιζομένους της φιλοτιμίας. 10 οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ή τε κραυγή καὶ τὸ σύστρεμμα δια-11 φέρον ἡν πρὸς αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις. οἱ γὰρ ἀρχήθεν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ παρ' ἀμφοῖν ταχθέντες, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ τρέψασθαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ προέσθαι ταθτα, τηλικαύτην έποιοθντο φιλοτιμίαν καὶ σπουδήν, οἱ μὲν ἐξῶσαι σπεύδοντες, οἱ δ' οὐδαμώς είξαι τούτοις τολμώντες, «ώστε» διά την 12 προθυμίαν τέλος εν αὐταῖς μένοντες ταῖς εξ ἀρχής χώραις ἀπέθνησκον. οι γε μὴν ἄμα τούτοις ἀναμεμιγμένοι, δậδα καὶ στυππίον καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντες, οὖτω τολμηρῶς καὶ πανταχόθεν ἄμα προσπίπτοντες ἐνέβαλλον ταῖς μηχαναῖς ὥστε τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον παραγενέσθαι κίνδυνον, μὴ δυναμέ-13 νους κατακρατῆσαι τῆς τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιβολῆς. ὁ δε των Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, θεωρών έν μεν τώ κινδύνω πολλούς ἀποθνήσκοντας, οῦ δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτ'

watch, and his orders having been executed, he led the whole force out as it was getting light and attacked the works in several places. The Romans. who had foreseen what was coming, were not idle or unprepared, but promptly ran to defend the threatened points and opposed a vigorous resistance to the enemy. Soon the whole of both forces were engaged, and a desperate fight was going on all round the walls, the salliers numbering not less than twenty thousand and the force outside being rather more numerous. Inasmuch as they were fighting confusedly and in no order, each man as he thought best, the battle was all the more fierce, such a large force being engaged man to man and company to company, so that there was something of the keenness of single combat in the whole contest. It was, however, particularly at the siege-works themselves that there was most shouting and pressure. For those on both sides whose task from the outset was on the one hand to drive the defenders from the works, and on the other not to abandon them, exhibited such emulation and resolution, the assailants doing their very best to turn the Romans out, and the latter refusing to give way, that at last owing to this resolute spirit the men remained and fell on the spot where they had first stood. Yet, in spite of all, the bearers of pinebrands, tow, and fire intermingled with the combatants, attacked the engines from every side, hurling the burning matter at them with such pluck that the Romans were in the utmost peril, being unable to master the onset of the enemy. But the Carthaginian general, observing that many were falling in the battle, and that his object of

ἔπραττεν, οὐ δυναμένους κρατῆσαι τῶν ἔργων, 14 ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παρήγγειλε τοῖς σαλπισταῖς. οἱ δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι παρ' οὐδὲν ἐλθόντες τοῦ πάσας ἀποβαλεῖν τὰς παρασκευάς, τέλος ἐκράτησαν τῶν ἔργων καὶ πάντα διετήρησαν ἀσφαλῶς. δ

46 μεν οὖν 'Αννίβας μετὰ τὴν χρείαν ταύτην έξέπλευσε νύκτωρ ἔτι μετὰ τῶν νεῶν λαθὼν τοὺς πολεμίους εἰς τὰ Δρέπανα πρὸς 'Ατάρβαν τὸν τῶν

2 Καρχηδονίων στρατηγόν. διὰ γὰρ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου καὶ τὸ κάλλος τοῦ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λιμένος ἀεὶ μεγάλην ἐποιοῦντο σπουδὴν οἱ Καρχηδό-

3 νιοι περί τὴν φυλακὴν αὐτοῦ. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου τοῦτον ἀπέχειν τὸν τόπον ὡς ἂν ἐκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι στάδια.

4 Τοις δ' εν τη Καρχηδόνι βουλομένοις μεν είδεναι τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον, οὐ δυναμένοις δε διὰ τὸ τοὺς μεν συγκεκλεισθαι, τοὺς δε παραφυλάττεσθαι φιλοτίμως, ἐπηγγείλατό τις ἀνὴρ τῶν ἐνδόξων, 'Αννίβας ἐπικαλούμενος 'Ρόδιος, εἰσπλεύσας εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον καὶ γενόμενος αὐτόπτης ἄπαντα

5 διασαφήσειν. οἱ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας μὲν ἀσμένως ἤκουσαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπίστευόν γε διὰ τὸ τῷ στόλῳ τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους ἐπὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν στόμα-

6 τος έφορμεῖν. ὁ δὲ καταρτίσας τὴν ἰδίαν ναῦν ἀνήχθη· καὶ διάρας εἴς τινα τῶν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου
κειμένων νήσων, τῆ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα λαβὼν εὐκαίρως ἄνεμον οὔριον περὶ τετάρτην ὥραν ἀπάντων τῶν πολεμίων ὁρώντων καὶ καταπεπληγμένων
7 τὴν τόλμαν εἰσέπλευσε. καὶ τὴν κατόπιν εὐθέως

8 εγίνετο περί άναγωγήν. δ δε τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατηγὸς βουλόμενος ἐπιμελέστερον τὸν κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν τόπον τηρεῖν, ἐξηρτυκώς ἐν τῆ νυκτὶ δέκα 128 taking the works was not being attained, ordered his trumpeters to sound the retreat. Thus the Romans who had come very near losing all their siege-material, at length were masters of their works, and remained in secure possession of them.

46. As for Hannibal he sailed out after the action while it was still night, unobserved by the enemy, and proceeded to Drepana to meet the Carthaginian commander there, Adherbal. Owing to the convenient situation of Drepana and the excellency of its harbour, the Carthaginians had always given great attention to its protection. The place lies at a distance of about a hundred and twenty stades from Lilybaeum.

The Carthaginians at home wishing to know what was happening at Lilybaeum, but being unable to do so as their own forces were shut up in the town and the Romans were active in their vigilance, one of their leading citizens, Hannibal, surnamed the Rhodian, offered to sail into Lilybaeum and make a full report from personal observation. They listened to his offer eagerly, but did not believe he could do this, as the Romans were anchored outside the mouth of the port. But after fitting out his own ship, he set sail, and crossed to one of the islands that lie before Lilybaeum, and next day finding the wind happily favourable, sailed in at about ten o'clock in the morning in full sight of the enemy who were thunderstruck by his audacity. Next day he at once made preparations for departure, but the Roman general, with the view of guarding the entrance more carefully, had fitted out in the night

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ναθς τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ λιμένος έστως έθεώρει το συμβαίνον, όμοίως δε καί 9 πῶν τὸ στρατόπεδον αί δὲ νῆες τοῦ στόματος έξ άμφοιν τοιν μεροιν, έφ' όσον ήν δυνατον έγγιστα τοις τενάγεσι προσάγειν, έπειχον, έπτερωκυίαι προς την εμβολήν και σύλληψιν της εκπλείν μελλούσης 10 νεώς. ὁ δὲ 'Ρόδιος ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς τὴν ἀναγωγην ποιησάμενος οὕτως κατανέστη τῶν πολεμίων τῆ τε τόλμη καὶ τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν ὥστ' οὐ μόνον άτρωτον έξέπλευσε την ναθν έχων καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας, οξον έστωτα παραδραμών τὰ σκάφη των ύπ-11 εναντίων, άλλὰ καὶ βραχύ προπλεύσας επέστη πτερώσας την ναθν, ώς αν εί προκαλούμενος τούς 12 πολεμίους. οὐδενὸς δὲ τολμῶντος ἐπ' αὐτὸν ἀντανάγεσθαι διὰ τὸ τάχος τῆς εἰρεσίας, ἀπέπλευσε καταναστάς μιᾶ νηὶ παντός τοῦ τῶν ἐναντίων στόλου. 13 καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ήδη πλεονάκις ποιῶν ταὐτὸ τοῦτο μεγάλην χρείαν παρείχετο, τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις ἀεὶ τὰ κατεπείγοντα διασαφῶν, τοὺς δὲ πολιορκουμένους εὐθαρσεῖς παρασκευάζων, τοὺς δὲ Ῥωμαίους 47 καταπληττόμενος τῷ παραβόλω. μέγιστα δὲ συν-εβάλλετο πρὸς τὴν τόλμαν αὐτοῦ τὸ διὰ τῶν προβραχέων έκ της έμπειρίας άκριβως σεσημειωσθαι τον 2 είσπλουν υπεράρας γάρ καὶ φαινόμενος έπειτ' αν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν μερῶν ἐλάμβανε τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάττης πύργον κατὰ πρῶρραν οὕτως ὤστε τοις πρός την Λιβύην τετραμμένοις πύργοις της πόλεως επιπροσθείν απασι δι' οδ τρόπου μόνως εστί δυνατόν έξ οὐρίας τοῦ κατά τὸν εἴσπλουν στόματος 3 εὐστοχείν. τῆ δὲ τοῦ 'Ροδίου τόλμη πιστεύσαντες καὶ πλείους ἀπεθάρρησαν τῶν εἰδότων τοὺς τόπους τὸ παραπλήσιον ποιείν εξ ών οι 'Ρωμαίοι δυσχρη-130

ten of his fastest ships, and now he himself and his whole army stood by the harbour waiting to see The ships were waiting on what would happen. either side of the entrance as near as the shoals would allow them to approach, their oars out and ready to charge and capture the ship that was about to sail out. But the "Rhodian," getting under weigh in the sight of all, so far outbraved the Romans by his audacity and speed that not only did he bring his ship and her whole crew out unhurt, passing the enemy's ships just as if they were motionless, but after sailing on a short way, he pulled up without shipping his oars as if to challenge the enemy, and no one venturing to come out against him owing to the speed of his rowing, he sailed off, after thus having with one ship successfully defied the whole Roman fleet. After this he several times performed the same feat and was of great service by continuing to report at Carthage the news of most urgent importance, while at the same time he kept up the spirits of the besieged and struck terror into the Romans by his venturesomeness. 47. What tended most to give him confidence was that from experience he had accurately noted the course to be followed through the shoals in entering. For as soon as he had crossed and come into view, he would get the sea-tower on the Italian side on his bows so that it covered the whole line of towers turned towards Africa; and this is the only way that a vessel running before the wind can hit the mouth of the harbour in entering. Several others who had local knowledge, gaining confidence from the "Rhodian's" audacity, undertook to do the same, and in consequence the Romans, to whom this was a

στούμενοι τῷ συμβαίνοντι χωννύειν τὸ στόμα τοῦ 4 λιμένος ἐπεχείρησαν. κατά μέν οὖν τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος τῆς ἐπιβολῆς οὐδὲν ἤνυον διὰ τὸ βάθος τῆς θαλάττης καὶ διὰ τὸ μηθὲν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐμβαλλομένων στηναι μηδέ συμμειναι τὸ παράπαν, άλλ' ύπό τε του κλύδωνος και της του ρου βίας το ριπτούμενον εὐθέως ἐν τῆ καταφορά παρωθεῖσθαι 5 καὶ διασκορπίζεσθαι, κατὰ δέ τινα τόπον έχοντα βραχέα συνέστη χῶμα μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας, ἐφ' ῷ τετρήρης ἐκτρέχουσα νυκτὸς ἐκάθισε καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ύποχείριος έγένετο, διαφέρουσα τῆ κατα-6 σκευή τής ναυπηγίας. ής οί 'Ρωμαΐοι κρατήσαντες καὶ πληρώματι καταρτίσαντες ἐπιλέκτω, πάντας η τούς είσπλέοντας, μάλιστα δε τον 'Ρόδιον, επετήρουν. ὁ δὲ κατὰ τύχην εἰσπλεύσας νυκτὸς μετὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀνήγετο φανερῶς. θεωρῶν δ' ἐκ καταβολής αύτῷ τὴν τετρήρη συνεξορμήσασαν, 8 γνούς την ναθν διετράπη. το μέν οθν πρώτον ωρμησεν ως καταταχήσων τῆ δε τοῦ πληρώματος παρασκευῆ καταλαμβανόμενος, τέλος ἐπιστρέψας 9 ηναγκάσθη συμβαλείν τοίς πολεμίοις. καταπροτερούμενος δε τοις επιβατικοις διά τε τὸ πληθος καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς 10 ύποχείριος. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, κυριεύσαντες καὶ ταύτης της νεώς εὖ κατεσκευασμένης, καὶ καταρτίσαντες αὐτὴν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν χρείαν, οὕτως ἐκώλυσαν τούς κατατολμώντας και πλέοντας είς το Λιλύβαιον.

48 Τῶν δὲ πολιορκουμένων ταῖς μὲν ἀντοικοδομίαις ἐνεργῶς χρωμένων, τοῦ δὲ λυμαίνεσθαι καὶ διαφθείρειν τὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων παρασκευὰς ἀπεγνω-2 κότων, γίνεταί τις ἀνέμου στάσις ἔχουσα τηλικαύτην

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great annoyance, tried to fill up the mouth of the harbour. For the most part indeed their attempt was resultless, both owing to the depth of the sea, and because none of the stuff that they threw in would remain in its place or hold together in the least, but all they shot in used to be at once shifted and scattered as it was sinking to the bottom, by the surge and the force of the current. However, in one place where there were shoals a solid bank was formed at the cost of infinite pains, and on this a four-banked ship which was coming out at night grounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. This ship was of remarkably fine build, and the Romans, after capturing it and manning it with a select crew, kept watch for all the blockade-runners and especially for the "Rhodian." It so happened that he had sailed in that very night, and was afterwards sailing out quite openly, but, on seeing the four-banked vessel putting out to sea again together with himself and recognizing it, he was alarmed. first he made a spurt to get away from it, but finding himself overhauled owing to the good oarsmanship of its crew he had at length to turn and engage the enemy. Being no match for the boarders, who were numerous and all picked men, he fell into the enemy's hands. His ship was, like the other, very well built, and the Romans when they were in possession of her fitted her out too for this special service and so put a stop to all this venturesome blockade-running at Lilybaeum.

48. The besieged were still counterbuilding energetically though they had renounced their effort to spoil or destroy the enemy's works, when there arose a turbulent storm of wind, blowing with

βίαν καὶ φορὰν εἰς αὐτὰς τὰς τῶν μηχανημάτων προσαγωγάς ώστε καὶ τὰς στοὰς διασαλεύειν καὶ τούς προκειμένους τούτων πύργους τῆ βία βαστά-3 ζειν. έν ῷ καιρῷ συννοήσαντές τινες τῶν Ελληνικών μισθοφόρων την επιτηδειότητα της περιστάσεως πρός τὴν τῶν ἔργων διαφθορὰν προσφέρουσι 4 τῷ στρατηγῷ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν. τοῦ δὲ δεξαμένου καὶ ταχέως έτοιμάσαντος παν τὸ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν άρμόζον, συστραφέντες οι νεανίσκοι κατά τριττούς τό-πους ενέβαλον πῦρ τοις έργοις. ὡς δ' ἄν τῶν μεν κατασκευασμάτων διά τον χρόνον εθ παρεσκευασμένων πρός το ραδίως έμπρησθηναι, της δε τοῦ πνεύματος βίας φυσώσης κατ' αὐτῶν τῶν πύργων καὶ μηχανημάτων, την μέν νομην τοῦ πυρὸς ένεργον συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι καὶ πρακτικήν, τὴν δ' ἐπάρκειαν καὶ βοήθειαν τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις εἰς τέλος ἄπραβ κτον καὶ δυσχερή. τοιαύτην γὰρ ἔκπληξιν παρίστα τὸ συμβαῖνον τοῖς βοηθοῦσιν ώστε μήτε συννοῆσαι μήτε συνιδείν δύνασθαι το γινόμενον, άλλ' άποσκοτουμένους ύπο της είς αὐτούς φερομένης λιγνύος καὶ τῶν φεψαλύγων, ἔτι δὲ τῆς τοῦ καπνοῦ πολυπληθίας, οὐκ ὀλίγους ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ πίπτειν, μὴ δυναμένους έγγίσαι πρός αὐτὴν τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς βοή-7 θειαν. όσω δε μείζω συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι την δυσχρηστίαν περί τους υπεναντίους διά τάς προειρημένας αιτίας, τοσούτω πλείων ευχρηστία περί τούς 8 ένι έντας ήν τὸ πῦρ. τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐπισκοτοῦν καὶ βλάπτειν δυνάμενον παν έξεφυσατο καὶ προωθειτο κατά των ὑπεναντίων, τὸ δὲ βαλλόμενον ἢ ῥιπτούμενον ἐπί τε τοὺς βοηθοῦντας καὶ τὴν τῶν ἔργων . διαφθοράν εύστοχον μέν έπεγίνετο διά το συνοράν τους αφιέντας τον προ αυτών τόπον, πρακτικόν δέ 134

such violence and fury on the actual apparatus for advancing the engines, that it shook the protecting sheds from their foundations and carried away the wooden towers in front of these by its force. During the gale it struck some of the Greek mercenaries that here was an admirable opportunity for destroying the works, and they communicated their notion to the general, who approved it and made all suitable preparations for the enterprise. The soldiers in several bodies threw fire on the works at three separate points. The whole apparatus being old and readily inflammable, and the wind blowing very strongly on the actual towers and engines, the action of the flames as they spread was most effective, whereas the efforts of the Romans to succour and save the works were quite the reverse, the task being most difficult. defenders were indeed so terrified by the outbreak that they could neither realize nor understand what was happening, but half blinded by the flames and sparks that flew in their faces and by the dense smoke, many of them succumbed and fell, unable even to get near enough to combat the actual conflagra-The difficulties that the enemy encountered for these various reasons were immense, while the exertions of the incendiaries were correspondingly facilitated. Everything that could blind or injure the enemy was blown into flame and pushed at them, missiles and other objects hurled or discharged to wound the rescuers or to destroy the works being easily aimed because the throwers could see in front



διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι σφοδρὰν τὴν πληγήν, συνεργούσης 9 τοῖς βάλλουσι τῆς τοῦ πνεύματος βίας. τὸ δὲ πέρας τοιαύτην συνέβη γενέσθαι τὴν παντέλειαν τῆς καταφθορᾶς ὧστε καὶ τὰς βάσεις τῶν πύργων καὶ τὰ

φθοράς ώστε και τάς βάσεις τών πύργων και τά 10 στύπη τών κριών ύπό τοῦ πυρός άχρειωθήναι. τού-των δὲ συμβάντων, τό μὲν ἔτι διὰ τῶν ἔργων πολιορκεῖν ἀπέγνωσαν οι Ῥωμαῖοι· περιταφρεύσαντες δὲ καὶ χάρακι περιλαβόντες κύκλω τὴν πόλιν, ἔτι δὲ τῆς ίδίας στρατοπεδείας τεῖχος προβαλόμενοι, τῷ

11 χρόνω παρέδοσαν τὴν πρᾶξιν. οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ Λιλυβαίω τὸ πεπτωκὸς ἐξοικοδομησάμενοι τεῖχος εὐθαρ-

σως υπέμενον ήδη την πολιορκίαν.

49 Εἰς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην προσπεσόντων τούτων, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πλειόνων ἀναγγελλόντων διότι συμβαίνει τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου πληρωμάτων τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ἔν τε τοῖς ἔργοις καὶ τῆ καθόλου πολιορκία 2 διεφθάρθαι, σπουδῆ κατέγραφον ναύτας, καὶ συνα-

θροίσαντες εἰς μυρίους ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς τὴν Σικελίαν.

3 ών διὰ τοῦ πορθμοῦ περαιωθέντων καὶ πεζῆ παραγενομένων εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, συναγαγών τοὺς χιλιάρχους ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν 'Ρωμαίων Πόπλιος Κλαύδιος ἔφη καιρὸν εἶναι πλεῖν ἐπὶ τὰ Δρέπανα

4 παντί τῷ στόλῳ. τὸν γὰρ στρατηγὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ᾿Ατάρβαν τὸν τεταγμένον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἀπαράσκευον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀγνοοῦντα μὲν τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων, πεπεισμένον δὲ μὴ δύνασθαι πλεῖν τὸν αὐτῶν στόλον διὰ τὴν γεγενημένην ἐν τῇ πολιορκία καταφθορὰν τῶν ἀνδρῶν. προ-

5 χείρως δ' αὐτών συγκατατιθεμένων, εὐθέως ἐνεβίβαζε τά τε προϋπάρχοντα καὶ τὰ προσφάτως παραγεγονότα πληρώματα, τοὺς δ' ἐπιβάτας ἐκ παντὸς ἐπέλεξε τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐθελοντὴν τοὺς ἀρίστους, 136

of them, while the blows were most effective as the strong wind gave them additional force. At the end the completeness of the destruction was such that the bases of the towers and the posts that supported the battering-rams were rendered useless by the fire. After this the Romans gave up the attempt to conduct the siege by works, and digging a trench and erecting a stockade all round the city, at the same time building a wall round their own encampment, they left the result to time. But the garrison of Lilybaeum rebuilt the fallen portions of the wall and now confidently awaited the issue of the siege.

49. On the news reaching Rome, and on it being reported from various quarters that the greater part of the crews of their fleet had perished in the works or in the siege operations in general, they set about actively enlisting sailors, and when they had collected about ten thousand dispatched them to Sicily. These reinforcements were ferried over the straits and thence proceeded on foot to the camp, where on their arrival the Roman Consul, Publius Claudius 249 B.C. Pulcher, called a meeting of the Tribunes and told them that now was the time to attack Drepana with the whole fleet. The Carthaginian general Adherbal who commanded there was, he said, unprepared for such a contingency, as he was ignorant of the arrival of the crews, and convinced that their fleet was unable to take the sea owing to the heavy loss of men in the siege. On the Tribunes readily consenting, he at once embarked the former crews and the new arrivals, and chose for marines the best men in the whole army, who readily volunteered as the

ατε δή τοῦ μεν πλοῦ σύνεγγυς όντος, της δ' ώφεβ λείας έτοίμου προφαινομένης. ταθτα δέ παρασκευασάμενος ἀνήχθη περί μέσας νύκτας, λαθών τοὺς πολεμίους. καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἄθρους ἔπλει, δεξιὰν 7 έχων την γην. αμα δε τω φωτί των πρώτων επί τὰ Δρέπανα νεῶν ἐπιφαινομένων, κατιδών 'Ατάρβας τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐξενίσθη διὰ τὸ παράδοξον· 8 ταχὺ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ γενόμενος, καὶ νοήσας τὸν ἐπίπλουν των ύπεναντίων, έκρινε παντός έργου πειραν λαμβάνειν καὶ πᾶν ὑπομένειν χάριν τοῦ μὴ περιιδεῖν σφᾶς εἰς πρόδηλον συγκλεισθέντας πο-9 λιορκίαν. διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μὲν πληρώματα συν-10 ηνε πρός του αίγιαλόν, τους δ' εκ της πόλεως μισθοφόρους ήθροιζε μετὰ κηρύγματος. τῶν δὲ συλλεχθέντων, ἐπεβάλετο διὰ βραχέων εἰς ἔννοιαν αὐτοὺς ἄγειν της τε τοῦ νικαν έλπίδος, έὰν τολμήσωσι ναυμαχείν, καὶ τῆς ἐν τῆ πολιορκία δυσχρη-11 στίας, εάν καταμελλήσωσι προϊδόμενοι τον κίνδυνον. έτοίμως δ' αὐτῶν παρορμηθέντων πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν, καὶ βοώντων ἄγειν καὶ μὴ μέλλειν, ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος τὴν ὁρμὴν παρήγγειλε κατὰ 12 τάχος ἐμβαίνειν, καὶ βλέποντας πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ ναθν έπεσθαι ταύτη κατά πρύμναν. διασαφήσας δὲ τὰ προειρημένα κατὰ σπουδήν πρώτος ἐποιεῖτο τον ανάπλουν, ύπ' αὐτὰς τὰς πέτρας ἐπὶ θάτερα 50 μέρη τοῦ λιμένος εξάγων τοῦ τῶν πολεμίων είσπλου. Πόπλιος δ' ό τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στρατηγός, θεωρων τους μεν πολεμίους παρά την αύτου δόξαν ουτ' 2 εἴκοντας οὖτε καταπεπληγμένους τὸν ἐπίπλουν, ἀλλὰ πρός τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ὄντας, τῶν δὲ σφετέρων νεῶν τας μεν εντός ήδη τοῦ λιμένος ούσας, τας δ' έν αὐτῶ τῶ στόματι, τὰς δὲ φερομένας ἐπὶ τὸν εἴσ-138

voyage was but a short one and the prospect of booty seemed certain. After making these preparations he put to sea about midnight unobserved by the enemy, and at first sailed in close order with the land on his right. At daybreak when the leading ships came into view sailing on Drepana, Adherbal was at first taken by surprise at the unexpected sight. but soon recovering his composure and understanding that the enemy had come to attack, he decided to make every effort and incur every sacrifice rather than expose himself to the certitude of a blockade. He therefore at once collected the crews on the beach and summoned by crier the mercenaries from the city. On all being assembled he tried in a few words to impress on their minds the prospect of victory if they risked a battle, and the hardships of a siege should they delay now that they clearly foresaw the danger. Their spirit for the fight was readily aroused, and on their calling on him to lead them on and not delay, he thanked them, praised their zeal, and then ordered them to get on board at once, and keeping their eves on his ship, to follow in his wake. Having made these orders quite clear to them he quickly got under weigh and took the lead, making his exit close under the rocks on the opposite side of the harbour from that on which the Romans were entering. 50. Publius, the Roman commander, had expected that the enemy would give way and would be intimidated by his attack, but when he saw that on the contrary they intended to fight him, and that his own fleet was partly inside the harbour, partly at the very mouth, and partly still sailing up to enter,

3 πλουν, πάσαις άναστρέφειν παρήγγειλε καὶ ποιείσθαι τὸν πλοῦν ἔξω πάλιν. ἔνθα δὴ τῶν μὲν ἐν τῷ λιμένι, τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸν εἴσπλουν ἐκ τῆς μεταβολής συμπιπτουσών, ου μόνον θόρυβος ήν έκ 4 των ανδρων απλετος, αλλά και τους ταρσους έθραυονθ' αί νηες άλλήλαις συγκρούουσαι. όμως δ' οὖν άεὶ τοὺς ἀνατρέχοντας ἐκτάττοντες οἱ τριήραρχοι παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν γῆν ταχέως ἐποίουν ἀντιπρώρρους κ τοις πολεμίοις. δ δε Πόπλιος αὐτὸς ἐπέπλει μεν άρχηθεν κατόπιν έπὶ παντὶ τῷ στόλῳ, τότε δ' έπι-στρέψας κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν πλοῦν πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος ε έλαβε την ευώνυμον της όλης δυνάμεως τάξιν. 'Ατάρβας δε κατά τον αυτον καιρον υπεράρας το λαιον των πολεμίων [Ρωμαίων], έχων πέντε ναθς επίπλους, υπέστησε την ξαυτου ναθν αντίπρωρρον η τοις πολεμίοις άπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος μέρους. αμα δε και των επιπλεόντων αει τοις συνάπτουσι η προσεπιταττομένοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖν παραγγείλας διὰ των ύπηρετων, καταστάντων δε πάντων είς μέτωπον σημήνας διά των συνθημάτων, τάς μεν άρχας έποιεῖτο τὸν ἐπίπλουν ἐν τάξει, μενόντων πρὸς τῆ 9 γη των 'Ρωμαίων διά το προσδέχεσθαι τάς έκ τοῦ λιμένος ανατρεχούσας ναθς. εξ οδ συνέβαινε με-51 γάλα τους 'Ρωμαίους έλαττωθήναι προς αυτή τή γή ποιησαμένους την συμπλοκήν. ἐπειδη δὲ σύνεγγυς 2 αύτῶν ἡσαν, ἀρθέντων τῶν συνθημάτων ἐφ' έκατέρας της ναυαρχίδος, συνέβαλλον άλληλοις. τὸ μεν οὖν πρῶτον ἰσόρροπος ἦν ὁ κίνδυνος, ὡς ἂν 3 αμφοτέρων τοις αρίστοις έκ της πεζικης δυνάμεως έπιβάταις χρωμένων αξί δε μαλλον ύπερείχον οί 4 Καρχηδόνιοι διά τὸ πολλά προτερήματα παρ' όλον έχειν τὸν ἀγῶνα. τῷ τε γὰρ ταχυναυτεῖν πολὺ 140

he gave orders for them all to put about and sail out again. On the ships already in the harbour fouling those which were entering owing to their sudden turn there was not only great confusion among the men but the ships had the blades of their oars broken as they came into collision. The captains, however, bringing the ships as they cleared the harbour into line, soon drew them up close to the shore with their prows to the enemy. Publius himself from the start had been bringing up the rear of the entire fleet, and now veering out to sea without stopping his course, took up a position on the extreme left. At the same time Adherbal, outflanking the enemy's left with five beaked ships, placed his own ship facing the enemy from the direction of the open sea. As the other ships came up and joined getting into line, he ordered them by his staff officers to place themselves in the same position as his own, and when they all presented a united front he gave the signal to advance that had been agreed upon and at first bore down in line on the Romans, who kept close to the shore awaiting those of their ships that were returning from the harbour. This position close inshore placed them at a great disadvantage in the engagement. 51. When the two fleets approached each other, the signals for battle were raised on both the admirals, and they closed. At first the battle was equally balanced, as the marines in both fleets were the very best men of their land forces; but the Carthaginians gradually began to get the best of it as they had many advantages throughout the whole struggle. They



περιήσαν διά τὴν διαφοράν τῆς ναυπηγίας καὶ τὴν των πληρωμάτων έξιν, ή τε χώρα μεγάλα συνεβάλ-5 λετ' αὐτοις, ατε πεποιημένων την έκταξιν από των κατὰ τὸ πέλαγος τόπων. εἶτε γὰρ πιέζοιντό τινες ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, κατόπιν ἀνεχώρουν ἀσφαλῶς β διά τὸ ταχυναυτεῖν εἰς τὸν ἀναπεπταμένον τόπον: κάπειτ' έκ μεταβολής τοις προπίπτουσι των διω-κόντων, τοτε μεν περιπλέοντες, τοτε δε πλάγιοι προσπίπτοντες στρεφομένοις καὶ δυσχρηστοῦσι διὰ τὸ βάρος τῶν πλοίων καὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν 7 πληρωμάτων εμβολάς τε συνεχείς εδίδοσαν καὶ πολλά των σκαφων έβάπτιζον είτε κινδυνεύοι τις των συμμάχων, έτοίμως παρεβοήθουν έξω τοῦ δεινοῦ καὶ μετ' ἀσφαλείας, παρὰ τὰς πρύμνας κατὰ 8 τὸ πέλαγος ποιούμενοι τὸν πλοῦν. τοῖς γε μὴν 'Ρωμαίοις τάναντία τούτων συνέβαινε· τοις τε γάρ πιεζομένοις οὐκ ην είς τουπισθέν δυνατόν ἀποχωρείν, πρός τῆ γῆ ποιουμένοις τὸν κίνδυνον, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸ θλιβόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν κατὰ πρόσωπον σκάφος ἢ τοις βραχέσι περιπίπτον εκάθιζε κατά πρύμναν ή 9 πρός τὴν γῆν φερόμενον επώκελλε. διεκπλείν μεν οῦν διὰ τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν καὶ κατόπιν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι τοις ήδη προς έτέρους διαμαχομένοις, όπερ έν τῷ ναυμαχεῖν ἐστι πρακτικώτατον, ἀδυνάτως είχον, διά τε την βαρύτητα των πλοίων, προσέτι 10 δε καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν τῶν πληρωμάτων. οὐδε μὴν επιβοηθείν τοις δεομένοις κατά πρύμναν εδύναντο διὰ τὸ συγκεκλεῖσθαι πρὸς τῇ γῇ καὶ μηδὲ μικρὸν ἀπολείπεσθαι τόπον τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπαρκεῖν τῷ 11 δεομένω. τοιαύτης δε δυσχρηστίας ύπαρχούσης περί

much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, and their position was very favourable to them, as they had freely developed their line in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them owing to their speed to retreat safely to the open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued and fell on them, they either got in their rear or attacked them on the flank, and as the enemy then had to turn round and found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, they rammed them repeatedly and sunk many. Again if any other of their own ships were in peril they were ready to render assistance with perfect security to themselves, as they were out of immediate danger and could sail in open water past the sterns of their own It was, however, just the opposite with the Those in distress could not retire backwards, as they were fighting close to the land, and the ships, hard pressed by the enemy in front, either ran on the shallows stern foremost or made for the shore and grounded. To sail on the one hand through the enemy's line and then appear on the stern of such of his ships as were engaged with others (one of the most effective manœuvres in naval warfare) was impossible owing to the weight of the vessels and their crews' lack of skill. again could they give assistance where it was required from astern, as they were hemmed in close to the shore, and there was not even a small space left for those who wished to come to the rescue of their comrades in distress. Such being their difficult

τον όλον άγωνα, καὶ των μεν καθιζόντων εν τοις βραχέσι, τῶν δ' ἐκπιπτόντων σκαφῶν, κατιδὼν ὁ στρατηγός τῶν 'Ρωμαίων τὸ συμβαῖνον, ὧρμησε πρὸς φυγήν, ἀπὸ τῶν εὐωνύμων παρὰ τὴν γῆν ἐξελίξας, και σύν αὐτῷ περί τριάκοντα νῆες, αἴπερ

12 έτυχον έγγυς οδσαι. των δε λοιπων σκαφών, δντων ένενήκοντα και τριων, έκυρίευσαν οι Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων, ὅσοι μὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τας ναθς είς την γην εκβαλόντες απεχώρησαν.

52 Γενομένης δε της ναυμαχίας τοιαύτης, 'Ατάρβας μεν ευδοκίμει παρά τοις Καρχηδονίοις, ώς δι' αύτον καὶ διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν πρόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν κατωρθω-2 κώς, Πόπλιος δὲ παρὰ τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις ἠδόξει καὶ διεβέβλητο μεγάλως, ως εἰκῆ κἀλογίστως τοῖς πράγμασι κεχρημένος, καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸν οὐ μικροῖς

3 έλαττώμασι περιβεβληκὼς τὴν 'Ρώμην· διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα μεγάλαις ζημίαις καὶ κινδύνοις κριθεὶς

περιέπεσεν.

Οὐ μὴν οί γε 'Ρωμαῖοι, καίπερ τοιούτων συμβεβηκότων, διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων φιλοτιμίαν οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῶν ἐνδεχομένων, ἀλλ' εἴχοντο τῶν 5 έξης πραγμάτων. διο και συνάψαντος τοῦ κατά τὰς άρχαιρεσίας χρόνου, στρατηγούς ύπάτους καταστήσαντες παραυτίκα τον έτερον αὐτῶν ἐξέπεμπον Λεύκιον Ἰούνιον, τάς τε σιταρχίας παρακομίζοντα τοις τὸ Λιλύβαιον πολιορκοῦσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας άγορὰς καὶ χορηγίας τῷ στρατοπέδῳ πρὸς δὲ καὶ παραπομπούς τούτοις ἐπλήρωσαν ἔξήκοντα ναῦς. 6 δ δ' Τούνιος αφικόμενος είς την Μεσσήνην, καὶ

προσλαβών τὰ συνηντηκότα τῶν πλοίων ἀπό τε τοῦ στρατοπέδου καὶ τῆς άλλης Σικελίας, παρεκομίσθη κατά σπουδήν είς τάς Συρακούσας, έχων έκατον

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position in every part of the battle, and some of the ships grounding on the shallows while others ran ashore, the Roman commander, when he saw what was happening, took to flight, slipping out on the left along shore, accompanied by about thirty of the ships nearest to him. The remainder, ninety-three in number, were captured by the Carthaginians, including their crews, with the exception of those men who ran their ships ashore and made off.

52. The battle having resulted so, Adherbal gained a high reputation at Carthage, the success being regarded as due to his foresight and boldness. Publius, on the contrary, fell into ill repute among the Romans, and there was a great outcry against him for having acted rashly and inconsiderately and done all a single man could to bring a great disaster on Rome. He was accordingly brought to trial afterwards, condemned to a heavy fine, and narrowly

escaped with his life.

Yet so determined were the Romans to bring the whole struggle to a successful issue, that, notwithstanding this reverse, they left undone nothing that was in their power, and prepared to continue the campaign. The time for the elections was now at hand, and accordingly when the new Consuls were appointed they dispatched one of them, Lucius Junius Pullus, a with corn for the besiegers of Lilybaeum and such other provisions and supplies as the army required, manning sixty ships to act as a convoy to him. Junius, on arriving at Messene and being joined by the ships from Lilybaeum and the rest of Sicily, coasted along with all speed to Syracuse,

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^a This is a mistake; L. Junius was one of the consuls of 249 s.c., the colleague of Publius.

είκοσι σκάφη καὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν σχεδὸν ἐν ὀκτακοη σίαις ναυσί φορτηγοίς. Εντεύθεν δε παραδούς τοίς ταμίαις τὰς ἡμισείας φορτηγούς καί τινα τῶν μακρών πλοίων έξαπέστειλε, διακομισθήναι σπουδά-

8 ζων τῷ στρατοπέδω τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. αὐτὸς δ' εν ταις Συρακούσαις υπέμενε, τούς τε κατά πλοῦν ἀφυστεροῦντας ἐκ τῆς Μεσσήνης ἀναδεχόμενος καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου συμμάχων σῖτον προσαναλαμβάνων.

53 Κατά δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ᾿Ατάρβας μὲν ἄνδρας τούς έν τη ναυμαχία ληφθέντας καὶ τὰς αίγμαλώτους νηας έξαπέστειλεν είς την Καρχηδόνα, 2 Καρθάλωνα δέ τον συνάρχοντα δούς τριάκοντα ναῦς

έξέπεμψε πρός αίς έχων αυτός έβδομήκοντα κατ-

3 έπλευσε, προστάξας άφνω προσπεσόντα ταις δρμούσαις παρά τὸ Λιλύβαιον τῶν πολεμίων ναυσίν, ὧν μέν αν δυνατός ή κυριεύσαι, ταις δε λοιπαις πύρ 4 εμβαλείν. πεισθέντος δε τοῦ Καρθάλωνος καὶ

ποιησαμένου τον επίπλουν ύπο την έωθινήν, και τά μεν εμπιπρώντος, τὰ δ' ἀποσπώντος τών πλοίων, μεγάλην συνέπεσε γενέσθαι ταραχήν περὶ τὸ τών

5 'Ρωμαίων στρατόπεδον, προσβοηθούντων γάρ αὐτων έπὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ γινομένης κραυγής, συννοήσας 'Ιμίλκων ο το Λιλύβαιον τηρών, καὶ θεωρών ήδη της ημέρας υποφαινούσης το συμβαινον, έπ-

β αποστέλλει τους έκ της πόλεως μισθοφόρους. οί δέ 'Ρωμαΐοι, τοῦ δεινοῦ πανταχόθεν αὐτοὺς περιστάντος, οὐκ εἰς μικρὰν οὐδ' εἶς τὴν τυχοῦσαν ήλθον 7 διατροπήν. δ δέ των Καργηδονίων ναύαρχος, δλίγα

των σκαφων τὰ μὲν ἀποσπάσας, τὰ δὲ συντρίψας. μετά ταθτα μικρόν ἀπό τοθ Λιλυβαίου παρακομισθείς ώς εφ' 'Ηρακλείας ετήρει, βουλόμενος διακω-146

having now a hundred and twenty ships and the supplies in about eight hundred transports. There he entrusted half the transports and a few of the war-ships to the Quaestors and sent them on, as he was anxious to have what the troops required conveyed to them at once. He himself remained in Syracuse waiting for the ships that were left behind on the voyage from Messene and procuring additional supplies and corn from the allies in the interior.

53. At about the same time Adherbal sent the prisoners from the naval battle and the captured ships to Carthage, and giving Carthalo his colleague thirty vessels in addition to the seventy with which he had arrived, dispatched him with orders to make a sudden descent on the enemy's ships that were moored near Lilvbaeum, capture all he could and set fire to the rest. When Carthalo acting on these orders made the attack at dawn and began to burn some of the ships and carry off others, there was a great commotion in the Roman camp. For as they rushed to rescue the ships with loud cries, Himilco, the commander of the garrison, heard them, and as day was just beginning to break, he saw what was happening, and sent out the mercenaries from the town to attack the Romans also. The Romans were now in danger from all sides and in no little or ordinary distress. The Carthaginian admiral, having made off with a few ships and broken up others, shortly afterwards left Lilybaeum, and after coasting along for some distance in the direction of Heraclea remained on the watch, as his design was to intercept

- 8 λύειν τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον πλέοντας. προσαγγειλάντων δὲ τῶν σκοπῶν πληθος ἱκανὸν πλοίων προσφέρεσθαι παντοδαπῶν καὶ συνεγγίζειν, ἀναχθεὶς ἔπλει, συμμίξαι σπεύδων διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ἐκ τοῦ προγεγενημένου προτερήμα-
- 9 τος. δμοίως δε καὶ τοῖς εκ τῶν Συρακουσῶν προαπεσταλμένοις ταμίαις ἀνήγγειλαν οἱ προπλεῖν εἰ-
- 10 θισμένοι λέμβοι τὸν ἐπίπλουν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ νομίσαντες οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως σφᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι πρὸς ναυμαχίαν, καθωρμίσθησαν πρός τι πολισμάτιον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοὺς ταττομένων, ἀλίμενον μέν, σάλους δ' ἔχον καὶ προβολὰς περικλειούσας ἐκ τῆς γῆς
- 11 εὐφυεῖς. οὖ ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ τούς τε καταπέλτας καὶ τοὺς πετροβόλους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστήσαντες, προσεδόκων τὸν ἐπίπλουν
- 12 των ύπεναντίων. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι συνεγγίσαντες τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεβάλοντο πολιορκεῖν τούτους, ὑπολαβόντες τοὺς μὲν ἄνδρας καταπλαγέντας εἰς τὸ πολισμάτιον ἀποχωρήσειν, τῶν δὲ πλοίων ἀσφαλῶς
- 13 κυριεύσειν οὐ προχωρούσης δὲ τῆς ἐλπίδος, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀμυνομένων γενναίως, καὶ τοῦ τόπου πολλὰς ἔχοντος καὶ παντοδαπὰς δυσχρηστίας, ὀλίγα τῶν τὰς ἄγορὰς ἐχόντων πλοίων ἀποσπάσαντες ἀπ-έπλευσαν πρός τινα ποταμόν, ἐν ῷ καθορμισθέντες ἐπετήρουν τὸν ἀνάπλουν αὐτῶν.
- 54 'Ο δ' ἐν ταῖς Συρακούσαις ὑπολειφθεὶς στρατηγός, ἐπεὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐπετέλεσε, κάμψας τὸν Πάχυνον ἐποιεῖτο τὸν πλοῦν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον, οὐδὲν εἰδὼς τῶν περὶ τοὺς προπλέοντας συμ-
 - 2 βεβηκότων. ὁ δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, ση-

the ships that were on their way to join the army. When his look-out men reported that a considerable number of ships of every variety were approaching and at no great distance, he got under weigh and sailed towards them eager to engage them, as after the recent success he had great contempt for the The approach of the enemy was also announced by the light boats that usually sail in front of a fleet to the Quaestors who had been sent on in advance from Syracuse. Considering themselves not strong enough to accept a battle, they anchored off a certain small fortified town subject to the Romans, which had indeed no harbour, but a roadstead shut in by headlands projecting from the land in a manner that made it a more or less secure anchorage. Here they disembarked, and setting up the catapults and mangonels procured from the fortress, awaited the enemy's attack. The Carthaginians on their approach at first thought of besieging them, supposing that the crews would be afraid and retreat to the city, and that they would then easily possess themselves of the ships; but when their hopes were not realized, the enemy on the contrary making a gallant defence, and the situation of the place presenting many difficulties of every kind, they carried off a few of the ships laden with provisions and sailed away to a certain river where they anchored, and waited for the Romans to put out to sea again.

54. The Consul, who had remained in Syracuse, when he had concluded his business there, rounded Cape Pachynus and sailed in the direction of Lilybaeum in entire ignorance of what had befallen the advance force. The Carthaginian admiral, when his



μηνάντων τῶν σκοπῶν αὐτῷ πάλιν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀναχθεὶς ἔπλει μετὰ σπουδῆς, βουλόμενος αὐτοῖς ώς πλεῖστον ἀπέγουσι τῶν οί-3 κείων νεών συμβαλείν. ὁ δ' Ἰούνιος κατιδών ἐκ πολλοῦ τὸν στόλον τὸν τῶν Καρχηδονίων καὶ τὸ πληθος των σκαφων, ούτε συμβαλείν τολμων ούτ έκφυνείν έτι δυνατός ων διά τὸ σύνενγυς είναι τούς πολεμίους, εγκλίνας είς τόπους τραχείς καὶ κατά 4 πάντα τρόπον επισφαλεῖς καθωρμίσθη, κρίνων αίρετώτερον ὑπάρχειν ὅ τι δέοι παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἡ τοῖς πολεμίοις αὔτανδρον τὸ σφέτερον στρατόπεδον ὑπο-5 χείριον ποιήσαι. συνιδών δέ καὶ τὸ περὶ τούτου γεγονός δ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναύαρχος, τὸ μὲν παραβάλλεσθαι καὶ προσάγειν τοιούτοις τόποις απέδοκίμασε, λαβών δ' ἄκραν τινά καὶ προσορμισθεὶς ταύτη, μεταξύ τῶν στόλων ἐτήρει καὶ προσείνε τὸν β νοῦν αμφοτέροις. ἐπιγενομένου δὲ χειμῶνος καὶ περιστάσεως προφαινομένης έκ τοῦ πελάγους όλοσχερεστέρας, οί μεν των Καρχηδονίων κυβερνηται διά τε την των τόπων και την του πράγματος έμπειρίαν προορώμενοι τὸ μέλλον καὶ προλένοντες τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἔπεισαν τὸν Καρθάλωνα φυγείν τον χειμώνα και κάμψαι την άκραν του Παη χύνου. πεισθέντος δὲ νουνεχῶς, οδτοι μὲν πολλά μοχθήσαντες καὶ μόλις ὑπεράραντες τὴν ἄκραν ἐν 8 ἀσφαλεῖ καθωρμίσθησαν, οί δὲ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων στόλοι, τοῦ χειμώνος ἐπιγενομένου καὶ τών τόπων εἰς τέλος ύπαρχόντων άλιμένων, ούτως διεφθάρησαν ωστε μηδέ των ναυαγίων μηδέν γενέσθαι χρήσιμον, άλλ' άμφοτέρους αὐτοὺς ἄρδην καὶ παραλόγως άχρειωθήναι.

55 Τούτου δὲ συμβάντος, τὰ μὲν τῶν Καρχηδο-

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look-outs again reported that the enemy were in sight, put to sea and sailed with all haste, as he wished to engage them at as great a distance as possible from their own ships. Junius had sighted the Carthaginian fleet for some time, and noticed the number of their ships, but he neither dared to engage them nor could he now escape them, as they were so near. He therefore diverted his course to a rugged and in every way perilous part of the coast and anchored there, thinking that, no matter what happened to him, it would be preferable to his whole force of ships and men falling into the hands of the enemy. The Carthaginian admiral, on seeing what Junius had done, decided not to incur the risk of approaching such a dangerous shore, but, gaining a certain cape and anchoring off it, remained on the alert between the two fleets, keeping his eye on both. When the weather now became stormy, and they were threatened with a heavy gale from the open sea, the Carthaginian captains who were acquainted with the locality and with the weather signs, and foresaw and prophesied what was about to happen, persuaded Carthalo to escape the tempest by rounding Cape Pachynus. He very wisely consented, and with great labour they just managed to get round the cape and anchor in a safe position. But the two Roman fleets, caught by the tempest, and the coast affording no shelter at all, were so completely destroyed that not even the wrecks were good for anything. In this unlooked for manner, then, the Romans had both their fleets annihilated.

55. Owing to this occurrence the hopes of the



νίων αδθις ανέκυψε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιρρεπεστέρας είχε 2 τὰς ἐλπίδας, οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, πρότερον μὲν ἐπὶ ποσον ήτυχηκότες, τότε δ' όλοσχερως, έκ μεν της θαλάττης έξέβησαν, των δ' ύπαίθρων επεκράτουν Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῆς μὲν θαλάττης ἐκυρίευον, τῆς δὲ 3 γης οὐχ ὅλως ἀπήλπιζον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντες ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ὅλοις ἐσχετλίαζον, οἴ τ' ἐν τῆ Ῥωμη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὰ προ-4 ειρημένα συμπτώματα της γε μην προθέσεως οὐκ άφίσταντο της κατά την πολιορκίαν, άλλ' οι μέν έχορήγουν κατά γην άπροφασίστως, οί δὲ προσ-5 εκαρτέρουν ταύτη κατά τὸ δυνατόν. ὁ δ' Ἰούνιος, ἀνακομισθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐκ τῆς ναυαγίας καὶ περιπαθής ών, εγένετο πρός τὸ καινοτομήσαί τι καὶ πράξαι τῶν δεόντων, σπουδάζων ἀναμαχέβ σασθαι την γεγενημένην περιπέτειαν. διὸ καὶ βραγείας αὐτῷ παραπεσούσης ἀφορμῆς, καταλαμβάνει πραξικοπήσας τον "Ερυκα, και γίνεται του τε της 7 'Αφροδίτης ίεροῦ καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἐγκρατής. ὁ δ' "Ερυξ έστι μεν όρος παρά θάλατταν της Σικελίας έν τῆ παρὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κειμένη πλευρά μεταξὺ Δρεπάνων καὶ Πανόρμου, μᾶλλον δ' ὅμορον καὶ συνάπτον πρὸς τὰ Δρέπανα, μεγέθει δὲ παρὰ πολὺ διαφέρον των κατά την Σικελίαν όρων πλην της 8 Αἴτνης. τούτου δ' ἐπ' αὐτῆς μὲν τῆς κορυφῆς, οὔσης έπιπέδου, κείται το της 'Αφροδίτης της 'Ερυκίνης ίερόν, όπερ όμολογουμένως ἐπιφανέστατόν ἐστι τῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ τῆ λοιπῆ προστασία τῶν κατὰ 9 την Σικελίαν ίερων ή δε πόλις ύπ' αὐτην την κορυφὴν τέταται, πάνυ μακρὰν ἔχουσα καὶ προσάντη 10 πανταχόθεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν. ἐπί τε δὴ τὴν κορυφὴν επιστήσας φυλακήν, δμοίως δε και την από Δρεπά-152

Carthaginians rose again, and it seemed to them that the fortune of war was inclining in their favour, while the Romans, on the contrary, who had been previously to a certain extent unlucky but never had met with so complete a disaster, relinquished the sea, while continuing to maintain their hold on the country. The Carthaginians were now masters of the sea and were not hopeless of regaining their position Subsequently, though all, both at Rome and in the army at Lilybaeum, continued to lament their 248 B.C. whole situation after these recent defeats, yet they did not abandon their purpose of pursuing the siege, the government not hesitating to send supplies over land, and the besiegers keeping up the investment as strictly as they could. Junius, returning to the army after the shipwreck in a state of great affliction, set himself to devise some novel and original step that would be of service, being most anxious to make good the loss inflicted by the disaster. Therefore on some slight pretext offering itself, he surprised and occupied Eryx, possessing himself both of the temple of Venus and of the town. Eryx is a mountain near the sea on that side of Sicily which looks towards Italy. It is situated between Drepana and Panormus. or rather it is adjacent to Drepana, on the borders, and is much the biggest mountain in Sicily after Etna.a On its summit, which is flat, stands the temple of Venus Erycina, which is indisputably the first in wealth and general magnificence of all the Sicilian holy places. The city extends along the hill under the actual summit, the ascent to it being very long and steep on all sides. He garrisoned the summit and also the approach from Drepana, and

a This is not a fact.

νων πρόσβασιν, ετήρει φιλοτίμως αμφοτέρους τούς τόπους, καὶ μαλλον ετι τὸν τῆς ἀναβολῆς, πεπεισμένος οὔτως καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ σύμπαν ὅρος ὑφ' αὐτὸν εξειν.

56 Οί δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετά ταθτα στρατηγόν καταστήσαντες αύτων 'Αμίλκαν τον Βάρκαν επικαλούο μενον, τούτω τὰ κατὰ τὸν στόλον ἐνεχείρισαν. δς παραλαβών τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις ὥρμησε πορθήσων την Ίταλίαν. έτος δ' ην οκτωκαιδέκατον τω 3 πολέμω. κατασύρας δε την Λοκρίδα καὶ την Βρεττιανήν χώραν, αποπλέων έντεθθεν κατήρε παντί τω στόλω πρός την Πανορμίτιν, καὶ καταλαμβάνει τόν έπὶ τῆς Είρκτῆς λεγόμενον τόπον, δς κείται μέν "Ερυκος καὶ Πανόρμου μεταξύ πρὸς θαλάττη, πολύ δέ τι των άλλων δοκεί διαφέρειν τόπων επίτηδειότητι πρός ἀσφάλειαν στρατοπέδων καὶ χρονισμόν. 4 έστι γὰρ όρος περίτομον έξανεστηκὸς έκ τῆς περικειμένης χώρας είς ύψος ίκανόν. τούτου δ' ή περίμετρος της άνω στεφάνης ου λείπει των έκατον σταδίων, ύφ' ής ο περιεχόμενος τόπος εύβοτος ύπάρχει καὶ γεωργήσιμος, πρὸς μὲν τὰς πελαγίους πνοιὰς εὐφυῶς κείμενος, θανασίμων δὲ θηρίων εἰς 5 τέλος άμοιρος. περιέχεται δε κρημνοίς άπροσίτοις έκ τε τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν μέρους καὶ τοῦ παρὰ την μεσόγαιαν παρήκοντος, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ τούτων

6 ἐστὶν ὀλίγης καὶ βραχείας δεόμενα κατασκευῆς. ἔχει δ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ μαστόν, δς ἄμα μὲν ἀκροπόλεως, ἄμα δὲ σκοπῆς εὐφυοῦς λαμβάνει τάξιν κατὰ τῆς τ ὑποκειμένης χώρας. κρατεῖ δὲ καὶ λιμένος εὐκαίρου πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ Δρεπάνων καὶ Λιλυβαίου δρόμον ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐν ῷ πλῆθος ὕδατος ἄφθονον ὑπάρχει. 8 προσόδους δὲ τὰς πάσας ἔχει τριττὰς δυσχερεῖς,

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jealously guarded both these positions, especially the latter, in the conviction that by this means he would securely hold the city and the whole mountain.

56. The Carthaginians shortly afterwards appointed 247 B.C. Hamilcar surnamed Barcas to the command and entrusted naval operations to him. He started with the fleet to ravage the Italian coast (this, I should say, was in the eighteenth year of the war) and after laying waste Locris and Bruttium quitted those parts and descended with his whole fleet on the territory of Panormus. Here he seized on a place called Hercte a lying near the sea between Eryx and Panormus, and thought to possess peculiar advantages for the safe and prolonged stay of an army. It is an abrupt hill rising to a considerable height from the surrounding flat country. The circumference of its brow is not less than a hundred stades and the plateau within affords good pasturage and is suitable for cultivation, being also favourably exposed to the sea-breeze and quite free of animals dangerous to life. On the side looking to the sea and on that which faces the interior of the island, this plateau is surrounded by inaccessible cliffs, while the parts between require only a little slight strengthening. There is also a knoll on it which serves for an acropolis as well as for an excellent post of observation over the country at the foot of the hill. Besides this Hercte commands a harbour very well situated for ships making the voyage from Drepana and Lilybaeum to Italy to put in at, and with an abundant supply of water. b The hill has only three approaches.

^a Now Monte Pellegrino.

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^b This cannot be the harbour of Palermo, which was in the hands of the Romans, and must be looked for on the opposite side of Monte Pellegrino.

δύο μέν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας, μίαν δ' ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης. 9 εν ῷ καταστρατοπεδεύσας παραβόλως 'Αμίλκας, ὡς αν μήτε πόλεως οἰκείας μήτ' ἄλλης ελπίδος μηδεμιᾶς ἀντεχόμενος, εἰς μέσους δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους έαυτὸν δεδωκώς, όμως οὐ μικροὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς τυχόν-τας 'Ρωμαίοις ἀγῶνας καὶ κινδύνους παρεσκεύασε. 10 πρώτον μεν γάρ εντεθθεν δρμώμενος κατά θάλατταν την παραλίαν της 'Ιταλίας επόρθει μέχρι της 11 Κυμαίων χώρας, δεύτερον δε κατά γην παραστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτῷ 'Ρωμαίων πρό της Πανορμιτων πόλεως εν ίσως πέντε σταδίοις, πολλούς καὶ ποικίλους άγωνας συνεστήσατο κατά γῆν σχεδον ἐπὶ τρείς ένιαυτούς. περί ων ούχ οδόν τε διά της γρα-57 φης τον κατά μέρος αποδοθναι λόγον καθάπερ γάρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιότησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται πληγην έπὶ πληγη τιθέντες άδιαπαύστως, λόγον μέν η πρόνοιαν έχειν ύπερ εκάστης επιβολης και πληγης ούτε τοις αγωνίζομένοις ούτε τοις θεωμένοις 2 έστὶ δυνατόν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθόλου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ἐκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐψυχίας, ίκανὴν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ περὶ 3 τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰτίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, δι' ὧν ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐποιοῦντο κατ' ἀλλήλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπιθέσεις, προσβολάς, οὖτ' ἃν ὁ γράφων έξαριθμούμενος εφίκοιτο, τοῖς τ' ἀκούουσιν ἀπέραντος ἄμα δ' ἀνωφελής ἃν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως γίνοιτο χρεία. 4 έκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τέλους της φιλοτιμίας μάλλον αν τις είς έννοιαν έλ-

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all difficult, two on the land side and one from the Here Hamilcar established his quarters, at great risk indeed, since he had neither the support of any of their own towns nor any prospect of support from elsewhere, but had thrown himself into the midst of the enemy. Notwithstanding this, the peril to which he put the Romans, and the combats to which he forced them, were by no means slight or insignificant. For in the first place he would sally out with his fleet from this place, and devastate the coast of Italy as far as Cyme, and next, after the Romans had taken up a position on land in front of the city of Panormus and at a distance of about five stades from his own camp, he harassed them by delivering during almost three years constant and variously contrived attacks by land. These combats I am unable to describe in detail here. in a boxing-match when two champions, both distinguished for pluck and both in perfect training, meet in the decisive contest for the prize, continually delivering blow for blow, neither the combatants themselves nor the spectators can note or anticipate every attack or every blow, but it is possible, from the general action of each, and the determination that each displays, to get a fair idea of their respective skill, strength, and courage, so it was with these two generals. The causes or the modes of their daily ambuscades, counter-ambuscades, attempts, and assaults were so numerous that no writer could properly describe them, while at the same time the narrative would be most tedious as well as unprofitable to the reader. It is rather by a general pronouncement about the two men and the result of their rival efforts that a notion of the facts

5 θοι τῶν προειρημένων. οὖτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας στρατηγημάτων οὖτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὖτε τῶν εἰς παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὖδὲν παρ-6 ελείφθη. κρίσιν γε μὴν ὁλοσχερῆ γενέσθαι διὰ πλείους αἰτίας οὐχ οἱόν τ' ἦν· αἴ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἦσαν ἐφάμιλλοι, τά τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας ὁμοίως ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τό τε διάστημα τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. ὅπερ αἴτιον ἦν μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύστους γίνεσθαι καθ' ἡμέραν, όλοσχερὲς δὲ συν-8 τελεῖσθαι μηδέν. τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ συνέβαινε διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν νόμω περιπεσόντας· οἱ δ' ἄπαξ ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀσφαλείαις, καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκινδύνευον.

58 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὤσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἡ τύχη μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προειρημένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος ἀθλήματος εἰς παραβολώτερον ἀγώνισμα καὶ τόπον ἐλάττω συν2 ἐκλεισεν. ὁ γὰρ ' Αμίλκας, τῶν ' Ρωμαίων τὸν " Ερυκα τηρούντων ἐπί τε τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τὴν βίζαν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατελάβετο τὴν πόλιν τῶν ' Ερυκίνων, ἤτις ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρὸς τῆ βίζη στρατοπεδευσάντων. ἐξ οῦ συνέβαινε παραβόλως μὲν ὑπομένειν καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πολιορκουμένους τοὺς τὴν κορυφὴν κατέχοντας τῶν ' Ρωμαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν, τῶν τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκειμένων καὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν οὐ ραδίως αὐτοῖς παρακομιζομένων, ὡς ἀντῆς θαλάττης καθ' ἔνα τόπον καὶ μίαν πρόσοδον ἀντεχομένοις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσαις

can be conveyed. Nothing was neglected; neither traditional tactics nor plans suggested by the occasion and by actual pressure of circumstances, nor those strokes which depend on a bold and strong initiative. Yet there were several reasons why no decisive success could be obtained. For the forces on each side were evenly matched: their trenches were so strong as to be equally unapproachable, and they were at a quite small distance from each other, this being the chief reason why there were daily conflicts at certain points, but no decisive engagement. The losses in these combats consisted only of those who fell in the hand-to-hand fighting, while the side which once gave way used to get out of danger at once behind their defences, from whence they would issue again and resume the fight.

58. But Fortune, however, like a good umpire, unexpectedly shifted the scene and changed the nature of the contest, confining both in a narrower field, where the struggle grew even more desperate. The Romans, as I said, had garrisons at Eryx on the summit of the mountain and at the foot. Hamilcar now seized the town which lies between 244 B.C. the summit and the spot at the foot where the garrison was. The consequence of this was that the Romans on the summit—a thing they had never expected—remained besieged and in considerable peril, and that the Carthaginians, though it is scarcely credible, maintained their position though the enemy were pressing on them from all sides and the conveyance of supplies was not easy, as they only held one place on the sea and one single road connecting with it. However, here again both sides employed

4 μεν αμφότεροι ταις πολιορκητικαις επινοίαις και βίαις χρησάμενοι κατ' άλλήλων, πων δε γένος ενδείας ανασχόμενοι, πάσης δ' επιθέσεως και μάχης πείραν

δ λαβόντες, τέλος οὐχ, ώς Φάβιός φησιν, έξαδυνατοῦντες καὶ περικακοῦντες, ἀλλ' ώς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς κἀήττητοί τινες ἄνδρες, ἱερὸν ἐποίησαν τὸν στέφα-

8 νον. πρότερον γὰρ ἢ κείνους ἀλλήλων ἐπικρατῆσαι, καίπερ δύ ἔτη πάλιν ἐν τούτω τῷ τόπω διαγωνισαμένους, δι ἄλλου τρόπου συνέβη λαβεῖν τὸν

πόλεμον την κρίσιν.

7 Τὰ μεν οδν περί τον Ερυκα και τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις τοιαύτην έσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύματ' ήν αμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι 8 τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πολλάκις ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῆ δὲ τῆ ψυχῆ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγάς, έως αν αὐτομάτως ποτέ περιπεσόντες αύτοις καιρίως άλλήλων διαδράξωνται, κάπειτα τούτου γενοο μένου συμβή τὸν ἔτερον αὐτῶν προπεσείν· οἴ τε 'Ρωμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ήδη τοῖς πόνοις διά την συνέχειαν των κινδύνων είς τέλος απήλγουν, τήν τε δύναμιν παρελέλυντο καὶ παρείντο 59 διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφορὰς καὶ δαπάνας. ὅμως δε 'Ρωμαίοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ έτη σχεδον ήδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων όλοσχερῶς άφεστηκότες διά τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πεπεισθαι δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρινείν 2 τον πόλεμον, τότε συνορώντες ου προχωρούν αυτοίς τούργον κατά τούς έκλογισμούς καὶ μάλιστα διά τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναν τὸ τρίτον αντιποιήσασθαι των έν ταις ναυτικαις δυνά-3 μεσιν ελπίδων, υπολαμβάνοντες δια της επινοίας 160

every device and effort that the siege demanded: both endured every kind of privation and both essayed every means of attack and every variety of action. At length not, as Fabius Pictor says, owing to their exhaustion and sufferings, but like two uninjured and invincible champions, they left the contest drawn. For before either could get the better of the other, though the struggle in this place 243-242 lasted for another two years, the war had been B.C.

decided by other means.

Such then was the condition of affairs at Eryx and as far as regarded the land forces. We may compare the spirit displayed by both states to that of game cocks engaged in a death-struggle. For we often see that when these birds have lost the use of their wings from exhaustion, their courage remains as high as ever and they continue to strike blow upon blow, until closing involuntarily they get a deadly hold of each other, and as soon as this happens one or other of the two will soon fall dead. 59. So the Romans and Carthaginians, worn out by their exertions owing to the continual fighting, at length began to be apathetic, their strength paralysed and their resources exhausted by protracted taxation and expense. in spite of all, the Romans, as if fighting for their lives, although they had for nearly five years utterly withdrawn from the sea owing to their disasters and their belief that they would be able to decide the war by the aid of their land forces alone, now, when they saw that chiefly owing to the bold action of the Carthaginian general they were not making the progress on which they had reckoned, decided again for the third time to court the prospect of success at sea. They thought that this course, if they could

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ταύτης, εί καιρίως ἄψαιντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἂν ούτως πέρας επιθείναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. δ 4 καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρησαν της θαλάττης είξαντες τοις έκ της τύχης συμπτώμασι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῆ περὶ τὰ 5 Δρέπανα ναυμαχία· τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιοῦντο ταύτην την επιβολήν, δι' ής νικήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Ερυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλείσαντες της κατά θάλατταν χορηγίας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν 6 τοις όλοις. ήν δε της επιβολής το πλείον ψυχομαχία. χορηγία μεν γάρ οὐχ ὑπῆρχε πρὸς τὴν πρό-θεσιν εν τοις κοινοις· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ανδρών είς τα κοινα φιλοτιμίαν καί 7 γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν. κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθ' ἔνα καὶ δύο καὶ τρεις υφίσταντο παρέξειν πεντήρη κατηρτισμένην, έφ' ὧ τὴν δαπάνην κομιοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν 8 πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. τῷ δὲ τοιούτω τρόπω ταχέως ετοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρικῶν, ὧν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν πρὸς [παράδειγμα] τὴν τοῦ 'Ροδίου ναῦν, μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγον καταστήσαντες Γάιον Λυτάτιον έξέπεμψαν άρ-9 χομένης της θερείας. δς καὶ παραδόξως επιφανείς τοις κατά την Σικελίαν τόποις τόν τε περί τά Δρέπανα λιμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον όρμους, παντός άνακεχωρηκότος είς την οἰκείαν τοῦ 10 τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῦ. συστησάμενος δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρεπάνοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τἄλλα πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευασάμενος, ἄμα μὲν ταύτη 11 προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ ποιῶν, ἄμα δὲ προορώ-μενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου, καὶ μνημονεύων της έξ άρχης προθέσεως ότι μόνως 162

but strike a deadly blow, was the only way of bringing the war to a favourable conclusion. And this they finally accomplished. It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made this third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war. The attempt was indeed of the nature of a struggle for existence. For there were no funds in the public treasury for this purpose; but yet, owing to the patriotic and generous spirit of the leading citizens, enough was found to carry out the project; as either one, two, or three of them, according to their means, undertook to provide a quinquereme fully equipped on the understanding that they would be repaid if all went well. In this way a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes was rapidly got ready, all built on the the model of the "Rhodian's" ship. They then appointed Gaius Lutatius to the 242 B.C. command and dispatched him at the beginning of summer. Suddenly appearing off the coast of Sicily, he seized on the harbour of Drepana and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum, the whole Carthaginian navy having retired to their own country. First of all he constructed works round the city of Drepana and made all preparations for its siege, but while continuing to prosecute this by every means in his power, he foresaw that the Carthaginian fleet would arrive, and was not forgetful of the original motive of the expedi-

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δύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνου κρίσεως τὰ ὅλα τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἀχρεῖον οὐδ' ἀργὸν εἴα γίνε12 σθαι τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ' ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναπείρας καὶ μελέτας ποιῶν τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκείως τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, τῆ τε λοιπῆ τῆ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπιμελεία προσκαρτερῶν, ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσε πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνω τοὺς ναύτας.

προκείμενον εν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνω τοὺς ναύτας. 60 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλω τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παρ-2 αυτίκα κατήρτιζον τὰς ναῦς, καὶ πληρώσαντες σίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, ἐξέπεμπον τὸν στόλον, βουλόμενοι μηδεν ελλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν "Ερυκα 3 στρατόπεδα των αναγκαίων. κατέστησαν δέ καὶ στρατηγόν έπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως Αννωνα δς άναχθείς και κατάρας έπι την Ίεραν καλουμένην νησον έσπευδε τους πολεμίους λαθών διακομισθήναι πρός τὸν "Ερυκα, καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγορὰς ἀποθέσθαι καὶ κουφίσαι τὰς ναῦς, προσλαβών δ' ἐπιβάτας έκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ Βάρκαν μετ' αὐτῶν, οὖτως συμμίσγειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. 4 ο δε Λυτάτιος συνείς την παρουσίαν των περί τον "Αννωνα, καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν, άναλαβών ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρίστους ανδρας επλευσε πρός την Αίγουσσαν νήσον 5 την πρό τοῦ Λιλυβαίου κειμένην. κάνταῦθα παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ τὰς δυνάμεις δι-

καλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ τὰς δυνάμεις διεσάφει τοῖς κυβερνήταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὔριον
ε ναυμαχίας. ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑωθινήν, ἤδη τῆς ἡμέρας
ὑποφαινούσης, ὁρῶν τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φορὸν ἄνεμον καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίσι δὲ δυσχερῆ
γινόμενον τὸν ἀνάπλουν πρὸς ἀντίον τὸ πνεῦμα,
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tion, the belief that it was only by a sea battle that the war could be decisively finished. He did not, then, allow the time to pass uselessly and idly, but every day was spent in exercising and practising the crews properly for this purpose. He also paid unremitting attention to the matter of training, so that in a very short time he got his sailors into perfect condition for the anticipated battle.

60. When the unexpected news reached Carthage that the Romans were at sea with a fleet and were again disputing the naval supremacy, they at once got their ships ready, and filling them with corn and other provisions, dispatched their fleet on its errand, desiring that the troops at Eryx should be in no need 241 B.C. of necessary supplies. Hanno, whom they had appointed to the command, set sail and reached the so-called Holy Isle from whence he designed to cross as soon as possible to Eryx, unobserved by the enemy, and, after lightening the ships by disembarking the supplies, to take on board as marines the best qualified mercenaries together with Barcas himself and then engage the enemy. Lutatius, learning of Hanno's arrival and divining his intentions, took on board a picked force from the army and sailed to the island of Aegusa which lies off Lilybaeum. There, after exhorting his troops as became the occasion, he informed the captains that the battle would take place next day. In the early morning, just as day was breaking, he saw that a brisk breeze was coming down favourable to the enemy, but that it had become difficult for himself to sail up against the wind, the

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κοίλης καὶ τραχείας ούσης τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν 7 πρώτον διηπόρει τί δει χρησθαι τοις παρούσι. συλλογιζόμενος δ' ώς εαν μεν παραβάλληται χειμώνος οντος, πρὸς "Αννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρός ἔτι γέμοντα 8 τὰ σκάφη, ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων έάση διάραι καὶ συμμίξαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς πολεμίους, πρός τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκουφισμένας άγωνιείται πρός τε τους άρίστους άνδρας των εκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον πρὸς τὴν ᾿Αμίλκου τόλμαν, ῆς οὐδὲν ῆν τότε φο- 9 βερώτερον· διόπερ ἔκρινε μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρόν συνιδών δὲ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς ίστιοδρομούσας, ανήγετο μετά σπουδής. των δέ πληρωμάτων εύχερως αναφερόντων τον κλύδωνα ταίς εὐεξίαις, ταχέως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκτείνας ναῦν ἀντίπρωρ-61 ρον κατέστησε τοις πολεμίοις τον στόλον. οι δέ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τον διάπλουν αὐτῶν προκατέχοντας τους 'Ρωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τους ίστους καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατά ναῦν σφας αὐτούς, συν-2 έβαλλον τοις υπεναντίοις. της δ' έκατέρων παρασκευής την έναντίαν έχούσης διάθεσιν τη περί τά Δρέπανα γενομένη ναυμαχία, καὶ τὸ τέλος έκατέροις 3 της μάχης εἰκότως εναντίον ἀπέβη. οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι μεν γάρ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν, καὶ τὰ βάρη πάντα χωρίς των πρός την ναυμαχίαν επιτηδείων έξετέθειντο· τά τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα διαφέρουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τούς τ' επιβάτας κατ' εκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους εκ 4 τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων είχον. περὶ δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τάναντία τούτοις ύπηρχεν. αι μέν γάρ νηες γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρός τον 166

sea too being heavy and rough. At first he hesitated much what to do under the circumstances, but reflected that if he risked an attack now that the weather was stormy, he would be fighting against Hanno and the naval forces alone and also against heavily laden ships, whereas if he waited for calm weather and by his delay allowed the enemy to cross and join the army, he would have to face ships now lightened and manageable as well as the pick of the land forces and above all the bravery of Hamilcar which was what they dreaded most at that time. therefore decided not to let the present opportunity slip. When he saw the Carthaginian ships under full sail he at once got under weigh. As his crews easily mastered the waves owing to their good training, he soon brought his fleet into a single line with their prows to the enemy. 61. The Carthaginians, seeing that the Romans were intercepting their crossing, lowered their masts and cheering each other on in each ship closed with the enemy. As the condition of each force was just the reverse of what it had been at the battle of Drepana, the result also was naturally the reverse for each. The Romans had reformed their system of shipbuilding and had also put ashore all heavy material except what was required for the battle; their crews rendered excellent service, as their training had got them well together, and the marines they had were men selected from the army for their steadfastness. With the Carthaginians it was just the opposite. Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while

κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ην ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δ' ἐπιβατικὰ νεοσύλλονα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ 5 παντός δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτ' ἂν ἔτι τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους έλπίσαι της θαλάττης άντιποιήσασθαι καταφρονήσαντες ώλιγώρουν των ναυτικών δυνά-6 μεων. τοιγαροῦν ἄμα τῶ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη της μάχης έλαττούμενοι ταχέως έλείφθησαν, καὶ πεντήκοντα μεν αὐτῶν ναθς κατέδυσαν, έβδο-7 μήκοντα δ' εάλωσαν αὔτανδροι τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πληθος επαράμενον τους ίστους και κατουρώσαν αθθις άπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἱερὰν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παραδόξως έκ μεταβολής αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δέοντα και-8 ρον τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. ὁ μεν οὖν 'Ρωμαίων στρατηγός αποπλεύσας πρός το Λιλύβαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο, μεγάλην οδσαν ου γάρ πολύ των μυρίων έλειπε σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρία κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον. 62 Οί δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτως της ήττης, ταίς μεν όρμαις και ταις φιλοτιμίαις άκμην έτοιμοι πολεμείν ήσαν, τοίς δε λογι-² σμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν. οὖτε γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἔτι ταῖς ἐν τῆ Σικελία δυνάμεσιν οἱοί τ' ἦσαν, κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἀπογνόντες δὲ ταύτας.

καὶ προδόται τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενοι, ποίαις χερσίν 3 ἢ ποίοις ἡγεμόσι πολεμήσειαν οὐκ εἶχον. διόπερ όξεως διαπεμψάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν ἐκείνω περὶ των ὅλων. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν 4 ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν τις ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἢ δεινῶν δοκούντων 168

the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them again, they had, in contempt for them, neglected their navv. So that immediately on engaging they had the worst in many parts of the battle and were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews. The remainder raising their masts and finding a fair wind got back to Holy Isle, very fortunate in the wind having unexpectedly gone round and helping them just when they required it. As for the Roman Consul he sailed away to Lilybaeum and the legions, and there occupied himself with the disposal of the captured ships and men, a business of some magnitude, as the prisoners made in the battle numbered very nearly ten thousand.

62. Even on hearing of this unexpected defeat the Carthaginians, had they let themselves be guided by passion and ambition, would readily have continued the war, but when it came to a matter of cool calculation they were quite at a loss. For one thing they were no longer able to send supplies to their forces in Sicily as the enemy commanded the sea, and if they abandoned and in a manner betrayed them, they had neither other men nor other leaders with whom to pursue the war. They therefore at once sent a message to Barcas giving him full powers to deal with the situation. Hamilcar acted thoroughly like the good and prudent leader he was. As long as there had been some reasonable hope in the situation he had left no means, however perilous and

είναι παρέλιπεν, άλλά πάσας τὰς τοῦ νικᾶν ἐν τῶ πολεμεῖν ἐλπίδας, εἰ καί τις ἄλλος ἡγεμόνων, ἐξ-5 ήλεγξεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατά λόγον οὐδεν ετι κατελείπετο προς το σώζειν τους υποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχώς και πραγματικώς είξας τοις παρούσιν ύπερ σπονδών και δια-6 λύσεων έξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς. τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ νομιστέον ήγεμόνος είναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τόν τε 7 τοῦ νικᾶν, όμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείπεσθαι καιρόν. τοῦ δὲ Λυτατίου προθύμως δεξαμένου τὰ παρακαλούμενα διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τετρυμένοις καὶ κάμνουσιν ήδη τῷ πολέμω, συνέβη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῆ διαφορᾶ τοιούτων τινῶν συνθη-8 κῶν διαγραφεισῶν '' ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Καρχηδονίοις καὶ 'Ρωμαίοις, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμω τῶν 'Ρωμαίων συνδοκή. ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἑπάσης Καρχηδονίους καὶ μὴ πολεμεῖν Ἱέρωνι μηδ' ἐπι-φέρειν ὅπλα Συρακοσίοις μηδὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων 9 συμμάχοις. ἀποδοῦναι Καρχηδονίους 'Ρωμαίοις χωρίς λύτρων απαντας τους αιχμαλώτους. άργυρίου κατενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους 'Ρωμαίοις έν ἔτεσιν εἴκοσι δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια 63 Εὐβοϊκά." τούτων δ' ἐπανενεχθέντων εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην, οὐ προσεδέξατο τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος, ἀλλ' έξαπέστειλεν ἄνδρας δέκα τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους 2 ύπερ των πραγμάτων. οι και παραγενόμενοι των μεν όλων οὐδεν έτι μετέθηκαν, βραχέα δε προσεπέτει-3 ναν τούς Καρχηδονίους. τόν τε γάρ χρόνον των φόρων ἐποίησαν ημισυν, χίλια τάλαντα προσθέντες, τῶν τε νήσων ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους προσεπέτα-ξαν, ὅσαι μεταξὺ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεῖνται καὶ τῆς Σικελίας.

venturesome it seemed, unemployed, and if there ever was a general who put to proof in a war every chance of success, it was he. But now that fortunes · were reversed and there was no reasonable prospect left of saving the troops under his command, he showed his practical good sense in yielding to circumstance and sending an embassy to treat for peace. For our opinion should be that a general ought to be qualified to discern both when he is victorious and when he is beaten. Lutatius readily consented to negotiate, conscious as he was that the Romans were by this time worn out and enfeebled by the war, and he succeeded in putting an end to the contest by a treaty more or less as follows. "There shall be friendship between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms if approved by the Roman people. The Carthaginians to evacuate the whole of Sicily and not to make war on Hiero or bear arms against the Syracusans or the allies of the Syracusans. The Carthaginians to give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians to pay to the Romans by instalments in twenty years two thousand two hundred Euboean talents." 63. But when these terms were referred to Rome, the people did not accept the treaty, but sent ten commissioners to examine the matter. On their arrival they made no substantial changes in the terms, but only slight modifications rendering them more severe for Carthage: for they reduced the term of payment by one half, added a thousand talents to the indemnity, and demanded the evacuation by the Carthaginians of all islands lying between Sicily and Italy.

4 'Ο μέν οὖν 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συστάς περί Σικελίας πόλεμος έπὶ τοιούτοις καὶ τοιοῦτον έσχε τὸ τέλος, ἔτη πολεμηθεὶς εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα συνεχώς, πόλεμος ών ήμεις ισμεν ακοή μαθόντες 5 πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. έν ῷ χωρὶς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀνώτερον, ἄπαξ μεν οἱ συνάμφω πλείοσιν η πεντακοσίοις, πάλιν δε μικρώ λείπουσιν έπτακοσίοις σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς έναυμάγησαν πρὸς 6 άλλήλους. ἀπέβαλόν γε μην 'Ρωμαΐοι μεν εν τώ πολέμω τούτω πεντήρεις μετά των έν ταις ναυαγίαις διαφθαρεισών είς έπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δ' η είς πεντακοσίας. ώστε τους θαυμάζοντας τὰς 'Αντινόνου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυμαχίας καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἂν περί τούτων ἱστορήσαντας έκπεπληχθαι την ύπερβολην των πράξεων. 8 εἰ δέ τις βουληθείη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφοράν τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αίς οί τε Πέρσαι πρός τους Ελληνας και πάλιν 'Αθηναιοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους εναυμάχουν, οὐδ' αν καθόλου δυνηθείη τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις εύρειν 9 εν θαλάττη διηγωνισμένας. εξ ων δηλον το προ-τεθεν ήμιν εξ άρχης ως ου τύχη 'Ρωμαιοι, καθάπερ ένιοι δοκούσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ' αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ένασκήσαντες ου μόνον έπεβάλοντο τη των όλων ήγεμονία καὶ δυναστεία τολμηρώς, ἀλλά καὶ 64 καθίκοντο της προθέσεως. καὶ τί δήποτ' έστι τὸ αἴτιον, ἀπορήσαι τις ἄν, ὅτι κεκρατηκότες τῶν ὅλων καὶ πολλαπλασίαν έχοντες ὑπεροχὴν νῦν ἢ πρόσθεν οὖτ' ἄν πληρῶσαι τοσαύτας ναῦς οὖτ' ἀναπλεῦσαι 2 τηλικούτοις στόλοις δυνηθεῖεν; οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ περὶ 172

Such then was the end of the war between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily, and such were the terms of peace. lasted without a break for twenty-four years and is the longest, most unintermittent, and greatest war we know of. Apart from all the other battles and armaments, the total naval forces engaged were, as I mentioned above, on one occasion more than five hundred quinqueremes and on a subsequent one very nearly seven hundred. Moreover the Romans lost in this war about seven hundred quinqueremes, inclusive of those that perished in the shipwrecks, and the Carthaginians about five hundred. So that those who marvel at the great sea-battles and great fleets of an Antigonus, a Ptolemy, or a Demetrius would, if I mistake not, on inquiring into the history of this war, be much astonished at the huge scale of the operations. Again, if we take into consideration the difference between quinqueremes and the triremes in which the Persians fought against the Greeks and the Athenians and Lacedaemonians against each other, we shall find that no forces of such magnitude ever met at sea. This confirms the assertion I ventured to make at the outset that the progress of the Romans was not due to chance and was not involuntary, as some among the Greeks choose to think, but that by schooling themselves in such vast and perilous enterprises it was perfectly natural that they not only gained the courage to aim at universal dominion, but executed their purpose. 64. Some of my readers will wonder what can be the reason why, now that they are masters of the world and far more puissant than formerly, they could neither man so many ships, nor put to sea with such large fleets.

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μέν ταύτης της απορίας σαφώς έξέσται τάς αιτίας κατανοείν, όταν έπὶ τὴν ἐξήγησιν αὐτῶν τῆς πολιτείας έλθωμεν ύπερ ής οδό ήμιν εν παρέργω ρη-3 τέον ούτε τοις ακούουσιν αργώς προσεκτέον. το μεν γαρ θέαμα καλόν, σχεδόν δ' ώς έπος είπειν άγνωστον έως τοῦ νῦν, χάριν τῶν περὶ αὐτῆς συγ-4 γεγραφότων. οι μεν γάρ ήγνοήκασιν, οι δ' άσαφη 5 και τελέως άνωφελη πεποίηνται την εξήγησιν. πλην έν γε τῶ προειρημένω πολέμω τὰς μὲν τῶν πολιτευμάτων αμφοτέρων προαιρέσεις έφαμίλλους ευροι τις αν γεγενημένας, οὐ μόνον ταις ἐπιβολαις, ἀλλά καὶ ταῖς μεγαλοψυχίαις, μάλιστα δὲ τῆ περὶ τῶν 6 πρωτείων φιλοτιμία, τούς γε μην άνδρας οὐ μικρῷ, πολλώ δε γενναιοτέρους εν παντί 'Ρωμαίους ήγεμόνα δὲ καὶ γνώμη καὶ τόλμη θετέον ἄριστον 'Αμίλκαν τῶν τότε γεγονέναι τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπικαλούμενον, πατέρα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν 'Αννίβου τοῦ μετὰ ταῦτα πολεμήσαντος 'Ρωμαίοις.

35 Μετά δε τὰς διαλύσεις ταύτας ἴδιόν τι καὶ 2 παραπλήσιον ἀμφοτέροις συνέβη παθεῖν. ἐξεδέξατο γὰρ πόλεμος ἐμφύλιος 'Ρωμαίους μὲν ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Φαλίσκους καλουμένους, ὃν ταχέως καὶ συμφερόντως ἐπετέλεσαν, ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἐγκρατεῖς γενόμενοι 3 τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶν, Καρχηδονίους δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν οὐ μικρὸς οὐδ' εὐκαταφρόνητος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς ἄμα τού-4 τοις ἀποστάντας Λίβυας, ἐν ῷ πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους ὑπομείναντες φόβους τέλος οὐ μόνον ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας ἐκινδύνευσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν 5 καὶ τοῦ τῆς πατρίδος ἐδάφους. ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον ἐπιστῆσαι μὲν ἄξιον διὰ πλείους αἰτίας, ἐπὶ

κεφαλαίου δέ καὶ διὰ βραχέων αὐτοῦ ποιήσασθαι

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Those, however, who are puzzled by this, will be enabled to understand the reason clearly when we come to deal with their political institutions, a subject not to be treated incidentally by the writer or followed inattentively by the reader. It offers a noble spectacle and one almost wholly unrevealed hitherto, owing to the incompetence of the authors who have dealt with it, some of whom sinned from lack of knowledge, while the account given by others is wanting in clearness and entirely unprofitable. regards, however, the war of which we are speaking, one will find its purpose and prosecution on the part of the two states equally characterized on both sides by enterprise, by lofty spirit, and above all by ambition for supremacy. In individual courage indeed the Romans were far superior, but the general to whom the palm must be given both for daring and for genius is Hamilcar called Barcas, the actual father of that Hannibal who afterwards made war on the Romans.

65. Shortly after this treaty it so happened that both states found themselves placed in circumstances peculiarly similar. For at Rome there followed a civil war against the Falisci, but this they brought to a speedy and favourable conclusion, taking Falerii in a few days. But the war the Carthaginians had to 241 B.C. face was no little or contemptible one, being against their mercenaries, the Numidians and those Libyans who joined in the revolt. In this war they encountered many great perils and finally were in danger of losing not only their territory, but their own liberty and the soil of their native town. several reasons I think it worth my while to call attention to this war, and, according to the plan I stated at the outset, to give a summary and brief

6 την έξηγησιν κατά την έξ άρχης πρόθεσιν. τόν τε γάρ παρά τοις πολλοις λεγόμενον ἄσπονδον πόλεμον, τίνα φύσιν έχει καὶ διάθεσιν, μάλιστ' αν τις 7 έκ τῶν τότε γεγονότων ἐπιγνοίη, τούς τε χρωμένους μισθοφορικαῖς δυνάμεσι τίνα δεῖ προορᾶσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι μακρόθεν έναργέστατ' αν έκ της τότε περιστάσεως συνθεωρήσειε, πρός δε τούτοις τί διαφέρει καὶ κατὰ πόσον ήθη σύμμικτα καὶ βάρ-8 βαρα τῶν ἐν παιδείαις καὶ νόμοις καὶ πολιτικοῖς έθεσιν εκτεθραμμένων το δε μέγιστον τας αιτίας έκ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς καιροῖς πεπραγμένων κατανοήσειε, δι' ας δ κατ' 'Αννίβαν συνέστη 'Ρωμαίοις 9 καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πόλεμος. ὑπὲρ οδ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον παρά τοις συγγραφεύσιν, άλλά και παρά τοις πεπολεμηκόσιν έτι νῦν ἀμφισβητεῖσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, χρήσιμόν έστι την άληθινωτάτην παραστήσαι διάληψιν τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν. 66 'Ως γὰρ θᾶττον ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν προειρημέ-

νων διαλύσεων ἀποκατέστησε τὰς περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα δυνάμεις εἰς τὸ Λιλύβαιον ὁ Βάρκας, εὐθέως αὐτὸς μὲν ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως στρατηγὸς Γέσκων ἐγίνετο περὶ τὸ περαιοῦν τοὺς 2 στρατιώτας εἰς τὴν Λιβύην. προϊδόμενος δὲ τὸ μέλλον ἐμφρόνως ἐνεβίβαζε κατὰ μέρη διαιρῶν αὐ-3 τοὺς καὶ διαλείμματα ποιῶν τῆς ἐξαποστολῆς, βουλόμενος ἀναστροφὴν διδόναι τοῦς Καρχηδονίοις εἰς τὸ τοὺς καταπλεύσαντας καὶ μισθοδοτηθέντας τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων φθάνειν ἀπαλλαττομένους ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν πρὶν ἢ τοὺς ἑξῆς περαιουμένους ἐπικαταλαβεῖν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Γέσκων ἐχόμενος ταύτης τῆς ἐννοίας οὖτως ἐχείριζε τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐξαποστολήν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰ 176



narrative of it. In the first place one could not find a better illustration of the nature and character of what is vulgarly known as a truceless war than the circumstances of this one, and secondly one can see very clearly from all that took place what kind of dangers those who employ mercenary forces should foresee and take early precautions to avert, as well as in what lies the great difference of character between a confused herd of barbarians and men who have been brought up in an educated, law-abiding, and civilized community. But the most important thing is that from these events one can get an idea of the causes of the Hannibalic war. As it is still a matter of dispute, not only among historians, but among the combatants, what were the actual causes of this latter war, it will be useful to students of history if I lay before them the explanation that is nearest to the truth

66. It is this. When, at once on the conclusion of the treaty, Barcas had transferred his forces from Eryx to Lilybaeum he immediately resigned his command, and Gesco the commandant there took steps for sending the troops over to Africa. Foreseeing what was likely to happen, he very wisely embarked them in detachments and at certain intervals in order to give the Carthaginians time to pay them their arrears as they arrived and to pack them off to their own countries before the next batch that crossed could catch them up. Such was the idea Gesco had, and he managed to dispatch the troops in this manner, but the Carthaginians

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μέν οὐκ εὐπορούμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παραιτή-σεσθαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τι τῶν προσοφειλο-μένων ὀψωνίων, ἐὰν καὶ συναθροίσωσι καὶ δέξωνται πάντας είς την Καρχηδόνα, παρακατείχον έκεί τούς καταπλέοντας δια ταύτην την έλπίδα και συνβ είχον εν τη πόλει. γινομένων δε πλειόνων άδικημάτων καὶ νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ύπιδόμενοι τον όχλον καὶ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν ἀκρα-σίαν ἠξίωσαν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ἔως ἂν ἐτοιμασθῆ μέν τὰ κατὰ τὰς σιταρχίας αὐτοῖς, προσδέξωνται δέ τούς ἀπολειπομένους, ἀναχωρήσαι πάντας είς τινα πόλιν την προσαγορευομένην Σίκκαν, λαβόν-7 τας είς τὰ κατεπείγοντα χρυσοῦν εκαστον. προθύμως δε συνυπακουσάντων πρός την έξοδον, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτοῦ καταλιπεῖν τὰς ἀποσκευάς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν πρώτον χρόνον ὑπῆρχον, ὡς θᾶττον έσομένης της έπανόδου πρός τους όψωνιασμούς, 8 ἀγωνιῶντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι μήποτε διὰ χρόνου παραγεγονότες, καὶ τινές μεν τέκνων, ένιοι δε καὶ γυναικών ίμείροντες, οί μεν ούκ εκπορευθώσι τὸ παράπαν, οί δ' εκπορευθέντες αδθις ανακάμπτωσι πρός ταθτα, και τω τοιούτω τρόπω μηδέν ήττον άδίκημα γίνηται κατά την πόλιν, ταθτα προορώμε-9 νοι μετά πολλης άπεχθείας οὐδαμῶς βουλομένους τους ανθρώπους ηνάγκασαν τὰς αποσκευὰς μεθ' 10 ξαυτών ἀπαγαγείν. οἱ δὲ μισθοφόροι συναναχθέντες είς την Σίκκαν, καὶ διὰ πολλοῦ χρόνου τετευχότες ἀνέσεως καὶ σχολης, ὅπερ ἀφυέστατον ὑπάρ-χει ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι, καὶ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀρχηγον καὶ μόνον αίτιον γίνεται στάσεως, διηγον 11 άδεως. άμα δε ραθυμοῦντες, τινες μεν αὐτων έξ-178

partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they had got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city. As they committed frequent offences there both by night and by day, the government in the first place, suspicious of their numbers and their present licentious spirit, asked their commanding officers, until arrangements had been made for paying them in full and those who were still missing had arrived, to withdraw them all to a town called Sicca, each man receiving a gold stater for pressing expenses. The troops readily consented to leave the capital, but wished to leave their baggage there, as they had formerly done, thinking that they would be soon returning to be paid off. The Carthaginians, however, were afraid lest, longing to be with their wives or children after their recent protracted absence, they might in many cases refuse to leave Carthage, or, if they did, would come back again to their families, so that there would be no decrease of outrages in the city. In anticipation then of this, they compelled the men, much against their will and in a manner calculated to cause much offence, to take their baggage with them. The mercenaries, when assembled in Sicca, lived in a free and easy manner, having not enjoyed for a long time relaxation of discipline and leisure, things most prejudicial to a force raised abroad, and nearly always the very arch-instigators and sole causes of mutiny. At the same time, as they had nothing else to do, some of them began

ελογίζοντο τὰ προσοφειλόμενα σφίσι τῶν ὀψωνίων έπὶ τὸ πλεῖον, καὶ συγκεφαλαιούμενοι πολλαπλάσια των καθηκόντων, ταθτ' έφασαν δείν απαιτείν τους 12 Καργηδονίους πάντες δ' άναμιμνησκόμενοι τῶν έπαγγελιών, ών οί στρατηγοί κατά τους επισφαλείς των καιρών παρακαλούντες σφας επεποίηντο, μεγάλας είχον έλπίδας και μεγάλην προσδοκίαν τῆς έσο-67 μένης περί αὐτούς ἐπανορθώσεως. διόπερ αμα τῷ συλλεχθήναι πάντας είς την Σίκκαν, καὶ παραγενόμενον "Αννωνα τον υπάρχοντα στρατηγον έν τη Λιβύη τότε τῶν Καρχηδονίων μὴ οἶον τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας ἐκπληροῦν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον λέγοντα τὸ βάρος τῶν φόρων καὶ τὴν καθόλου στενοχωρίαν τῆς πόλεως ἐγχειρεῖν παραιτεῖσθαι μέρος τι τῶν ἐξ δμολόγου προσοφειλομένων ὀψω-2 νίων, εὐθέως διαφορὰ καὶ στάσις ἐγεννᾶτο καὶ συνδρομαὶ συνεχεῖς ἐγίνοντο, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ γένη, ποτὲ 3 δ' ὁμοῦ πάντων. ὡς δ' ἃν μήθ' ὁμοεθνῶν μήθ' ὁμογλώττων ὑπαρχόντων, ἡν ἀμιξίας καὶ θορύβου καὶ τῆς λεγομένης τύρβης πλῆρες τὸ στρατόπεδον. 4 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ἀεὶ χρώμενοι ποικίλαις καὶ μισθοφορικαις δυνάμεσι, πρός μεν το μη ταχέως συμφρονήσαντας απειθείν μηδέ δυσκαταπλήκτους είναι τοις ήγουμένοις όρθως στοχάζονται, ποιούντες έκ 5 πολλών γενών την δύναμιν, προς δε το γενομένης οργης η διαβολης η στάσεως διδάξαι και πραθναι καὶ μεταθείναι τοὺς ήγνοηκότας όλοσχερῶς ἀστοε χοῦσιν. οὐ γὰρ οἶον ἀνθρωπίνη χρῆσθαι κακία συμβαίνει τὰς τοιαύτας δυνάμεις, ὅταν ἄπαξ εἰς οργήν και διαβολήν έμπέσωσι πρός τινας, άλλ' άπο-

reckoning up the total pay due to them, all to their own advantage, and having arrived at a most exorbitant result, submitted that this was the sum they should demand from the Carthaginians. whole force remembered the promises the generals had made to them in critical situations, and had great hopes and indeed quite expected that the government would thus correct in their favour the account of the sum they had earned. 67. The consequence was that when the total force was assembled at Sicca, and when Hanno, who was then commanderin-chief in Africa, came there and not only said that it was impossible to meet their claims and fulfil their hopes, but on the contrary tried by dwelling on the present heavy taxation and general distress of Carthage to induce them to renounce some of their stipulated wage, it produced at once a spirit of dissension and sedition, and the soldiers began to hold constant meetings, sometimes of particular nations and sometimes general. As they were neither all of the same nationality nor spoke the same language, the camp was full of confusion and tumult and what is known as $\tau \psi \rho \beta \eta$ or turbulence. For the Carthaginian practice of employing hired troops of various nationalities is indeed well calculated to prevent them from combining rapidly in acts of insubordination or disrespect to their officers, but in cases of an outburst of anger or of slanderous rumours or disaffection it is most prejudicial to all efforts to convey the truth to them, to calm their passions, or to conciliate the culprits. Indeed, such forces, when once their anger is aroused against anyone, or slander spreads among them, are not content with mere human wickedness, but end by becoming like

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θηριοῦσθαι τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ παραστατικήν λαμ-7 βάνειν διάθεσιν. δ καὶ τότε συνέβη γενέσθαι περὶ αὐτούς ήσαν γὰρ οἱ μὲν "Ιβηρές, οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, τινές δε Λιγυστίνοι και Βαλιαρείς, ουκ ολίγοι δε μιξέλληνες, ών οι πλείους αὐτόμολοι καὶ δοῦλοι. 8 τὸ δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῶν ἡν Λίβυες. διόπερ οὕτ' ἐκκλησιάσαι συναθροίσαντα πάντας όμοῦ δυνατον ήν ούτ' άλλην οὐδεμίαν εύρεσθαι πρός τοῦτο 9 μηχανήν. πως γάρ οδόν τε; τον μέν γάρ στρατηγον είδέναι τὰς εκάστων διαλέκτους ἀδύνατον διὰ πλειόνων δ' έρμηνέων εκκλησιάζειν, αμα τετράκις καὶ πεντάκις περί ταὐτοῦ λέγοντα πράγματος, σχε-10 δον ώς είπειν έτι του πρόσθεν άδυνατώτερον. λοιπον ην διά των ηγεμόνων ποιείσθαι τάς άξιώσεις καὶ παρακλήσεις. ὅπερ ἐπειρᾶτο τότε συνεχῶς 11 ποιεῖν ὁ "Αννων. ἀκμὴν δὲ καὶ τούτους συνέβαινεν α μεν οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαί τῶν λεγομένων, α δε καὶ συναινέσαντας ένίστε τῷ στρατηγῷ τάναντία πρὸς τούς πολλούς αναγγέλλειν, τούς μέν δι' άγνοιαν, τούς δε διά κακίαν εξ ων ην άσαφείας, άπιστίας, άμι-12 ξίας, απαντα πλήρη. πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῷοντο καὶ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπίτηδες τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας στρατηγούς τάς γεγενημένας χρείας κατά Σικελίαν έξ αὐτῶν, καὶ πεποιημένους σφίσι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ούκ έξαποστέλλειν ώς αὐτούς, τὸν δὲ μηδενὶ τού-13 των παρηκολουθηκότα τοῦτον ἐκπεπομφέναι. τέλος δ' οὖν ἀπαξιώσαντες μέν τὸν "Αννωνα, διαπιστήσαντες δε τοις κατά μέρος ήγεμόσιν, εξοργισθέντες δέ προς τους Καρχηδονίους, ώρμησαν προς την πόλιν καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσαν ἀπέχοντες ώς αν έκατὸν καὶ είκοσι στάδια τῆς Καρχηδόνος ἐπὶ τῷ καλουμένω Τύνητι, πλείους όντες τῶν δισμυρίων. 182



wild beasts or men deranged, as happened in the present case. Some of these troops were Iberians, some Celts, some Ligurians, and some from the Balearic islands; there were a good many Greek halfbreeds, mostly deserters and slaves, but the largest portion consisted of Libvans. It was therefore impossible to assemble them and address them as a body or to do so by any other means; for how could the general be expected to know all their languages? And again to address them through several interpreters. repeating the same thing four or five times, was, if anything, more impracticable. The only means was to make demands or entreaties through their officers. as Hanno continued to attempt on the present occasion, and even these did not understand all that was told them, or at times, after seeming to agree with the general, addressed their troops in just the opposite sense either from ignorance or from malice. The consequence was that everything was in a state of uncertainty, mistrust and confusion. For one thing, they thought the Carthaginians had acted purposely in not communicating with them through the generals who were acquainted with their performances in Sicily and who had made them the promises of bounties, but in sending one who had not been present on any of those occasions. length, then, refusing to treat with thoroughly distrusting their divisional officers, and highly indignant with the Carthaginians, they marched on the capital and encamped at a distance of about one hundred and twenty stades from Carthage at the place called Tunis. They were more than twenty thousand in number.



68 Οί δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τότε πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλάμβα-2 νον την αύτων άγνοιαν, ότ' ήν οὐδεν όφελος. μεγάλα μὲν γὰρ ημαρτον, εἰς ἔνα τόπον ἁθροίσαντες τοσοῦτο πληθος μισθοφόρων, ἔχοντες οὐδεμίαν έλπίδα πολεμικής χρείας έν ταις πολιτικαις δυνά-3 μεσι, τούτου δε μείζον έτι, προέμενοι τὰ τέκνα καὶ τας γυναίκας και σύν τούτοις τας αποσκευάς οίς έξην όμήροις χρησαμένους ασφαλέστερον μέν αὐτους βουλεύσασθαι περί των υποπιπτόντων, ευπειθεστέροις δ' ἐκείνοις χρησθαι πρὸς τὸ παρακαλού-4 μενον, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ καταπλαγέντες τὴν στρατοπεδείαν παν υπέμενον, σπουδάζοντες έξιλάσασθαι **5** την οργην αὐτῶν, καὶ τάς τε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀγοράς εκπέμποντες δαψιλείς επώλουν, καθώς εκείνοι βούλοιντο καὶ τάττοιεν τὰς τιμάς, τῶν τε τῆς νεοουσίας αξί τινας έξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις, ύπισχνούμενοι ποιήσειν παν ο, τι ποτ' αν αὐτοὺς αξιώσαιεν κεὶ κατὰ δύναμιν. ἦν δὲ πολὸ τὸ καθ' ἐκάστην ήμέραν παρά τοις μισθοφόροις επινοούμενον. ατε δή κατατεθαρρηκότων μεν και συντεθεωρηκότων η την κατάπληξιν καὶ πτοίαν τῶν Καρχηδονίων, πεφρονηματισμένων δε καὶ πεπεισμένων διὰ τοὺς προγεγονότας αὐτοῖς ἐν Σικελία πρὸς τὰ Ῥωμαϊκὰ στρατόπεδα κινδύνους μή οίον Καρχηδονίους άντοφθαλμησαί ποτ' αν προς αὐτοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ἀλλὰ g μηδέ των λοιπων ανθρώπων μηδένα ραδίως. διόπερ αμα τῶ συγχωρησαι τὰ περὶ τῶν ὀψωνίων αὐτοις τους Καρχηδονίους ευθέως επέβαινον, και των ο τεθνεώτων ιππων απήτουν τας αξίας. προσδεξαμένων δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, πάλιν τῆς προσοφειλομένης σιτομετρίας ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου τὴν μεγίστην γενονυῖαν εν τῶ πολέμω τιμὴν έφασκον αύτους δεῖν 184

68. Now, when there was no mending, it was brought home to the Carthaginians how blind they For they had committed two great mistakes. The first was in collecting at one place so large a body of mercenaries while themselves they could hope for nothing from the fighting power of their civic force. Their second error was even more serious, to let out of their hands the women and children of the mercenaries as well as their movables, all which would have served as hostages. giving themselves greater security in their deliberations about the circumstances and ensuring a more favourable reception for their demands. Still now. in their alarm at the troops encamping so near, they were ready to put up with anything in their eagerness to propitiate them, sending out lavish supplies of provisions which they sold to them at any price they chose to pay and constantly dispatching envoys from the Senate, promising to meet all their demands as far as it was in their power. These increased daily. the mercenaries continuing to invent new claims, gaining confidence as they witnessed the terror and cowardice of the Carthaginians, and being convinced in their arrogance, owing to their success in Sicily against the Roman legions, that not only the Carthaginians, but any other people in the world would not readily face them in arms. When, therefore, the Carthaginians had agreed to their claims for pay, they went a step further and asked for the value of the horses they had lost. This also was conceded, whereupon they maintained that they ought to get the value of the rations of corn due to them for a considerable time at the highest price corn had stood

- 10 κομίζεσθαι. καθόλου δ' ἀεί τι νέον καὶ καινὸν προσεξεύρισκον, εἰς ἀδύνατον ἐκβάλλοντες τὴν διάλυσιν, διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς καχέκτας καὶ στασιώδεις ἐν
- 11 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ δυνατὸν ὑπισχνουμένων τῶν Καρχηδονίων, κατένευσαν ἐπιτρέψειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐνὶ τῶν ἐν
- 12 Σικελία γεγονότων στρατηγών. προς μεν οδν 'Αμίλκαν τον Βάρκαν, μεθ' οδ συγκεκινδυνεύκεσαν εν τη Σικελία, δυσχερώς είχον, δοκοῦντες οὐχ ήκιστα δι' εκείνον ολιγωρείσθαι, τῷ μήτε πρεσβεύειν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τήν τε στρατηγίαν εκουσίως
- 13 δοκείν ἀποτεθείσθαι πρὸς δὲ Γέσκωνα πάνυ διέκειντο φιλανθρώπως, δς ἐγεγόνει μὲν ἐν Σικελία
 στρατηγός, ἐπεποίητο δ' αὐτῶν πρόνοιαν τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὴν
 ἀνακομιδήν. διόπερ ἐπέτρεψαν τούτω περὶ τῶν
- 69 αμφισβητουμένων. δε παραγενόμενος κατά θάλατταν μετά των χρημάτων, καὶ προσπλεύσας πρός τον Τύνητα, τὸ μεν πρωτον λαμβάνων τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναθροίζων κατὰ γένη τοὺς
 - 2 πολλούς, ἃ μὲν ἐπετίμα περὶ τῶν γεγονότων, ἃ δὲ διδάσκειν ἐπειρᾶτο περὶ τῶν παρόντων τὸ δὲ πλεῖον παρεκάλει πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ἀξιῶν αὐτοὺς εὖνους
 - 3 ὑπάρχειν τοις έξ ἀρχῆς μισθοδόταις. τέλος δ' ὥρμησε πρὸς τὸ διαλύειν τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων, κατὰ γένη ποιούμενος τὴν μισθοδοσίαν.
 - 4 ήν δέ τις Καμπανός ηθτομοληκώς παρά τῶν 'Ρωμαίων δοῦλος, ἔχων σωματικὴν δύναμιν καὶ τόλμαν
 ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς παράβολον, ὄνομα Σπένδιος.
 - 5 οὖτος εὐλαβούμενος μὴ παραγενόμενος αὐτὸν ὁ δεσπότης κομίσηται, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων νόμους αἰκισθεὶς διαφθαρῆ, πᾶν ἐτόλμα καὶ λέγειν καὶ 186



at during the war. In short they always went on devising some new claim, putting matters off so as to make it impossible to come to terms, a great many of them being disaffected and mutinous. However, on the Carthaginians promising to concede everything in their power, they agreed to refer the disputed points to one of the generals who had been present in Sicily. Now to Hamilton Barcas. with whom they had served there, they were ill disposed, thinking that it was largely his fault that they had been slighted, since he never came himself as an envoy to them and was believed to have resigned his command voluntarily. But being very favourably inclined to Gesco, who had been general in Sicily and had been full of attention to them in other matters and in that of their transport, they submitted the points in dispute to him. 69. Gesco, on reaching Tunis by sea bringing the money, at first conferred privately with the officers, and subsequently held meetings of the troops according to their nationalities. He rebuked them for their past conduct, attempted to enlighten them about the present, but most of all dwelt on the future, begging them to show themselves well-disposed to those in whose pay they had been from the outset. Finally he proceeded to discharge their arrears, paying off each nationality separately. There was a certain Campanian, a runaway Roman slave, called Spendius, a man of great physical strength and remarkable courage in war. He was afraid of his master coming to claim him, when, if given up, he would by Roman law be tortured and put to death. He therefore hesitated at nothing in his endeavour both by speech

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πράττειν, σπουδάζων διακόψαι τὰς διαλύσεις τὰς 6 προς Καργηδονίους. αμα δέ τούτω και Λίβυς τις Μάθως, δε ήν μεν ελεύθερος και των συνεστρατευμένων, πλείστα δὲ κεκινηκώς κατὰ τὰς προειρημένας ταραχάς. άγωνιῶν οὖν μὴ τίση καὶ τὴν ὑπέρ τῶν λοιπῶν δίκην, ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐγένετο γνώμης τοῖς 7 περί τον Σπένδιον. καὶ λαμβάνων τοὺς Λίβυας ύπεδείκνυε διότι μετά τὸν οψωνιασμὸν χωρισθέντων των άλλων γενών είς τὰς πατρίδας ἀπερείσονται καὶ τὴν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων ὀργὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, καὶ βουλήσονται διὰ τῆς εἰς σφᾶς τιμωρίας 8 απαντας καταπλήξασθαι τους έν τῆ Λιβύη. ταχύ δέ προσανασεισθέντες οι πολλοί τοις τοιούτοις λόγοις, καὶ λαμβανόμενοι βραχείας άφορμῆς ἐκ τοῦ τον Γέσκωνα τὰ μεν οψώνια διαλύειν, τὰς δὲ τιμὰς τοῦ τε σίτου καὶ τῶν ἴππων ὑπερτίθεσθαι, συνη έτρεχον εὐθέως εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. καὶ τοῦ μὲν Σπενδίου καὶ τοῦ Μάθω διαβαλλόντων καὶ κατηγορούντων τοῦ τε Γέσκωνος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ήκουον, καὶ προσείχον ἐπιμελῶς τὸν νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις. 10 εί δέ τις έτερος προπορευθείη συμβουλεύσων, οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο περιμείναντες ἔως τοῦ γνῶναι πότερον άντερών ή συνηγορήσων πάρεστι τοίς περί τὸν Σπένδιον, παραχρημα βάλλοντες τοις λίθοις άπ-11 έκτεινον. καὶ πολλοὺς δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ κατὰ τας συνδρομας και των ήγεμόνων και των ιδιωτων 12 διέφθειρον. καὶ μόνον τὸ ἡῆμα τοῦτο κοινῆ συνίεσαν τὸ βάλλε διὰ τὸ συνεχῶς αὐτὸ πράττειν. μάλιστα δέ τοῦτ' ἐποίουν, ὅπότε μεθυσθέντες ἀπὸ 13 των αρίστων συνδραμοιεν. διόπερ ότε τις αρξαιτο βάλλε λέγειν, οὔτως εγίνετο πανταχόθεν ἄμα καὶ ταχέως ὧστε μηδένα δύνασθαι διαφυγεῖν τῶν ἄπαξ 188

and action to break off the negotiations with the Carthaginians. He was supported by a Libyan called Matho, who was indeed a freeman and a member of the force, but had taken a leading part in the late disturbances. Consequently he stood in great fear of being singled out to bear the whole penalty and therefore was of one mind with Spendius. Taking the Libyans aside, he pointed out to them that when the other nations departed to their own countries after being paid off, they would be left to bear the whole weight of the wrath of the Carthaginians, whose object it would be by the punishment they inflicted on them to terrorize all their Libvan subjects. The men were soon stirred by such arguments, and availing themselves of the slender pretext that Gesco while discharging their pay postponed the compensation for the horses and corn, they at once held a meeting. When Spendius and Matho began to traduce and accuse Gesco and the Carthaginians, they were all ears, and listened with great attention, but if anyone else came forward to offer an opinion, they did not even wait to find out if he were going to speak in favour of Spendius or against him, but at once stoned him to death. Numbers both of the officers and privates perished thus in the different meetings, and in fact this phrase "Stone him" was the only one that became intelligible to all the different nations, owing to the frequency of They used to behave thus mostly when they held meetings after their morning meal in a drunken condition, so that the moment anyone called out "Stone him," the stones flew from all sides and so quickly that it was impossible for anyone who once came forward to address them to escape.



14 προελθόντων. πλην οὐδενος έτι τολμῶντος συμβουλεύειν διὰ ταύτην την αἰτίαν, κατέστησαν αὐτῶν

στρατηγούς Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον.

70 ὁ δὲ Γέσκων εώρα μεν τὴν ὅλην ἀκαταστασίαν καὶ ταραχήν, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμενος τὸ τῆ πατρίδι συμφέρον, καὶ θεωρῶν ὅτι τούτων ἀποθηριωθέντων κινδυνεύουσι προφανῶς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοῦς

2 ολοις πράγμασι, παρεβάλλετο καὶ προσεκαρτέρει, ποτε μεν τοὺς προεστώτας αὐτών εἰς τὰς χεῖρας

- 3 λαμβάνων, ποτέ δε κατά γένη συναθροίζων καὶ παρακαλών. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν Λιβύων οὐδέπω κεκομισμένων τὰς σιταρχίας, οἰομένων δε δεῦν ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι, καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως, βουλόμενος ὁ Γέσκων ἐπιπλῆξαι τὴν προπέτειαν αὐτῶν, Μάθω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀπαιτεῦν ἐκέλευεν. οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ' οὐδὲ τὸν 4 τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὧρμησαν τὸ μὲν
- 4 τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφήν δόντες ὥρμησαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρπάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τόν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίους. οἱ δὲ περὶ
- 5 τον Μάθω καὶ τον Σπένδιον ὖπολαμβάνοντες τάχιστ' αν οὖτως ἐκκαυθῆναι τον πόλεμον, εἰ παράνομόν τι πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, συνήργουν ταῖς τῶν ὅχλων ἀπονοίαις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποσκευὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἄμα τοῖς χρήμασι διήρπαζον, τον δὲ Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ δήσαντες ὑβριστικῶς εἰς φυλακὴν
- 6 παρεδίδοσαν. καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἤδη φανερώς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, συνωμοσίας ἀσεβεῖς καὶ παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι.

7 'Ο μεν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ Λιβυκὸς ἐπικληθεὶς πόλεμος διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν

for this reason, no one dared any longer to express an opinion, they appointed Matho and Spendius Generals.

70. Gesco saw how complete was the disorganization and disturbance, but valuing more than anything the interest of his country and foreseeing that if these troops became utterly deaf to all considerations of humanity, Carthage would evidently be in the gravest danger, he persisted, at great personal risk, in his conciliatory efforts, sometimes conferring privately with their officers, and at other times summoning and addressing meetings of the separate The Libyans, however, had not yet received their pay, and considering it overdue, came to him to demand it in a very insolent manner, when Gesco. thinking to rebuke their presumption, told them to go and ask Matho their "General" for it. aroused their anger to such a pitch, that without a moment's delay they, first of all, seized on what money they could lay their hands on, and next arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians who were with As for Matho and Spendius, thinking that the most expeditious means of fanning the flame would be to commit some violation of law or good faith, they co-operated in the excesses of the soldiery, plundering the personal effects as well as the moneychests of the Carthaginians, and after subjecting Gesco and those with him to the outrage of putting them in fetters, sent them to prison. From this time forward they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves by certain impious oaths contrary to the principles recognized by all mankind.

Such then was the origin and beginning of the 240 B.C. war against the mercenaries, generally known as the

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g ἀρχήν. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω συντελεσάμενοι τὰ προειρημένα παραυτίκα μεν εξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις έπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῦν καὶ ο συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι των πραγμάτων. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντων σχεδον των κατά την Λιβύην έτοιμως συνυπακουσάντων αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπόστασιν, καὶ τάς τε χορηγίας καὶ τὰς βοηθείας προθύμως έξαποστελλόντων, διελόντες σφας πολιορκείν ενεχείρησαν οί μεν την Ιτύκην, οί δε τους Ίππακρίτας, διὰ τὸ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις μη βού-

λεσθαι μετασχείν αὐτοίς της ἀποστάσεως. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν κατ' ιδίαν βίους ἀεὶ διεξαγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας γεννημάτων, τας δε κοινάς παρασκευάς και χορηγίας άθροίζοντες έκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην προσόδων, ἔτι δὲ πολεμεῖν 2 είθισμένοι ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι, τότε πάντων ἄμα τούτων οὐ μόνον ἐστερημένοι παραλόγως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αύτων δρώντες έκαστα των προειρημένων έπιστρέφοντα, τελέως ἐν μεγάλῃ δυσθυμία καὶ δυσελπιστία καθέστασαν, ἄτε παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αὐτοῖς τῶν 3 πραγμάτων ἀποβεβηκότων. τετρυμένοι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περί Σικελίας πολέμω συνεχώς, ήλπιζον επιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν διαλύσεων ἀναπνοῆς τινος τεύξεσθαι καὶ 4 καταστάσεως εὐδοκουμένης. συνέβαινε δ' αὐτοῖς τάναντία μείζονος γάρ ενίστατο πολέμου καταρχή 5 καὶ φοβερωτέρου. πρόσθεν μεν γαρ υπερ Σικελίας ημφισβήτουν 'Ρωμαίοις, τότε δε περί σφων αὐτων καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἔμελλον κινδυνεύσειν, πόλεμον 6 ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἐμφύλιον. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ὅπλων πλῆθος, οὐ ναυτικὴ δύναμις, οὐ πλοίων κατασκευή παρ' αὐτοῖς ἦν, ώς αν τοσαύταις ναυμα-192

Libyan war. Matho, having so far carried out his purpose, at once sent envoys to the Libyan towns urging them to strike a blow for liberty and imploring their support and practical assistance. Hereupon, when nearly all the Libyans had agreed to join in the revolt against Carthage and willingly contributed troops and supplies, they divided their forces into two and undertook the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, since these cities had refused to participate in the rebellion.

71. The Carthaginians had ever been accustomed to depend for their private supplies on the produce of the country, their public expenses for armaments and commissariat had been met by the revenue they derived from Libya, and they had always been in the habit of employing hired soldiers. present moment not only did they find themselves deprived of all these resources at one blow, but actually saw them turned against themselves. Consequently they fell into a state of utter depression and despondency, things having turned out quite otherwise than they expected. For they had been much worn by the long continued war for Sicily, and had hoped that the peace would procure them some rest and a grateful period of tranquillity, and what happened was just the reverse, as they were now threatened by the outbreak of a greater and more formidable war. In the former case they were disputing the dominion of Sicily with the Romans, but now they were about to fight for their own existence and that of their native city. Besides neither had they a sufficient supply of arms, nor a proper navy, nor the material left to construct one, so many had been the battles in which they

χίαις περιπεπτωκότων καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ χορηγιῶν διάθεσις οὐδὲ φίλων οὐδὲ συμμάχων τῶν βοηθησόντων 7 έξωθεν έλπὶς οὐδ' ἡτισοῦν ὑπῆρχε. διὸ καὶ τότε σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν ἡλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν ξενικὸς καὶ 8 διαπόντιος πόλεμος εμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχής. Οὐχ ηκιστα δ' αὐτοὶ σφίσι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τη-λικούτων κακῶν ἐγεγόνεισαν αἴτιοι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν προγεγονότα πόλεμον εὐλόγους ἀφορμας ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, πικρώς επεστάτησαν των κατά την 2 Λιβύην ανθρώπων, παραιρούμενοι μεν των άλλων πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διπλασίους δὲ ταις πόλεσι τους φόρους η πρίν επιτάττοντες, συγγνώμην δε τοις ἀπόροις η συμπεριφοράν οὐδ' ήν-3 τινοῦν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ τῶν πραττομένων διδόντες, θαυμάζοντες δε και τιμώντες των στρατηγών ου τους πράως καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῷ πλήθει χρωμένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοῖς μὲν έτοιμάζοντας πλείστας χορηγίας κάπισκευάς, τοις δε κατά την χώραν πικρό-4 τατα χρωμένους, ὧν εἶς ἦν "Αννων. τοιγαροῦν οί μεν ἄνδρες οὐχ οἷον παρακλήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπό-5 στασιν, ἀλλ' ἀγγέλου μόνον εδεήθησαν· αἱ δε γυναικες αι τον προ του χρόνον απαγομένους περιορωσαι τους σφετέρους άνδρας και γονεις προς τας εισφοράς, τότε συνομνύουσαι κατά πόλεις εφ' ώ μηδέν κρύψειν των ύπαρχόντων αὐταις, ἀφαιρούμεναι τὸν κόσμον εἰσέφερον ἀπροφασίστως εἰς τοὺς 6 οθωνιασμούς. καὶ τοιαύτην παρεσκεύασαν εὐπορίαν τοις περί τον Μάθω και Σπένδιον ώστε μη μόνον διαλθσαι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων τοῖς μισθοφόροις κατά τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ἃς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς την απόστασιν, άλλα και προς το συνεχές ευπορη-7 σαι χορηγίας. ούτως οὐδέποτε δεῖ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν 194

had been engaged at sea. They had not even the means of providing supplies and not a single hope of external assistance from friends or allies. So it was now that they thoroughly realized how great is the difference between a war against a foreign state carried on over sea and civil discord and disturbance.

72. They had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances. During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honoured not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly—Hanno for example. The consequence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt—a mere message was sufficient—while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund. Matho and Spendius were thus so well off that not only could they pay the soldiers their arrears, as they had promised in inciting them to mutiny, but found themselves furnished with ample means for a protracted war. This teaches us that it is the right policy not only to look to the

μόνον, έτι δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπειν

αεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους.
73 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ εν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ὅντες οί Καρχηδόνιοι, προστησάμενοι τὸν "Αννωνα στρατηγον διά το δοκείν τούτον και πρότερον αὐτοίς τά κατά την Εκατοντάπυλον της Λιβύης καταστρέψασθαι, συνήθροιζον μεν μισθοφόρους, καθώπλιζον δε τούς έν ταις ήλικίαις των πολιτών εγύμναζον δέ 2 καὶ συν έταττον τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἱππεῖς παρεσκεύαζον δέ καὶ τὰ περιλιπη τῶν πλοίων, τριήρεις καὶ πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀκατίων. οἱ δὲ περὶ 3 τον Μάθω, παραγενομένων αὐτοῖς εἰς έπτὰ μυριάδας Λιβύων, ἐπιδιελόντες τούτους ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιόρκουν τους 'Ιτυκαίους και τους 'Ιππακρίτας, βεβαίως δέ την έν τῶ Τύνητι στρατοπεδείαν κατείχον, ἀποκεκλείκεσαν δε τους Καρχηδονίους άπάσης της έκτὸς Λιβύης. ή γὰρ Καρχηδών αὐτή μεν εν κόλπω 4 κείται, προτείνουσα καὶ χερρονησίζουσα τῆ θέσει, τὸ μέν τη θαλάττη, τὸ δέ τι και λίμνη περιεχομένη κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον· ὁ δὲ συνάπτων ἰσθμὸς αὐτὴν τῆ 5 Λιβύη τὸ πλάτος ώς εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε σταδίων ἐστί. τούτου δ' επὶ μεν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος νεύοντος μέρους οὐ μακράν ἡ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων κεῖται πόλις, έπὶ δὲ θατέρου παρά την λίμνην ο Τύνης. ἐφ' ὧν ε έκατέρων τότε στρατοπεδεύσαντες οι μισθοφόροι, καὶ διακλείσαντες ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, λοιπὸν ἐπεβούλευον αὖτἢ τἢ πόλει, καὶ ποτὲ 7 μεν ήμερας, ποτε δε και νύκτωρ παραγινόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος, εἰς φόβους καὶ θορύβους ὁλοσχερεις ενέβαλλον τους ένδον.

74 Αννων δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰς παρασκευὰς ενδεχομένως εγίνετο· καὶ γὰρ ἢν πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος εὐφυής·

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present, but to look forward still more attentively to the future.

73. Yet, although the Carthaginians were in such straits, they first of all appointed Hanno to the command, as he had, they thought, on a former occasion brought matters concerning Hecatompylus in Libva to a satisfactory conclusion; they next busied themselves with enrolling mercenaries and arming the citizens of military age. They also mustered and drilled their civic cavalry and got ready what ships they had left, consisting of triremes, quinqueremes and the largest of their Meanwhile Matho, when about seventy thousand Libvans had joined him, divided them into several forces with which he maintained unmolested the sieges of Utica and Hippacritae, secured his main camp at Tunis and thus shut out the Carthaginians from all outer Libya. Carthage, I should explain, lies in a gulf, on a promontory or peninsula surrounded mostly by the sea and in part by a lake. The isthmus which connects it with Libva is about twenty-five stades in width and on the side of this isthmus which faces the sea, at no great distance from the capital, lies Utica, while Tunis is on the other side by the lake. So that the mutineers, encamped now as they were before both of these towns and thus shutting off Carthage from the land, continued to threaten the capital itself, appearing before the walls sometimes by day and sometimes by night and creating the utmost terror and commotion within.

74. Hanno was doing fairly well in the matter of outfit, his talent lying in that direction, but

έξορμήσας δε μετά της δυνάμεως ετερος ήν καί 2 γὰρ τοῖς καιροῖς ἀστόχως έχρητο καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν ἀπείρως καὶ νωθρώς. διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν 3 πρώτον είς 'Ιτύκην παραβοηθήσας τοῖς πολιορκουμένοις και καταπληξάμενος τους υπεναντίους τω πλήθει τῶν θηρίων είχε γὰρ οὐκ ἐλάττους ἑκατὸν έλεφάντων καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα λαβών προτερήματος άρχην όλοσχερούς ουτως έχρησατο κακώς ώστε κινδυνεθσαι προσαπολέσαι και τους πολιορκουμένους. κομίσας γαρ έκ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς κατα-4 πέλτας καὶ τὰ βέλη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀπάσας τὰς πρός την πολιορκίαν παρασκευάς, καὶ στρατοπεδεύσας πρό της πόλεως, ενεχείρησε προσβάλλειν πρός τὸν τῶν ὑπεναντίων χάρακα. τῶν δὲ θηρίων 5 βιασαμένων εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν, οὐ δυνάμενοι τὸ βάρος οὐδὲ τὴν ἔφοδον οἱ πολέμιοι μεῖναι, πάντες εξέπεσον εκ τῆς στρατοπεδείας. καὶ πολλοί μεν αὐτῶν ἀπέθανον τρωθέντες ὑπὸ τῶν θηρίων, 6 τὸ δὲ διασωζόμενον μέρος πρός τινα λόφον έρυμνον καὶ σύμφυτον έμενε, πιστεῦον ταῖς έξ αὐτῶν 7 τῶν τόπων ἀσφαλείαις. ὁ δ' Αννων, εἰθισμένος Νομάσι καὶ Λίβυσι πολεμεῖν, οἵτινες ὅταν ἄπαξ ἐγκλίνωσι, ποιούνται την φυγήν ἐπὶ δύ' ήμέρας καὶ τρεις εκτοπίζοντες αυτούς, υπολαβών και τότε πέρας έχειν τοῦ πολέμου καὶ νενικηκέναι τοῖς ὅλοις, 8 τῶν μὲν στρατιωτῶν ωλιγώρησε καὶ καθόλου τῆς παρεμβολής, αὐτὸς δ' εἰσελθών εἰς τὴν πόλιν εἰςί-9 νετο περί τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν. οἱ δὲ συμπεφευγότες τῶν μισθοφόρων εἰς τὸν λόφον, σύντροφοι μέν γεγονότες της Βάρκα τόλμης, συνήθεις δ' έκ των κατά Σικελίαν αγώνων πολλάκις της αὐτης ημέρας ποτέ μεν ύποχωρείν, ποτέ δε πάλιν εκ 198



when it came to taking the field with his forces, he was another man. He had no idea how to avail himself of opportunities and generally showed an entire lack of experience and energy. For instance, as regards Utica, he began by coming to the help of the besieged and terrifying the enemy by his strong force of elephants, of which he had no less than a hundred; but when, in consequence of this, he had a chance of gaining a decisive success, he made such poor use of his advantage that he very nearly brought a catastrophe on the besieged, as well as on himself. For bringing from Carthage catapults, missiles and all requirements for a siege and encamping before the city he undertook the assault of the enemy's entrenched camp. When the elephants forced their way into the camp, the enemy unable to face the weight of their attack all evacuated Many of them were mangled and killed by the elephants, but those who escaped rallied on a steep hill overgrown with brushwood, relying on the natural security of the position. Hanno had been accustomed to fight with Numidians and Libvans, who once they give way continue their flight for two or three days, trying to get as far away as possible. Thinking then, on the present occasion too, that the war was over and he had secured a complete victory he took no precaution for the safety of his army and camp, but entered the city and occupied himself with the care of his person. The mercenaries, who had rallied on the hill, were men schooled in the daring tactics of Barcas and accustomed from their fighting in Sicily to make in one day repeated retirements followed by fresh

10 μεταβολής έγχειρεῖν τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τότε συνιδόντες τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν ἀπηλλαγμένον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς διὰ τὸ προτέρημα ῥαθυ-

11 μοῦντας καὶ διαρρέοντας ἐκ τῆς στρατοπέδείας, συστραφέντες ἐπιτίθενται τῷ χάρακι, καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀπέκτειναν, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἠνάγκασαν φυ-

12 γεῖν αἰσχρῶς ὑπὸ τὰ τείχη καὶ τὰς πύλας ἐκυρίευσαν δὲ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἁπάσης καὶ τῆς τῶν πολιορκουμένων παρασκευῆς ἡν Αννων πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις
ἐκκομίσας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐποίησε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς

13 ὑποχείριον. οὐ μόνον δὲ περὶ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν οὕτως ἀνεστράφη νωθρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας περὶ τὴν καλουμένην Γόρζαν ἀντιστρατοπεδευσάντων αὐτῷ τῶν πολεμίων, λαβὼν καιροὺς δὶς μὲν ἐκ παρατάξεως εἰς τὸ νικᾶν, δὶς δ' ἐξ ἐπι-

14 θέσεως, ἄτε καὶ στρατοπεδευόντων σύνεγγυς αὐτῷ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἀμφοτέρους δοκεῖ τούτους εἰκῆ

καὶ παραλόγως προέσθαι.

5 Διόπερ οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, θεωροῦντες αὐτὸν κακῶς χειρίζοντα τὰς πράξεις, 'Αμίλκαν τὸν ἐπικαλού-2 μενον Βάρκαν αὖθις προεστήσαντο, καὶ τοῦτον ἐξεέπεμπον εἰς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον στρατηγόν, δόντες ἐβδομήκοντα μὲν ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς ἐπισυνηγμένους τῶν μισθοφόρων καὶ τοὺς ηὐτομοληκότας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων, ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πολιτικοὺς ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζούς, ὥστε τοὺς σύμπαντας εἰς μυρίους ὁ ὑπάρχειν. ὅς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην εὐθέως ἔξοδον καταπληξάμενος τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἤττησε μὲν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ὑπεναντίων, ἔλυσε δὲ τὴν τῆς Ἰτύκης πολιορκίαν, ἐφάνη δ' ἄξιος τῶν προγεγονότων ἔργων καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ πλήθει προσδοκίας.

attacks. At present, on seeing that the general was absent in the city, while the troops were at their ease owing to their success and streaming out of their camp, they drew themselves up and attacked the camp, putting many to the sword and compelling the rest to take refuge ignominiously under the walls and at the gates. They captured all the baggage and all the artillery of the besieged, which Hanno had brought out of the town and added to his own, thus putting it in the enemy's hands. This was not the only occasion on which he acted so negligently, but a few days later at a place called Gorza, when the enemy were encamped opposite him and owing to their proximity he had four opportunities of beating them, twice in a pitched battle and twice by a surprise attack, he is said in each case to have thrown them away by his heedlessness and lack of judgement.

75. The Carthaginians, in consequence, seeing that he was mismanaging matters, again appointed Hamilcar Barcas to the command and dispatched him to this war, giving him seventy elephants, all the additional mercenaries they had been able to collect, and the deserters from the enemy, besides their burgher forces, horse and foot, so that in all he had about ten thousand men. Hamilcar, on his very first expedition, struck terror into the enemy by the unexpectedness of the attack, cowing their spirit, raising the siege of Utica, and showing himself worthy of his past exploits and of the high expectations of the populace. What he accomplished in this campaign was as follows. On

την τοιοθτον. των γεωλόφων των έπιζευγνύντων τον αυχένα τον συνάπτοντα την Καρχηδόνα προς την Λιβύην ὄντων δυσβάτων, καὶ χειροποιήτους ἐχόντων διεκβολας ἐπὶ την χώραν, συνέβαινε τοὺς περὶ τον Μάθω πάντας τοὺς διὰ τῶν προειρημένων λόφων εὐκαίρως κειμένους τόπους φυλακαῖς δι-5 ειληφέναι, πρός δε τούτοις τοῦ προσαγορευομένου Μακάρα ποταμοῦ διείργοντος κατά τινας τόπους παραπλησίως την έπι την χώραν τοις έκ της πόλεως έξοδον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πλήθος τοῦ ρεύματος ἀβάτου κατά τὸ πλειστον ὑπάρχοντος, μιᾶς δ' ούσης ἐπ' αὐτῷ γεφύρας, καὶ ταύτην τηρεῖν τὴν δίοδον ἀσφα-6 λως, πόλιν έπ' αὐτης ψκοδομηκότας. έξ ων συνέβαινε τους Καρχηδονίους μή οίον στρατοπέδω της χώρας ἐπιβαίνειν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς κατ' ἰδίαν θέλοντας διαπεσείν ραδίως αν δύνασθαι λαθείν τους η ύπεναντίους. είς ἃ βλέπων 'Αμίλκας, καὶ παντός πράγματος καὶ καιροῦ πεῖραν λαμβάνων διὰ τὸ δυσχρηστείν περί την έξοδον, διενοήθη τι τοιούτον. 8 τοῦ προειρημένου ποταμοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰς θάλατταν έκβολήν συνθεωρήσας κατά τινας ανέμων στάσεις άποθινούμενον τὸ στόμα καὶ τεναγώδη γινομένην την παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ στόμα πάροδον, ποιήσας εὐτρεπη τῶ στρατοπέδω τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξοδον, καὶ κρύπτων έν αύτω την επιβολήν, ετήρει το προειρημένον 9 σύμπτωμα. παραπεσόντος δε τοῦ καιροῦ, νυκτὸς έξορμήσας έλαθε πάντας αμα τῷ φωτὶ τὸν προ-10 ειρημένον τόπον διαβιβάσας την δύναμιν. δόξου δὲ τοῦ πράγματος φανέντος καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῆ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, ὁ μὲν ᾿Αμίλκας προῆγε δια τοῦ πεδίου, ποιούμενος την πορείαν ἐπὶ τοὺς 76 την γέφυραν φυλάττοντας. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπέν-202

the neck of land connecting Carthage with Libya is a chain of hills difficult of access and with several passes to the country artificially cut in them. Matho had posted guards in all those spots which were favourable for the passage of the hills. In addition to this there is a river called Macaras a which shuts off in certain places the access from the town to the country. This river is for the most part unfordable owing to the volume of water, and there is only one bridge, which Matho had also secured, building a town at the bridge-head. So that not only was it impossible for the Carthaginians to reach the country with an army, but it was not even an easy matter for single persons wishing to get through to elude the vigilance of the enemy. Hamilcar, seeing all these obstacles, after passing in review every means and every chance of surmounting this difficulty about a passage, thought of the following plan. He had noticed that when the wind blew strongly from certain quarters the mouth of the river got silted up and the passage became shallow just where it falls into the sea. He therefore got his force ready to march out, and keeping his project to himself, waited for this to occur. When the right time came he started from Carthage at night, and without anyone noticing him, had by daybreak got his army across at the place mentioned. Both those in the city and the enemy were taken by surprise, and Hamilcar advanced through the plain making for the guardians of the bridge.

^a The same as Bagraclas.

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διον συνέντες τὸ γεγονὸς ἀπήντων εἰς τὸ πεδίον καὶ παρεβοήθουν άλλήλοις, οἱ μὲν ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὴν γέφυραν πόλεως όντες οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, οἱ δ' άπὸ τῆς Ἰτύκης ὑπὲρ τοὺς μυρίους καὶ πεντακισχι-2 λίους. ἐπεὶ δ' εἰς σύνοπτον ήκον ἀλλήλοις, νομίσαντες έν μέσω τους Καρχηδονίους απειληφέναι, σπουδή παρηγγύων αμα παρακαλούντες σφας αὐτούς 3 καὶ συνήπτον τοῖς πολεμίοις. ὁ δ' 'Αμίλκας ήγε μέν την πορείαν πρώτους έχων τους ελέφαντας, επί δε τούτοις τους ίππεις και τους ευζώνους, τελευ-Α ταῖα δὲ τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων. κατιδὼν δὲ προγειρότερον επιφερομένους τους υπεναντίους, αναστρέ-5 φειν παρήγγειλε πασι τοις έαυτου. και τους μέν άπὸ τῆς πρωτοπορείας ἀναστρέψαντας σπουδῆ ποιείσθαι την ἀποχώρησιν ἐκέλευσε· τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας έξ ἀρχης ὑπάρχοντας έξ ἐπιστροφης περισπων έξέταττε πρός την των πολεμίων επιφάνειαν. 6 οί δè Λίβυες καὶ μισθοφόροι, νομίσαντες αὐτούς καταπεπληγμένους φυγείν, λύσαντες την τάξιν έπέκειντο καὶ συνηπτον είς τὰς χειρας έρρωμένως, η άμα δὲ τῶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συνεγγίσαντας τοῖς παρατεταγμένοις έκ μεταβολής ύποστήναι, την δε λοιπήν δύναμιν ἐπάγειν, ἐκπλαγεῖς γινόμενοι διὰ τὸ παράδοξον οι Λίβυες εγκλίναντες ευθέως έφευγον, ώς 8 αν είκη και σποράδην επικείμενοι. λοιπόν οί μεν τοις κατόπιν επιφερομένοις περιπίπτοντες εσφάλλοντο, καὶ διέφθειρον αύτούς τε καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους. οί δὲ πλείους συνεπατήθησαν, ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν ίπ-9 πέων ἐπικειμένων αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν θηρίων. ἀπ-204

Spendius, on learning what had happened, put his two forces in movement to meet in the plain and render mutual assistance to each other, those from the town near the bridge being not less than ten thousand in number and those from Utica over fifteen thousand. When they got in sight of each other, thinking that they had caught the Carthaginians in a trap between them, they exhorted each other with loud shouts and advanced to attack. Hamilcar was advancing in the following order. front were the elephants, after them the cavalry and light-armed troops and last of all the heavyarmed. When he saw that the enemy were attacking him in such precipitation he ordered his whole force to face about. He bade those in front, after facing about, retire with all speed, and reversing the order of those who originally were in the rear he deployed them to await the onslaught of the enemy. The Libyans and mercenaries, thinking that the Carthaginians were afraid of them and retreating, broke their ranks and fell on them vigorously. But when the cavalry, on approaching the line of hoplites, wheeled round again and faced the Libyans, while at the same time the remainder of the Carthaginian army was coming up, the enemy were so much surprised that they at once turned and fled panic-stricken, in the same loose order and confusion in which they had advanced. Consequently some of them came into collision with their comrades who were advancing in their rear with disastrous effect, causing the destruction both of themselves and the latter, but the larger number were trampled to death, the cavalry and elephants attacking them at close quarters.

ώλοντο μὲν οὖν εἰς έξακισχιλίους τῶν Λιβύων καὶ τῶν ξένων, ἐάλωσαν δὲ περὶ δισχιλίους· οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ διέφυγον, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν πρὸς τῷ γεφύρᾳ πό10 λιν, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς Ἰτύκῃ παρεμβολήν. ᾿Αμίλκας δὲ ποιήσας τὸ προτέρημα τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, εἴπετο κατὰ πόδας τοῖς πολεμίοις, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς γεφύρας πόλιν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατέσχε, προεμένων καὶ φευγόντων εἰς τὸν Τύνητα τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πολεμίων, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν χώραν ἐπιπορευόμενος τὰς μὲν 11 προσήγετο, πλείστας δὲ κατὰ κράτος ἐξήρει. τοῖς

δὲ Καρχηδονίοις βραχύ τι θάρσους ἐνειργάσατο καὶ τόλμης, ἐπὶ ποσὸν αὐτοὺς ἀπαλλάξας τῆς προγεγε-

νημένης δυσελπιστίας.

Ο δε Μάθως αὐτὸς μεν επὶ τῆς τῶν Ἱππακριτών πολιορκίας ἐπέμενε, τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὸν Αὐτάριτον τὸν τῶν Γαλατῶν ἡγεμόνα καὶ Σπένδιον 2 έγεσθαι των ύπεναντίων συνεβούλευε, τὰ μὲν πεδία φεύγοντας διὰ τὸ πληθος τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις ίππέων καὶ θηρίων, ταῖς δ' ὑπωρείαις ἀντιπαράγοντας καὶ συνεπιτιθεμένους κατὰ τὰς ὑπο-3 πιπτούσας ἀεὶ δυσχερείας. ἄμα δὲ ταῖς ἐπινοίαις ταύταις καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Νομάδας καὶ τοὺς Λίβυας έξέπεμπε, δεόμενος βοηθεῖν σφίσι καὶ μὴ κατα-4 προΐεσθαι τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καιρούς. ὁ δὲ Σπένδιος, προσλαβών έκ τοῦ Τύνητος ἀφ' έκάστου τῶν γενῶν τοὺς πάντας εἰς έξακισχιλίους, προῆγε, ταις ύπωρείαις άντιπαράγων τοις Καρχηδονίοις, έχων αμα τοις προειρημένοις και τους μετ' Αύτακ ρίτου Γαλάτας, όντας είς δισχιλίους. το γάρ λοιπον μέρος αὐτῶν τοῦ κατ' ἀρχὰς συστήματος ηὐτομολήκει πρός τους 'Ρωμαίους έν ταις περί τον Ερυκα 6 στρατοπεδείαις. τοῦ δ' 'Αμίλκου παρεμβεβληκότος 206

About six thousand Libyans and mercenaries fell and nearly two thousand were made prisoners. The rest escaped, some to the town by the bridge and some to the camp before Utica. Hamilcar after this victory followed closely on the retreating enemy and took the town by the bridge, the enemy in it deserting it and flying to Tunis. He next traversed the rest of the country, winning over some towns and taking others by assault. He thus restored some confidence and courage to the Carthaginians, delivering them in a measure from their previous despondency.

77. Matho for his own part continued to prosecute the siege of Hippacritae, advising Autaritus, the leader of the Gauls, and Spendius to harass the enemy, keeping away from the plains owing to the numbers of the cavalry and elephants opposed to them but marching along the foothills parallel to the Carthaginians and descending on them whenever they were on difficult ground. While adopting this plan he at the same time sent messages to the Numidians and Libyans, begging them to come to his assistance and not lose the chance of gaining their freedom. Spendius, taking with him from Tunis a force of about six thousand men drawn from all the nationalities, advanced along the slopes parallel to the Carthaginians. He had also with him Autaritus and his Gauls numbering only about two thousand, the rest of the original corps having deserted to the Romans when encamped near Ervx. Hamilcar 207

έν τινι πεδίω πανταχόθεν ὅρεσι περιεχομένω, συν-έβη τὰς παρὰ τῶν Νομάδων καὶ Λιβύων βοηθείας εἰς τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον συνάψαι τοῖς περὶ τὸν Σπέν-7 διον. γενομένης δὲ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις τῆς μὲν τῶν Λιβύων ἐπιστρατοπεδείας αἰφνιδίου καὶ κατὰ πρόσωπον, τῆς δὲ τῶν Νομάδων ἀπ' οὐρᾶς, τῆς δὲ περὶ

τον Σπένδιον έκ πλαγίου, μεγάλην αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν συνέβη περιστήναι καὶ δυσέκφευκτον. 78 Κατά δέ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Ναραύας, δς ην μέν Νομάς των ενδοξοτάτων είς, ήν δε και πλήρης όρμης πολεμικής, ούτος ἀεὶ μεν οἰκείως διέκειτο προς τους Καρχηδονίους, πατρικήν έχων σύστασιν, τότε δε μαλλον παρωρμήθη διά την Αμίλκου τοῦ 2 στρατηγοῦ καταξίωσιν. διὸ καὶ νομίσας έχειν εὐφυῆ καιρὸν πρὸς ἔντευξιν αὐτῷ καὶ σύστασιν, 3 ήκεν είς την στρατοπεδείαν, έχων περί αύτον Νομάδας είς έκατόν. καὶ συνεγγίσας τῷ χάρακι τολμηρώς ἔμενε, κατασείων τῆ χειρί. τοῦ δ' 4 'Αμίλκου θαυμάσαντος τὴν ἐπιβολήν, καὶ προπέμψαντός τινα των ίππέων, είς λόγους έφη βούλεσθαι 5 συνελθεῖν τῷ στρατηγῷ. διαποροῦντος δ' ἀκμὴν καὶ διαπιστούντος του των Καρχηδονίων ήγεμόνος, παραδούς ο Ναραύας τον ίππον και τὰς λόγχας τοις 6 μεθ' αύτοῦ, παρην ἄνοπλος εὐθαρσῶς εἰς τὴν παρεμβολήν. οι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐθαύμαζον, τὰ δὲ κατε-7 πλήττοντο τὴν τόλμαν όμως δὲ προσεδέξαντο καὶ συνηλθον είς τάς χειρας. ὁ δὲ παραγενόμενος είς λόγους έφη πασι μέν Καρχηδονίοις εὐνοεῖν, μάλιστα δ' ἐπιθυμεῖν Βάρκα γενέσθαι φίλος διὸ καὶ νῦν 8 άδόλως παντός έργου καὶ πάσης ἐπιβολῆς. 'Αμίλκας

παρείναι συσταθησόμενος αὐτῷ καὶ κοινωνήσων δε ταθτ' ακούσας οθτως ήσθη μεγάλως επί τε τω 208

had established his camp in a plain surrounded by mountains, and just at this time Spendius was joined by the Numidian and Libyan reinforcements. The Carthaginians, suddenly finding the additional force of Libyans in their front, and that of the Numidians in their rear, while Spendius was on their flank, were in a very difficult situation, from which it was not easy to extricate themselves.

78. There was a certain Naravas, a Numidian of high rank and full of martial spirit. He had always had that attachment to the Carthaginians which was traditional in his family, and it was now strengthened by his admiration for Hamilcar. Thinking that this was a favourable opportunity for meeting Hamilcar and introducing himself, he rode up to the camp escorted by about a hundred Numidians. Coming close to the palisade he remained there quite fearlessly making signals with his hand. Hamilcar was much astonished at his venturesomeness and sent out a horseman to meet him, when he said that he desired an interview with the general. Carthaginian leader remaining still much amazed and distrustful, Naravas handed over his horse and his spears to his attendants, and very boldly came into the camp unarmed. The Carthaginians looked on in mingled admiration and amazement at his daring, but they met and received him, and when he was admitted to the interview, he said that he wished all the Carthaginians well but particularly desired the friendship of Barcas, and this was why he had come to introduce himself and offer his cordial assistance in all actions and enterprises. Hamilcar, on hearing this, was so delighted at the young man's courage in

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κατά τὴν παρουσίαν θάρσει καὶ τῆ κατά τὴν έντευξιν άπλότητι τοῦ νεανίσκου, ώς οὐ μόνον εὐδόκησε κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν προσλαβέσθαι τῶν πράξεων, άλλα και την θυγατέρα δώσειν επηγγείλατο 9 μεθ' δρκου, διαφυλάξαντος αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς Καρχηδονίους πίστιν.

Γενομένων δὲ τῶν ὁμολογιῶν, ὁ μὲν Ναραύας ἡκε τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν τεταγμένους ἔχων Νομάδας, 10 οντας είς δισχιλίους, ό δ' 'Αμίλκας, προσγενομένης αὐτῷ τῆς χειρὸς ταύτης, παρετά-ξατο τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον συνάψαντες επί ταὐτὸ τοῖς Λίβυσι καὶ βάντες είς το πεδίον συνέβαλλον τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

11 γενομένης δε μάχης ἰσχυρᾶς, ενίκων οἱ περὶ τὸν Αμίλκαν, καλώς μεν τῶν θηρίων άγωνισαμένων, έπιφανεστάτην δε τοῦ Ναραύα παρασχομένου 12 χρείαν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Αὐτάριτος καὶ Σπένδιος δι-

έφυγον, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἔπεσον μὲν εἰς μυρίους,

13 ξάλωσαν δ' εἰς τετρακισχιλίους. ἐπιτελεσθέντος δὲ τοῦ κατορθώματος, ᾿Αμίλκας τοῖς μὲν βουλομένοις τῶν αἰχμαλώτων μεθ' ἐαυτοῦ συστρατεύειν έξουσίαν έδωκε καὶ καθώπλιζε τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν 14 πολεμίων σκύλοις, τοὺς δὲ μὴ βουλομένους άθροί-

σας παρεκάλει, φάσκων, έως μεν τοῦ νῦν συγγνώμην αὐτοῖς ἔχειν τῶν ἡμαρτημένων διὸ καὶ συγχωρείν τρέπεσθαι κατά τὰς ίδίας όρμὰς οδ ποτ'

15 αν έκαστος αὐτῶν προαιρῆται. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα δι-ηπειλήσατο μηθένα φέρειν ὅπλον πολέμιον κατ' αὐτῶν, ώς, ἐὰν άλῷ τις, ἀπαραιτήτου τευξόμενον τιμωρίας.

79 Κατά δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς οἱ τὴν Σαρδόνα [την νησον] παραφυλάττοντες τῶν μισθοφόρων, 210

coming to him and his simple frankness at their interview that not only did he consent to associate him in his undertakings but swore to give him his daughter in marriage if he remained loyal to Carthage.

The agreement having thus been made, Naravas came in with the Numidians under his command, about two thousand in number, and Hamilcar, thus reinforced, offered battle to the enemy. Spendius, after effecting a junction with the Libyans, descended into the plain and attacked the Carthaginians. The battle was a stubborn one, but ended in the victory of Hamilcar, the elephants fighting well and Naravas rendering brilliant services. Autaritus and Spendius escaped, but with the loss of about ten thousand killed and four thousand prisoners. After the victory Hamilcar gave permission to those of the prisoners who chose to join his own army, arming them with the spoils of the fallen enemies; those who were unwilling to do so he collected and addressed saying that up to now he pardoned their offences, and therefore they were free to go their several ways, wherever each man chose, but in future he threatened that if any of them bore arms against Carthage he would if captured meet with inevitable punishment.

79. About the same time the mercenaries who garrisoned Sardinia, emulous of the exploits of Matho 211

ζηλώσαντες τούς περί τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον, 2 επιτίθενται τοις εν τη νήσω Καρχηδονίοις. και τον μέν τότε παρ' αὐτοις όντα βοήθαρχον Βώσταρον συγκλείσαντες είς την ακρόπολιν μετά των έαυτοῦ 3 πολιτών ἀπέκτειναν, αθθις δε τών Καργηδονίων στρατηγον έξαποστειλάντων μετά δυνάμεως Αννωνα, κάπειτα καὶ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἐγκαταλιπου-4 σων τον "Αννωνα, και μεταθεμένων προς σφας, γενόμενοι ζωγρία κύριοι τοῦ προειρημένου, παραυτίκα τοῦτον μὲν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρηλλαγμένας έπινοοθντες τιμωρίας, πάντας τους έν τῆ νήσω Καρχηδονίους στρεβλοῦντες απέκτειναν καί το λοιπον ήδη ποιησάμενοι τας πόλεις ύφ' έαυτους 5 είχον εγκρατώς την νήσον, εως οδ στασιάσαντες πρός τους Σαρδονίους εξέπεσον υπ' εκείνων είς β την Ἰταλίαν. ή μέν οὖν Σαρδώ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον άπηλλοτριώθη Καρχηδονίων, νήσος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῆ πολυανθρωπία καὶ τοῖς γεννήμασι δια-7 φέρουσα. τω δέ πολλούς και πολύν ΰπέρ αὐτῆς πεποιησθαι λόγον οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἡγούμεθ' εἶναι ταυτολογείν ύπερ των δμολογουμένων. 8 Μάθως δὲ καὶ Σπένδιος, ἄμα δὲ τούτοις Αὐτάριτος ό Γαλάτης, ὑπιδόμενοι τὴν ᾿Αμίλκου φιλανθρωπίαν είς τούς αίχμαλώτους, καὶ φοβηθέντες μὴ τῷ τοιούτω τρόπω ψυχαγωγηθέντες δρμήσωσι πρός την ύποδεικνυμένην ἀσφάλειαν οί τε Λίβυες καὶ τὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων πληθος, έβουλεύοντο πώς αν καινοτομήσαντές τι τῶν πρὸς ἀσέβειαν εἰς τέλος ἀποθηριώ-9 σειαν τὰ πλήθη πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. ἔδοξεν οὖν αὐτοῖς συναθροῖσαι τοὺς πολλούς. γενομένου δὲ τούτου γραμματοφόρον εἰσήγαγον, ώς ἀπεσταλ-10 μένον ύπο των έκ της Σαρδόνος αίρετιστων. ή δ'

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and Spendius, attacked the Carthaginians in the island. They began by shutting up in the citadel and putting to death Bostar, the commander of the foreign contingent, and his compatriots. Next, when the Carthaginians sent Hanno over in command of a fresh force, this force deserted him and joined the mutineers, who thereupon took him prisoner and at once crucified him. After this, devising the most exquisite torments, they tortured and murdered all the Carthaginians in the island, and when they had got all the towns into their power continued to hold forcible possession of Sardinia, until they quarrelled with the natives, and were driven out by them to Italy. Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile. Many authors have described it at length, and I do not think it necessary to repeat statements which no one disputes.

Matho and Spendius, as well as the Gaul Autaritus, 239 B.C. were apprehensive of the effect of Hamilcar's leniency to the prisoners, fearing that the Libyans and the greater part of the mercenaries might thus be won over and hasten to avail themselves of the proffered immunity. They therefore set themselves to devise some infamous crime which would make the hatred of the troops for Carthage more savage. They decided to call a general meeting and at this they introduced a letter-bearer supposed to have been sent by their confederates in Sardinia. The letter

έπιστολή διεσάφει τόν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ πάντας, ους παρεσπόνδησαν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, φυλάττειν ἐπιμελῶς, ὡς πραττόντων τινών έκ τοῦ στρατοπέδου τοῖς Καρχη-11 δονίοις ύπερ της τούτων σωτηρίας. λαβόμενος δε της άφορμης ταύτης ο Σπένδιος, πρώτον μεν παρεκάλει μή πιστεύειν την ύπο τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων γεγενημένην φιλανθρωπίαν πρὸς 12 τούς αίχμαλώτους οὐ γὰρ σῶσαι προαιρούμενον αὐτὸν ταῦτα βεβουλεῦσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀλόντων, ἀλλὰ διά της εκείνων αφέσεως ημών εγκρατή γενέσθαι σπουδάζοντα, πρὸς τὸ μὴ τινάς, ἀλλὰ πάντας ἡμᾶς 13 αμα τιμωρήσασθαι πιστεύσαντας αὐτῶ. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φυλάττεσθαι παρήνει μη προέμενοι τους περί τὸν Γέσκωνα καταφρονηθώσι μεν ύπο των έχθρων, μεγάλα δὲ βλάψωσι τὰς ίδίας πράξεις, ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐάσαντες διαφυγεῖν, ὃν 14 είκὸς εχθρον αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι φοβερώτατον. ἔτι δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντος αὐτοῦ παρῆν ἄλλος γραμματοφόρος, ώς από των έκ τοῦ Τύνητος απεσταλμένος, παρα-80 πλήσια τοις έκ της Σαρδόνος διασαφών. έφ' δν Αὐτάριτος ὁ Γαλάτης ἐπιβαλών μίαν ἔφη σωτηρίαν είναι τοις έαυτων πράγμασι τὸ πάσας ἀπογνωναι ο τὰς ἐν Καρχηδονίοις ἐλπίδας. ἔως δ' ἃν ἀντέχηταί τις της εκείνων φιλανθρωπίας, ου δυνατόν αυτοίς 3 αληθινόν γενέσθαι τον τοιούτον σύμμαχον. διόπερ ηξίου τούτοις πιστεύειν, τούτοις ακούειν, τοις τοιούτοις προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, οἶτινες αν ἀεί τι των ἀπεχθεστάτων καὶ πικροτάτων εἰσαγγέλλωσι κατὰ Καρχηδονίων τους δ' έναντία τούτοις λέγοντας 4 προδότας καὶ πολεμίους ἡγεῖσθαι παρήνει. ταῦτα δ' είπων συνεβούλευε τόν τε Γέσκωνα και τους 214

advised them to keep careful guard over Gesco and all the others whom they had, as above narrated, treacherously arrested at Tunis, since some persons in the camp were negotiating with the Carthaginians Spendius, seizing on this about their release. pretext, begged them in the first place to have no reliance on the Carthaginian general's reported clemency to the prisoners. "It is not," he said, "with the intention of sparing their lives that he has taken this course regarding his captives, but by releasing them he designs to get us into his power, so that he may take vengeance not on some, but on all of us who trust him." Moreover, he warned them to take care lest by giving up Gesco and the others they incur the contempt of their enemies and seriously damage their own situation by allowing to escape them so able a man and so good a general, who was sure to become their most formidable enemy. He had not finished his speech when in came another post supposed to be from Tunis with a message similar to that from Sardinia. 80. Autaritus the Gaul was the next speaker. He said that the only hope of safety for them was to abandon all reliance on the Carthaginians. Whoever continued to look forward to clemency from them could be no true ally of their own. Therefore he asked them to trust those, to give a hearing to those, to attend to those only who bring the most hateful and bitterest accusations against the Carthaginians, and to regard speakers on the other side as traitors and enemies. Finally, he recommended them to torture and put to



μετ' αὐτοῦ συλληφθέντας καὶ τοὺς ὕστερον γενομένους αίχμαλώτους των Καρχηδονίων αίκισαμέ-5 νους ἀποκτεῖναι. πρακτικώτατος δ' ήν οὖτος ἐν ταῖς συμβουλίαις διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τὴν φωνὴν αὐτοῦ 6 συνιέναι. πάλαι γὰρ στρατευόμενος ἤδει διαλέγεσθαι φοινικιστί· ταύτῃ δέ πως οἱ πλεῖστοι συνεσαίνοντο τη διαλέκτω δια το μηκος της προγεγενη-7 μένης στρατείας. διόπερ επαινέσαντος αὐτὸν όμοθυμαδον τοῦ πλήθους, ούτος μεν εὐδοκιμῶν ἀν-8 εγώρησε. πολλων δε προπορευομένων αφ' εκάστου γένους αμα, καὶ βουλομένων αὐτὴν παραιτεῖσθαι την αικίαν διά τὰς γεγενημένας ἐκ τοῦ Γέσκωνος είς αὐτοὺς εὐεργεσίας, οὕτε μὴν τῶν λεγομένων οὐθὲν ἦν συνετόν, ὡς ἂν ἄμα πολλῶν, ἐκάστου 9 δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν διάλεκτον συμβουλεύοντος ἐπεὶ δέ καὶ παρεγυμνώθη διότι τὴν τιμωρίαν παραιτοῦνται, καί τις ἐκ τῶν καθημένων εἶπε Βάλλε, 10 πάντας αμα κατέλευσαν τοὺς προπορευθέντας. καὶ τούτους μέν, ώσπερ ύπο θηρίων διεφθαρμένους, 11 εξέφερον οι προσήκοντες. τους δε περί τον Γέσκωνα λαβόντες, όντας είς έπτακοσίους, ήγον εκ τοῦ χάρακος οἱ περὶ τὸν Σπένδιον· καὶ προαγαγόντες βραχὺ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας πρῶτον μὲν 12 απέκοπτον τὰς χειρας, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ Γέσκωνος, δυ βραχεῖ χρόνω πρότερον ἐκ πάντων Καρχηδονίων προκρίναντες ανέδειξαν μέν εὐεργέτην αὐτῶν, ἐπέτρεψαν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβη-13 τουμένων. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰς χεῖρας ἀπέκοψαν, ἠκρωτηρίαζον τοὺς ταλαιπώρους· κολοβώσαντες δὲ καὶ συντρίψαντες τὼ σκέλε' ἔτι ζῶντας ἔρριψαν εἴς τινα τάφρον.

81 Οι δέ Καρχηδόνιοι, τοῦ δυστυχήματος αὐτοῖς

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death not only Gesco and those arrested with him. but all the Carthaginians they had subsequently taken prisoners. He was much the most effective speaker in their councils, because a number of them could understand him. He had been a long time in the service and had learned Phoenician, a language which had become more or less agreeable to their ears owing to the length of the previous war. His speech therefore met with universal approbation, and he retired from the platform amid applause. Numerous speakers from each nationality now came forward all together, maintaining that the prisoners should be spared at least the infliction of torture in view of Gesco's previous kindness. Nothing, however, they said was intelligible, as they were all speaking together and each stating his views in his own language. But the moment it was disclosed that they were begging for a remission of the sentence someone among the audience called out "Stone them," and they instantly stoned all the speakers to These unfortunates, mangled as if by wild beasts, were carried off for burial by their friends. Spendius and his men then led out from the camp Gesco and the other prisoners, in all about seven Taking them a short distance away, they first of all cut off their hands, beginning with Gesco, that very Gesco whom a short time previously they had selected from all the Carthaginians, proclaiming him their benefactor and referring the points in dispute to him. After cutting off their hands they cut off the wretched men's other extremities too, and after thus mutilating them and breaking their legs. threw them still alive into a trench.

81. The Carthaginians, when news came of this

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άναγγελθέντος, ποιείν μέν οὐδέν είχον, ἐσχετλίαζον δέ, καὶ περιπαθεῖς γινόμενοι τῆ συμφορᾶ πρὸς μὲν ᾿Αμίλκαν καὶ τὸν ἔτερον τῶν στρατηγῶν ϶Αννωνα πρεσβευτάς εξέπεμπον, δεόμενοι βοηθείν καὶ 2 τιμωρείν τοις ήτυχηκόσι. πρός δε τους ήσεβηκότας κήρυκας έξαπέστελλον περί της των νεκρών αναι-3 ρέσεως. οί δ' ουτ' έδοσαν, προειπόν τε τοις παροῦσι μήτε κήρυκα πέμπειν πρὸς σφας μήτε πρεσβευτήν, ώς της αὐτης κολάσεως ὑπομενούσης τοὺς 4 παραγενομένους ης νῦν Γέσκων τέτευχε. πρὸς δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν έδογματοποίησαν καὶ παρήνεσαν αύτοις, ον μέν αν λάβωσι Καρχηδονίων, τιμωρησαμένους αποκτείνειν ον δ' αν των συμμαχούντων αὐτοῖς, άποκόψαντας τὰς χειρας αθθις εἰς Καρχηδόν' ἀποπέμπειν. δ δή και διετέλεσαν επιμελώς ποιούντες. 5 διόπερ είς ταθτα βλέπων ουκ αν τις είπειν οκνήσειεν ώς οὐ μόνον τὰ σώματα τῶν ἀνθρώπων καί τινα των εν αὐτοῖς γεννωμένων έλκων καὶ φυμάτων ἀποθηριοῦσθαι συμβαίνει καὶ τελέως ἀβοήθητα 6 γίνεσθαι, πολύ δὲ μάλιστα τὰς ψυχάς. ἐπί τε γὰρ των έλκων, έαν μεν θεραπείαν τοις τοιούτοις προσάγη τις, ύπ' αὐτης ένιστε ταύτης έρεθιζόμενα θᾶττον ποιείται την νομήν εάν δε πάλιν άφη, κατά την έξ αύτων φύσιν φθείροντα το συνεχές οὖκ ἴσχει 7 παθλαν, έως αν άφανίση το ύποκείμενον ταις τε ψυχαις παραπλησίως τοιαθται πολλάκις επιφύονται μελανίαι και σηπεδόνες ώστε μηδεν ασεβέστερον άνθρώπου μηδ' ωμότερον ἀποτελεῖσθαι τῶν ζώων. 8 οίς ἐὰν μὲν συγγνώμην τινὰ προσάγης καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν, επιβουλήν και παραλογισμόν ήγούμενοι τὸ συμβαίνον ἀπιστότεροι καὶ δυσμενέστεροι γίο νονταί πρός τους φιλανθρωπουντας εάν δ' άντι-218



unhappy event, could take no action, but their indignation was extreme, and in the heat of it they sent messengers to Hamilcar and their other general Hanno imploring them to come and avenge the unfortunate victims. To the assassins they sent heralds begging that the bodies might be given up Not only was this request refused but the messengers were told to send neither herald nor envoy again, as they would meet with the same fate that had just befallen Gesco. With regard to treatment of prisoners in the future, the mutineers passed a resolution and engaged each other to torture and kill every Carthaginian and send back to the capital with his hands cut off every ally of Carthage, and this practice they continued to observe carefully. No one looking at this would have any hesitation in saying that not only do men's bodies and certain of the ulcers and tumours afflicting them become so to speak savage and brutalized and quite incurable, but that this is true in a much higher degree of their In the case of ulcers, if we treat them, they are sometimes inflamed by the treatment itself and spread more rapidly, while again if we neglect them they continue, in virtue of their own nature, to eat into the flesh and never rest until they have utterly destroyed the tissues beneath. Similarly such malignant lividities and putrid ulcers often grow in the human soul, that no beast becomes at the end more wicked or cruel than man. In the case of men in such a state, if we treat the disease by pardon and kindness, they think we are scheming to betray them or take them in, and become more mistrustful and hostile to their would-be benefactors, but if, on the

τιμωρή, διαμιλλώμενοι τοῖς θυμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ἀπειρημένων ἡ δεινῶν ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀναδέχονται, σὺν καλῷ τιθέμενοι τὴν τοιαύτην τόλμαν· τέλος δ' ἀποθηριωθέντες ἐξέστησαν τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. 10 τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα

10 τῆς δὲ διαθέσεως ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ μεγίστην μερίδα νομιστέον ἔθη μοχθηρὰ καὶ τροφὴν ἐκ παίδων κακήν, συνεργὰ δὲ καὶ πλείω, μέγιστα δὲ τῶν συνεργῶν, τὰς ἀεὶ τῶν προεστώτων ὕβρεις καὶ πλεο-11 νεξίας. ἃ δὴ τότε συνέβαινε καὶ περὶ μὲν τὸ σύστημα τῶν μισθοφόρων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον περὶ τοὺς

ήγεμόνας αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν.

32 `Αμίλκας δέ, δυσχρηστούμενος τῆ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπονοία, τὸν μὲν *Αννωνα πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐκάλει, πεπεισμένος άθροισθέντων ὁμοῦ τῶν στρατοπέδων 2 θᾶττον ἐπιθήσειν τέλος τοῖς ὅλοις. τῶν δὲ πολεμίων οὖς ποτε κρατήσειε, τοὺς μὲν ἐν χειρῶν νόμω διέφθειρε, τοὺς δὲ ζωγρία πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσαναχθέντας ὑπέβαλλε τοῖς θηρίοις, μίαν ὁρῶν λύσιν ταύ-

την, εί δυνηθείη τους έχθρους άρδην άφανίσαι.

3 Δοκούντων δὲ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐπικυδεστέρας ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἤδη κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον, γίνεταί τις δλοσχερὴς καὶ παράδοξος περὶ αὐτοὺς παλίρροια τῶν 4 πραγμάτων. οἱ τε γὰρ στρατηγοὶ συνελθόντες ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ διεστασίασαν πρὸς σφᾶς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε μὴ μόνον τοὺς κατὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν παραλιπεῖν καιρούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὰς ἀφορμὰς διδόναι τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις διὰ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διλονεικίαν. ἃ δὴ καὶ συνέντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τῷ

μεν ένὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι προσέταξαν, τῷ δ' ἐτέρῳ μένειν, ὅν ἃν αἱ δυνάμεις προκρίνω-6 σιν. ἄμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὰς παρακομιζομένας ἀγο-

contrary, we attempt to cure the evil by retaliation they work up their passions to outrival ours, until there is nothing so abominable or so atrocious that they will not consent to do it, imagining all the while that they are displaying a fine courage. Thus at the end they are utterly brutalized and no longer can be called human beings. Of such a condition the origin and most potent cause lies in bad manners and customs and wrong training from childhood, but there are several contributory ones, the chief of which is habitual violence and unscrupulousness on the part of those in authority over them. All these conditions were present in this mercenary force as a whole and especially in their chiefs.

82. This desperation of the enemy made Hamilcar anxious, and he begged Hanno to join him, being convinced that if both armies united, an end would be put sooner to the whole war. Meanwhile he continued to put to the sword those of the enemy who were conquered in the field, while those brought to him captive prisoners he threw to the elephants to be trampled to death, as it was clear to him that the rebellion would never be stamped out until the

enemy were utterly exterminated.

The prospects of the Carthaginians now seemed much brighter, but the tide suddenly turned completely against them. For when the two generals met, they quarrelled so seriously, that this difference caused them not only to neglect many opportunities of striking a blow at the enemy, but to afford many such to the latter. The Carthaginians perceiving this, ordered one of the two to leave his post and the other to remain in sole command, leaving the choice to the troops. In addition to this

ράς έκ των παρ' αὐτοῖς καλουμένων 'Εμπορίων, έφ' αίς είχον τὰς μεγίστας έλπίδας περί τε τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων, διαφθαρήναι συνέβη 7 κατὰ θάλατταν όλοσχερῶς ὑπὸ χειμῶνος. τὰ δὲ κατά τὴν Σαρδόνα, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προείπον, ἐτύγγανεν απηλλοτριωμένα, μεγάλας αὐτοῖς αἰεί ποτε χρείας παρεχομένης της νήσου ταύτης κατά τάς 8 περιστάσεις. το δε μέγιστον η των Ίππακριτων καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων ἀπέστη πόλις, αἴτινες ἐτύγχανον μόναι των κατά την Λιβύην ου μόνον τον ένεστωτα πόλεμον αναδεδεγμέναι γενναίως, αλλά καὶ τοὺς κατ' 'Αγαθοκλέα καιρούς καὶ τὴν 'Ρωμαίων ἔφοδον εὐγενῶς ὑπομεμενηκυῖαι, καὶ συλλήβδην οὐδέποτε 9 βεβουλευμέναι Καρχηδονίοις οὐδεν ὑπεναντίον. τότε δέ χωρις της αλόγου πρός τους Λίβυας αποστάσεως καί δια της μεταθέσεως εὐθέως τούτοις μεν την μεγίστην οἰκειότητα καὶ πίστιν ἐναπεδείξαντο, πρός δέ τους Καρχηδονίους απαραίτητον οργήν ένεστή-10 σαντο καὶ μίσος. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ παραβεβοηθηκότας αὐτοῖς παρ' ἐκείνων, ὄντας εἰς πεντακοσίους, καὶ τον ήγεμόνα τούτων αποκτείναντες απαντας έρριψαν κατά τοῦ τείχους, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐνεχείρισαν τοῖς Λίβυσι τοις γε μην Καρχηδονίοις οὐδέ θάψαι συν-11 εχώρησαν τοὺς ήτυχηκότας αἰτουμένοις. τούτων δὲ συμβαινόντων, οί μεν περί τον Μάθω καί Σπένδιον, ἐπαρθέντες τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι, πολιορκεῖν 12 ένεχείρησαν αὐτὴν τὴν Καρχηδόνα. Βάρκας δὲ παραλαβών 'Αννίβαν τον στρατηγόν τοῦτον γὰρ έξαπέστειλαν οι πολίται πρός τας δυνάμεις, έπει τον "Αννωνα το στρατόπεδον έκρινε δείν άπαλλάττεσθαι, κατά την ύπο των Καργηδονίων αὐτοῖς



they suffered the total loss at sea in a storm, of the supplies they were conveying from the place they call Emporiae, supplies on which they entirely relied for their commissariat and other needs. And again, as I said above, they had lost Sardinia, an island which had always been of great service to them in difficult circumstances. The severest blow of all. however, was the defection of Hippacritae and Utica, the only two cities in Libya which had not only bravely faced the present war, but had gallantly held out during the invasion of Agathocles and that of the Romans; indeed they never had on any occasion given the least sign of hostility to Carthage. But now, apart from their unjustifiable defection to the cause of the Libyans, their sympathies so suddenly changed, that they exhibited the greatest friendship and loyalty to the rebels, while beginning to show every symptom of passionate and determined hatred of Carthage. After butchering the troops the Carthaginians had sent to assist them, about five hundred in number, together with their commander, they threw all the bodies from the wall, and surrendered the city to the Libyans. They would not even give the Carthaginians the permission they requested to bury their unfortunate compatriots. Matho and Spendius in the meantime, elated by these events, undertook the siege of Carthage itself. Barcas had now been joined in the command by Hannibal, the general whom the citizens had dispatched to the army, on the soldiers voting that Hanno should be the one to retire, when the decision was left in their hands by the Carthaginians at the



δοθείσαν ἐπιτροπὴν περὶ τὰς γενομένας τῶν στρα-13 τηγών στάσεις πρός άλλήλους διόπερ 'Αμίλκας, έχων τοῦτόν τε καὶ Ναραύαν, ἐπήει τὴν χώραν, διακλείων τὰς χορηγίας τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον, μεγίστην αὐτῶ παρεχομένου χρείαν περί τε ταῦτα καὶ τἄλλα Ναραύα τοῦ Νομάδος.

14 Τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ὑπαίθρους δυνάμεις ἐν 83 τούτοις ήν. οί δε Καρχηδόνιοι περικλειόμενοι πανταχόθεν ήναγκάζοντο καταφεύγειν έπὶ τὰς συμμα-

2 χίδων πόλεων έλπίδας. Ίέρων δ' ἀεὶ μέν ποτε κατὰ

- τον ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο σπουδὴν 3 εἰς πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τότε δὲ καὶ μαλλον εφιλοτιμείτο, πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν έαυτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελία δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν 'Ρωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σώζεσθαι Καρχηδονίους, ΐνα μή παντάπασιν έξη το προτεθέν ακονιτί συντελείσθαι τοις ισχύουσι, πάνυ φρονίμως και νουνεχώς λογι-
- 4 ζόμενος. οὐδέποτε γὰρ χρη τὰ τοιαῦτα παρορᾶν, οὐδὲ τηλικαύτην οὐδενὶ συγκατασκευάζειν δυναστείαν, πρός ην οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων έξ-5 έσται δικαίων αμφισβητεῖν. οὐ μὴν άλλα καὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια
- 8 προθυμίας οὐδεν ἀπέλειπον. εν ἀρχαίς μεν γάρ έγένετό τις αμφισβήτησις έξ αμφοῖν διά τινας
- 7 τοιαύτας αιτίας. των Καρχηδονίων τους πλέοντας έξ 'Ιταλίας είς Λιβύην καὶ χορηγοῦντας τοῖς πολεμίοις καταγόντων ώς αύτούς, και σχεδον άθροισθέντων τούτων είς την φυλακην είς τούς πεντακοσίους,
- 8 ηγανάκτησαν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαπρεσβευσάμενοι, καὶ κομισάμενοι διὰ λόγου πάντας. ἐπὶ τοσούτον εὐδόκησαν ώστε παραχρημα τοῦς Καρχηδονίοις αντιδωρήσασθαι τους υπολειπομένους παρ 224

time the two generals had quarrelled. Accompanied then by this Hannibal and by Naravas, Hamilcar scoured the country, intercepting the supplies of Matho and Spendius, receiving the greatest assistance in this and all other matters from the Numidian Naravas.

Such were the positions of the field forces. 83. The Carthaginians, being shut in on all sides, were obliged to resort to an appeal to the states in alliance with them. Hiero during the whole of the present war had been most prompt in meeting their requests, and was now more complaisant than ever, being convinced that it was in his own interest for securing both his Sicilian dominions and his friendship with the Romans, that Carthage should be preserved, and that the stronger Power should not be able to attain its ultimate object entirely without effort. In this he reasoned very wisely and sensibly, for such matters should never be neglected, and we should never contribute to the attainment by one state of a power so preponderant, that none dare dispute with it even for their acknowledged rights. now the Romans as well as Hiero observed lovally the engagements the treaty imposed on them. At first there had been a slight dispute between the two states for the following reason. The Carthaginians when they captured at sea traders coming from Italy to Africa with supplies for the enemy, brought them in to Carthage, and there were now in their prisons as many as five hundred such. The Romans were annoyed at this, but when on sending an embassy, they recovered all the prisoners by diplomatic means, they were so much gratified, that in return they gave back to the Carthaginians all

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αὐτοῖς αἰχμαλώτους ἐκ τοῦ περὶ Σικελίαν πολέμου. 3 ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ καιροῦ πρὸς ἔκαστα τῶν παρακαλουμένων ἐτοίμως καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὑπήκουον.

καλουμένων ετοιμώς και φιλανσρώπως υπηκουον.
10 διό καὶ πρός μέν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἐπέτρεψαν τοῖς

έμπόροις έξαγαγεῖν αἰεὶ το κατεπεῖγον, προς δὲ τοὺς 11 πολεμίους ἐκώλυσαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν μὲν ἐν τῆ Σαρδόνι μισθοφόρων, καθ' δν καιρὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπέστησαν, ἐπισπωμένων αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν νῆσον οὐχ ὑπήκουσαν· τῶν δ' Ἰτυκαίων ἐγχειριζόντων σφᾶς, οὐ προσεδέξαντο, τηροῦντες τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας δίκαια.

12 Καρχηδόνιοι μέν οὖν τῆς παρὰ τῶν προειρημένων φίλων τυγχάνοντες ἐπικουρίας ὑπέμενον τὴν

84 πολιορκίαν. τοις δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον οὐχ ήττον πολιορκεισθαι συνέβαινεν ἢ πολιορκείν.
2 εἰς τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν ᾿Αμίλκαν ἔν-

2 είς τοιαύτην γὰρ αὐτοὺς οἱ περὶ τὸν ᾿Αμίλκαν ἔνδειαν καθίστασαν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκα-

3 σθηναι τέλος αὐτοὺς διαλῦσαι τὴν πολιορκίαν. μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον ἁθροίσαντες τῶν τε μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἀρίστους καὶ Λιβύων, τοὺς ἄπαντας εἰς πεντακισμυρίους, μεθ' ὧν ἢν καὶ Ζάρζας ὁ Λίβυς ἔχων τοὺς ὑφ' αὐτὸν ταττομένους, ὥρμησαν αὖθις ἀντιπαράγειν ἐν τοῦς ὑπαίθροις καὶ τηρεῖν τοὺς περὶ

4 τον 'Αμίλκαν. των μέν οὖν πεδινων τόπων ἀπείχοντο, καταπεπληγμένοι τὰ θηρία καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ναραύαν ἱππεῖς, τοὺς δ' ὀρεινοὺς καὶ στενοὺς

5 ἐπειρῶντο προκαταλαμβάνειν. ἐν οἷς καιροῖς συνέβη ταῖς μὲν ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ τόλμαις μηδὲν αὐτοὺς λείπεσθαι τῶν ὑπεναντίων, διὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπειρίαν

6 πολλάκις έλαττοῦσθαι. τότε γὰρ ἦν, ὡς ἔοικε, συνιδεῖν ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας πηλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἐμπειρία μεθοδικὴ καὶ στρατηγικὴ δύναμις ἀπειρίας 226

the remaining prisoners from the Sicilian war and henceforth gave prompt and friendly attention to all their requests. They gave permission to their merchants to export all requirements for Carthage, but not for the enemy, and shortly afterwards, when the mercenaries in Sardinia on revolting from Carthage invited them to occupy the island, they refused. Again on the citizens of Utica offering to surrender to them they did not accept, but held to their treaty engagements.

The Carthaginians, then, on thus obtaining assist- 288 B.C. ance from their allies continued to withstand the siege. 84. But Matho and Spendius were just as much in the position of besieged as of besiegers. Hamilear had reduced them to such straits for supplies that they were finally forced to raise the siege. A short time afterwards, collecting a picked force of mercenaries and Libvans to the number of about fifty thousand and including Zarzas the Libvan and those under his command, they tried again their former plan of marching in the open parallel to the enemy and keeping a watch on Hamilcar. They avoided level ground, as they were afraid of the elephants and Naravas' horse, but they kept on trying to anticipate the enemy in occupying positions on the hills and narrow passes. In this campaign they were quite equal to the enemy in courage and enterprise, but were often worsted owing to their want of tactical skill. This was, it seems, an opportunity for seeing by the light of actual fact, how much the methods gained by experience and the skill of a general, differ from a soldier's inexperience

7 καὶ τριβης ἀλόνου στρατιωτικης. πολλούς μὲν νὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν ταῖς κατὰ μέρος χρείαις ἀποτεμνόμενος καὶ συγκλείων ώσπερ άγαθὸς πεττευτής, άμαχεὶ 8 διέφθειρε, πολλούς δ' έν τοις όλοσχερέσι κινδύνοις τούς μέν είς ενέδρας ανυπονοήτους επαγόμενος άνήρει, τοῖς δ' ἀνελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως ποτέ μέν μεθ' ήμέραν, ποτε δε νύκτωρ, επιφαινόμενος έξέπληττεν ων δσους λάβοι ζωγρία, πάντας παρέβαλ-9 λε τοις θηρίοις. τέλος δ' επιστρατοπεδεύσας αὐτοις ανυπονοήτως εν τόποις αφυέσι μεν προς την εκείνων χρείαν, εὐφυέσι δὲ πρὸς τὴν έαυτοῦ δύναμιν, είς τοῦτ' ήγαγε περιστάσεως ώστε μήτε διακινδυνεύειν τολμώντας μήτ' αποδράναι δυναμένους διά τὸ τάφρω καὶ χάρακι περιειληφθαι πανταχόθεν τέλος ύπο της λιμοῦ συναγομένους ἐσθίειν ἀλλήλων 10 αναγκασθήναι, τοῦ δαιμονίου τὴν οἰκείαν αμοιβὴν αὐτοῖς ἐπιφέροντος τῆ πρὸς τοὺς πέλας ἀσεβεία καὶ 11 παρανομία. πρὸς μέν γὰρ τὸν κίνδυνον οὖκ ἐτόλμων έξιέναι, προδήλου της ήττης και της τιμωρίας τοις άλισκομένοις ύπαρχούσης, περί δε διαλύσεως οὐδ' ὑπενόουν ποιεῖσθαι μνήμην, συνειδότες σφίσι 12 τὰ πεπραγμένα. προσανέχοντες δ' ἀεὶ ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος βοηθείαις διὰ τὰς τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐπαγγελίας παν υπέμενον ποιείν κατά σφων αυτών. 85 έπεὶ δὲ κατεχρήσαντο μὲν ἀσεβῶς τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. τροφη ταύτη χρώμενοι, κατεχρήσαντο δε τα δουλικὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ἐβοήθει δ' ἐκ τοῦ Τύνητος οὐ-2 δείς, τότε προδήλου της αικίας διά την περικάκησιν έκ των πολλών τοις ήγεμόσιν ύπαρχούσης, έκριναν οί περί τὸν Αὐτάριτον καὶ Ζάρζαν καὶ Σπέν-

in the art of war and mere unreasoning routine. For in many partial engagements, Hamilcar, like a good draught-player, by cutting off and surrounding large numbers of the enemy, destroyed them without their resisting, while in the more general battles he would sometimes inflict large loss by enticing them into unsuspected ambuscades and sometimes throw them into panic by appearing when they least expected it by day or by night. All those he captured were thrown to the elephants. Finally, taking them by surprise and encamping opposite to them in a position unfavourable for action on their part but favouring his own strong point-generalship —he brought them to such a pass, that not daring to risk a battle and unable to escape, as they were entirely surrounded by a trench and palisade, they were at last driven by famine to eat each other-a fitting retribution at the hands of Providence for their violation of all law human and divine in their treatment of their neighbours. They did not venture to march out and do battle, as they were faced by the certainty of defeat and condign punishment for all captured, and they did not even think of asking for terms, as they had their evil deeds on their conscience. Always expecting the relief from Tunis that their leaders continued to promise them, there was no crime against themselves that they scrupled to commit. 85. But when they had used up their prisoners in this abominable manner by feeding on them, and had used up their slaves, and no help came from Tunis, and their leaders saw that their persons were in obvious danger owing to the dreadful extremity to which the soldiers were reduced, Autaritus, Zarzas and Spendius decided to

διον ἐγχειρίζειν έαυτοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις καὶ δια-3 λαλεῖν περὶ διαλύσεως 'Αμίλκα. πέμψαντες οὖν κήρυκα καὶ λαβόντες συγχώρημα περὶ πρεσβείας, 4 ήκον όντες δέκα πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. πρὸς ους 'Αμίλκας όμολογίας εποιήσατο τοιαύτας εξείναι Καργηδονίοις εκλέξασθαι των πολεμίων οθς αν αὐτοί βούλωνται δέκα· τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς ἀφ-5 ιέναι μετά χιτώνος. γενομένων δε τούτων, εὐθέως 'Αμίλκας έφη τους παρόντας εκλέγεσθαι κατά τάς δμολογίας. των μέν οὖν περὶ τὸν Αὐτάριτον καὶ Σπένδιον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων ἡγεμόνων τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐκυρίευσαν οἱ Καρχηδόβ νιοι. τῶν δὲ Λιβύων, ἐπεὶ τὴν σύλληψιν ἤσθοντο των ήγεμόνων, νομισάντων, αύτους παρεσπονδήσθαι διὰ τὸ τὰς συνθήκας ἀγνοεῖν, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν η αιτίαν δρμησάντων έπι τὰ ὅπλα, περιστήσας αὐτοῖς 'Αμίλκας τά τε θηρία καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἄπαντας διέφθειρε πλείους όντας των τετρακισμυρίων περί τον τόπον τον Πρίονα καλούμενον δν συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τοῦ σχήματος πρὸς τὸ νῦν είρημένον δργανον ταύτης τετευχέναι της προσηγορίας. 86΄ Πράξας δὲ τὰ προδεδηλωμένα τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις αδθις έλπίδα παρέστησε μεγάλην πρός τὸ βέλτιον, καίπερ ἀπεγνωκόσιν ήδη τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ Ναραύα καὶ μετ' 'Αννίβου τὴν χώ-

βέλτιον, καίπερ ἀπεγνωκόσιν ἤδη τὴν σωτηρίαν αὐτὸς δὲ μετὰ Ναραύα καὶ μετ' ᾿Αννίβου τὴν χώ- ραν ἐπήει καὶ τὰς πόλεις. προσχωρούντων δὲ καὶ μετατιθεμένων πρὸς αὐτοὺς τῶν Λιβύων διὰ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα, ποιησάμενοι τὰς πλείστας πόλεις ὑφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἦκον ἐπὶ τὸν Τύνητα, καὶ πολιορκεῖν τὰν ἐκτὲίρησαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος πλευρὰν προσεστρατοπέδευσεν

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give themselves up to the enemy and discuss terms with Hamilcar. They therefore dispatched a herald. and when they had obtained leave to send envoys, they went, ten in all, to the Carthaginians. terms Hamilcar made with them were, that the Carthaginians might choose from the enemy any ten they wished, the remainder being free to depart with one tunic apiece. These terms having been agreed to, Hamilcar at once said that by virtue of them he chose the ten envoys. By this means the Carthaginians got into their power Autaritus, Spendius, and the other principal leaders. The Libyans, when they learnt of their officers' arrest, thought they had been betrayed, as they were ignorant of the treaty, and rushed to arms, but Hamilcar, surrounding them with his elephants and the rest of his forces, cut them all to pieces. They numbered more than forty thousand. The scene of this slaughter was a place called the Saw from its resemblance to that tool.

86. By this achievement Hamilcar again made the Carthaginians very hopeful of better fortune, although by this time they had nearly given up all for lost. In conjunction with Naravas and Hannibal he now raided the country and its towns. The Libyans in general gave in and went over to them owing to the recent victory, and after reducing most of the cities, they reached Tunis and began to besiege Matho. Hannibal encamped on the side of

'Αννίβας, κατά δὲ τὴν ἀπέναντι ταύτης 'Αμίλκας. 4 μετά δὲ ταῦτα προσαγαγόντες πρὸς τὰ τείχη τοὺς περί τον Σπένδιον αίχμαλώτους έσταύρωσαν έπι-5 φανώς. οί δὲ περὶ τον Μάθω, κατανοήσαντες τον Αννίβαν ραθύμως καὶ κατατεθαρρηκότως αναστρεφόμενον, επιθέμενοι τῷ χάρακι πολλούς μεν τῶν Καργηδονίων απέκτειναν, πάντας δ' εξέβαλον εκ της στρατοπεδείας, εκυρίευσαν δε καὶ της αποσκευης άπάσης, έλαβον δὲ καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν Αννίβαν ζω-6 γρία. τοθτον μέν οθν παραχρημα πρός τον τοθ Σπενδίου σταυρον άγαγόντες και τιμωρησάμενοι πικρώς, εκείνον μεν καθείλον, τοῦτον δ' ἀνέθεσαν ζώντα καὶ περικατέσφαξαν τριάκοντα τῶν Καρχηδονίων τους επιφανεστάτους περί το του Σπενδίου 7 σώμα, της τύχης ώσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἐκ παραθέσεως αμφοτέροις έναλλαξ διδούσης αφορμάς εἰς ὑπερβο-8 λην της κατ' αλλήλων τιμωρίας. ὁ δὲ Βάρκας ὀψὲ μέν συνήκε την επίθεσιν των έκ της πόλεως διά την απόστασιν των στρατοπέδων οὐδε μην συνείς ούδ' ούτως κατετάχει πρός την βοήθειαν διά τάς 9 μεταξύ δυσχωρίας. διόπερ αναζεύξας από τοῦ Τύνητος, καὶ παρελθών ἐπὶ τὸν Μακάραν ποταμόν, κατεστρατοπέδευσε προς τω στόματι του ποταμού καὶ τῆ θαλάττη.

37 Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παραδόξου τῆς περιπετείας αὐτοῖς φανείσης δυσθύμως καὶ δυσελπίστως εἶχον πάλιν· ἄρτι γὰρ ἀναθαρροῦντες ταῖς ψυχαῖς παρὰ 2 πόδας ἔπιπτον αὖθις ταῖς ἐλπίσιν. οὐ μὴν ἀφ-

2 ποοας επιπτον αυθις ταις ελπισιν. ου μην αφ-3 ίσταντο τοῦ ποιεῖν τὰ πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν. διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τῆς γερουσίας προχειρισάμενοι, καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὸν πρότερον μὲν ἀπελθόντα στρατηγὸν "Αννωνα, (τότε δ' ἐπαναγαγόντα) σὺν δὲ

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the town next Carthage and Hamilcar on the opposite side. Their next step was to take Spendius and the other prisoners up to the walls and crucify them there in the sight of all. Matho noticed that Hannibal was guilty of negligence and over-confidence, and attacking his camp, put many Carthaginians to the sword and drove them all out of the camp. All the baggage fell into the rebel's hands and they made Hannibal himself prisoner. Taking him at once to Spendius' cross they tortured him cruelly there, and then, taking Spendius down from the cross, they crucified Hannibal alive on it and slew round the body of Spendius thirty Carthaginians of the highest rank. Thus did Fortune, as if it were her design to compare them, give both the belligerents in turn cause and opportunity for inflicting on each other the cruellest punishments. Owing to the distance between the two camps it was some time before Hamiltar heard of the sortie and attack. and even then he was slow to give assistance owing to the difficult nature of the interjacent ground. He therefore broke up his camp before Tunis and on reaching the river Macaras, encamped at its mouth by the seaside.

87. The suddenness of this reverse took the Carthaginians by surprise, and they became again despondent and low-spirited. It was only the other day that their spirits had begun to revive; so they at once fell again. Yet they did not omit to take steps for their safety. They appointed a committee of thirty senators and dispatched them to Hamilcar accompanied by Hanno, the general who had previously retired from command, but now resumed it,



τούτοις τούς ύπολοίπους των έν ταις ήλικίαις καθοπλίσαντες, οδον έσχάτην τρέχοντες ταύτην, έξαπ-4 έστελλον πρός τον Βάρκαν, εντειλάμενοι πολλά τοις της γερουσίας κατά πάντα τρόπον διαλύσαι τούς στρατηγούς έκ της προγεγενημένης διαφοράς καὶ συμφρονείν σφας αναγκάσαι, βλέψαντας είς τὰ παρ-5 όντα των πραγμάτων. ων πολλούς και ποικίλους διαθεμένων λόγους, έπειδή συνήγαγον όμόσε τους στρατηγούς, ήναγκάσθησαν συγχωρείν καὶ πείθεσθαι τοις λεγομένοις οι περί τον "Αννωνα και τον 8 Βάρκαν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ήδη συμφρονήσαντες μιᾶ γνώμη πάντα κατὰ νοῦν ἔπραττον τοῖς Καρχηδο-γ νίοις, ὥστε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Μάθω, δυσχρηστουμένους έν τοις κατά μέρος κινδύνοις, πολλούς γάρ έποιήσαντο περί τε την Λέπτιν προσαγορευομένην καὶ τινας των ἄλλων πόλεων, τέλος ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ μάχης κρίνειν δρμησαι τὰ πράγματα, προθύμως έχόντων 8 πρός τοῦτο τὸ μέρος καὶ τῶν Καρχηδονίων. διόπερ άμφότεροι τοῦτο προθέμενοι παρεκάλουν μεν πάντας τούς συμμάχους πρός τον κίνδυνον, συνήγον δε τὰς φρουρὰς εκ τῶν πόλεων, ώς ᾶν μελλοντες 9 εκκυβεύειν ύπερ των όλων. επειδή δ' έκατέροις ήν τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἔτοιμα, παραταξάμενοι συν-10 έβαλον ἀλλήλοις ἐξ ὁμολόγου. γενομένου δὲ τοῦ νικήματος κατὰ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι των Λιβύων έν αὐτῷ τῷ κινδύνω διεφθάρησαν, οί δε πρός τινα πόλιν συμφυγόντες μετ' οὐ πολύ παρέδοσαν έαυτούς, ὁ δὲ Μάθως ὑποχείριος ἐγένετο τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ζωγρία.

18 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλὰ μέρη τῆς Λιβύης μετὰ τὴν 2 μάχην εὐθέως ὑπήκουσε τοῦς Καρχηδονίοις· ἡ δὲ τῶν Ἱππακριτῶν καὶ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων πόλις ἔμενον,

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and by all their remaining citizens of military age, whom they had armed as a sort of forlorn hope. They enjoined these commissioners to put an end by all means in their power to the two generals' longstanding quarrel, and to force them, in view of the circumstances, to be reconciled. The senators, after they had brought the generals together, pressed them with so many and varied arguments, that at length Hanno and Barcas were obliged to yield and do as they requested. After their reconciliation they were of one mind, and consequently everything went as well as the Carthaginians could wish. so that Matho, unsuccessful in the many partial engagements which took place around Leptis and some other cities, at length resolved to decide matters by a general battle, the Carthaginians being equally anxious for this. Both sides then, with this purpose, called on all their allies to join them for the battle and summoned in the garrisons from the towns, as if about to stake their all on the issue. When they were each ready to attack, they drew up their armies confronting each other and at a preconcerted signal closed. The Carthaginians gained the victory, most of the Libyans falling in the battle, while the rest escaped to a certain city and soon afterwards surrendered, but Matho himself was taken prisoner.

88. The rest of Libya at once submitted to Carthage after the battle, but Hippacritae and Utica

οὐδεμίαν ἀφορμὴν ἔχουσαι πρὸς διάλυσιν διὰ τὸ μη καταλείπεσθαι σφίσι τόπον έλέους μηδε συγγνώ-3 μης κατά τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολάς. οῦτως καὶ κατά ταύτας τὰς άμαρτίας μεγάλην ἔχει διαφορὰν ἡ μετριότης καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἀνήκεστον ἐπιτηδεύειν έκου-4 σίως. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ παραστρατοπεδεύσαντες ἡ μὲν "Αννων, ή δε Βάρκας, ταχέως ηνάγκασαν αὐτοὺς όμολογίας ποιήσασθαι καὶ διαλύσεις εὐδοκουμένας Καρχηδονίοις. 5 ΄΄Ο μέν οὖν Λιβυκὸς πόλεμος εἰς τοιαύτην ἀγαγων περίστασιν Καρχηδονίους τοιοῦτον έσχε τὸ τέλος, ώστε μη μόνον κυριεύσαι πάλιν της Λιβύης τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αἰτίους τῆς ἀποβ στάσεως τιμωρήσασθαι καταξίως το γαρπέρας άγαγόντες οἱ νέοι τὸν θρίαμβον διὰ τῆς πόλεως πᾶσαν 7 αἰκίαν ἐναπεδείξαντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω. μεν οὖν ἔτη καὶ τέτταράς που μῆνας ἐπολέμησαν οι μισθοφόροι πρός τους Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον ων ήμεις ισμεν ακοή μαθόντες πολύ τι τους άλλους 8 ωμότητι καὶ παρανομία διενηνοχότα. 'Ρωμαῖοι δὲ κατά τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς Σαρδόνος αὐτομολησάντων μισθοφόρων πρὸς σφᾶς ἐκκληθέντες επεβάλοντο πλείν έπι την προειρημένην νήσον. 9 των δέ Καρχηδονίων αγανακτούντων, ώς αύτοις καθηκούσης μάλλον της των Σαρδώων δυναστείας,

10 στήσαντας αὐτῶν τὴν νῆσον, λαβόμενοι τῆς ἀφορμης ταύτης οί 'Ρωμαΐοι πόλεμον εψηφίσαντο πρός τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, φάσκοντες αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἐπὶ Σαρδονίους, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σφᾶς ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παρα-11 σκευήν. οἱ δὲ παραδόξως διαπεφευγότες τὸν προ-

καὶ παρασκευαζομένων μεταπορεύεσθαι τοὺς ἀπο-

still held out, feeling they had no reasonable grounds to expect terms in view of their having been so proof to all considerations of mercy and humanity when they first rebelled. This shows us that even in such offences it is advantageous to be moderate and abstain from unpardonable excesses. However, Hanno besieging one town and Barcas the other soon compelled them to accept such terms and ransom as the Carthaginians thought fit to impose.

This Libyan war, that had brought Carthage into such peril, resulted not only in the Carthaginians regaining possession of Libya, but in their being able to inflict exemplary punishment on the authors of the rebellion. The last scene in it was a triumphal procession of the young men leading Matho through the town and inflicting on him all kinds of torture. This war had lasted for three years and four months, and it far excelled all wars we know of in cruelty and defiance of principle.

The Romans about the same time, on the invitation of the mercenaries who had deserted to them from Sardinia, undertook an expedition to that island. When the Carthaginians objected on the ground that the sovereignty of Sardinia was rather their own than Rome's, and began preparations for punishing those who were the cause of its revolt, the Romans made this the pretext of declaring war on them, alleging that the preparations were not against Sardinia, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, who had barely escaped destruction in this

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ειρημένον πόλεμον, κατά πάντα τρόπον ἀφυῶς διακείμενοι κατά τὸ παρὸν πρὸς τὸ πάλιν ἀναλαμβά12 νειν τὴν πρὸς 'Ρωμαίους ἀπέχθειαν, εἴξαντες τοῖς καιροῖς οὐ μόνον ἀπέστησαν τῆς Σαρδόνος, ἀλλὰ καὶ χίλια τάλαντα καὶ διακόσια προσέθηκαν τοῖς 'Ρωμαίοις, ἐφ' ῷ μὴ κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἀναδέξασθαι τὸν πόλεμον. ταῦτα μὲν οὕτως ἐπράχθη.

last war, were in every respect ill-fitted at this moment to resume hostilities with Rome. Yielding therefore to circumstances, they not only gave up Sardinia, but agreed to pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents to the Romans to avoid going to war for the present.

Έν μεν τῆ πρὸ ταύτης βύβλω διεσαφήσαμεν πότε 'Ρωμαΐοι συστησάμενοι τὰ κατὰ τὴν 'Ιταλίαν τοις εκτός εγχειρειν ήρξαντο πράγμασιν, έπι δε τούτοις πως είς Σικελίαν διέβησαν και δι' ας αιτίας τὸν περὶ τῆς προειρημένης νήσου συνεστήσαντο 2 πόλεμον πρός Καρχηδονίους, μετά δὲ ταῦτα πότε πρώτον συνίστασθαι ναυτικάς ήρξαντο δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον έκατέροις ἔως τοῦ τέλους, ἐν ῷ Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ἐξεχώρησαν πά-σης Σικελίας, 'Ρωμαῖοι δ' ἐπεκράτησαν τῆς ὅλης νήσου πλην των υφ' Ίέρωνα ταττομένων μερών. 3 έξης δε τούτοις επεβαλόμεθα λέγειν πως στασιάσαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τὸν προσαγορευθέντα Λιβυκον πόλεμον έξέκαυσαν, καὶ τὰ συμβάντα κατὰ τοῦτον ἀσεβήματα μέχρι τίνος προύβη καὶ τίνα διέξοδον ἔλαβε τὰ παράλογα τῶν έργων, έως τοῦ τέλους καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπι-4 κρατείας. νυνὶ δὲ τὰ συνεχῆ τούτοις πειρασόμεθα

5 Καρχηδόνιοι γὰρ ὡς θᾶττον κατεστήσαντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, εὐθέως 'Αμίλκαν ἐξαπέστελλον δυνάμεις συστήσαντες εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν 'Ιβηρίαν κα τὰ τὰν 'Ιβηρίαν κα τὰ τὰν ὑὰν κὰ στοατόπεδα καὶ τὰν υἰὰν

έξ άρχης πρόθεσιν.

δηλοῦν κεφαλαιωδώς εκάστων επιψαύοντες κατά την

6 τόπους. δ δ' ἀναλαβών τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ τον υίον 240

1. In the preceding book I stated in the first place at what date the Romans having subjected Italy began to concern themselves in enterprises outside the peninsula; next I narrated how they crossed to Sicily and what were their reasons for undertaking the war with Carthage for the possession of that island. After relating when and how they first built a navy, I pursued the history of the war until its end, at which the Carthaginians evacuated all Sicily, and the Romans acquired the whole island except Hiero's dominions. In the next place I set myself to describe how the mercenaries mutinied against Carthage and set ablaze the socalled Libyan war; I described all the terrible atrocities committed in this war, all its dramatic surprises, and their issues, until it ended in the final triumph of Carthage. I will now attempt to give a summary view, according to my original project, of the events immediately following.

The Carthaginians, as soon as they had set the 288 B.C. affairs of Libya in order, dispatched Hamilcar to Spain entrusting him with an adequate force. Taking with him his army and his son Hannibal now about

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'Αννίβαν, όντα τότε κατά την ηλικίαν ετών εννέα, καὶ διαβάς κατὰ τὰς Ἡρακλέους στήλας ἀνεκτᾶτο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. 7 διατρίψας δ' εν τοις τόποις τούτοις έτη σχεδον εννέα, καὶ πολλούς μέν πολέμω, πολλούς δὲ πειθοῖ ποιήσας 'Ιβήρων ύπηκόους Καρχηδόνι, κατέστρεψε 8 τον βίον άξίως των προγεγενημένων πράξεων. πρός γάρ τους ανδρωδεστάτους και μεγίστην δύναμιν έχοντας παραταττόμενος, καὶ χρώμενος τολμηρῶς καὶ παραβόλως έαυτῷ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κινδύνου και-9 ρόν, έρρωμένως τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε. τὴν δὲ στρατηγίαν οι Καρχηδόνιοι παρέδοσαν 'Ασδρούβα, τῶ 'κείνου κηδεστή καὶ τριηράρχω. 2 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους 'Ρωμαῖοι τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν είς την Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη της Ευρώπης επεβάλοντο ποιείσθαι μετά δυνάμεως. 2 απερ ου παρέργως, άλλα μετ' έπιστάσεως θεωρητέον τοις βουλομένοις άληθινώς τήν τε πρόθεσιν την ημετέραν συνθεάσασθαι και την αυξησιν και 3 κατασκευήν της 'Ρωμαίων δυναστείας. έγνωσαν δέ 4 διαβαίνειν διά τινας τοιαύτας αιτίας. "Αγρων ο των 'Ιλλυριών βασιλεύς ήν μεν υίος Πλευράτου, δύναμιν δε πεζην και ναυτικήν μεγίστην έσχε των προ 5 αὐτοῦ βεβασιλευκότων ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς. οδτος ὑπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φιλίππου πατρός πεισθείς χρήμασιν ύπέσχετο βοηθήσειν Μεδιωνίοις ύπ' Αιτωλών ποβ λιορκουμένοις. Αιτωλοί γάρ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμενοι πείσαι Μεδιωνίους μετέχειν σφίσι της αὐτης πολι-7 τείας, ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος έλεῖν αὐτούς. στρατεύσαντες οὖν πανδημεί, καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες αὐτῶν τὴν πόλιν, κατὰ τὸ συνεχές ἐπολιόρκουν, 8 πασαν βίαν προσφέροντες καὶ μηχανήν. συνάψαν-

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nine years of age, he crossed the straits of Gibraltar and applied himself to subjugating Spain to the Carthaginians. In this country he spent about nine 2288-229 years during which he reduced many Iberian tribes to obedience either by force of arms or by diplomacy, and finally met with an end worthy of his high achievements, dying bravely in a battle against one of the most warlike and powerful tribes, after freely exposing his person to danger on the field. The Carthaginians handed over the command of the army to Hasdrubal his son-in-law and chief naval officer.

2. It was at this period that the Romans first crossed with an army to Illyria and that part of Europe. This is a matter not to be lightly passed over, but deserving the serious attention of those who wish to gain a true view of the purpose of this work and of the formation and growth of the Roman dominion. The circumstances which decided them 238-282 to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria, B.C. was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V., had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging. The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force. Levying all their forces they encamped round the city and strictly besieged it, employing every forcible means and every device. The date

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τος δὲ τοῦ χρόνου τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων, καὶ δέον στρατηγὸν ἔτερον αἱρεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν πολιορκουμένων ἤδη κακῶς διακειμένων, καὶ δοκούντων ἀν' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἐνδώσειν ἐαυτούς, ὁ προϋπάρχων στρατηγὸς προσφέρει λόγον τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ πὸς κακοπαθείας καὶ τοὺς κυδύνους αὐτὸς ἀνοδέ-

9 γός προσφέρει λόγον τοις Αιτωλοις, φάσκων, ἐπειδὴ τὰς κακοπαθείας καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους αὐτὸς ἀναδέδεκται τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πολιορκίαν, δίκαιον είναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὰν κρατήσωσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἑαυτῷ συγχωρεισθαι.

10 τινῶν δέ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν, ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ παρακαλούντων τὰ πλήθη μὴ προδιαλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἀκέραιον ἐᾶν, ῷ ποτ' ᾶν ἡ τύχη βουληθῆ περι-

11 θείναι τοῦτον τὸν στέφανον, ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς, δς αν ἐπικατασταθείς στρατηγὸς κρατήση τῆς πόλεως, κοινὴν ποιεῖν τῷ προϋπάρχοντι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων.

3 Δεδογμένων δὲ τούτων, καὶ δέον τῆ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρα γενέσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τὴν παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς, προσπλέουσι τῆς νυκτὸς ἐκατὸν λέμβοι πρὸς τὴν Μεδιωνίαν, κατὰ τοὺς ἔγγιστα τόπους τῆς πόλεως, ἐφ' ὧν ἦσαν Ἰλ-

2 λυριοί πεντακισχίλιοι. καθορμισθέντες δέ, καὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἐπιγενομένης ἐνεργὸν καὶ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενοι τὴν ἀπόβασιν, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῆ παρ' αὐτοῦς εἰθισμένη τάξει, προῆγον κατὰ σπείρας ἐπὶ τὴν 3 τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατοπεδείαν. οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοί, συν-

3 τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατοπεδείαν. οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοί, συνέντες τὸ γινόμενον, ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ παραδόξῳ καὶ τῆ
τόλμη τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν ἦσαν ἐκπλαγεῖς· πεφρονηματισμένοι δ' ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου, καὶ καταπιστεύσαντες ταῖς ἰδίαις δυνάμεσι, κατὰ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς εἶ-

4 χον. το μέν οὖν πολύ μέρος τῶν ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν 944



of the annual elections was now at hand, and they had to choose another Strategus. As the besieged were in the utmost extremity and were expected to surrender every day, the actual Strategus addressed the Aetolians, maintaining that as it was he who had supported the dangers and hardships of the siege, it was only just, that, on the town falling, he should have the privilege of dealing with the booty and inscribing with his name the shields dedicated in memory of the victory. Some, more especially the candidates for the office, disputed this, and begged the people not to decide the matter in advance, but leave it, as things stood, to Fortune to determine to whom she should award this prize. The Aetolians hereupon passed a resolution, that if it was the new Strategus whoever he might be, to whom the city fell, he should share with the present one the disposition of the booty and the honour of inscribing the shields.

3. This decree had been passed, and next day the election was to be held, and the new Strategus was to enter at once into office, as is the practice of the Aetolians, when that night a hundred boats containing a force of five thousand Illyrians arrived at the nearest point on the coast to Medion. Anchoring there they landed, as soon as it was daylight, with promptitude and secrecy, and forming in the order customary in Illyria, advanced by companies on the Aetolian camp. The Aetolians, on becoming aware of it, were taken aback by the unexpected nature and boldness of the attack, but having for many years ranked very high in their own estimation and relying on their strength, they were more or less confident. Stationing the greater part of their

ίππέων αὐτοῦ πρὸ τῆς στρατοπεδείας ἐν τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρενέβαλλον, μέρει δέ τινι της ίππου καὶ τοις εὐζώνοις τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους καὶ πρὸ τοῦ γάρακος εὐφυῶς κειμένους τόπους προκατελάμβανον. 5 οί δ' Ίλλυριοί τους μέν έλαφρους έξ έφόδου προσπεσόντες τῶ τε πλήθει καὶ τῷ βάρει τῆς συντάξεως έξέωσαν, τους δε μετά τούτων ίππεις συγκινδυνεύοντας ηνάγκασαν αποχωρήσαι πρός τὰ βαρέα των β οπλων. λοιπον εξ ύπερδεξίου ποιούμενοι την εφοδον επί τους εν τῶ πεδίω τεταγμένους, ταχέως ετρέψαντο, συνεπιθεμένων τοις Αιτωλοις αμα και των 7 Μεδιωνίων εκ της πόλεως. και πολλούς μεν αὐτων απέκτειναν, έτι δε πλείους αιχμαλώτους έλαβον των δ' ὅπλων καὶ τῆς ἀποσκευῆς ἐγένοντο 8 πάσης έγκρατείς. οί μεν οὖν Ἰλλυριοί πράξαντες τὸ συνταχθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, καὶ διακομίσαν-τες τὴν ἀποσκευὴν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὠφέλειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς λέμβους εὐθέως ἀνήγοντο, ποιούμενοι τὸν 4 πλοῦν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. οἱ δὲ Μεδιώνιοι τετευχότες άνελπίστου σωτηρίας, άθροισθέντες είς την έκκλησίαν εβουλεύοντο περί τε των άλλων καὶ περὶ τῆς 2 των οπλων επιγραφής. έδοξεν οθν αθτοίς κοινήν ποιήσειν την επιγραφην από τε τοῦ την αρχην τῶν Αιτωλών έχοντος και τών είς το μέλλον προπορευ-3 ομένων κατά τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δόγμα, τῆς τύχης ώσπερ επίτηδες και τοις άλλοις ανθρώποις επί των έκείνοις συμβαινόντων ένδεικνυμένης την αύτης δύ-4 ναμιν. ἃ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν αὐτοὶ προσεδόκων οσον ήδη πείσεσθαι, ταθτα πράττειν αθτοις εκείνοις παρέδωκεν έν πάνυ βραχεί χρόνω κατά των 5 πολεμίων. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ τῆ παραδόξω χρησάμενοι συμφορῷ πάντας ἐδίδαξαν μηδέποτε βουλεύεσθαι 246

hoplites and cavalry on the level ground just in front of their lines, they occupied with a portion of their cavalry and their light-armed infantry certain favourable positions on the heights in front of the camp. The Illyrians, charging the light infantry, drove them from their positions by their superior force and the weight of their formation, compelling the supporting body of cavalry to fall back on the heavyarmed troops. After this, having the advantage of attacking the latter, who were drawn up on the plain, from higher ground, they speedily put them to flight, the Medionians also joining in the attack from the city. They killed many Aetolians and took a still larger number of prisoners, capturing all their arms and baggage. The Illyrians, having thus executed the orders of their king, carried off to their boats the baggage and other booty and at once set sail for home. 4. The Medionians, thus unexpectedly saved, met in assembly and discussed, among other matters, that of the proper inscription for the shields. They decided, in parody of the Aetolian decree, to inscribe them as won from and not by the present Aetolian chief magistrate and the candidates for next year's office. It seemed as if what had befallen this people was designed by Fortune to display her might to men in general. For in so brief a space of time she put it in their power to do to the enemy the very thing which they thought the enemy were just on the point of doing to themselves. The unlooked-for calamity of the Aetolians was a lesson to mankind never to

περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ὡς ἤδη γεγονότος, μηδὲ προκατελπίζειν βεβαιουμένους ὑπὲρ ὧν ἀκμὴν ἐνδεχόμενόν ἐστιν ἄλλως γενέσθαι, νέμειν δὲ μερίδα τῷ παραδόξῳ πανταχῆ μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὅντας, μάλιστα

παραδόξω πανταχή μεν ανθρώπους όντας, μάλιστα δ' έν τοις πολεμικοις. 6 'Ο δε βασιλεύς "Αγρων, επεί κατέπλευσαν οί λέμβοι, διακούσας των ήγεμόνων τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον, καὶ περιχαρής γενόμενος ἐπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν Αἰτω-λοὺς τοὺς μέγιστον ἔχοντας τὸ φρόνημα νενικηκέ-ναι, πρὸς μέθας καί τινας τοιαύτας ἄλλας εὐωχίας τραπείς ενέπεσεν είς πλευρίτιν εκ δε ταύτης εν 7 ολίγαις ήμέραις μετήλλαξε τον βίον. την δε βασιλείαν ή γυνη Τεύτα διαδεξαμένη τὸν κατά μέρος χειρισμόν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐποιεῖτο διὰ τῆς τῶν 8 φίλων πίστεως. χρωμένη δε λογισμοῖς γυναικείοις, καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς εὐτύχημα μόνον ἀποβλέπουσα, των δ' έκτος ουδέν περισκεπτομένη, πρώτον μέν συνεχώρησε τοῖς κατ' ίδιαν πλέουσι 9 λήζεσθαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας, δεύτερον δ' άθροίσασα στόλον καὶ δύναμιν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῆς πρότερον ἐξέπεμψε, πασαν γην αποδείξασα πολεμίαν τοις ήγου-5 μένοις. οί δ' έξαποσταλέντες την μεν πρώτην έπιβολήν έσχον έπὶ τὴν 'Ηλείαν καὶ τὴν Μεσσηνίαν. ταύτας γάρ ἀεὶ τὰς χώρας Ἰλλυριοὶ πορθοῦντες δι-2 ετέλουν. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ

2 ετέλουν. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μῆκος τῆς παραλίας καὶ διὰ τὸ μεσογαίους εἶναι τὰς δυναστευούσας εἰναι τὰς δυναστευούσας εἰναι τὰς πόλεις μακραὶ καὶ βραδεῖαι λίαν εἰνινοντο τοῖς προειρημένοις αἱ παραβοήθειαι πρὸς τὰς ἀποβάσεις τῶν
Ἰλλυριῶν ὅθεν ἀδεῶς ἐπέτρεχον καὶ κατέσυρον ἀεὶ
3 ταύτας τὰς χώρας. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τότε γενόμενοι τῆς Ἡπείρου κατὰ Φοινίκην προσέσχον επισιτισμοῦ
4 χάριν. συμμίζαντες δὲ τῶν Γαλατῶν τισιν, οἶ
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discuss the future as if it were the present, or to have any confident hope about things that may still turn out quite otherwise. We are but men, and should in every matter assign its share to the unexpected,

this being especially true of war.

King Agron, when the flotilla returned and his officers gave him an account of the battle, was so overjoyed at the thought of having beaten the Aetolians, then the proudest of peoples, that he took to carousals and other convivial excesses, from which he fell into a pleurisy that ended fatally in a few days. He was succeeded on the throne by his wife Teuta, who left the details of administration to friends on whom she relied. As, with a woman's 231 R.C. natural shortness of view, she could see nothing but the recent success and had no eyes for what was going on elsewhere, she in the first place gave letters of marque to privateers to pillage any ships they met, and next she collected a fleet and a force of troops as large as the former one and sent it out, ordering the commanders to treat all countries alike as belonging to their enemies. 5. The expedition began by making a descent on Elis and Messenia, lands which the Illyrians had always been in 230 B.C. the habit of pillaging, because, owing to the extent of their sea-board and owing to the principal cities being in the interior, help against their raids was distant and slow in arriving; so that they could always overrun and plunder those countries unmolested. On this occasion, however, they put in at Phoenice in Epirus for the purpose of provisioning themselves. There they fell in with certain Gaulish soldiers, about eight hundred

μισθοφοροῦντες παρά τοῖς Ἡπειρώταις διέτριβον ἐν τη Φοινίκη, τὸ πληθος όντες εἰς ὀκτακοσίους, καὶ κοινολογηθέντες τούτοις περί προδοσίας τῆς πόλεως εξέβησαν, συγκαταθεμένων σφίσι τῶν προειρημένων, καὶ τῆς πόλεως έξ ἐφόδου καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῆ κύριοι κατέστησαν, συνεργησάντων έσωθεν αὐτοῖς 5 τῶν Γαλατῶν. οἱ δ' Ἡπειρῶται πυθόμενοι τὸ γεγονός έβοήθουν πανδημεὶ μετά σπουδής. παραγενόμενοι δε προς την Φοινίκην, και προβαλόμενοι τον παρά την πόλιν ρέοντα ποταμόν, εστρατοπέδευσαν, της έπ' αὐτῷ γεφύρας ἀνασπάσαντες τὰς σα-6 νίδας ἀσφαλείας χάριν. προσαγγελθέντος δ' αὐτοῖς Σκερδιλαίδαν έχοντα πεντακισχιλίους 'Ιλλυριούς παραγίνεσθαι κατά γην διά των παρ' 'Αντιγόνειαν στενων, μερίσαντες αύτων τινας έξαπέστειλαν παραφυλάξοντας την 'Αντιγόνειαν αὐτοὶ δὲ τά τε λοιπά ραθύμως διηγον, απολαύοντες των έκ της χώρας ἀνέδην, τῶν τε κατὰ τὰς φυλακὰς καὶ προκοι-7 τίας ωλιγώρουν. οί δ' Ίλλυριοί συνέντες τον μερισμον αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν ράθυμίαν, ἐκπορεύονται νυκτός καὶ τῆ γεφύρα σανίδας ἐπιβαλόντες τόν τε ποταμόν ἀσφαλῶς διέβησαν καὶ λαβόντες ὀχυρὸν 8 τόπον έμειναν τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς νυκτός. ἐπιγενομένης δε της ημέρας καὶ παραταξαμένων άμφοτέρων πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, συνέβη λειφθῆναι τοὺς 'Ηπειρώτας, καὶ πολλούς μὲν αὐτῶν πεσεῖν, ἔτι δὲ πλείους άλωναι, τους δε λοιπους διαφυγείν ως επ' 'Ατιντάνων.

6 Οὖτοι μὲν οὖν τοιούτοις περιπεσόντες ἀτυχήμασι, καὶ πάσας ἀπολέσαντες τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας, ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἔθνος, δεόμενοι μεθ᾽ ἰκετηρίας σφίσι βοη-250

in number, at present in the employ of the Epirots. They approached these Gauls with a proposal for the betrayal of the city, and on their agreeing, they landed and captured the town and its inhabitants by assault with the help from within of the Gauls. When the Epirots learnt of this they hastened to come to help with their whole force. On reaching Phoenice they encamped with the river that runs past the town on their front, removing the planking of the bridge so as to be in safety. On news reaching them that Scerdilaïdas with five thousand Illyrians was approaching by land through the pass near Antigonia, they detached a portion of their force to guard Antigonia, but they themselves henceforth remained at their ease, faring plenteously on the produce of the country, and quite neglecting night and day watches. The Illyrians, learning of the partition of the Epirot force and of their general remissness, made a night sortie, and replacing the planks of the bridge, crossed the river in safety and occupied a strong position where they remained for the rest of the night. When day broke, both armies drew up their forces in front of the town and engaged. The battle resulted in the defeat of the Epirots, many of whom were killed and still more taken prisoners, the rest escaping in the direction of Atintania.

6. The Epirots, having met with this misfortune and lost all hope in themselves, sent embassies to the Aetolians and to the Achaean league imploring their

2 θεῖν. οἱ δὲ κατελεήσαντες τὰς συμφορὰς αὐτῶν ὑπήκουσαν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα παραβοηθοῦντες ἦκον

3 είς Ελίκρανον. οί δε την Φοινίκην κατασχόντες, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον παραγενόμενοι μετὰ Σκερδιλαίδου πρός τὸ χωρίον παρεστρατοπέδευσαν τοῖς βεβοη-

4 θηκόσι, βουλόμενοι συμβαλείν. δυσχρηστούμενοι δὲ διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας τῶν τόπων, ἄμα δὲ καὶ προσπεσόντων παρά της Τεύτας γραμμάτων, δι' ὧν ὤετο δείν αὐτοὺς τὴν ταχίστην εἰς οἶκον ἀναχωρείν διὰ τὸ τινὰς τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν ἀφεστηκέναι πρὸς τοὺς Δαρ-

δ δανεις, ούτω λεηλατήσαντες την "Ηπειρον άνοχας 6 εποιήσαντο προς τους 'Ηπειρώτας. εν αις τα μεν έλεύθερα σώματα καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀπολυτρώσαντες αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ δουλικὰ καὶ τὴν λοιπὴν σκευὴν ἀναλαβόντες είς τους λέμβους, οι μεν απέπλευσαν, οι δέ περί τον Σκερδιλαίδαν πεζή πάλιν άνεχώρησαν

7 διὰ τῶν παρὰ τὴν ᾿Αντιγόνειαν στενῶν, οὐ μικρὰν οὐδὲ τὴν τυχοῦσαν κατάπληξιν καὶ φόβον ἐνεργασάμενοι τοις τάς παραλίας οικούσι των Ελλήνων.

8 έκαστοι γὰρ θεωροῦντες τὴν ὀχυρωτάτην ἄμα καὶ δυνατωτάτην πόλιν τῶν ἐν Ἡπείρῳ παραλόγως ούτως έξηνδραποδισμένην, οὐκέτι περί τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ήγωνίων, καθάπερ έν τοις έμπροσθεν χρόνοις, άλλα περί σφων αὐτων και των πόλεων.

Οί δ' 'Ηπειρώται παραδόξως διασεσωσμένοι, τοσοῦτον ἀπεῖχον τοῦ πειράζειν ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς ἡδικηκότας η χάριν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς βοηθήσασιν, ώστε τουναντίον διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρός την Τεύταν συμμαχίαν έθεντο μετ' 'Ακαρνάνων προς τους 'Ιλ-

10 λυριούς, καθ' ην έκείνοις μέν κατά τους έξης καιρούς συνήργουν, τοις δ' 'Αχαιοις και τοις Αίτωλοις 11 αντέπραττον. Εξ ων εγένοντο καταφανεις ακρίτως

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Both leagues took pity on their situation and consented, and shortly afterwards this relieving force reached Helicranum. The Illyrians in Phoenice at first united with Scerdilaïdas, and advancing to Helicranum encamped opposite the Achaeans and Aetolians, and were anxious to give battle. But the ground was very difficult and unfavourable to them, and just at this time a dispatch came from Teuta ordering them to return home by the quickest route, as some of the Illyrians had revolted to the Dar-They therefore, after plundering Epirus, made a truce with the Epirots. By the terms of this they gave up to them the city and its free population on payment of a ransom; the slaves and other goods and chattels they put on board their boats, and while the one force sailed off home, Scerdilaïdas marched back through the pass near Antigonia. caused the Greek inhabitants of the coast no little consternation and alarm; for, seeing the most strongly situated and most powerful town in Epirus thus suddenly taken and its population enslaved, they began to be anxious not, as in former times, for their agricultural produce, but for the safety of themselves and their cities.

The Epirots, thus unexpectedly saved, were so far from attempting to retaliate on the wrongdoers or from thanking those who had come to their relief, that, on the contrary, they sent an embassy to Teuta, and together with the Acarnanians entered into an alliance with Illyria, engaging in future to co-operate with the Illyrians and work against the Achaeans and Actolians. Their whole conduct showed them

μέν κεχρημένοι τότε τοῖς εὐεργέταις, ἀφρόνως δ' έξ ἀρχῆς βεβουλευμένοι περὶ τῶν καθ' αύτοὺς πραγ-7 μάτων. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους ὅντας παραλόγως περιπεσείν τινι των δεινών ου των παθόντων, της 2 τύχης δὲ καὶ τῶν πραξάντων ἐστὶν ἔγκλημα, τὸ δ' άκριτως καὶ προφανώς περιβαλεῖν αύτους ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραίς δμολογούμενον έστι των πασχόν-3 των άμάρτημα. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τύχης πταίουσιν έλεος έπεται μετά συγγνώμης κάπικουρία, τοῖς δε διά την αυτών άβουλίαν ονειδος κάπιτίμησις 4 συνεξακολουθεί παρά τοίς εὖ φρονοῦσιν. ἃ δὴ καὶ τότε παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων εἰκότως αν τοῖς 5 'Ηπειρώταις άπηντήθη. πρώτον γάρ τίς οὐκ ἂν την κοινην περί Γαλατών φήμην ύπιδόμενος εύλαβηθείη τούτοις εγχειρίσαι πόλιν εὐδαίμονα καὶ πολβ λας αφορμάς έχουσαν είς παρασπόνδησιν; δεύτερον τίς οὐκ αν ἐφυλάξατο τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συστήματος έκείνου προαίρεσιν; οί γε την μεν άρχην εξέπεσον έκ της ίδίας, συνδραμόντων έπ' αὐτούς τῶν όμοεθνών, διά τὸ παρασπονδήσαι τοὺς αὐτών οἰκείους 7 καὶ συγγενεῖς ύποδεξαμένων γε μὴν αὐτοὺς Καρχηδονίων δια το κατεπείγεσθαι πολέμω, το μέν πρώτον γενομένης τινός άντιρρήσεως τοίς στρατιώταις πρός τούς στρατηγούς ύπερ όψωνίων εξ αυτής επεβάλοντο διαρπάζειν την των 'Ακραγαντίνων πόλιν, φυλακής χάριν είσαχθέντες είς αὐτήν, όντες τότε 8 πλείους τῶν τρισχιλίων μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα παρεισαγαγόντων αὐτοὺς πάλιν εἰς "Ερυκα τῆς αὐτῆς χρείας ένεκεν, πολιορκούντων την πόλιν 'Ρωμαίων, έπεχείρησαν μεν καὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς συμπολιορ-9 κουμένους προδοῦναι της δὲ πράξεως ταύτης ἀπο-



not only to have acted now towards their benefactors without judgement, but to have blundered from the outset in the management of their own affairs. 7. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him: but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and And in this case the Greeks would reproach them. have been amply justified in their censure of the To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betraved their own friends and Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then about three thousand strong. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company, and when this plan fell through, they deserted to



τυχόντες ηὐτομόλησαν πρός τοὺς πολεμίους παρ' οίς πιστευθέντες πάλιν εσύλησαν το της 'Αφροδί-10 της της Έρυκίνης ίερον. διὸ σαφώς ἐπεγνωκότες 'Ρωμαΐοι την ασέβειαν αὐτῶν, αμα τῷ διαλύσασθαι τον προς Καρχηδονίους πόλεμον ουδέν εποιήσαντο προυργιαίτερον τοῦ παροπλίσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς πλοῖα καὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας πάσης ἐξορίστους κατα-11 στήσαι. οθς 'Ηπειρώται τής δημοκρατίας καὶ τών νόμων φύλακας ποιησάμενοι, και την εὐδαιμονεστάτην πόλιν εγχειρίσαντες, πως οὐκ αν εἰκότως

φανείησαν αὐτοὶ τών συμπτωμάτων αύτοις αἴτιοι γεγονότες: Περὶ μέν οὖν τῆς Ἡπειρωτῶν ἀγνοίας, καὶ περὶ τοῦ μηδέποτε δεῖν τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας ἰσχυροτέραν εἰσάνεσθαι φυλακὴν ἄλλως τε καὶ βαρβάρων, ἐπὶ 8 τοσοῦτον ἔκρινον ποιήσασθαι μνήμην. οί δ' Ἰλλυριοί καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνωτέρω μέν χρόνους συνεχῶς 2 ἠδίκουν τοὺς πλοϊζομένους ἀπ' Ἰταλίας· καθ' οὖς δέ καιρούς περί την Φοινίκην διέτριβον, καὶ πλείους ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου χωριζόμενοι πολλούς τῶν Ἰτα-λικῶν ἐμπόρων ἔσθ' ους μεν ἐσύλησαν, ους δ' ἀπέσφαξαν, οὐκ ὀλίγους δὲ καὶ ζωγρία τῶν ἀλισκο-3 μένων ανηγον. οι δε 'Ρωμαίοι, παρακούοντες τον πρό τοῦ χρόνον τῶν ἐγκαλούντων τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς. τότε και πλειόνων επελθόντων επί την σύγκλητον, κατέστησαν πρεσβευτάς είς την Ἰλλυρίδα τους επίσκεψιν ποιησομένους περί τῶν προειρημένων Γάιον 4 καὶ Λεύκιον Κορογκανίους. ή δὲ Τεύτα, καταπλευ-

σάντων προς αὐτην των έκ της Ήπείρου λέμβων, καταπλαγείσα τὸ πληθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος της ἀγομένης κατασκευής πολύ γάρ ή Φοινίκη διέφερε τότε των κατά την "Ηπειρον πόλεων εὐδαιμονία διπλα-256



the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their laws and liberties and to whom they entrusted their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?

I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians. 8. To return to the For a long time previously they had been in the habit of maltreating vessels sailing from Italy, and now while they were at Phoenice, a number of them detached themselves from the fleet and robbed or killed many Italian traders, capturing and carrying off no small number of prisoners. The Romans had hitherto turned a deaf ear to the complaints made against the Illyrians, but now when a number of persons approached the Senate on the 230 B.C. subject, they appointed two envoys, Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to proceed to Illyria, and investigate the Teuta, on the return of the flotilla from matter. Epirus, was so struck with admiration by the quantity and beauty of the spoils they brought back (Phoenice being then far the wealthiest city there), that she

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σίως ἐπερρώσθη πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀδικίαν. ου μην άλλα τότε μεν επέσχε δια τας εγχωρίους ταραγάς, καταστησαμένη δε ταγέως τὰ κατὰ τούς αποστάντας 'Ιλλυριούς επολιόρκει την "Ισσαν β διὰ τὸ ταύτην ἔτι μόνον ἀπειθεῖν αὐτῆ. κατὰ δὲ τον καιρον τοῦτον κατέπλευσαν οι τῶν Ῥωμαίων πρέσβεις και δοθέντος αὐτοῖς καιροῦ πρὸς ἔντευξιν διελέγοντο περί των είς αὐτούς γεγονότων άδιτ κημάτων. ή δὲ Τεύτα καθόλου μὲν παρ' όλην τὴν κοινολογίαν άγερώχως και λίαν ὑπερηφάνως αὐτῶν ε διήκουε. καταπαυσάντων δε τον λόγον, κοινή μεν έφη πειρασθαι φροντίζειν ίνα μηδεν αδίκημα γίνηται 'Ρωμαίοις έξ 'Ιλλυριών ιδία γε μήν ου νόμιμον είναι τοις βασιλεύσι κωλύειν Ἰλλυριοις τὰς κατὰ ο θάλατταν ώφελείας. ὁ δὲ νεώτερος τῶν πρεσβευτων, δυσχεράνας έπὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, έχρήσατο παρρησία καθηκούση μέν, οὐδαμῶς δὲ πρὸς καιρόν. 10 είπε γὰρ ὅτι Ῥωμαίοις μέν, ὡ Τεύτα, κάλλιστον έθος έστὶ τὰ κατ' ιδίαν άδικήματα κοινή μετα-11 πορεύεσθαι καὶ βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. πειρασόμεθα δή θεοῦ βουλομένου σφόδρα καὶ ταχέως άναγκάσαι σε τὰ βασιλικὰ νόμιμα διορθώσασθαι πρὸς 12 Ἰλλυριούς. ή δε γυναικοθύμως κάλογίστως δεξαμένη την παρρησίαν, έπὶ τοσοῦτον έξωργίσθη πρὸς τὸ ρηθεν ως ολιγωρήσασα τῶν παρ ἀνθρώποις ώρισμένων δικαίων αποπλέουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπαποστεῖλαί τινας τον παρρησιασάμενον των πρέσβεων άπο-13 κτείναι. προσπεσόντος δε του γεγονότος είς την 'Ρώμην, διοργισθέντες ἐπὶ τῆ παρανομία τῆς γ**υναι**κὸς εὐθέως περὶ παρασκευὴν ἐγίνοντο, καὶ στρατώ πεδα κατέγραφον και στόλον συνήθροιζον.

was twice as eager as before to molest the Greeks. For the present, however, she had to defer her projects owing to the disturbance in her own dominions: she had speedily put down the revolt elsewhere, but was engaged in besieging Issa, which alone still refused to submit to her, when the Roman ambassadors arrived. Audience having been granted them, they began to speak of the outrages committed against them. Teuta, during the whole interview, listened to them in a most arrogant and overbearing manner, and when they had finished speaking, she said she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong from Illyria, but that, as for private wrongs, it was contrary to the custom of the Illyrian kings to hinder their subjects from winning booty from the sea. The younger of the ambassadors was very indignant at these words of hers, and spoke out with a frankness most proper indeed, but highly inopportune: "O Teuta," he said, "the Romans have an admirable custom, which is to punish publicly the doers of private wrongs and publicly come to the help of the wronged. Be sure that we will try, God willing, by might and main and right soon, to force thee to mend the custom toward the Illyrians of their kings." Giving way to her temper like a woman and heedless of the consequences, she took this frankness ill, and was so enraged at the speech that, defying the law of nations, when the ambassadors left in their ship, she sent emissaries to assassinate the one who had been so bold of speech. On the news reaching Rome, the outrage created great indignation and they at once set themselves to prepare for an expedition, enrolling legions and getting a fleet together.

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9 'Η δὲ Τεύτα, τῆς ὥρας ἐπιγενομένης, ἐπισκευάσασα λέμβους πλείους τῶν πρότερον εξαπέστειλε 2 πάλιν είς τούς κατά την Ελλάδα τόπους. ών οί μεν διά πόρου τον πλούν επί την Κερκυραν εποιοῦντο, μέρος δέ τι προσέσχε τὸν τῶν Ἐπιδαμνίων λιμένα, λόγω μεν ύδρείας κάπισιτισμοῦ χάριν, έργω 3 δ' ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ πράξεως ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν. τῶν δ' Έπιδαμνίων ἀκάκως ἄμα καὶ ραθύμως αὐτοὺς παραδεξαμένων, είσελθόντες εν αυτοίς τοίς περιζώμασιν ώς ύδρευσόμενοι, μαχαίρας έχοντες έν τοις κεραμίοις, ούτως κατασφάξαντες τους φυλάττοντας την πύλην ταχέως έγκρατείς έγένοντο τοῦ πυλώνος. 4 επιγενομένης δε κατά το συντεταγμένον ενεργώς της από των πλοίων βοηθείας, παραδεξάμενοι τού-**5 τους ραδίως κατείγον τὰ πλείστα τῶν τειγῶν. τῶν** δ' έκ της πόλεως απαρασκεύως μέν δια το παράδοξον, εκθύμως δε βοηθούντων καὶ διαγωνιζομένων, συνέβη τους 'Ιλλυριούς έπι πολύν χρόνον αντιποιηη σαμένους τέλος έκπεσειν έκ της πόλεως. δάμνιοι μεν οὖν εν ταύτη τῆ πράξει διὰ μεν τὴν ολιγωρίαν εκινδύνευσαν αποβαλείν την πατρίδα, δια δε την ευψυχίαν αβλαβως επαιδεύθησαν πρός τό η μέλλον. τῶν δ΄ Ιλλυριῶν οἱ προεστῶτες κατὰ σπουό δην ἀναχθέντες, καὶ συνάψαντες τοῖς προπλέουσι, κατήραν είς την Κέρκυραν και ποιησάμενοι καταπληκτικήν τήν ἀπόβασιν ἐνεχείρησαν πολιορκεῖν τήν 8 πόλιν. ών συμβαινόντων οι Κερκυραίοι, δυσχρηστούμενοι και δυσελπίστως διακείμενοι τοις όλοις, έπρεσβεύοντο πρός τε τους 'Αχαιους και τους Αίτωλούς, αμα δε τούτοις 'Απολλωνιαται καὶ 'Επιδάμνιοι, δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν κατὰ σπουδήν καὶ μή περιίδειν σφας αὐτούς αναστάτους γενομένους ὑπὸ 260



9. Teuta, when the season came, fitted out a 229 B.C. larger number of boats than before and dispatched them to the Greek coasts. Some of them sailed through the strait to Corcyra, while a part put in to the harbour of Epidamnus, professedly to water and provision, but really with the design of surprising and seizing the town. They were received by the Epidamnians without any suspicion or concern, and landing as if for the purpose of watering, lightly clad but with swords concealed in the water-jars. they cut down the guards of the gate and at once possessed themselves of the gate-tower. A force from the ships was quickly on the spot, as had been arranged, and thus reinforced, they easily occupied the greater part of the walls. The citizens were taken by surprise and quite unprepared, but they rushed to arms and fought with great gallantry, the result being that the Illyrians, after considerable resistance, were driven out of the town. Thus the Epidamnians on this occasion came very near losing their native town by their negligence, but through their courage escaped with a salutary lesson for the future. The Illyrian commanders hastened to get under weigh and catching up the rest of their flotilla bore down on Corcyra. There they landed, to the consternation of the inhabitants, and laid siege to the city. Upon this the Corcyreans, in the utmost distress and despondency, sent, together with the peoples of Apollonia and Epidamnus, envoys to the Achaeans and Aetolians, imploring them to hasten to their relief and not allow them to be driven from

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9 τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν. οἱ δὲ διακούσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων, καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους, ἐπλήρωσαν κοινή τὰς τῶν 'Αγαιῶν δέκα ναθς καταφράκτους, καταρτίσαντες δ' έν ολίγαις ήμέραις έπλεον έπὶ της Κερ-10 κύρας, έλπίζοντες λύσειν την πολιορκίαν. οί δ' 'Ιλλυριοί, συμπαραλαβόντες 'Ακαρνάνων ναθς κατά την συμμαχίαν ούσας έπτα καταφράκτους, άνταναχθέντες συνέβαλον τοις των 'Αχαιων σκάφεσι περί 2 τους καλουμένους Παξούς. οι μέν ουν 'Ακαρνωνες καὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαϊκῶν νεῶν αἱ κατὰ τούτους ταχθεῖσαι πάρισον ἐποίουν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ διέμενον ἀκέραιοι κατά τὰς συμπλοκὰς πλην τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς τοὺς 3 ἄνδρας γινομένων τραυμάτων. οι δ' Ἰλλυριοί ζεύξαντες τοὺς παρ' αὐτῶν λέμβους ἀνὰ τέτταρας συνεπλέκοντο τοις πολεμίοις. και των μεν ιδίων ωλιγώρουν, καὶ παραβάλλοντες πλαγίους συνήργουν 4 ταις εμβολαις των υπεναντίων. ότε δε τρώσαντα καὶ δεθέντα κατὰ τὰς ἐμβολὰς δυσχρήστως (διέκειτο πρὸς τὸ παρὸν) τὰ τῶν ἀντιπάλων σκάφη, προσκρεμαμένων αὐτοῖς περὶ τοὺς ἐμβόλους τῶν ἐζευνμένων λέμβων, τότ' ἐπιπηδῶντες ἐπὶ τὰ καταστρώματα τῶν 'Αχαϊκῶν νεῶν κατεκράτουν διὰ τὸ πλη-5 θος τῶν ἐπιβατῶν. καὶ τούτω τῶ τρόπω τεττάρων μεν πλοίων εκυρίευσαν τετρηρικών, μίαν δε πεν-τήρη σὺν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνδράσιν εβύθισαν, εφ' ῆς έπλει Μάργος ὁ Καρυνεύς, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῷ κοινῷ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέγρι β της καταστροφής. οί δὲ πρὸς τοὺς 'Ακαρνανας δίαγωνιζόμενοι, συνιδόντες το κατά τους Ίλλυριους προτέρημα, καὶ πιστεύοντες τῷ ταχυναυτεῖν, ἐπουρώσαντες ἀσφαλῶς τὴν ἀποχώρησιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν η ἐποιήσαντο. τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν πληθος, φρονη-262

their homes by the Illyrians. The two Leagues, after listening to the envoys, consented to their request, and both joined in manning the ten decked ships belonging to the Achaeans. In a few days they were ready for sea and sailed for Corcyra in the hope of raising the siege. 10. The Illyrians, now reinforced by seven decked ships sent by the Acarnanians in compliance with the terms of their treaty, put to sea and encountered the Achaean ships off the island of The Acarnanians and those Achaean ships which were told off to engage them fought with no advantage on either side, remaining undamaged in their encounter except for the wounds inflicted on some of the crew. The Illyrians lashed their boats together in batches of four and thus engaged the enemy. They sacrificed their own boats, presenting them broadside to their adversaries in a position favouring their charge, but when the enemy's ships had charged and struck them and getting fixed in them, found themselves in difficulties, as in each case the four boats lashed together were hanging on to their beaks, they leapt on to the decks of the Achaean ships and overmastered them by their numbers. In this way they captured four quadriremes and sunk with all hands a quinquereme, on board of which was Margos of Caryneia, a man who up to the end served the Achaeans most loyally. The ships that were engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing the success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their speed, made sail with a fair wind and escaped home in safety. The Illyrian forces, highly elated by their 263

ματισθέν έπὶ τῷ προτερήματι, λοιπὸν ἤδη ραδίως έχρήσατο τῆ πολιορκία καὶ τεθαρρηκότως. οι δὲ 8 Κερκυραίοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες τοίς όλοις εκ των συμβεβηκότων, βραχὺν ἔτι χρόνον ὑπομείναντες τὴν πολιορκίαν, συνέθεντο τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς, καὶ παρεδέ-

ξαντο φρουράν καὶ μετά της φρουράς Δημήτριον

9 τον Φάριον. τούτων δε πραχθέντων εὐθέως οί τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν προεστῶτες ἀνήγοντο καὶ κατάραντες είς την Ἐπίδαμνον ταύτην πάλιν ἐπεβάλοντο πολιορκεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

11 Κατά δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς τῶν τὰς ὑπάτους άργας εγόντων Γνάιος μεν Φουλούιος εξέπλει ναυσί διακοσίαις έκ της 'Ρώμης, Αθλος δέ Ποστούμιος τας

2 πεζικας έχων δυνάμεις έξώρμα. την μεν οθν πρώτην επιβολήν έσχε πλείν ο Γνάιος επί της Κερκύρας, ὑπολαμβάνων ἔτι καταλήψεσθαι τὴν πολιορ-

3 κίαν ἄκριτον ὑστερήσας δὲ τῶν καιρῶν ὅμως ἐπὶ την νησον έπλει, βουλόμενος αμα μεν επιγνωναι σαφως τὰ γεγονότα περί την πόλιν, αμα δὲ πειραν λαβεῖν τῶν παρὰ τοῦ Δημητρίου προσαγγελλομέ-

4 νων. ο γάρ Δημήτριος έν διαβολαίς ων καὶ φοβούμενος την Τεύταν διεπέμπετο πρός τους 'Ρωμαίους, ἐπαγγελλόμενος τήν τε πόλιν ἐγχειριεῖν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πράγματα παραδώσειν, ὧν ἢν αὐτὸς κύ-

5 ριος. οί δε Κερκυραΐοι την παρουσίαν των 'Ρωμαίων ἀσμένως ἰδόντες, τήν τε φρουράν παρέδοσαν των 'Ιλλυριων μετά της του Δημητρίου γνώμης, αὐτοί τε σφᾶς δμοθυμαδον ἔδωκαν παρακληθέντες είς την των 'Ρωμαίων πίστιν, μίαν ταύτην ύπολαβόντες ἀσφάλειαν αύτοις υπάρχειν είς τον μελλοντα κρόνον προς την Ιλλυριών παρανομίαν. 'Ρωμαιοι

δε προσδεξάμενοι τους Κερκυραίους είς την φιλίαν 264

success, continued the siege with more security and confidence, and the Corcyreans, whose hopes were crushed by the repulse of their allies, after enduring the siege for a short time longer, came to terms with the Illyrians, receiving a garrison under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. After this the Illyrian commanders at once sailed off and coming to anchor at Epidamnus, again set themselves to besiege that city.

229 B.C.

11. At about the same time one of the Consuls. Gnaeus Fulvius, sailed out from Rome with the two hundred ships, while the other, Aulus Postumius, left with the land forces. Gnaeus' first intention had been to make for Corcyra, as he supposed he would find the siege still undecided. discovering that he was too late, he none the less sailed for that island, wishing on the one hand to find out accurately what had happened about the city, and on the other hand to put to a test the sincerity of communications made to him by Demetrius. Accusations had been brought against the latter, and being in fear of Teuta he sent messages to the Romans undertaking to hand over to them the city and whatever else was under his charge. The Corcyreans were much relieved to see the Romans arrive, and they gave up the Illyrian garrison to them with the consent of Demetrius. unanimously accepted the Romans' invitation to place themselves under their protection, considering this the sole means of assuring for the future their safety from the violence of the Illyrians. The Romans, having admitted the Corcyreans to their

έπλεον έπὶ τῆς 'Απολλωνίας, έχοντες εἰς τὰ κατάλοιπα των πραγμάτων ήγεμόνα τον Δημήτριον. 7 κατά δε τον αὐτον καιρον και Ποστούμιος τὰς πεζικάς διεβίβαζε δυνάμεις έκ τοῦ Βρεντεσίου, πεζούς 8 μεν είς δισμυρίους, ίππεις δε περί δισχιλίους. άμα δὲ τῷ προσέχειν έκατέρας όμοῦ τὰς δυνάμεις πρὸς την Απολλωνίαν δμοίως και τούτων αποδεξαμένων καὶ δόντων έαυτους είς την επιτροπήν παραχρημα πάλιν ἀνήχθησαν, ἀκούοντες πολιορκεῖσθαί τὴν 9 Ἐπίδαμνον. οι δ' Ἰλλυριοί συνέντες την έφοδον τῶν Ῥωμαίων, οὐδενὶ κόσμω λύσαντες τὴν πολιορ-10 κίαν ἔφυνον. 'Ρωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους παραλαβόντες είς την πίστιν, προηγον είς τους είσω τόπους τῆς Ἰλλυρίδος, ἄμα καταστρεφόμενοι τοὺς 11 'Αρδιαίους. συμμιξάντων δὲ πρεσβευτῶν αὐτοῖς καὶ πλειόνων, ών οί παρά των Παρθίνων ήκον έπιτρέποντες τὰ καθ' αύτούς, δεξάμενοι τούτους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν, παραπλησίως δέ καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν 'Ατιντάνων προσεληλυθότας προήγον ώς έπὶ τὴν Ίσσαν, διὰ τὸ καὶ ταύτην ὑπὸ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν πολιορκεῖ-12 σθαι τὴν πόλιν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ καὶ λύσαντες τὴν πολιορκίαν, προσεδέξαντο καὶ τοὺς Ἰσσαίους εἰς τήν 13 έαυτῶν πίστιν. είλον δὲ καὶ πόλεις τινὰς Ἰλλυρίδας έν τῶ παράπλω κατὰ κράτος εν αίς περὶ Νουτρίαν οὐ μόνον τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπέβαλον πολλούς, 14 άλλα και των χιλιάρχων τινάς και τον ταμίαν. ἐκυρίευσαν δε και λεμβων είκοσι των αποκομιζόντων 15 την έκ της χώρας ωφέλειαν. των δε πολιορκούντων την "Ισσαν οί μεν εν τη Φάρω δια τον Δημήτριον άβλαβεις έμειναν, οι δ' άλλοι πάντες έφυγον 16 είς τὸν "Αρβωνα σκεδασθέντες. ή δὲ Τεύτα πάνυ μετ' ολίγων είς τον 'Ρίζονα διεσώθη, πολισμάτιον 266

friendship, set sail for Apollonia, Demetrius in future acting as their guide. Simultaneously Postumius was bringing across from Brundisium the land forces consisting of about twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse. On the two forces uniting at Apollonia and on the people of that city likewise agreeing to put themselves under Roman protection, they at once set off again, hearing that Epidamnus was being besieged. The Illyrians, on hearing of the approach of the Romans, hastily broke up the siege and fled. The Romans, taking Epidamnus also under their protection, advanced into the interior of Illyria, subduing the Ardiaei on their way. Many embassies met them, among them one from the Parthini offering unconditional surrender. They admitted this tribe to their friendship as well as the Atintanes, and advanced towards Issa which was also being besieged by the Illyrians. On their arrival they forced the enemy to raise the siege and took the Issaeans also under their protection. The fleet too took several Illyrian cities by assault as they sailed along the coast, losing, however, at Nutria not only many soldiers, but some of their military tribunes and their quaestor. They also captured twenty boats which were conveying away agricultural produce to save it from pillage. Of the besiegers of Issa those now in Pharos were allowed, through Demetrius' influence, to remain there unhurt, while the others dispersed and took refuge at Arbo. Teuta, with only a few followers, escaped to 267

εὖ πρὸς ὀχυρότητα κατεσκευασμένον, ἀνακεχωρηκὸς μεν ἀπὸ τῆς θαλάττης, ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὲ κείμενον τῷ 'Ρίζονι ποταμῶ. ταῦτα δὲ πράξαντες, καὶ τῷ Δη-17 μητρίω τους πλείστους υποτάξαντες τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν, καὶ μεγάλην αὐτῷ περιθέντες δυναστείαν ἀνεχώοησαν είς την Ἐπίδαμνον άμα τῷ στόλω καί τῆ 12 Ἡ δυνάμει. Γνάιος μεν οῦν Φουλούιος εἰς την Ἡ Ὑ Ῥώμην ἀπέπλευσε, τὸ πλεῖον ἔχων μέρος τῆς τε ναυτικής και πεζικής στρατιάς. δ δε Ποστούμιος, ύπολειπόμενος τετταράκοντα σκάφη, καὶ στρατόπεδον εκ των περικειμένων πόλεων άθροίσας, παρεχείμαζε, συνεφεδρεύων τω τε των 'Αρδιαίων έθνει 3 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς δεδωκόσιν έαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν πίστιν. ύπὸ δὲ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ὥραν ἡ Τεύτα διαπρεσβευσαμένη προς τους 'Ρωμαίους ποιείται συνθήκας, έν αίς εὐδόκησε φόρους τε τοὺς διαταχθέντας οἴσειν πάσης τ' ἀναχωρήσειν της Ἰλλυρίδος πλην ολίγων τόπων, καὶ τὸ συνέχον δ μάλιστα πρὸς τοὺς Ελληνας διέτεινε, μὴ πλεύσειν πλέον ἢ δυσὶ λέμβοις έξω τοῦ 4 Λίσσου, καὶ τούτοις ἀνόπλοις. ὧν συντελεσθέντων ό Ποστούμιος μετά ταθτα πρεσβευτάς έξαπέστειλε πρός τε τους Αίτωλους και το των 'Αχαιων έθνος οι καὶ παραγενόμενοι πρώτον μεν απελογίσαντο τάς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως, έξῆς δὲ τούτοις τὰ πεπραγμένα διεξηλθον, καὶ τὰς συνθήκας παρανέγνωσαν, ας έπεποίηντο πρός τους 'Ιλλυριούς. 5 τυχόντες δε παρ' έκατέρου τῶν εθνῶν τῆς καθηκούσης φιλανθρωπίας αθθις απέπλευσαν είς την 6 Κέρκυραν, ίκανοῦ τινος ἀπολελυκότες φόβου τοὺς «Ελληνας διὰ τὰς προειρημένας συνθήκας. οὐ γὰρ τισίν, άλλα πασι, τότε κοινούς έχθρούς είναι συν-

έβαινε τούς Ἰλλυριούς.

Rhizon, a small place strongly fortified at a distance from the sea and situated on the river Rhizon. After accomplishing so much and placing the greater part of Illyria under the rule of Demetrius, thus making him an important potentate, the Consuls returned to Epidamnus with the fleet and army. 12. Gnaeus Fulvius now left for Rome with the greater part of both forces, and Postumius, with whom forty ships were left, enrolled a legion from the cities in the neighbourhood and wintered at Epidamnus to guard the Ardiaeans and the other tribes who had placed themselves under the protection of Rome. In the early spring Teuta sent an 228 B.C. embassy to the Romans and made a treaty, by which she consented to pay any tribute they imposed, to relinquish all Illyria except a few places, and, what mostly concerned the Greeks, undertook not to sail beyond Lissus with more than two unarmed vessels. When this treaty had been concluded Postumius, sent legates to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. On their arrival they first explained the causes of the war and their reason for crossing the Adriatic, and next gave an account of what they had accomplished, reading the treaty they had made with the Illyrians. After meeting with all due courtesy from both the leagues, they returned to Corcyra, having by the communication of this treaty, delivered the Greeks from no inconsiderable dread; for the Illyrians were then not the enemies of this people or that, but the common enemies of all.

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7 'Η μὲν οὖν πρώτη διάβασις 'Ρωμαίων μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα καὶ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη τῆς Εὐρώπης, ἔτι δ' ἐπιπλοκὴ μετὰ πρεσβείας εἰς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν 'Ελλάδα τόπους, τοιάδε καὶ διὰ ταύτας 8 ἐγένετο τὰς αἰτίας. ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς

8 έγένετο τάς αίτίας. άπό δέ ταύτης τής καταρχής 'Ρωμαιοι μέν εὐθέως άλλους πρεσβευτὰς έξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς 'Αθηναίους, ὅτε δὴ καὶ Κορίνθιοι πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν 'Ρω-

μαίους τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγῶνος. 13 'Ασδρούβας δὲ κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους, ἐν ναρ τούτοις απελίπομεν τα κατά την 'Ιβηρίαν, νουνέχως καὶ πραγματικώς χειρίζων τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν έν τε τοις όλοις μεγάλην έποιειτο προκοπήν τήν τε παρά μέν τισι Καρχηδόνα, παρά δε τισι Καινήν πόλιν προσαγορευομένην κατασκευάσας, ου μικρά, μεγάλα δὲ συνεβάλλετο Καρχηδονίοις εἰς πραγμά-2 των λόγον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν τοῦ τόπου πρός τε τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν πράγματα καὶ πρός τὰ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην, περὶ ης ἡμεῖς εὐφυέστερον καιρον λαβόντες υποδείξομεν την θέσιν αυτης και την χρείαν, ην αμφοτέραις δύναται παρ-3 έχεσθαι ταις είρημέναις χώραις. Ον και θεωρουντές Ρωμαῖοι μείζω καὶ φοβερωτέραν ήδη συνιστάμενον δυναστείαν, ώρμησαν έπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονείν τὰ 4 κατά τὴν Ἰβηρίαν. εύρόντες δὲ σφᾶς ἐπικεκοιμημένους εν τοις έμπροσθεν χρόνοις και προειμένους είς τὸ μεγάλην χείρα κατάσκευάσασθαι Καρχηδο-5 νίους, ανατρέχειν επειρώντο κατα δύναμιν. αὐτόθεν μεν οὖν ἐπιτάττειν ἢ πολεμεῖν οὐ κατετόλμων τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις διὰ τὸ τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Κελτῶν φόβον έπικρέμασθαι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι καὶ μόνον ου καθ' έκάστην ημέραν προσδοκάν την έφοδον 270

Such were the circumstances and causes of the Romans crossing for the first time with an army to Illyria and those parts of Europe, and of their first coming into relations through an embassy with Greece. But having thus begun, the Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to Athens and Corinth, on which occasion the Corinthians first admitted them to participation in the Isthmian games.

13. We have said nothing of affairs in Spain during these years. Hasdrubal had by his wise and practical administration made great general progress, and by the foundation of the city called by some Carthage, and by others the New Town, 228 B.C. made a material contribution to the resources of Carthage, especially owing to its favourable position for action in Spain or Africa. On a more suitable occasion we will describe its position and point out the services it can render to both these countries. The Romans, seeing that Hasdrubal was in a fair way to create a larger and more formidable empire than Carthage formerly possessed, resolved to begin to occupy themselves with Spanish affairs. Finding that they had hitherto been asleep and had allowed Carthage to build up a powerful dominion, they tried, as far as possible, to make up for lost time. For the present they did not venture to impose orders on Carthage, or to go to war with her, because the threat of a Celtic invasion was hanging over them, the attack being indeed expected

6 αὐτῶν. καταψήσαντες δὲ καὶ πραΰναντες τὸν 'Ασδρούβαν οὕτως ἔκριναν ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς Κελτοῖς καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πρὸς αὐτούς, οὐδέποτ ἀν ὑπολαμβάνοντες οὐχ οἶον δυναστεῦσαι τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἀσφαλῶς οἰκῆσαι τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα τούτους ἔχοντες ἐφέδρους τοὺς ἄνδρας. διόπερ ἄμα τῷ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς τὸν 'Ασδρούβαν ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὴν μὲν ἄλλην Ἰβηρίαν παρεσιώπων, τὸν δὲ καλούμενον ˇΙβηρα ποταμὸν οὐκ ἔδει Καρχηδονίους ἐπὶ πολέμῳ διαβαίνειν, εὐθέως ἐξήνεγκαν τὸν πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν Κελτοὺς πόλεμον.

14 Υπέρ ὧν δοκεῖ μοι χρήσιμον εἶναι κεφαλαιώδη μέν ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐξήγησιν, ἴνα τὸ τῆς προκατασκευῆς οἰκεῖον συσσώσωμεν κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν, ἀναδραμεῖν δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐξ ὅτον

2 κατέσχον οἱ προειρημένοι τὴν χώραν ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν ἱστορίαν οὐ μόνον ἀξίαν εἶναι γνώσεως καὶ μνήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ τελέως ἀναγκαίαν, χάριν τοῦ μαθεῖν τίσι μετὰ ταῦτα πιστεύσας ἀνδράσι καὶ τόποις ᾿Αννίβας ἐπεβάλετο καταλύειν τὴν

3 'Ρωμαίων δυναστείαν. πρώτον δὲ περὶ τῆς χώρας ρητέον ποία τίς ἐστι καὶ πῶς κεῖται πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην Ἰταλίαν. οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις διαφέροντα κατανοεῖν βέλτιον, ὑπογραφέντων τῶν περί τε τοὺς τόπους καὶ τὴν χώραν ἰδιωμάτων.

4 Της δη συμπάσης 'Ιταλίας τῷ σχήματι τριγωνοειδοῦς ὑπαρχούσης, τὴν μὲν μίαν ὁρίζει πλευρὰν
αὐτης τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολὰς κεκλιμένην ὅ τ' 'Ιόνιος
πόρος καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ὁ κατὰ τὸν 'Αδρίαν κόλπος, τὴν δὲ πρὸς μεσημβρίαν καὶ δυσμὰς τετραμ5 μένην τὸ Σικελικὸν καὶ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος. αὖται
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from day to day. They decided, then, to smooth down and conciliate Hasdrubal in the first place, and then to attack the Celts and decide the issue by arms, for they thought that as long as they had these Celts threatening their frontier, not only would they never be masters of Italy, but they would not even be safe in Rome itself. Accordingly, after having sent envoys to Hasdrubal and made a treaty, in which no mention was made of the rest of Spain, but the Carthaginians engaged not to cross the Ebro in arms, they at once entered on the struggle against the Italian Celts.

14. I think it will be of use to give some account of these peoples, which must be indeed but a summary one, in order not to depart from the original plan of this work as defined in the preface. We must, however, go back to the time when they first occupied these districts. I think the story is not only worth knowing and keeping in mind, but quite necessary for my purpose, as it shows us who were the men and what was the country on which Hannibal afterwards relied in his attempt to destroy the Roman dominion. I will first describe the nature of the country and its position as regards the rest of Italy. A sketch of its peculiarities will help us better to comprehend the more important of the events I have to relate.

Italy as a whole has the shape of a triangle of which the one or eastern side is bounded by the Ionian Sea and then continuously by the Adriatic Gulf, the next side, that turned to the south and west, by the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian Seas. The

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δ' αί πλευραί συμπίπτουσαι πρός άλλήλας κορυφήν ποιοθσι τοθ τριγώνου τὸ προκείμενον ακρωτήριον τῆς Ἰταλίας εἰς τὴν μεσημβρίαν, δ προσαγορεύεται μὲν Κόκυνθος, διαιρεῖ δὲ τὸν Ἰόνιον πόρον καὶ τὸ 6 Σικελικόν πέλαγος. την δε λοιπήν την παρά τε τὰς ἄρκτους καὶ τὴν μεσόγαιαν παρατείνουσαν ὁρί-ζει κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς ἡ τῶν "Αλπεων παρώρεια, λαμβάνουσα την μέν άρχην ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας καὶ τῶν ύπερ το Σαρδώον πέλαγος τόπων, παρήκουσα δε συνεχώς μέχρι προς τον τοῦ παντος 'Αδρίου μυχόν, πλην βραχέος, ο προκαταλήγουσα λείπει τοῦ μὴ 7 συνάπτειν αὐτῷ. παρὰ δὲ τὴν προειρημένην παρ-ώρειαν, ἢν δεῖ νοεῖν ὡς ᾶν εἰ βάσιν τοῦ τριγώ-νου, παρὰ ταύτην ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας ὑπόκειται πεδία της συμπάσης 'Ιταλίας τελευταία πρός τὰς ἄρκτους, ύπερ ων ο νῦν δη λόγος, ἀρετή καὶ μεγέθει δια-φέροντα των κατά την Εὐρώπην, ὅσα πέπτωκεν 8 ύπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἱστορίαν. ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλον είδος καὶ τῆς ταῦτα τὰ πεδία περιγραφούσης γραμμης τριγωνοειδές. τούτου δε τοῦ σχήματος την μεν κορυφην ή τε των 'Απεννίνων καλουμένων όρων καὶ τῶν ᾿Αλπεινῶν σύμπτωσις οὐ μακράν ἀπό τοῦ 9 Σαρδώου πελάγους ύπερ Μασσαλίας αποτελεί των δὲ πλευρῶν παρὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρκτων, ὡς επάνω προείπον, τὰς "Αλπεις αὐτὰς επὶ δισχιλίους 10 καὶ διακοσίους σταδίους παρήκειν συμβαίνει, παρά δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας τὸν ᾿Απεννῖνον ἐπὶ τρισχι-11 λίους έξακοσίους. βάσεώς γε μην τάξιν λαμβάνει τοῦ παντὸς σχήματος ή παραλία τοῦ κατὰ τὸν 'Αδρίαν κόλπου τὸ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς βάσεώς ἐστιν ἀπὸ πόλεως Σήνης έως έπὶ τὸν μυχὸν ὑπὲρ τοὺς δισχι-12 λίους σταδίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ώστε την πάσαν 274

apex of the triangle, formed by the meeting of these two sides, is the southernmost cape of Italy known as Cocynthus and separating the Ionian Strait from the Sicilian Sea. The remaining or northern and inland side of the triangle is bounded continuously by the chain of the Alps which beginning at Marseilles and the northern coasts of the Sardinian Sea stretches in an unbroken line almost to the head of the whole Adriatic, only failing to join that sea by stopping at quite a short distance from it. At the foot of this chain, which we should regard as the base of the triangle, on its southern side, lies the last plain of Italy to the north. It is with this that we are now concerned, a plain surpassing in fertility any other in Europe with which we are acquainted. The general shape of the lines that bound this plain is likewise triangular. The apex of the triangle is formed by the meeting of the Apennines and Alps not far from the Sardinian Sea at a point above Marseilles. Its northern side is, as I have said, formed by the Alps themselves and is about two thousand two hundred stades in length, the southern side by the Apennines which extend for a distance of three thousand six hundred stades. The base of the whole triangle is the coast of the Adriatic, its length from the city of Sena a to the head of the gulf being more than two thousand five hundred stades; so that the whole circumference of

a Siniglia.

περίμετρον τῶν προειρημένων πεδίων μὴ πολὺ λεί-15 πειν τῶν μυρίων σταδίων. περί γε μὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐδ' εἰπεῖν ράδιον. σίτου τε γὰρ τοσαύτην ἀφθονίαν ύπάργειν συμβαίνει κατά τους τόπους, ώστ' έν τοις καθ' ήμας καιροίς πολλάκις τεττάρων όβολων είναι τῶν πυρῶν τὸν Σικελικὸν μέδιμνον, τῶν δὲ κριθῶν δυεῖν, τοῦ δ' οἴνου τὸν μετρητὴν ἰσόκριθον. 2 ελύμου γε μην καὶ κέγχρου τελέως ὑπερβάλλουσα δαψίλεια γίνεται παρ' αὐτοῖς. τὸ δὲ τῶν βαλάνων πληθος το γινόμενον έκ των κατά διάστημα δρυμών έν τοις πεδίοις έκ τούτων αν τις μάλιστα 3 τεκμήραιτο πλείστων γάρ ύϊκῶν ἱερείων κοπτομένων έν Ἰταλία διά τε τὰς εἰς τοὺς ἰδίους βίους καὶ τὰς εἰς τὰ στρατόπεδα παραθέσεις, τὴν ὁλοσχερεστάτην χορηγίαν έκ τούτων συμβαίνει των πεδίων 4 αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν. περὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ μέρος εὐωνίας καὶ δαψιλείας τῶν πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ἀνηκόντων οὕ-5 τως αν τις ακριβέστατα κατανοήσειε ποιοθνται γάρ τὰς καταλύσεις οἱ διοδεύοντες τὴν χώραν ἐν τοῖς πανδοκείοις, οὐ συμφωνοῦντες περὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος επιτηδείων, άλλ' ερωτώντες πόσου τον άνδρα 6 δέχεται. ώς μέν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ παρίενται τοὺς καταλύτας οι πανδοκείς, ώς ίκανα πάντ' έχειν τα προς την χρείαν, ημιασσαρίου τοῦτο δ' έστι τέταρτον μέρος όβολοῦ σπανίως δὲ τοῦθ' ὑπερβαίνουσι. 7 τό γε μην πληθος των ανδρών, και το μέγεθος και κάλλος των σωμάτων, έτι δε την εν τοις πολέμοις τόλμαν, έξ αὐτῶν τῶν πράξεων σαφῶς ἔσται κατα-

μαθεῖν.
8 Τῶν δ' "Αλπεων έκατέρας τῆς πλευρᾶς, τῆς ἐπὶ τὸν 'Ροδανὸν ποταμὸν καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία νευούσης, τοὺς βουνώδεις καὶ γεώδεις τόπους 276

the plain is not much less than ten thousand stades. 15. Its fertility is not easy to describe. It produces such an abundance of corn, that often in my time the price of wheat was four obols per Sicilian medimnus a and that of barley two obols, a metretes of wine costing the same as the medimnus of barley. Panic and millet are produced in enormous quantities, while the amount of acorns grown in the woods dispersed over the plain can be estimated from the fact that, while the number of swine slaughtered in Italy for private consumption as well as to feed the army is very large, almost the whole of them are supplied by this plain. The cheapness and abundance of all articles of food will be most clearly understood from the following fact. Travellers in this country who put up in inns, do not bargain for each separate article they require, but ask what is the charge per diem for one person. The innkeepers, as a rule, agree to receive guests, providing them with enough of all they require for half an as per diem, i.e. the fourth part of an obol, the charge being very seldom higher. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak.

16. The hilly ground with sufficient soil on both slopes of the Alps, that on the north towards the Rhone and that towards the plain I have been

 a About 5 Roman modii or 10 gallons. The metretes of wine was about 9 gallons.

κατοικοῦσι, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν 'Ροδανὸν καὶ τὰς ἄρκτους έστραμμένους Γαλάται Τρανσαλπίνοι προσαγορευόμενοι, τοὺς δ' ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία Ταυρίσκοι καὶ 9 "Αγωνες καὶ πλείω γένη βαρβάρων ἔτερα. Τρανσ-αλπινοί γε μὴν οὐ διὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τοῦ τόπου διαφοράν προσαγορεύονται, τὸ γὰρ τράνς έξερμηνευόμενόν έστι πέραν διό τούς έπ-10 έκεινα των "Αλπεων Τρανσαλπίνους καλοῦσι. τὰ δ' άκρα διά τε την τραχύτητα και το πληθος της έπι-16 μενούσης άει χιόνος αοίκητα τελέως έστί. τον δ' Απεννίνον από μεν της άρχης της υπερ Μασσαλίαν καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰς Αλπεις συμπτώσεως Λιγυστίνοι κατοικούσι, και την έπι το Τυρρηνικον πέλαγος αὐτοῦ πλευρὰν κεκλιμένην καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ 2 πεδία, παρά θάλατταν μεν μέχρι πόλεως Πίσης, η πρώτη κείται της Τυρρηνίας ώς πρός τας δυσμάς, κατά δὲ τὴν μεσόγαιαν ἔως τῆς ᾿Αρρητίνων 3 χώρας. έξης δε Τυρρηνοί τούτοις δε συνεχείς έκάτερον τὸ κλίμα νέμονται τῶν προειρημένων ὀρῶν 4 "Ομβροι. λοιπον δ μεν 'Απεννίνος, απέχων της κατά τον 'Αδρίαν θαλάττης σταδίους ώς αν εί πεντακοσίους, ἀπολείπει τὰ πεδία, δεξιὸς ἀπονεύων, καὶ διὰ μέσης της λοιπης 'Ιταλίας διήκων είς το Σικελικον 5 κατατείνει πέλαγος. τὸ δ' ἀπολειπόμενον μέρος πεδινόν της πλευρας έπι θάλατταν και πόλιν καθήκει 6 Σήνην. ὁ δὲ Πάδος ποταμός, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν 'Ηριδανός θρυλούμενος, έχει μέν τὰς πηγάς ἀπὸ τῶν "Αλπεων ὡς πρὸς τὴν κορυφὴν μαλλον τοῦ προειρημένου σχήματος, καταφέρεται δ' είς τὰ πεδία, 7 ποιούμενος την ρύσιν ώς έπι μεσημβρίαν. ἀφικόμενος δ' είς τους επιπέδους τόπους, εκκλίνας τω ρεύματι προς εω φέρεται δι' αὐτῶν ποιεί δε την 278

describing, is inhabited in the former case by the Transalpine Gauls and in the latter by the Taurisci, Agones and several other barbarous tribes. Transalpine is not a national name but a local one, trans meaning "beyond," and those beyond the Alps being so called. The summits of the Alps are quite uninhabitable owing to their ruggedness and the quantity of snow which always covers them. 16. The Apennines. from their junction with the Alps above Marseilles, are inhabited on both slopes, that looking to the Tyrrhenian sea and that turned to the plain, by the Ligurians whose territory reaches on the seaboard-side as far as Pisa, the first city of western Etruria, and on the land side as far as Arretium." Next come the Etruscans, and after them both slopes are inhabited by the Umbrians. After this the Apennines, at a distance of about five hundred stades from the Adriatic, quit the plain and, turning to the right, pass along the centre of the rest of Italy as far as the Sicilian sea, the remaining flat part of this side of the triangle continuing to the sea and the city of Sena. The river Po, celebrated by poets as the Eridanus, rises in the Alps somewhere near the apex of the triangle and descends to the plain, flowing in a southerly direction. On reaching the flat ground, it takes a turn to the East and flows through the plain,

a Arezzo.

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έκβολην δυσί στόμασιν είς τούς κατά τὸν 'Αδρίαν τόπους· τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἀποτέμνεται μέρος τῆς πε-διάδος χώρας εἰς τὰς "Αλπεις καὶ τὸν 'Αδριατικὸν 8 μυγόν. ἄνει δὲ πληθος ὕδατος οὐδενὸς ἔλαττον τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ποταμῶν, διὰ τὸ τὰς ρύσεις τὰς ἐπὶ τὰ πεδία νευούσας ἀπό τε τῶν Ἄλπεων καὶ των 'Απεννίνων όρων είς τοῦτον εμπίπτειν άπάσας 9 καὶ πανταχόθεν. μεγίστω δὲ καὶ καλλίστω ρεύματι φέρεται περί κυνὸς ἐπιτολήν, αὐξόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνατηκομένων χιόνων ἐν τοῖς 10 προειρημένοις ὄρεσιν. ἀναπλεῖται δ' ἐκ θαλάττης κατά το στόμα το καλούμενον "Ολανα σχεδον επί 11 δισχιλίους σταδίους. την μέν γάρ πρώτην έκ τῶν πηγῶν ἔχει ρύσιν ἀπλην, σχίζεται δ' είς δύο μέρη κατά τους προσαγορευομένους Τριγαβόλους. τούτων δε το μεν ετερον στόμα προσονομάζεται 12 Παδόα, τὸ δ' ἔτερον "Ολανα. κεῖται δ' ἐπὶ τούτω λιμήν, οὐδενὸς τῶν κατὰ τὸν ᾿Αδρίαν ήττω παρεχόμενος ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ καθορμιζομένοις. παρά γε μὴν τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις ὁ ποταμός προσαγο-13 ρεύεται Βόδεγκος. τάλλα δὲ τὰ περὶ τὸν ποταμὸν τοῦτον ἱστορούμενα παρὰ τοῖς "Ελλησι, λέγω δή τὰ περί Φαέθοντα καὶ τὴν ἐκείνου πτῶσιν, ἔτι δὲ τὰ δάκρυα τῶν αἰγείρων καὶ τοὺς μελανείμονας τοὺς περί τον ποταμόν οἰκοῦντας, ους φασι τὰς ἐσθῆ-τας εἰσέτι νῦν φορεῖν τοιαύτας ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ Φαέ-14 θοντα πένθους, καὶ πᾶσαν δὴ τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ταύτη προσεοικυίαν ύλην, ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ παρόντος ὑπερθησόμεθα, διὰ τὸ μὴ λίαν καθήκειν τῷ τῆς προκατασκευής γένει την περί των τοιούτων άκρι-15 βολογίαν. μεταλαβόντες δέ καιρον άρμόττοντα ποιησόμεθα την καθήκουσαν μνήμην, καὶ μάλιστα 280

falling into the Adriatic by two mouths. It cuts off the larger half of the plain, which thus lies between it on the south and the Alps and head of the Adriatic on the north. It has a larger volume of water than any other river in Italy, since all the streams that descend into the plain from the Alps and Apennines fall into it from either side, and is highest and finest at the time of the rising of the Dog-star, a as it is then swollen by the melting of the snow on those It is navigable for about two thousand mountains. stades from the mouth called Olana; for the stream, which has been a single one from its source, divides at a place called Trigaboli, one of the mouths being called Padua and the other Olana. At the latter there is a harbour, which affords as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic. The native name of the river is Bodencus. The other tales the Greeks tell about this river, I mean touching Phaëthon and his fall and the weeping poplar-trees and the black clothing of the inhabitants near the river, who, they say, still dress thus in mourning for Phaëthon, and all similar matter for tragedy, may be left aside for the present, detailed treatment of such things not suiting very well the plan of this work. I will, however, when I find a suitable occasion make proper mention of all

a Middle of July.

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διὰ τὴν Τιμαίου περὶ τοὺς προειρημένους τόπους

άγνοιαν. 17 Πλην ταθτά γε τὰ πεδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἐνέμοντο Τυρρηνοί, καθ' ους χρόνους καὶ τὰ Φλεγραῖά ποτε καλούμενα τὰ περὶ Καπύην καὶ Νώλην ά δὴ καὶ διά το πολλοις εμποδών είναι και γνωρίζεσθαι με-2 γάλην ἐπ' ἀρετῆ δόξαν είληφε. διὸ καὶ τοὺς ίστοροῦντας τὰς Τυρρηνών δυναστείας οὐ χρή ποιεῖσθαι την αναφοράν έπι την νυν κατεχομένην ύπ' αὐτῶν χώραν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰ προειρημένα πεδία καὶ 3 τας έκ τούτων των τόπων άφορμάς. οίς έπιμιγνύμενοι κατά την παράθεσιν Κελτοί και περί τό κάλλος της γώρας δοθαλμιάσαντες, έκ μικράς προφάσεως μεγάλη στρατιά παραδόξως ἐπελθόντες ἐξέβαλον έκ τῆς περί τὸν Πάδον χώρας Τυρρηνούς καὶ 4 κατέσχον αὐτοί τὰ πεδία. τὰ μὲν οὖν πρῶτα καὶ περί τὰς ἀνατολὰς τοῦ Πάδου κείμενα Λάοι καὶ Λέβέκιοι, μετά δὲ τούτους "Ινσομβρες κατώκησαν, δ μέγιστον έθνος ήν αὐτῶν έξης δὲ τούτοις παρὰ 5 τον ποταμόν Γονομάνοι. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὸν 'Αδρίαν ήδη προσήκοντα γένος άλλο πάνυ παλαιον διακατέσχε προσαγορεύονται δ' Οὐένετοι, τοῖς μὲν ἔθεσι καὶ τῷ κόσμῳ βραχὺ διαφέροντες Κελτῶν, γλώττη 6 δ' άλλοία χρώμενοι. περί ών οι τραγωδιογράφοι πολύν τινα πεποίηνται λόγον καὶ πολλήν διατέθειν-7 ται τερατείαν. τὰ δὲ πέραν τοῦ Πάδου τὰ περὶ τον 'Απεννίνον πρώτοι μέν "Αναρες, μετά δέ τού-8 τους Βοίοι κατώκησαν έξης δε τούτων ώς πρός τον 'Αδρίαν Λίγγονες, τὰ δὲ τελευταῖα πρὸς θαλάττη Σήνωνες.

Τὰ μέν οὖν ἐπιφανέστατα τῶν κατασχόντων τοὺς η προειρημένους τόπους ἐθνῶν ταῦθ' ὑπῆρχεν. ἄκουν

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this, especially as Timaeus has shown much ignorance

concerning the district.

17. The Etruscans were the oldest inhabitants of this plain at the same period that they possessed also that Phlegraean plain in the neighbourhood of Capua and Nola, which, accessible and well known as it is to many, has such a reputation for fertility. Those therefore who would know something of the dominion of the Etruscans should not look at the country they now inhabit, but at these plains and the resources they drew thence. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po. occupied it themselves. The first settlers at the eastern extremity, near the source of the Po, were the Laevi and Lebecii, after them the Insubres, the largest tribe of all, and next these, on the banks of the river, the Cenomani. The part of the plain near the Adriatic had never ceased to be in the possession of another very ancient tribe called the Veneti, differing slightly from the Gauls in customs and costume and speaking another language. About this people the tragic poets tell many marvellous stories. On the other bank of the Po, by the Apennines, the first settlers beginning from the west were the Anares and next them the Boii. Next the latter, towards the Adriatic, were the Lingones and lastly, near the sea, the Senones.

These are the names of the principal tribes that settled in the district. They lived in unwalled



10 δε κατά κώμας άτειχίστους, της λοιπης κατασκευης άμοιροι καθεστώτες. διὰ γὰρ τὸ στιβαδοκοιτεῖν καὶ κρεαφαγεῖν, ἔτι δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν τὰ πολεμικὰ καὶ τὰ κατὰ γεωργίαν ἀσκεῖν, ἁπλοῦς εἶχον τοὺς βίους, οὖτ' ἐπιστήμης ἄλλης οὖτε τέχνης παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παράπαν γινωσκομένης. ὕπαρξίς γε 11 μην έκάστοις ην θρέμματα και χρυσός δια το μόνα

ταθτα κατά τὰς περιστάσεις ραδίως δύνασθαι πανταχή περιαγαγείν και μεθιστάναι κατά τάς αύτῶν

12 προαιρέσεις. περί δὲ τὰς έταιρείας μεγίστην σπουδην εποιούντο δια το και φοβερώτατον και δυνατώτατον είναι παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦτον ος αν πλείστους έχειν δοκή τους θεραπεύοντας και συμπεριφερομένους αὐτῶ.

18 Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἀρχὰς οὐ μόνον τῆς χώρας ἐπεκράτουν, άλλα και των σύνεγγυς πολλούς ύπηκόους 2 επεποίηντο, τῆ τόλμη καταπεπληγμένοι. μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον μάχη νικήσαντες 'Ρωμαίους καὶ τοὺς μετὰ τούτων παραταξαμένους, επόμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι τρισὶ τῆς μάχης ἡμέραις ὕστερον κατέσχον αὐτὴν 3 την 'Ρώμην πλην τοῦ Καπετωλίου. γενομένου δ' άντισπάσματος, καὶ τῶν Οὐενέτων ἐμβαλόντων εἰς την χώραν αὐτῶν, τότε μεν ποιησάμενοι συνθήκας προς 'Ρωμαίους και την πόλιν αποδόντες, έπαν-4 ηλθον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς ἐμφυλίοις συνείχοντο πολέμοις, ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τῶν τὰς "Αλπεις κατοικούντων δρμάς εποιούντο, καὶ συνηθροίζοντο πολλάκις επ' αὐτούς, θεωροῦντες εκ παραθέσεως 5 την παραγεγενημένην αὐτοῖς εὐδαιμονίαν. ἐν ὧ καιρώ 'Ρωμαΐοι τήν τε σφετέραν δύναμιν ανέλαβον καὶ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Λατίνους αδθις πράγματα συνβ εστήσαντο. παραγενομένων δε πάλιν τῶν Κελτῶν 284

villages, without any superfluous furniture; for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates.

18. On their first invasion they not only conquered 390 B.C. this country but reduced to subjection many of the neighbouring peoples, striking terror into them by their audacity. Not long afterwards they defeated the Romans and their allies in a pitched battle, and pursuing the fugitives, occupied, three days after the battle, the whole of Rome with the exception of the Capitol, but being diverted by an invasion of their own country by the Veneti, they made on this occasion a treaty with the Romans, and evacuating the city, returned home. After this they were occupied by domestic wars, and certain of the neighbouring Alpine tribes, witnessing to what prosperity they had attained in comparison with themselves, frequently gathered to attack them. Meanwhile the Romans re-established their power and again became masters of Latium. Thirty years \$60 B.C.

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είς "Αλβαν στρατεύματι μεγάλω μετά την της πόλεως κατάληψιν έτει τριακοστώ, τότε μεν οὐκ ἐτόλμησαν άντεξάγαγεῖν Ῥωμαῖοι τὰ στρατόπεδα, διὰ τὸ παραδόξου γενομένης της εφόδου προκαταληφθηναι καὶ μὴ καταταχῆσαι τὰς τῶν συμμάχων άθροίσαν-7 τας δυνάμεις. αδθις δ' έξ ἐπιβολῆς ἐτέρας ἔτει δωδεκάτω μετά μεγάλης στρατιάς επιπορευομένων, προαισθόμενοι καὶ συναγείραντες τοὺς συμμάχους, μετά πολλης προθυμίας απήντων, σπεύδοντες συμ-8 βαλεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. οί δὲ Γαλάται καταπλαγέντες τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν καὶ διαστασιάσαντες πρός σφας, νυκτός επιγενομένης φυγή παραπλησίαν εποιήσαντο την αποχώρησιν είς την οί-9 κείαν. ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου τοῦ φόβου τριακαίδεκα μὲν έτη την ήσυχίαν έσχον, μετά δε ταθτα συνορώντες αὐξανομένην τὴν Ῥωμαίων δύναμιν, εἰρήνην ἐποι-19 ήσαντο καὶ συνθήκας. ἐν αίς ἔτη τριάκοντα μείναντες έμπεδως, αθθις γενομένου κινήματος έκ των Τρανσαλπίνων, δείσαντες μή πόλεμος αὐτοῖς ἐγερθῆ βαρύς, ἀπὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔτρεψαν τὰς ὁρμὰς τῶν ἐξανισταμένων, δωροφοροῦντες καὶ προτιθέμενοι την συγγένειαν, έπὶ δὲ 'Ρωμαίους παρώξυναν καὶ μετ-2 έσχον αὐτοῖς τῆς στρατείας. ἐν ἡ τὴν ἔφοδον ποιησάμενοι διὰ Τυρρηνίας, όμοῦ συστρατευσαμένων σφίσι Τυρρηνών, καὶ περιβαλόμενοι λείας πληθος, έκ μεν της 'Ρωμαίων επαρχίας ασφαλώς επανηλθον. 3 είς δε την οικείαν αφικόμενοι, και στασιάσαντες περί την των είλημμένων πλεονεξίαν, της τε λείας και της αυτών δυνάμεως το πλειστον μέρος δι-4 έφθειραν. τοῦτο δὲ σύνηθές ἐστι Γαλάταις πράττειν, ἐπειδὰν σφετερίσωνταί τι τῶν πέλας, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὰς ἀλόγους οἰνοφλυγίας καὶ πλησμονάς. 286

after the occupation of Rome, the Celts again appeared before Alba with a large army, and the Romans on this occasion did not venture to meet them in the field, because, owing to the suddenness of the attack, they were taken by surprise and had not had time to anticipate it by collecting the forces of their allies. But when, twelve years later, the 848 B.C. Celts again invaded in great strength, they had early word of it, and, assembling their allies, marched eagerly to meet them, wishing for nothing better than a decisive battle. The Gauls, alarmed by the Roman advance and at variance among themselves, waited until nightfall and then set off for home, their retreat resembling a flight. After this panic, they kept quiet for thirteen years, and then, as they saw how rapidly the power of the Romans was 884 B.C. growing, they made a formal peace with them, to the terms of which they adhered steadfastly for thirty 19. But then, when a fresh movement began among the Transalpine Gauls, and they feared 299 B.C. they would have a big war on their hands, they deflected from themselves the inroad of the migrating tribes by bribery and by pleading their kinship, but they incited them to attack the Romans, and even joined them in the expedition. They advanced through Etruria, the Etruscans too uniting with them, and, after collecting a quantity of booty, retired quite safely from the Roman territory, but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and

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5 μετά δε ταθτα πάλιν έτει τετάρτω συμφρονήσαντες άμα Σαυνίται καὶ Γαλάται παρετάξαντο 'Ρωμαίοις εν τη Καμερτίων χώρα καὶ πολλούς αὐτῶν 6 εν τῷ κινδύνῳ διέφθειραν. εν ῷ καιρῷ προσ-φιλονεικήσαντες πρὸς τὸ γεγονὸς ελάττωμ' αὐτοῖς Ρωμαῖοι μετ' ολίγας ἡμέρας έξηλθον, καὶ συμβαλόντες πασι τοις στρατοπέδοις εν τη των Σεντινατών χώρα πρός τους προειρημένους τους μεν πλείστους απέκτειναν, τους δε λοιπους ηνάγκασαν προτροπάη δην έκάστους είς την οἰκείαν φυγείν. διαγενομένων δὲ πάλιν ἐτῶν δέκα παρεγένοντο Γαλάται μετά μεγάλης στρατιας, πολιορκήσοντες την 'Αρρη-8 τίνων πόλιν. 'Ρωμαΐοι δὲ παραβοηθήσαντες, καὶ συμβαλόντες πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἡττήθησαν. ἐν δὲ τῆ μάχη ταύτη Λευκίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τελευτή-9 σαντος Μάνιον επικατέστησαν τον Κόριον. πρεσβευτάς εκπέμψαντος είς Γαλατίαν ύπερ των αίχμαλώτων, παρασπονδήσαντες έπανείλοντο τους πρέ-10 σβεις. τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων ὑπὸ τὸν θυμὸν ἐκ χειρὸς έπιστρατευσαμένων, ἀπαντήσαντες συνέβαλον οἱ Σή11 νωνες καλούμενοι Γαλάται. 'Ρωμαῖοι δ' ἐκ παρατάξεως κρατήσαντες αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν πλείστους ἀπέκτειναν, τούς δε λοιπούς εξέβαλον, της δε χώρας 12 έγένοντο πάσης έγκρατείς. είς ην καὶ πρώτην της Γαλατίας αποικίαν έστειλαν την Σήνην προσαγορευομένην πόλιν, δμώνυμον οδσαν τοίς πρότερον 13 αὐτὴν κατοικοῦσι Γαλάταις, ὑπὲρ ἡς ἀρτίως διεσαφήσαμεν, φάσκοντες αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸν 'Αδρίαν ἐπὶ τῷ πέρατι κεῖσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων. 20 οἱ δὲ Βοῖοι, θεωροῦντες ἐκπεπτωκότας τοὺς Σήνωνας, καὶ δείσαντες περὶ σφῶν καὶ τῆς χώρας, μη πάθωσι το παραπλήσιον, έξεστράτευσαν παν-288

surfeiting. Four years later the Gauls made a league with the Samnites, and engaging the Romans in the 295 B.C. territory of Camerinum inflicted on them considerable loss: but the Romans, determined on avenging their reverse, advanced again a few days after with all their legions, and attacking the Gauls and Samnites in the territory of Santinum, put the greater number of them to the sword and compelled the rest to take precipitate flight each to their separate homes. Again, ten years afterwards, the Gauls appeared in 288 B.C. force and besieged Arretium. The Romans, coming to the help of the town, attacked them in front of it and were defeated. In this battle their Practor Lucius Caecilius fell, and they nominated Manius Curius in his place. When Manius sent legates to Gaul to treat for the return of the prisoners, they were treacherously slain, and this made the Romans so indignant that they at once marched upon Gaul. They were met by the Senones, whom they defeated in a pitched battle, killing most of them and driving the rest out of their country, the whole of which they occupied. This was the first part of Gaul in which they planted a colony, calling it Sena after the name of the tribe who formerly inhabited it. This is the city I mentioned above as lying near the Adriatic at the extremity of the plain of the Po. 20. Hereupon the Boii, seeing the Senones expelled from their territory, and fearing the same fate for themselves and their own land, implored the aid of the Etruscans and

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2 δημεὶ παρακαλέσαντες Τυρρηνούς. άθροισθέντες δὲ περὶ τὴν 'Οάδμονα προσαγορευομένην λίμνην παρ-

3 ετάξαντο 'Ρωμαίοις. εν δε τῆ μάχη ταύτη Τυρρηνῶν μεν οἱ πλεῖστοι κατεκόπησαν, τῶν δε Βοίων

4 τελέως ολίγοι διέφυγον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῷ κατὰ πόδας ἐνιαυτῷ συμφρονήσαντες αὖθις οἱ προειρημένοι καὶ τοὺς ἄρτι τῶν νέων ἡβῶντας καθοπλίσαν-

5 τες παρετάξαντο προς 'Ρωμαίους. ήττηθέντες δ' όλοσχερως τῆ μάχη μόλις εἶξαν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ διαπρεσβευσάμενοι περὶ σπονδων καὶ διαλύσεων, συν-

8 θήκας ἔθεντο πρὸς Ῥωμαίους. ταῦτα δὲ συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τῷ τρίτῳ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Πύρρου διαβάσεως εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, πέμπτῳ δὲ τῆς Γαλατῶν

7 περὶ Δελφοὺς διαφθορᾶς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἡ τύχη τοῖς καιροῖς ὡς ἄν εἰ λοιμικήν τινα πολέμου διάθεσιν

8 ἐπέστησε πᾶσι Γαλάταις. ἐκ δὲ τῶν προειρημένων ἀγώνων δύο τὰ κάλλιστα συνεκύρησε Ῥωμαίοις τοῦ γὰρ κατακόπτεσθαι συνήθειαν ἐσχηκότες ὑπὸ Γαλατῶν οὐδὲν ἠδύναντο δεινότερον ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ προσ-

9 δοκησαι τῶν αὐτοῖς ήδη πεπραγμένων· εξ ὧν πρός τε Πύρρον ἀθληταὶ τέλειοι γεγονότες τῶν κατὰ πό-

10 λεμον ἔργων συγκατέστησαν τήν τε Γαλατῶν τόλμαν ἐν καιρῷ καταπληξάμενοι λοιπὸν ἀπερισπάστως τὸ μὲν πρῶτον πρὸς Πύρρον περὶ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐπολέμουν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς Καρχηδονίους ὑπὲρ τῆς Σικελιωτῶν ἀρχῆς διηγωνίζοντο.

21 Γαλάται δ' έκ των προειρημένων έλαττωμάτων έτη μεν πέντε καὶ τετταράκοντα τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον, 2 εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς 'Ρωμαίους. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μεν

ε εἰρήνην ἄγοντες πρὸς 'Ρωμαίους. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ μὲν αὐτόπται γεγονότες τῶν δεινῶν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἐξεχώ- ρησαν διὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἐπεγένοντο δὲ νέοι, θυμοῦ μὲν ἀλογίστου πλήρεις, ἄπειροι δὲ κἀόρατοι παν- 290



marched out in full force. The united armies gave 282 B.C. battle to the Romans near Lake Vadimon, and in this battle most of the Etruscans were cut to pieces while only quite a few of the Boii escaped. But, notwithstanding, in the very next year these two peoples once more combined and arming their young men, even the mere striplings, again encountered the Romans in a pitched battle. They were utterly defeated and it was only now that their courage at length gave way and that they sent an embassy to sue for terms and made a treaty with the Romans. This took place three years before the crossing of Pyrrhus to Italy and five years before the destruction of the Gauls at Delphi; for it really seems that at this time Fortune afflicted all Gauls alike with a sort of epidemic of war. From all these struggles the Romans gained two great advantages. In the first place, having become accustomed to be cut up by Gauls, they could neither undergo nor expect any more terrible experience, and next, owing to this, when they met Pyrrhus they had become perfectly trained athletes in war, so that they were able to daunt the courage of the Gauls before it was too late, and henceforth could give their whole mind first to the fight with Pyrrhus for Italy and afterwards to the maintenance of the contest with Carthage for the possession of Sicily.

21. After these reverses, the Gauls remained quiet and at peace with Rome for forty-five years. But when, as time went on, those who had actually witnessed the terrible struggle were no more, and a younger generation had taken their place, full of unreflecting passion and absolutely without experi-

3 τὸς κακοῦ καὶ πάσης περιστάσεως, αὖθις ἤρξαντο τὰ καθεστώτα κινείν δ φύσιν έχει γίνεσθαι, καὶ τραχύνεσθαι μέν έκ των τυχόντων προς 'Ρωμαίους, 4 ἐπισπᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἄλπεων Γαλάτας. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον χωρὶς τοῦ πλήθους δι' αὐτῶν τῶν ήγουμένων εν απορρήτοις επράττετο τὰ προειρη-5 μένα. διὸ καὶ παραγενομένων τῶν Τρανσαλπίνων έως 'Αριμίνου μετά δυνάμεως, διαπιστήσαντα τά πλήθη τῶν Βοίων καὶ στασιάσαντα πρός τε τοὺς έαυτῶν προεστῶτας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παραγεγονότας, άνειλον μέν τους ίδίους βασιλείς "Ατιν και Γάλατον, κατέκοψαν δ' άλλήλους, συμβαλόντες έκ παραη τάξεων. ότε δη καὶ 'Ρωμαῖοι κατάφοβοι γενόμενοι την έφοδον, έξηλθον μετά στρατοπέδου συνέντες δέ την αθθαίρετον καταφθοράν τῶν Γαλατῶν, η αδθις άνεχώρησαν είς την οἰκείαν. μετά δὲ τοῦτον τὸν φόβον ἔτει πέμπτω, Μάρκου Λεπέδου στρατηγοῦντος, κατεκληρούχησαν έν Γαλατία 'Ρωμαῖοι την Πικεντίνην προσαγορευομένην χώραν, έξ ής νικήσαντες έξέβαλον τους Σήνωνας προσαγορευομέ-8 νους Γαλάτας, Γαΐου Φλαμινίου ταύτην την δημαγωγίαν είσηγησαμένου καὶ πολιτείαν, ην δη καὶ 'Ρωμαίοις ώς έπος είπειν φατέον άρχηγον μεν γενέσθαι της έπι το χειρον του δήμου διαστροφης, αίτίαν δέ καὶ τοῦ μετά ταῦτα πολέμου συστάντος 9 αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς προειρημένους. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν Γαλατῶν ὑπεδύοντο τὴν πρᾶξιν, μάλιστα δ' οί Βοΐοι, διὰ τὸ συντερμονεῖν τῆ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων χώρα, νομίσαντες ούχ ὑπερ ἡγεμονίας ἔτι καὶ δυναστείας 'Ρωμαίους τον πρός αὐτοὺς ποιήσασθαι πόλεμον, άλλ' ύπερ όλοσχεροῦς έξαναστάσεως καὶ καταφθορᾶς. 292

ence of suffering or peril, they began again, as was natural, to disturb the settlement, becoming exasperated against the Romans on the least pretext and inviting the Alpine Gauls to make common cause with them. At first these advances were made secretly by their chiefs without the knowledge of the 286 B.C. multitude; so that when a force of Transalpine Gauls advanced as far as Ariminum the Boian populace were suspicious of them, and quarrelling with their own leaders as well as with the strangers, killed their kings, Atis and Galatus, and had a pitched battle with the other Gauls in which many fell on either side. The Romans had been alarmed by the advance of the Gauls, and a legion was on its way; but, on learning of the Gauls' self-inflicted losses, they returned home. Five years after this alarm, in the consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans 282 B.C. divided among their citizens the territory in Gaul known as Picenum, from which they had ejected the Senones when they conquered them. Gaius Flaminius was the originator of this popular policy, which we must pronounce to have been, one may say, the first step in the demoralization of the populace, as well as the cause of the war with the Gauls which followed. For what prompted many of the Gauls and especially the Boii, whose territory bordered on that of Rome, to take action was the conviction that now the Romans no longer made war on them for the sake of supremacy and sovereignty, but with a view to their total expulsion and extermination.

22 Διόπερ εὐθέως τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἐθνῶν, τό τε τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοίων, συμφρονήσαντα διεπέμποντο πρός τους κατά τὰς "Αλπεις καὶ περὶ τὸν 'Ροδανόν ποταμόν κατοικοῦντας Γαλάτας, προσανορευομένους δε διά το μισθοῦ στρατεύειν Γαισάτους. 2 ή γάρ λέξις αθτη τοθτο σημαίνει κυρίως. ών τοθς βασιλεῦσι Κογκολιτάνω καὶ Ανηροέστω παραυτίκα μέν χρυσίου προτείναντες πληθος, είς το μέλλον δ' ύποδεικνύντες το μέγεθος της 'Ρωμαίων εύδαιμονίας καὶ τὸ πληθος τῶν ὑπαρξόντων αὐτοῖς ἀγαθῶν, ἐὰν κρατήσωσι, προυτρέποντο καὶ παρώξυνον 3 προς την επί 'Ρωμαίους στρατείαν. ραδίως δ' έπεισαν, αμα τοις προειρημένοις διδόντες μέν τὰ πιστὰ περί της αύτων συμμαχίας, άναμιμνήσκοντες δέ της 4 τῶν ἰδίων προγόνων πράξεως αὐτούς εν ή κεῖνοι στρατεύσαντες ου μόνον ενίκησαν μαχόμενοι 'Ρωμαίους, άλλα και μετά την μάχην έξ έφόδου κατ-5 έσχον αὐτὴν τὴν 'Ρώμην· γενόμενοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ύπαρχόντων απάντων έγκρατείς, και της πόλεως αὐτῆς έπτὰ μῆνας κυριεύσαντες, τέλος ἐθελοντὶ καὶ μετά χάριτος παραδόντες την πόλιν, άθραυστοι κάσινεις έχοντες την ωφέλειαν είς την οικείαν έπ-6 ανηλθον. ών ακούοντες οί περί αὐτοὺς ήγεμόνες ούτω παρωρμήθησαν έπὶ τὴν στρατείαν ώστε μηδέποτε μήτε πλείους μήτ' ενδοξοτέρους μήτε μαχιμωτέρους ἄνδρας έξελθεῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων τῆς 7 Γαλατίας. κατά δέ τους καιρούς τούτους 'Ρωμαΐοι τὰ μὲν ἀκούοντες, τὰ δὲ καταμαντευόμενοι τὸ μέλλον, είς φόβους ενέπιπτον συνεχείς και ταραχάς 8 επί τοσοῦτον ώστε ποτε μεν στρατόπεδα καταγράφειν καὶ σίτου καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ποιεῖσθαι παρασκευάς, ποτε δε και τας δυνάμεις εξάγειν επί τους 294

22. The two largest tribes, therefore, the Insubres 231 B.C. and Boii, made a league and sent messengers to the Gauls dwelling among the Alps and near the Rhone, who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word. They urged and incited their kings Concolitanus and Aneroestus to make war on Rome, offering them at present a large sum in gold, and as to the future. pointing out to them the great prosperity of the Romans, and the vast wealth that would be theirs if they were victorious. They had no difficulty in persuading them, as, in addition to all this, they pledged themselves to be loval allies and reminded them of the achievement of their own ancestors, who had not only overcome the Romans in combat. but, after the battle, had assaulted and taken Rome itself, possessing themselves of all it contained, and, after remaining masters of the city for seven months, had finally given it up of their own free will and as an act of grace, and had returned home with their spoil, unbroken and unscathed. When the kings had been told all this, they became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. All this time, the Romans, either hearing what was happening or divining what was coming, were in such a state of constant alarm and unrest, that at times we find them busy enrolling legions and making provision of corn and other stores, at times marching to the

όρους, ώς ήδη παρόντων εἰς τὴν χώραν τῶν πολεμίων, οὐδέπω κεκινηκότων ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας τῶν Κελ9 τῶν. οὐκ ἐλάχιστα δὲ συνήργησε καὶ Καρχηδονίος τοῦτο τὸ κίνημα πρὸς τὸ κατασκευάσασθαι τὰ

10 κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἀσφαλῶς. 'Ρωμαῖοι γάρ, ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν ἡμῖν εἴρηται, κρίνοντες ἀναγκαιότερα ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πρὸς ταῖς πλευραῖς αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν παρορᾶν ἠναγκάζοντο τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, σπουδάζοντες πρότερον ἐν καλῷ θέσθαι τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Κελτούς.

11 διόπερ ἀσφαλισάμενοι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους διὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ᾿Ασδρούβαν ὁμολογιῶν, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄρτι δεδηλώκαμεν, ἐνεχείρησαν ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς καιροῖς πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν πολεμίους, νομίζοντες συμφέρειν σφίσι τὸ διακριθῆναι

πρός τούτους.

23 Οί δὲ Γαισάται Γαλάται συστησάμενοι δύναμιν πολυτελή καὶ βαρεῖαν, ήκον ὑπεράραντες τὰς Αλπεις είς τὸν Πάδον ποταμὸν έτει μετά τὴν τῆς χώ-2 ρας διάδοσιν ὀγδόω. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων καὶ Βοίων γένος έμεινε γενναίως έν ταις έξ άρχης έπιβολαις, οί δ' Οὐένετοι και Γονομάνοι, διαπρεσβευσαμένων 'Ρωμαίων, τούτοις είλοντο συμμαχείν. 3 διὸ καὶ μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως καταλιπεῖν ἡναγκάσθησαν οι βασιλείς των Κελτων φυλακής χάριν τής 4 χώρας πρός τὸν ἀπὸ τούτων φόβον. αὐτοὶ δ' έξάραντες παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι κατατεθαρρηκότως ώρμησαν, ποιούμενοι την πορείαν ώς επί Τυρρηνίας, έχοντες πεζούς μέν είς πεντακισμυρίους, ίπ-5 πεις δέ και συνωρίδας εις δισμυρίους. 'Ρωμαίοι δ' ώς θαττον ήκουσαν τούς Κελτούς ύπερβεβληκέναι τας "Αλπεις, Λεύκιον μεν Αιμίλιον υπατον μετα δυνάμεως έξαπέστειλαν ώς έπ' 'Αριμίνου, τηρήσοντα 296

frontier, as if the enemy had already invaded their territory, while as a fact the Celts had not yet budged from their own country. This movement of the Gauls contributed in no small measure to the rapid and unimpeded subjugation of Spain by the Carthaginians; for the Romans, as I stated above, regarded this matter as of more urgency, since the danger was on their flank, and were compelled to neglect the affairs of Spain until they had dealt with the Gauls. They therefore secured themselves against the Carthaginians by the treaty with Hasdrubal, the terms of which I stated above, and threw their whole effort into the struggle with their enemies in Italy, considering it their main interest to bring this to a decisive conclusion.

23. The Gaesatae, having collected a richly equipped and formidable force, crossed the Alps, and descended into the plain of the Po in the eighth 225 B.C. year after the partition of Picenum. The Insubres and Boii held stoutly to their original purpose; but the Veneti and Cenomani, on the Romans sending an embassy to them, decided to give them their support; so that the Celtic chiefs were obliged to leave part of their forces behind to protect their territory from invasion by these tribes. They themselves marched confidently out with their whole available army, consisting of about fifty thousand foot and twenty thousand horse and chariots, and advanced on Etruria. The Romans, the moment they heard that the Gauls had crossed the Alps, sent Lucius Aemilius, their Consul, with his army to Ariminum to await

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ταύτη τῶν ἐναντίων τὴν ἔφοδον, ἔνα δὲ τῶν έξα-6 πελέκεων είς Τυρρηνίαν. ὁ μεν γαρ έτερος των ὑπάτων Γάιος ᾿Ατίλιος προεξεληλυθώς ἔτυχεν είς 7 Σαρδόνα μετά των στρατοπέδων, οί δ' έν τη 'Ρώμη πάντες περιδεεις ήσαν, μέγαν και φοβερον αυτοις υπολαμβάνοντες επιφέρεσθαι κίνδυνον. Επασχον δε τοῦτ' εἰκότως, ἔτι περὶ Γαλατῶν ἐγκαθημένου ταῖς 8 ψυχαις αὐτῶν τοῦ παλαιοῦ φόβου. διὸ καὶ πρὸς ταύτην αναφέροντες την έννοιαν τα μεν συνήθροιζον, τὰ δὲ κατέγραφον στρατόπεδα, τοῖς δ' ετοίμοις 9 είναι παρήγγελλον τῶν συμμάχων. καθόλου δὲ τοῖς ύποτεταγμένοις αναφέρειν ἐπέταξαν απογραφας τῶν έν ταις ήλικίαις, σπουδάζοντες ειδέναι το σύμπαν 10 πλήθος τής ύπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς δυνάμεως. δέ καὶ βελών καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιτηδειότητος πρὸς πόλεμον τηλικαύτην έποιήσαντο κατασκευὴν ἡλίκην 11 οὐδείς πω μνημονεύει πρότερον. συνηργείτο δ' 12 αὐτοῖς πάντα καὶ πανταχόθεν έτοίμως. καταπεπληγμένοι γάρ οί την 'Ιταλίαν οἰκοῦντες την των Γαλατων έφοδον, οὐκέτι 'Ρωμαίοις ήγοῦντο συμμαχείν οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς τούτων ἡγεμονίας γίνεσθαι τὸν πόλεμον, ἀλλὰ περὶ σφῶν ἐνόμιζον ἔκαστοι καὶ τῆς ίδίας πόλεως καὶ χώρας ἐπιφέρεσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον. 13 διόπερ έτοίμως τοις παραγγελλομένοις υπήκουον. 24 "Iva δε συμφανες επ' αυτών γενηται των εργων ήλίκοις 'Αννίβας ετόλμησε πράγμασιν επιθέσθαι [μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα] καὶ πρὸς ἡλίκην δυναστείαν παραβόλως αντοφθαλμήσας έπὶ τοσοῦτο καθίκετο τῆς προθέσεως ώστε τοῖς μεγίστοις συμπτώμασι περί-2 βάλλειν 'Ρωμαίους, ρητέον αν είη την παρασκευήν καὶ τὸ πληθος της ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς τότε δυνά-3 μεως. μετά μεν δή των ύπάτων εξεληλύθει τέτταρα 298

the attack of the enemy, and one of their Praetors to Etruria, their other Consul, Gaius Atilius, being absent in Sardinia with his legions. There was great and general alarm in Rome, as they thought they were in imminent and serious peril, and this indeed was but natural, as the terror the old invasion had inspired still dwelt in their minds. Being, therefore, in this state of profound apprehension, they busied themselves mustering and enrolling their own legions and ordered those of the allies to be in readiness. All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men of military age. as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders.

24. But, that it may appear from actual facts what a great power it was that Hannibal ventured to attack, and how mighty was that empire boldly confronting which he came so near his purpose as to bring great disasters on Rome, I must state what were their resources and the actual number of their forces at this time. Each of the Consuls was in

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στρατόπεδα 'Ρωμαϊκά, πεντάκις μεν χιλίους καὶ διακοσίους πεζικούς, ίππεις δε τριακοσίους έχον 4 εκαστον. σύμμαχοι δε μεθ' εκατέρων ήσαν οι συνάμφω πεζοί μεν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ' ίππεις. 5 τῶν δ' ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ προσβοηθησάντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην Σαβίνων καὶ Τυρρηνῶν ἱππεῖς μὲν ἦσαν είς τετρακισχιλίους, πεζοί δὲ πλείους τῶν πεντακισβ μυρίων. τούτους μεν έθροίσαντες ώς έπὶ Τυρρηνίας προεκάθισαν, έξαπέλεκυν αὐτοῖς ἡγεμόνα συη στήσαντες. οί δε τον 'Απεννίνον κατοικοθντες "Ομβροι καὶ Σαρσινάτοι συνήγθησαν είς δισμυρίους, μετά δε τούτων Οὐένετοι καὶ Γονομάνοι δισμύριοι. 8 τούτους δ' έταξαν έπὶ τῶν ὅρων τῆς Γαλατίας, ἵν' έμβαλόντες είς την των Βοίων χώραν άντιπερισπῶσι τοὺς ἐξεληλυθότας. τὰ μὲν οὖν προκαθ-9 ήμενα στρατόπεδα της χώρας ταθτ' ήν. έν δε τη Τωμη διέτριβον ήτοιμασμένοι χάριν των συμβαίνόντων εν τοις πολέμοις, εφεδρείας έχοντες τάξιν, 'Ρωμαίων μεν αὐτῶν πεζοί δισμύριοι, μετὰ δε τούτων ίππεις χίλιοι και πεντακόσιοι, τῶν δὲ συμ-10 μάχων πεζοί μέν τρισμύριοι, δισχίλιοι δ' ίππείς. καταγραφαί δ' άνηνέχθησαν Λατίνων μεν οκτακισμύριοι πεζοί, πεντακισχίλιοι δ' ίππεις, Σαυνιτών δὲ πεζοὶ μὲν ἐπτακισμύριοι, μετὰ δὲ τούτων ἱππεῖς 11 ἐπτακισχίλιοι, καὶ μὴν Ἰαπύγων καὶ Μεσσαπίων συνάμφω πεζών μεν πέντε μυριάδες, ίππεις δε μύ-12 ριοι σὺν έξακισχιλίοις, Λευκανῶν δὲ πεζοὶ μὲν τρισμύριοι, τρισχίλιοι δ' ίππεις, Μαρσών δέ και Μαρρουκίνων καὶ Φρεντανών, ἔτι δ' Οὐεστίνων, πεζοὶ μεν δισμύριοι, τετρακισχίλιοι δ' ίππεις. έτι γε 13 μην κάν Σικελία καὶ Τάραντι στρατόπεδα δύο παρεφήδρευεν, ων έκατερον ήν ανά τετρακισχιλίους 300

command of four legions of Roman citizens, each consisting of five thousand two hundred foot and three hundred horse. The allied forces in each Consular army numbered thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse. The cavalry of the Sabines and Etruscans, who had come to the temporary assistance of Rome, were four thousand strong, their infantry above fifty thousand. The Romans massed these forces and posted them on the frontier of Etruria under the command of a Praetor. The levy of the Umbrians and Sarsinatae inhabiting the Apennines amounted to about twenty thousand, and with these were twenty thousand Veneti and Cenomani. These they stationed on the frontier of Gaul, to invade the territory of the Boii and divert them back from their expedition. These were the armies protecting the Roman territory. In Rome itself there was a reserve force ready for any contingency consisting of twenty thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, all Roman citizens, and thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse furnished by the allies. The lists of men able to bear arms that had been returned were as follows. Latins eighty thousand foot and five thousand horse, Samnites seventy thousand foot and seven thousand horse, Iapygians and Messapians fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse, Lucanians thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse, Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, and Vestini twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse. In Sicily and Tarentum were two reserve legions, each consisting of four thousand

14 καὶ διακοσίους πεζούς, ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους. 'Ρωμαίων δὲ καὶ Καμπανῶν ἡ πληθὺς πεζῶν μὲν εἰς
εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε κατελέχθησαν μυριάδες, ἱππέων
δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς δύο μυριάσιν ἐπῆσαν ἔτι τρεῖς χιλιάδες.

15 ωστ' είναι τὸ [κεφάλαιον των μεν προκαθημένων τῆς 'Ρώμης δυνάμεων πεζοὶ μεν ὑπερ πεντεκαίδεκα

18 μυριάδες, ίππεις δὲ πρὸς έξακισχιλίους, τὸ δὲ] σύμπαν πληθος τῶν δυναμένων ὅπλα βαστάζειν αὐτῶν
τε 'Ρωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων πεζῶν ὑπὲρ τὰς
έβδομήκοντα μυριάδας, ἱππέων δ' εἰς ἐπτὰ μυριά-

17 δας. έφ' οῦς 'Αννίβας ελάττους έχων δισμυρίων επέβαλεν εἰς τὴν 'Ιταλίαν. περὶ μεν οῦν τούτων εν τοῦς εξῆς σαφέστερον εκποιήσει κατανοεῖν.

25 Οί δὲ Κελτοί κατάραντες εἰς τὴν Τυρρηνίαν ἐπεπορεύοντο την χώραν, πορθοῦντες άδεῶς οὐδενὸς δ' αὐτοῖς ἀντιταττομένου, τέλος ἐπ' αὐτὴν ὥρμησαν 2 την 'Ρώμην. ήδη δ' αὐτῶν περὶ πόλιν ὅντων ἡ καλείται μεν Κλούσιον, απέχει δ' ήμερων τριών όδον ἀπο της 'Ρώμης, προσαγγέλλεται διότι κατόπιν αὐτοῖς ἔπονται καὶ συνάπτουσιν αἱ προκαθήμεναι 3 των 'Ρωμαίων εν τη Τυρρηνία δυνάμεις. οί δ' άκούσαντες έξ ύποστροφης απήντων, σπεύδοντες τούτοις 4 συμβαλείν. εγγίσαντες δ' άλλήλοις ήδη περί δυσμας ήλίου, τότε μεν εν συμμέτρω διαστήματι κατα-5 στρατοπεδεύσαντες ηθλίσθησαν αμφότεροι. της δέ νυκτός επιγενομένης πῦρ ἀνακαύσαντες οἱ Κελτοὶ τοὺς μὲν ἱππεῖς ἀπέλιπον, συντάξαντες ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ συμφανείς γενομένους τοίς πολεμίοις ύποχωρείν κατά 6 τον αὐτον στίβον. αὐτοὶ δὲ λαθραίαν ποιησάμενοι την αποχώρησιν ώς έπὶ πόλιν Φαισόλαν, αὐτοῦ παρενέβαλον, πρόθεσιν έχοντες αμα μεν εκδέχεσθαι τούς έαυτων ίππεις, αμα δέ παραδόξως ένοχλησαι 302

two hundred foot and two hundred horse. Of Romans and Campanians there were on the roll two hundred and fifty thousand and about twenty-three thousand horse; so that the total number of Romans and allies able to bear arms was more than seven hundred thousand foot and seventy thousand horse, while Hannibal invaded Italy with an army of less than twenty thousand men. 25. On this matter I shall be able to give my readers more explicit information in the course of this work.

The Celts, descending on Etruria, overran the country without let or hindrance and, as nobody appeared to oppose them, they marched on Rome itself. When they had got as far as Clusium, a city three days' journey from Rome, news reached them that the advanced force which the Romans had posted in Etruria was on their heels and approaching. On hearing this, they turned to meet it, eager to engage it. At sunset the two armies were in close proximity, and encamped for the night at no great distance from each other. After nightfall, the Celts lit their camp-fires, and, leaving orders with their cavalry to wait until daybreak and then, when visible to the enemy, to follow on their track, they themselves secretly retreated to a town called Faesulae and posted themselves there, their intention being to wait for their cavalry, and also to put unexpected difficulties in the way of the enemy's

η την των ύπεναντίων έφοδον. οί δε 'Ρωμαίοι της ήμέρας επιγενομένης συνιδόντες τους ίππεις αυτούς, καὶ νομίσαντες τους Κελτους αποδεδρακέναι, κατά σπουδην ηκολούθουν τοις ίππεθσι κατά την εκείνων 8 ἀποχώρησιν. ἄμα δὲ τῷ συνεγγίζειν τοῖς πολεμίοις

διαναστάντων τῶν Κελτῶν, καὶ συμπεσόντων αὐτοῖς,

9 ην άγων τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν βίαιος. τέλος δὲ καθυπερεγόντων τῶν Κελτῶν τῆ τόλμη καὶ τῷ πλήθει, συνέβη διαφθαρήναι μέν των 'Ρωμαίων οὐκ έλάττους έξακισχιλίων, τους δε λοιπούς φεύγειν ων οί πλείους πρός τινα τόπον έρυμνον ἀποχωρήσαντες 10 έμενον. οθς το μέν πρώτον οι Κελτοί πολιορκείν

επεβάλοντο κακώς δ' ἀπαλλάττοντες ἐκ τῆς προγεγενημένης εν τη νυκτί πορείας και κακοπαθείας και ταλαιπωρίας, ώρμησαν πρός ανάπαυσιν καὶ θεραπείαν, φυλακήν απολιπόντες των ιδίων ίππέων περί 11 τον λόφον, πρόθεσιν έχοντες κατά τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν

πολιορκείν τους συμπεφευγότας, εαν μη παραδώσιν έαυτούς έκουσίως.

Κατά δὲ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος δ 26 προκαθήμενος επί των κατά τον 'Αδρίαν τόπων άκούσας τους Κελτους διά Τυρρηνίας εμβεβληκότας συνεγγίζειν τῆ 'Ρώμη, παρην βοηθῶν κατὰ σπουδην 2 εὐτυχῶς εἰς δέοντα καιρόν. καταστρατοπεδεύσαντος δ' αὐτοῦ σύνεγγυς τῶν πολεμίων, κατιδόντες τὰ πυρὰ καὶ νοήσαντες τὸ γεγονὸς οἱ συμπεφευγότες έπὶ τὸν λόφον, ταχέως ἀναθαρρήσαντες έξαπέστειλαν αύτῶν τινας τῆς νυκτὸς ἀνόπλους διὰ της ύλης αναγγελούντας τῷ στρατηγῷ τὸ συμβεβη-3 κός. ὁ δὲ διακούσας, καὶ θεωρῶν οὐδὲ διαβούλιον αύτω καταλειπόμενον ύπερ των ενεστώτων, τοις μεν χιλιάρχοις αμα τῷ φωτί παρήγγειλε τοὺς πεζοὺς 304

At daybreak, the Romans, seeing the cavalry alone and thinking the Celts had taken to flight, followed the cavalry with all speed on the line of the Celts' retreat. On their approaching the enemy, the Celts issued from their camp and attacked them, and a conflict, at first very stubborn, took place, in which finally the numbers and courage of the Celts prevailed, not fewer than six thousand Romans falling and the rest taking to flight. of them retreated to a hill of some natural strength where they remained. The Celts at first attempted to besiege them, but as they were getting the worst of it, fatigued as they were by their long night march and the suffering and hardships it involved, they hastened to rest and refresh themselves. leaving a detachment of their cavalry to keep guard round the hill, intending next day to besiege the fugitives, if they did not offer to surrender.

26. At this very time Lucius Aemilius, who was in command of the advanced force near the Adriatic, on hearing that the Celts had invaded Etruria and were approaching Rome, came in haste to help, fortunately arriving in the nick of time. He encamped near the enemy, and the fugitives on the hill, seeing his camp-fires and understanding what had occurred, immediately plucked up courage and dispatched by night some unarmed messengers through the wood to announce to the Consul the plight they were in. On hearing of it and seeing that there was no alternative course under the circumstances, he ordered his Tribunes to march

έξάγειν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀναλαβών καθηγεῖτο της δυνάμεως, ποιούμενος την πορείαν επί τον τηροειρημένον βουνόν. οι δε των Γαλατων ήγεμόνες, αφορώντες τὰ πυρὰ τῆς νυκτός καὶ συλλογιζόμενοι την παρουσίαν των πολεμίων συνήδρευον. 5 οξς 'Ανηροέστης ὁ βασιλεύς γνώμην εἰσέφερε λέγων ότι δεί τοσαύτης λείας εγκρατείς γεγονότας, ήν γάρ, ώς ξοικε, καὶ τὸ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ θρεμμάτων πληθος, έτι δε της αποσκευής ής είχον, αμύθητον 6 διόπερ έφη δεῖν μὴ κινδυνεύειν ἔτι μηδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοις όλοις, άλλ' είς την οικείαν άδεως έπανάγειν ταθτα δ' αποσκευασαμένους καὶ γενομένους εὐζώνους αθθις έγχειρεῖν όλοσχερῶς, ἐὰν δοκῆ, τοῖς 7 'Ρωμαίων πράγμασι. δόξαντος δε σφίσι κατά την 'Ανηροέστου γνώμην χρήσασθαι τοῖς παροῦσιν, οὖτοι μὲν τῆς νυκτὸς ταῦτα βουλευσάμενοι, πρὸ φωτὸς ἀναζεύξαντες προῆγον παρὰ θάλατταν διὰ τῆς 8 Τυρρηνών χώρας. ὁ δὲ Λεύκιος, ἀναλαβών ἐκ τοῦ βουνοῦ τὸ διασωζόμενον τοῦ στρατοπέδου μέρος αμα ταις ιδίαις δυνάμεσι, το μεν διακινδυνεύειν εκ παρατάξεως οὐδαμῶς ἔκρινε συμφέρειν, ἐπιτηρεῖν δὲ μᾶλλον καιροὺς καὶ τόπους εὐφυεῖς, ἐπόμενος, ἐάν πού τι βλάψαι τοὺς πολεμίους η της λείας αποσπάσαι δυνηθη.

27 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους ἐκ Σαρδόνος μετὰ τῶν στρατοπέδων Γάιος ᾿Ατίλιος ὕπατος εἰς Πίσας καταπεπλευκὼς προῆγε μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως εἰς Ἡωμην, ἐναντίαν ποιούμενος τοῖς πολεμίοις τὴν 2 πορείαν. ἤδη δὲ περὶ Τελαμῶνα τῆς Τυρρηνίας τῶν Κελτῶν ὑπαρχόντων, οἱ προνομεύοντες ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς τοὺς παρὰ τοῦ Γαΐου προπο-3 ρευομένους ἐάλωσαν· καὶ τά τε προγεγονότα διεσά-



out the infantry at daybreak, he himself proceeding in advance with the cavalry towards the hill. leaders of the Gauls, on seeing the camp-fires at night, surmised that the enemy had arrived and held a council at which the King Aneroestes expressed the opinion, that having captured so much booty (for it appears that the quantity of slaves, cattle and miscellaneous spoil was enormous), they should not give battle again nor risk the fortune of the whole enterprise, but return home in safety, and having got rid of all their encumbrances and lightened themselves, return and, if advisable, try issues with the Romans. It was decided under the circumstances to take the course recommended by Aneroestes, and having come to this resolution in the night, they broke up their camp before daybreak and retreated along the sea-coast through Etruria. Lucius now took with him from the hill the survivors of the other army and united them with his other forces. He thought it by no means advisable to risk a general battle, but decided to hang on the enemy's rear and watch for times and places favourable for inflicting damage on them or wresting some of the spoil from their hands.

27. Just at this time, Gaius Atilius, the other Consul, had reached Pisa from Sardinia with his legions and was on his way to Rome, marching in the opposite direction to the enemy. When the Celts were near Telamon in Etruria, their advanced guard encountered that of Gaius and were made prisoners. On being examined by the Consul they

φουν ἀνακρινόμενοι τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τὴν παρουσίαν αμφοτέρων των στρατοπέδων ανήγγελλον, σημαίνοντες διότι τελείως σύνεγγύς είσιν οἱ Κελτοὶ καὶ 4 τούτων κατόπιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Λεύκιον. ὁ δὲ τὰ μὲν ξενισθείς επί τοις προσπίπτουσι, τὰ δ' εὔελπις γενόμενος έπὶ τῷ δοκεῖν μέσους κατὰ πορείαν ἀπειληφέναι τοὺς Κελτούς, τοῖς μεν χιλιάρχοις παρήγγειλε τάττειν τὰ στρατόπεδα, καὶ βάδην εἰς τουμπροσθεν προάγειν, καθ' όσον αν οι τόποι προσδέχωνται την 5 μετωπηδον εφοδον, αὐτος δε συνθεωρήσας εὐκαίοως λόφον κείμενον ύπερ την όδον, ύφ' ον έδει παραπορευθήναι τους Κελτούς, αναλαβών τους ίππεις, ωρμησε σπεύδων προκαταλαβέσθαι την ακρολοφίαν καὶ πρώτος κατάρξαι τοῦ κινδύνου, πεπεισμένος τῆς έπιγραφής των έκβαινόντων πλείστον ούτω κληρονοβ μήσειν. οί δε Κελτοί το μεν πρώτον την παρουσίαν τών περί τὸν 'Ατίλιον άγνοοθντες, ἐκ δὲ τοθ συμ-Βαίνοντος ύπολαμβάνοντες τούς περί τον Αιμίλιον περιπεπορεύσθαι την νύκτα τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τους τόπους, εὐθέως έξαπέστελλον τούς παρ' αύτων ίππεις καί τινας των εὐζώνων, η άντιποιησομένους των κατά τον βουνον τόπων, ταχύ δε συνέντες την τοῦ Γαΐου παρουσίαν ἔκ τινος τῶν άχθέντων αίχμαλώτων, σπουδή παρενέβαλον τούς πεζούς, ποιούμενοι τὴν ἔκταξιν ἄμα πρὸς ἐκατέραν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν, καὶ τὴν ἀπ' οὐρᾶς καὶ τὴν κατὰ 8 πρόσωπον ους μεν γάρ ήδεσαν επομένους αύτοις. ους δε κατά το στόμα προσεδόκων απαντήσειν, εκ τε των προσαγγελλομένων τεκμαιρόμενοι καὶ των 28 κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν συμβαινόντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τον Αιμίλιον ακηκοότες μεν τον είς τας Πίσας κατάπλουν των στρατοπέδων, ούπω δὲ προσδοκών-308

narrated all that had recently occurred and told him of the presence of the two armies, stating that the Gauls were quite near and Lucius behind them. The news surprised him but at the same time made him very hopeful, as he thought he had caught the Gauls on the march between the two armies. He ordered his Tribunes to put the legions in fighting order and to advance thus at marching pace in so far as the nature of the ground allowed the attack He himself had happily noticed a hill situated above the road by which the Celts must pass, and taking his cavalry with him, advanced at full speed, being anxious to occupy the crest of the hill before their arrival and be the first to begin the battle, feeling certain that thus he would get the ' largest share of credit for the result. The Celts at first were ignorant of the arrival of Atilius and imagined from what they saw, that Aemilius' cavalry had got round their flank in the night and were engaged in occupying the position. They therefore at once sent on their own cavalry and some of their light-armed troops to dispute the possession of the hill. But very soon they learnt of Gaius' presence from one of the prisoners brought in, and lost no time in drawing up their infantry, deploying them so that they faced both front and rear, since, both from the intelligence that reached them and from what was happening before their eyes, they knew that the one army was following them, and they expected to meet the other in their front. Aemilius, who had heard of the landing of the legions at Pisa but had not any idea that they were already

τες αὐτὰ συνεγγίζειν, τότε σαφώς ἐκ τοῦ περὶ τὸν λόφον αγώνος έγνωσαν διότι τελέως έγγυς είναι 2 συμβαίνει τὰς οἰκείας αὐτῶν δυνάμεις. διὸ καὶ τούς μέν ίππεις παραυτίκα βοηθήσοντας έξαπέστελλον τοις έν τῷ λόφω διαγωνιζομένοις, αὐτοὶ δε κατά τὰς είθισμένας τάξεις διακοσμήσαντες τοὺς 3 πεζούς προήγον έπὶ τούς ύπεναντίους. οί δὲ Κελτοὶ τοὺς μέν ἐκ τῶν "Αλπεων Γαισάτους προσαγορευομένους έταξαν πρός την άπ' οὐρᾶς ἐπιφάνειαν ή προσεδόκων τούς περί τον Αιμίλιον, επί δε τού-4 τοις τούς "Ινσομβρας πρός δέ την κατά πρόσωπον τούς Ταυρίσκους καὶ τούς ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Πάδου κατοικοῦντας Βοίους παρενέβαλον, την εναντίαν μέν στάσιν έχοντας τοις προειρημένοις, βλέποντας δέ πρός την των τοῦ Γαΐου στρατοπέδων έφοδον. 5 τὰς δ' ἀμάξας καὶ συνωρίδας ἐκτὸς ἐκατέρου τοῦ κέρατος παρέστησαν, την δε λείαν είς τι τῶν παρακειμένων ορών φυλακήν περιστήσαντες ήθροιζον. 6 γενομένης δ' αμφιστόμου της των Κελτων δυνάμεως, οὐ μόνον καταπληκτικήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρακτικήν 7 είναι συνέβαινε την τάξιν. οι μεν οδν "Ινσομβρες καὶ Βοῖοι τὰς ἀναξυρίδας ἔχοντες καὶ τοὺς εὐπετεῖς 8 των σάγων περί αύτους εξέταξαν, οι δε Γαισάται διά τε την φιλοδοξίαν και το θάρσος ταθτ' ἀπορρίψαντες γυμνοί μετ' αὐτῶν τῶν ὅπλων πρῶτοι τῆς δυνάμεως κατέστησαν, ύπολαβόντες ούτως έσεσθαι πρακτικώτατοι, διὰ τό τινας τῶν τόπων βατώδεις οντας εμπλέκεσθαι τοῖς εφάμμασι καὶ παραποδίζειν 9 την των οπλων χρείαν. το μέν οδν πρώτον αὐτος ό κατά τὸν λόφον ἐνειστήκει κίνδυνος, ἄπασιν ῶν σύνοπτος, ώς αν αμα τοσούτου πλήθους ίππέων άφ' έκάστου των στρατοπέδων αναμίξ άλλήλοις 310

so near him, now, when he saw the fight going on round the hill, knew that the other Roman army was quite close. Accordingly, sending on his cavalry to help those who were fighting on the hill, he drew up his infantry in the usual order and advanced to attack. The Celts had drawn up facing their rear, from which they expected Aemilius to attack, the Gaesatae from the Alps and behind them the Insubres, and facing in the opposite direction, ready to meet the attack of Gaius' legions, they placed the Taurisci and the Boii from the left bank of the Po. Their wagons and chariots they stationed at the extremity of either wing and collected their booty on one of the neighbouring hills with a protecting force round it. This order of the Celtic forces, facing both ways, not only presented a formidable appearance, but was well adapted to the exigencies of the situation. The Insubres and Boii wore their trews and light cloaks, but the Gaesatae had discarded these garments owing to their proud confidence in themselves, and stood naked, with nothing but their arms, in front of the whole army, thinking that thus they would be more efficient, as some of the ground was overgrown with brambles which would catch in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons. At first the battle was confined to the hill, all the armies gazing on it, so great were the numbers of cavalry from each host com-

10 συμπεπτωκότος. ἐν δὲ τούτω τῷ καιρῷ συνέβη Γάιον μεν τον υπατον παραβόλως άγωνιζόμενον έν γειρων νόμω τελευτήσαι τον βίον, την δε κεφαλήν αὐτοῦ πρός τοὺς βασιλέας ἐπανενεχθῆναι τῶν Κελτων τους δε των Ρωμαίων ίππεις, κινδυνεύσαντας έρρωμένως τέλος επικρατήσαι τοῦ τόπου καὶ τῶν 11 ύπεναντίων. μετά δε ταθτα των πεζικών στρατοπέδων ήδη σύνεγγυς όντων άλλήλοις ίδιον ήν καί θαυμαστὸν τὸ συμβαῖνον οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ καιρῷ τότε παροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ποτε μετὰ ταθτα δυναμένοις ύπο την όψιν λαμβάνειν έκ των 29 λεγομένων το γεγονός. πρώτον μέν γάρ έκ τριών στρατοπέδων της μάχης συνισταμένης, δηλον ώς ξένην καὶ παρηλλαγμένην είκὸς καὶ την επιφάνειαν 2 καὶ τὴν χρείαν φαίνεσθαι τοῦ συντεταγμένου. δεύτερον δέ πως οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι τις καὶ νῦν καὶ τότε παρ' αὐτὸν ὢν τὸν καιρὸν πότερον οἱ Κελτοὶ τὴν ἐπισφαλεστάτην είχον χώραν, έξ ἀμφοῖν τοῖν 3 μεροίν αμα των πολεμίων επαγόντων αὐτοίς, η το υναντίον την επιτευκτικωτάτην, αμα μεν άγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς ἀμφοτέρους, ἄμα δὲ τὴν ἀφ' ἐκατέρων ασφάλειαν έκ των όπισθεν αύτοις παρασκευάζοντες, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀποκεκλειμένης πάσης τῆς εἶς τουπισθεν ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ λείπεσθαι 4 σωτηρίας; ή γὰρ τῆς ἀμφιστόμου τάξεως ἰδιότης 5 τοιαύτην ἔχει τὴν χρείαν. τούς γε μὴν Ῥωμαίους τὰ μὲν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐποίει τὸ μέσους καὶ πάντοθεν περιειληφέναι τους πολεμίους, τὰ δὲ πάλιν ὁ κόσμος αὐτοὺς καὶ θόρυβος έξέπληττε τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν 6 δυνάμεως. ἀναρίθμητον μέν γὰρ ήν τὸ τῶν βυκανητών καὶ σαλπιγκτών πλήθος. οίς αμα τοῦ παντός στρατοπέδου συμπαιανίζοντος τηλικαύτην

bating there pell-mell. In this action Gaius the Consul fell in the mellay fighting with desperate courage, and his head was brought to the Celtic kings: but the Roman cavalry, after a stubborn struggle, at length overmastered the enemy and gained possession of the hill. The infantry were now close upon each other, and the spectacle was a strange and marvellous one, not only to those actually present at the battle, but to all who could afterwards picture it to themselves from the reports. 29. For in the first place, as the battle was between three armies, it is evident that the appearance and the movements of the forces marshalled against each other must have been in the highest degree strange and unusual. Again, it must have been to all present. and still is to us, a matter of doubt whether the Celts, with the enemy advancing on them from both sides, were more dangerously situated, or, on the contrary, more effectively, since at one and the same time they were fighting against both their enemies and were protecting themselves in the rear from both, while, above all, they were absolutely cut off from retreat or any prospect of escape in the case of defeat, this being the peculiarity of this two-faced formation. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host and the dreadful din, for there were innumerable trumpeters and horn-blowers, and, as the whole army were shouting their war-cries at the same

καὶ τοιαύτην συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι κραυγήν ώστε μή μόνον τὰς σάλπιγγας καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούς παρακειμένους τόπους συνηγοθντας έξ αύτων 7 δοκεῖν προτεσθαι φωνήν. ἐκπληκτικὴ δ' ἦν καὶ τῶν γυμνῶν προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν ἥ τ' ἐπιφάνεια καὶ κίνησις, ώς ἂν διαφερόντων ταῖς ἀκμαῖς καὶ 8 τοῖς εἴδεσι. πάντες δ' οἱ τὰς πρώτας κατέχοντες σπείρας χρυσοῖς μανιάκαις καὶ περιχείροις ἦσαν β κατακεκοσμημένοι. προς α βλέποντες οι 'Ρωμαιοι τὰ μὲν ἐξεπλήττοντο, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λυσιτελοῦς έλπίδος αγόμενοι διπλασίως παρωξύνοντο πρός τον 30 κίνδυνον. πλην αμα τω τους ακοντιστάς προελθόντας έκ των 'Ρωμαϊκών στρατοπέδων κατά τὸν έθισμον είσακοντίζειν ένεργοίς και πυκνοίς τοίς βέλεσι, τοις μέν οπίσω των Κελτων πολλήν εύγρη-2 στίαν οἱ σάγοι μετὰ τῶν ἀναξυρίδων παρεῖχον τοῖς δὲ γυμνοῖς προεστῶσι παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν τοῦ πράγματος συμβαίνοντος τάναντία πολλήν απορίαν 3 καὶ δυσχρηστίαν παρείχε τὸ γινόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δυναμένου τοῦ Γαλατικοῦ θυρεοῦ τὸν ἄνδρα περισκέπειν, δσω γυμνά καὶ μείζω τὰ σώματ' ήν, τοσού-4 τω συνέβαινε μαλλον τὰ βέλη πίπτειν ένδον. τέλος δ' οὐ δυνάμενοι μὲν ἀμύνασθαι τοὺς εἰσακοντίζοντας διά την απόστασιν και το πληθος των πιπτόντων βελών, περικακούντες δέ καὶ δυσχρηστούμενοι τοῖς παροθσιν, οἱ μὲν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀλογιστίας εἰκῆ προπίπτοντες καὶ διδόντες σφας αὐτοὺς έκουσίως ἀπέθνησκον, οἱ δ' εἰς τοὺς φίλους αναχωροῦντες ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ προδήλως απο-5 δειλιώντες διέστρεφον τούς κατόπιν. το μέν ούν τῶν Γαισατῶν φρόνημα παρὰ τοῖς ἀκοντισταῖς β τούτω τῶ τρόπω κατελύθη, τὸ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων 914

time, there was such a tumult of sound that it seemed that not only the trumpets and the soldiers but all the country round had got a voice and caught up the cry. Very terrifying too were the appearance and the gestures of the naked warriors in front, all in the prime of life, and finely built men, and all in the leading companies richly adorned with gold torques and armlets. The sight of them indeed dismayed the Romans, but at the same time the prospect of winning such spoils made them twice as keen for the fight. 30. But when the javelineers advanced, as is their usage, from the ranks of the Roman legions and began to hurl their javelins in well-aimed volleys, the Celts in the rear ranks indeed were well protected by their trews and cloaks, but it fell out far otherwise than they had expected with the naked men in front, and they found themselves in a very difficult and helpless predicament. For the Gaulish shield does not cover the whole body; so that their nakedness was a disadvantage, and the bigger they were a the better chance had the missiles of going home. At length, unable to drive off the javelineers owing to the distance and the hail of javelins, and reduced to the utmost distress and perplexity, some of them, in their impotent rage, rushed wildly on the enemy and sacrificed their lives, while others, retreating step by step on the ranks of their comrades, threw them into disorder by their display of faint-heartedness. Thus was the spirit of the Gaesatae broken down by the javelineers; but the main body of the Insubres,

 $^{\rm a}$ Literally "so that the more naked and the bigger they were . . ."

καὶ Βοίων ἔτι δὲ Ταυρίσκων πλήθος ἄμα τῷ τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους δεξαμένους τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ἀκοντιστὰς προσβάλλειν σφίσι τὰς σπείρας συμπεσὸν τοῖς 7 πολεμίοις ἐκ χειρὸς ἐποίει μάχην ἐχυράν. διακοπτόμενοι γὰρ ἔμενον ἐπ' ἴσον ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα λειπόμενοι, ταῖς τῶν 8 ὅπλων κατασκευαῖς. οἱ μὲν οὖν θυρεοὶ πρὸς ἀσφάλειαν, αἱ δὲ μάχαιραι πρὸς πρᾶξιν μεγάλην διαφορὰν . . . ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ Γαλατικὴν καταφορὰν ἔχειν μόνον. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐξ ὑπερδεξίων καὶ κατὰ κέρας οἱ τῶν 'Ρωμαίων ἱππεῖς ἐμβαλόντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόφου προσέφερον τὰς χεῖρας ἐρρωμένως, τόθ' οἱ μὲν πεζοὶ τῶν Κελτῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ τῆς παρατάξεως τόπῳ κατεκόπησαν, οἱ δ' ἱππεῖς πρὸς φυγὴν ὥρμησαν. 1 'Απέθανον μὲν οὖν τῶν Κελτῶν εἰς τετρακισμυ-

1 Απέθανον μέν ούν τῶν Κελτῶν είς τετρακισμυρίους, ἐάλωσαν δ' οὐκ ἐλάττους μυρίων, ἐν οἷς καὶ 2 τῶν βασιλέων Κογκολιτάνος. ὁ δ' ἔτερος αὐτῶν 'Ανηρόεστος εἷς τινα τόπον συμφυγὼν μετ' ὀλίγων προσήνεγκε τὰς χεῖρας αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαίοις.

3 ο΄ δὲ στρατηγὸς τῶν 'Ρωμαίων τὰ μὲν σκῦλα συναθροίσας εἰς τὴν 'Ρώμην ἀπέστειλε, τὴν δὲ λείαν 4 ἀπέδωκε τοῖς προσήκουσιν. αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβών τὰ

άπέδωκε τοῖς προσήκουσιν. αὐτὸς δ' ἀναλαβών τὰ στρατόπεδα καὶ διελθών παρ' αὐτὴν τὴν Λιγυστικὴν εἰς τὴν τῶν Βοίων ἐνέβαλε χώραν. πληρώσας δὲ τὰς όρμὰς τῶν στρατοπέδων τῆς ἀφελείας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἡκε μετὰ τῶν δυνάμεων εἰς τὴν

5 'Ρώμην." καὶ τὸ μὲν Καπετώλιον ἐκόσμησε ταῖς τε σημαίαις καὶ τοῖς μανιάκαις τοῦτο δ' ἔστι χρυσοῦν ψέλιον, δ φοροῦσι περὶ τὸν τράχηλον οἱ Γαλάται.

6 τοις δε λοιποις σκύλοις και τοις αίχμαλώτοις πρός την είσοδον εχρήσατο την έαυτου και πρός την του θριάμβου διακόσμησιν.

Boii, and Taurisci, once the javelineers had withdrawn into the ranks and the Roman maniples attacked them, met the enemy and kept up a stubborn hand-to-hand combat. For, though being almost cut to pieces, they held their ground, equal to their foes in courage, and inferior only, as a force and individually, in their arms. The Roman shields, it should be added, were far more serviceable for defence and their swords for attack, the Gaulish sword being only good for a cut and not for a thrust. But finally, attacked from higher ground and on their flank by the Roman cavalry, which rode down the hill and charged them vigorously, the Celtic infantry were cut to pieces where they stood, their cavalry taking to flight.

31. About forty thousand Celts were slain and at least ten thousand taken prisoners, among them the king Concolitanus. The other king, Aneroestes, escaped with a few followers to a certain place where he put an end to his life and to those of his friends. The Roman Consul collected the spoils and sent them to Rome, returning the booty of the Gauls to the owners. With his legions he traversed Liguria and invaded the territory of the Boii, from whence, after letting his legions pillage to their heart's content, he returned at their head in a few days to Rome. He sent to ornament the Capitol the standards and torques (the gold necklets worn by the Gauls), but the rest of the spoil and the prisoners he used for his entry into Rome and the adornment of his triumph.

7 'Η μεν οὖν βαρυτάτη τῶν Κελτῶν ἔφοδος οὖτω καὶ τούτω τῷ τρόπω διεφθάρη, πᾶσι μεν Ἰταλιώταις, μάλιστα δε 'Ρωμαίοις, μέγαν καὶ φοβερὸν 8 ἐπικρεμάσασα κίνδυνον. ἀπὸ δε τοῦ κατορθώματος τούτου κατελπίσαντες 'Ρωμαῖοι δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον όλο-

τούτου κατελπίσαντες 'Ρωμαΐοι δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς Κελτοὺς ἐκ τῶν τόπων τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον όλοσχερῶς ἐκβαλεῖν, τούς τε μετὰ ταῦτα κατασταθέντας ὑπάτους Κόϊντον Φόλουιον καὶ Τίτον Μάλιον ἀμφοτέρους καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις μετὰ παρασκευῆς μενάλης ἐξαπέστειλαν ἐπὶ τοὺς Κελτούς, οῦτοι δὲ

9 γάλης εξαπέστειλαν επὶ τοὺς Κελτούς. οὖτοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν Βοίους εξ εφόδου καταπληξάμενοι συνηνάγκασαν εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων εαυτοὺς δοῦναι πίστιν,

10 τον δε λοιπον χρόνον της στρατείας, επιγενομένων ομβρων εξαισίων, ετι δε λοιμικής διαθέσεως εμ-

πεσούσης αὐτοῖς, εἰς τέλος ἄπρακτον εἶχον.

32 Μετὰ δὲ τούτους κατασταθέντες Πόπλιος Φούριος καὶ Γάιος Φλαμίνιος αὖθις ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Κελτικὴν διὰ τῆς τῶν ᾿Ανάρων χώρας, οἶς συμβαίνει μὴ μα-2 κρὰν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἔχειν τὴν οἴκησιν. οὖς εἰς

2 κρὰν ἀπὸ Μασσαλίας ἔχειν τὴν οἴκησιν. οὖς εἰς τὴν φιλίαν προσαγαγόμενοι διέβησαν εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων γῆν κατὰ τὰς συρροίας τοῦ τ' Άδοα καὶ

3 Πάδου ποταμοῦ. λαβόντες δὲ πληγὰς περί τε τὴν διάβασιν καὶ περὶ τὴν στρατοπεδείαν, παραυτίκα μὲν ἔμειναν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα σπεισάμενοι καθ' όμο-

4 λογίαν ἀνέλυσαν ἐκ τῶν τόπων. περιελθόντες δὲ πλείους ἡμέρας, καὶ διελθόντες τὸν Κλούσιον ποταμόν, ἡλθον εἰς τὴν τῶν Γονομάνων χώραν, καὶ προσλαβόντες τούτους, ὄντας συμμάχους, ἐνέβαλον πάλιν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὰς "Αλπεις τόπων εἰς τὰ τῶν 'Ινσόμβρων πεδία καὶ τήν τε γῆν ἐδήουν καὶ τὰς κατοικίας αὐτῶν ἐξεπόοθουν. οἱ δὲ τῶν 'Ινσόμβρων

5 κατοικίας αὐτῶν ἐξεπόρθουν. οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἰνσόμβρων προεστῶτες, θεωροῦντες ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν τὴν ἐπι318

0.0

Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. This success encouraged the Romans to hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po; and the Consuls of the next year, Quintus Fulvius and Titus Manlius, were sent against them 224 B.C. with a formidable expeditionary force. They surprised and terrified the Boii, compelling them to submit to Rome, but the rest of the campaign had no practical results whatever, owing to the very heavy rains, and an epidemic which broke out among them.

32. Next year's Consuls, however, Publius Furius 223 B.C. and Gaius Flaminius, again invaded the Celtic territory, through the country of the Anares who dwelt not far from Marseilles. Having admitted this tribe to their friendship, they crossed into the territory of the Insubres, near the junction of the Po and Adda. Both in crossing and in encamping on the other side, they suffered some loss, and at first remained on the spot, but later made a truce and evacuated the territory under its terms. After a circuitous march of some days, they crossed the river Clusius and reached the country of the Cenomani, who were their allies, and accompanied by them, again invaded from the district at the foot of the Alps the plains of the Insubres and began to lay the country waste and pillage their dwellings. The chieftains of the Insubres, seeing that the

βολην των 'Ρωμαίων, έκριναν της τύχης λαβείν πειραν και διακινδυνεύσαι πρός αυτούς όλοσχερώς. β συναθροίσαντες οὖν ἀπάσας <τὰς δυνάμεις> ἐπὶ ταὐτόν, καὶ τὰς χρυσᾶς σημαίας τὰς ἀκινήτους λεγομένας καθελόντες ἐκ τοῦ τῆς ᾿Αθηνᾶς ίεροῦ, καὶ τάλλα παρασκευασάμενοι δεόντως, μετά ταθτα τεθαρρηκότως καὶ καταπληκτικώς ἀντεστρατοπέδευσαν τοις πολεμίοις, όντες τὸ πληθος είς 7 πέντε μυριάδας. οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι, τὰ μὲν ὁρῶντες σφας ελάττους όντας παρά πολύ των εναντίων, έβούλοντο συγχρησθαι ταίς των συμμαχούντων αὐ-8 τοις Κελτων δυνάμεσι τὰ δὲ συλλογισάμενοι τήν τε Γαλατικήν άθεσίαν καὶ διότι πρός δμοφύλους τῶν προσλαμβανομένων μέλλουσι ποιείσθαι τὸν κίνδυνον, εύλαβοῦντο τοιούτοις ανδράσι τοιούτου θ καιροῦ καὶ πράγματος κοινωνεῖν. τέλος δ' οὖν αὐτοὶ μὲν ὑπέμειναν ἐντὸς τοῦ ποταμοῦ, τοὺς δέ τῶν Κελτῶν σφίσι συνόντας διαβιβάσαντες είς τὸ πέραν ἀνέσπασαν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ ῥείθρου γε-10 φύρας, αμα μεν ἀσφαλιζόμενοι τὰ πρὸς ἐκείνους, ἄμα δὲ μίαν ἐαυτοῖς ἀπολείποντες ἐλπίδα τῆς σωτηρίας την έν τω νικάν, διά το κατόπιν αὐτοίς άβατον όντα παρακείσθαι τον προειρημένον ποτα-11 μόν. πράξαντες δε ταθτα πρός τῷ διακινδυνεύειν ήσαν.

33 Δοκοῦσι δ' ἐμφρόνως κεχρῆσθαι τῆ μάχη ταύτη 'Ρωμαῖοι, τῶν χιλιάρχων ὑποδειξάντων ὡς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὸν ἀγῶνα κοινῆ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστους.
2 συνεωρακότες γὰρ ἐκ τῶν προγεγονότων κινδύνων ὅτι τοῖς τε θυμοῖς κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἔφοδον, ἔως ἄν ἀκέραιον ἦ, φοβερώτατόν ἐστι πῶν τὸ Γαλατικὸν 3 φῦλον, αἴ τε μάχαιραι ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, καθάπερ 320

Romans adhered to their purpose of attacking them, decided to try their luck in a decisive battle. Collecting all their forces in one place, they took down the golden standards called "immovable" from the temple of Minerva, and having made all other necessary preparations, boldly took up a menacing position opposite the enemy. They were about fifty thousand strong. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies, but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were shy of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. Finally, remaining themselves on their side of the river, they sent the Celts who were with them across it, and demolished the bridges that crossed the stream, firstly as a precaution against their allies, and secondly to leave themselves no hope of safety except in victory, the river, which was impassable, lying in their rear. After taking these measures they prepared for battle.

33. The Romans are thought to have managed matters very skilfully in this battle, their commanding officers having instructed them how they should fight, both as individuals and collectively. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught, while still fresh, and that, from the way

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εἴρηται πρότερον, μίαν ἔχουσι τὴν πρώτην καταφοράν καιρίαν, ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης εὐθέως ἀποξυστροῦνται, καμπτόμεναι κατὰ μῆκος καὶ κατὰ πλάτος ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὧστ' ἐὰν μὴ δῷ τις ἀναστροφὴν τοῖς χρωμένοις, ερείσαντας πρός την γην απευθυναί τω ποδί, τελέως ἄπρακτον είναι την δευτέραν πληγην 4 αὐτῶν ἀναδόντες οὖν οἱ χιλίαρχοι τὰ τῶν τριαρίων δόρατα τῶν κατόπιν ἐφεστώτων ταῖς πρώταις σπείραις, καὶ παραγγείλαντες ἐκ μεταλήψεως τοῖς ξίφεσι χρησθαι, συνέβαλον έκ παρατάξεως κατά πρό-5 σωπον τοις Κελτοις. αμα δε τω πρός τα δόρατα ταις πρώταις καταφοραις χρωμένων των Γαλατων άχρειωθήναι τὰς μαχαίρας συνδραμόντες εἰς τὰς χειρας τοὺς μὲν Κελτοὺς ἀπράκτους ἐποίησαν, ἀφελόμενοι την έκ διάρσεως αὐτῶν μάχην, ὅπερ ἴδιόν ἐστι Γαλατικης χρείας, διὰ τὸ μηδαμῶς κέντημα τὸ 6 ξίφος ἔχειν αὐτοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐκ καταφορᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐκ διαλήψεως όρθαις χρώμενοι ταις μαχαίραις, πρακτικοῦ τοῦ κεντήματος περί αὐτὰς ὑπάρχοντος, τύπτοντες είς τὰ στέρνα καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα καὶ πληγὴν έπὶ πληγη φέροντες, διέφθειραν τοὺς πλείστους τῶν παραταξαμένων διά την τών χιλιάρχων πρόνοιαν. 7 δ μέν γάρ στρατηγός Φλαμίνιος οὐκ ὀρθώς δοκεῖ κεχρησθαι τῷ προειρημένω κινδύνω. παρ' αὐτην γάρ τὴν ὀφρύν τοῦ ποταμοῦ ποιησάμενος τὴν ἔκταξιν διέφθειρε το της 'Ρωμαϊκης μάχης ίδιον, οὐχ ὑπολειπόμενος τόπον προς την επὶ πόδα ταις σπεί-8 ραις ἀναχώρησιν. εὶ γὰρ συνέβη βραχὺ μόνον πιεσθηναι τῆ χώρα τοὺς ἄνδρας κατὰ τὴν μάχην, ρί-πτειν αν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν αὐτοὺς ἔδει διὰ τὴν ἀστοg χίαν τοῦ προεστώτος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε πολλῷ νικήσαντες ταΐς σφετέραις άρεταῖς, καθάπερ εἶπον, καὶ 322

their swords are made, as has been already explained. only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite The tribunes therefore distributed ineffectual. amongst the front line the spears of the triarii who were stationed behind them, ordering them to use their swords instead only after the spears were done with. They then drew up opposite the Celts in order of battle and engaged. Upon the Gauls slashing first at the spears and making their swords unserviceable the Romans came to close quarters, having rendered the enemy helpless by depriving them of the power of raising their hands and cutting, which is the peculiar and only stroke of the Gauls, as their swords have no points. The Romans, on the contrary, instead of slashing, continued to thrust with their swords which did not bend, inflicting very effectual penetrating wounds. Thus, striking one blow after another on the breast or face, they slew the greater part of their adversaries. This was solely due to the foresight of the tribunes, the Consul Flaminius being thought to have mismanaged the battle by deploying his force at the very edge of the river-bank and thus rendering impossible a tactical movement peculiar to Romans, as he left the cohorts no room to fall back gradually. For had the troops been even in the slightest degree pushed back from their ground during the battle, they would have had to throw themselves into the river, all owing to their general's blunder. However, as it was, they gained a decisive victory by their own skill and valour, as I said, and

παμπληθοῦς μεν λείας, οὐκ ὀλίγων δε σκύλων κρα-

τήσαντες, έπανηλθον είς την 'Ρώμην.

34 Τῷ δ' έξης έτει, διαπρεσβευσαμένων τῶν Κελτων ύπερ ειρήνης και παν ποιήσειν ύπισχνουμένων, ἔσπευσαν οἱ κατασταθέντες ΰπατοι Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καὶ Γνάιος Κορνήλιος τοῦ μὴ συγχωρη-2 θηναι την ειρήνην αὐτοῖς. οι δ' ἀποτυχόντες, καὶ κρίναντες έξελέγξαι τὰς τελευταίας έλπίδας, αδθις ώρμησαν έπὶ τὸ μισθοῦσθαι τῶν περὶ τὸν 'Ροδανὸν Γαισατών Γαλατών είς τρισμυρίους ούς παραλαβόντες είχον εν ετοίμω και προσεδόκων την των 3 πολεμίων έφοδον. οι δέ των 'Ρωμαίων στρατηγοί, της ώρας επιγενομένης, αναλαβόντες τας δυνάμεις 4 ήνον είς την των Ινσόμβρων χώραν. παραγενόμενοι δέ καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσαντες πόλιν 'Αχέρρας, η μεταξύ κείται του Πάδου και των 'Αλπεινών 5 ορων, επολιόρκουν ταύτην. οί δ' Ίνσομβρες, βοηθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνάμενοι, διὰ τὸ προκαταληφθηναι τούς εύφυεις τόπους, σπεύδοντες δε λύσαι την πολιορκίαν των 'Αχερρων, μέρος τι της δυνάμεως διαβιβάσαντες τὸν Πάδον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀνάρων χώραν επολιόρκουν τὸ προσαγορευόμενον Κλαστίδιον. β προσπεσόντος δε τοῦ συμβαίνοντος τοῖς στρατηγοῖς. άναλαβών τους ίππεις Μάρκος Κλαύδιος καί τινας των πεζικών ήπείγετο, σπεύδων βοηθήσαι τοις πο-7 λιορκουμένοις. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, πυθόμενοι τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν ὑπεναντίων, λύσαντες τὴν πολιορκίαν 8 ύπήντων καὶ παρετάξαντο, τῶν δὲ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοις τοις ίππευσιν έξ εφόδου τολμηρώς σφίσι προσπεσόντων, τὰς μὲν ἀρχὰς ἀντεῖχον. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περιισταμένων καὶ κατὰ νώτου καὶ κατὰ κέρας, δυσχρηστούμενοι τη μάχη, τέλος ετράπησαν ύπ 324

returned to Rome with a quantity of booty and many trophies.

34. Next year the Celts sent ambassadors begging 222 B.C. for peace and engaging to accept any conditions, but the new Consuls Marcus Claudius and Gnaeus Cornelius strongly urged that no peace should be granted them. On meeting with a refusal, the Celts decided to resort to their last hope and again appealed to the Gaesatae on the Rhone, and hired a force of about thirty thousand men. When they had these troops they kept them in readiness and awaited the attack of the enemy. The Roman Consuls, when the season came, invaded the territory of the Insubres with their legions. Encamping round a city called Acerrae lying between the Po and the Alps, they laid siege to it. The Insubres could not come to the assistance of the besieged, as the Romans had occupied all the advantageous positions, but, with the object of making the latter raise the siege, they crossed the Po with part of their forces, and entering the territory of the Anari, laid siege to a town there called Clastidium. On the Consuls learning of this, Marcus Claudius set off in haste with the cavalry and a small body of infantry to relieve the besieged if possible. The Celts, as soon as they were aware of the enemy's arrival, raised the siege and advancing to meet them, drew up in order of battle. When the Romans boldly charged them with their cavalry alone, they at first stood firm, but afterwards, being taken both in the rear and on the flank, they found themselves in difficulties and were finally put to rout by the cavalry unaided,

9 αὐτῶν τῶν ἱππέων. καὶ πολλοὶ μὲν εἰς τὸν ποταμὸν ἐμπεσόντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ῥεύματος διεφθάρησαν, οἱ 10 δὲ πλείους ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων κατεκόπησαν. ἔλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰς ᾿Αχέρρας οἱ Ἡωμαῖοι σίτου γεμούσας, ἐκχωρησάντων εἰς τὸ Μεδιόλανον τῶν Γαλατῶν, ὅσπερ ἐστὶ κυριώτατος τόπος τῆς τῶν Ἰνσόμ-

11 βρων χώρας. οἷς ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπακολουθήσαντος τοῦ Γναΐου, καὶ προσβαλόντος ἄφνω πρὸς τὸ Μεδιό-

12 λανον, τὸ μὲν πρώτον ἡσυχίαν ἔσχον ἀπολυομένου δ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν εἰς τὰς 'Αχέρρας, ἐπεξελθόντες καὶ τῆς οὐραγίας ἁψάμενοι θρασέως πολλοὺς μὲν νεκροὺς ἐποίησαν, μέρος δέ τι καὶ φυγεῖν αὐτῶν 13 ἢνάγκασαν, ἔως ὁ Γνάιος ἀνακαλεσάμενος τοὺς ἐκ

της πρωτοπορείας παρώρμησε στήναι καὶ συμβαλεῖν 14 τοῖς πολεμίοις. οἱ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαῖοι, πειθαρχήσαν-

14 τοις πολεμιοις. οι μεν ουν Ρωμαιοι, πεισαρχησαντες τῷ στρατηγῷ, διεμάχοντο πρὸς τοὺς ἐπικειμέ-15 νους εὐρώστως. οἱ δὲ Κελτοί, διὰ τὸ παρὸν εὐτύχημα μείναντες ἐπὶ ποσὸν εὐθαρσῶς, μετ' οὐ πολὺ

χημα μείναντες έπι ποσόν εύθαρσως, μετ΄ οὐ πολύ τραπέντες έφευγον είς τὰς παρωρείας. δ δὲ Γνάιος ἐπακολουθήσας τήν τε χώραν ἐπόρθει καὶ τὸ Με35 διόλανον είλε κατὰ κράτος. οῦ συμβαίνοντος οἱ

προεστώτες των Ἰνσόμβρων, ἀπογνόντες τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας, πάντα τὰ καθ' αὐτοὺς ἐπέτρεψαν

τοῖς "Ρωμαίοις.

2 'Ο μέν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Κελτοὺς πόλεμος τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, κατὰ μὲν τὴν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἀνδρῶν, ἔτι δὲ κατὰ τὰς μάχας καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀπολλυμένων καὶ παραταττομένων, οὐδενὸς καταδεέστερος τῶν ἱστο-3 ρημένων, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ τὴν ἀκρισίαν τοῦ κατὰ μέρος χειρισμοῦ τελέως εὐκαταφρόνητος, διὰ τὸ μὴ τὸ πλεῖον, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην ἄπαν τὸ γινό-326



many of them throwing themselves into the river and being swept away by the current, while the larger number were cut to pieces by the enemy. The Romans now took Acerrae, which was well stocked with corn, the Gauls retiring to Mediolanum, the chief place in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed close on their heels, and suddenly appeared before Mediolanum. The Gauls at first did not stir, but, when he was on his way back to Acerrae, they sallied out, and made a bold attack on his rear, in which they killed a considerable number of the Romans and even forced a portion of them to take to flight, until Gnaeus, calling back the forces in advance, urged the fugitives to rally and withstand the enemy. After this the Romans, on their part obeying their Consul, continued to fight vigorously with their assailants, and the Celts after holding their ground for a time, encouraged as they were by their momentary success, were shortly put to flight and took refuge on the hills. Gnaeus, following them, laid waste the country and took Mediolanum itself by assault, (35) upon which the chieftains of the Insubres, despairing of safety, put themselves entirely at the mercy of the Romans.

Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history, but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgement shown in executing it, not most steps but

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μενον ύπὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν θυμῷ μᾶλλον ἢ λογισμῷ 4 βραβεύεσθαι. περί ων ήμεις συνθεωρήσαντες μετ ολίγον χρόνον αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πάδον πεδίων εξωσθέντας, πλην ολίνων τόπων των ύπ αὐτας τας "Αλπεις κειμένων, ουκ ωήθημεν δείν ούτε την έξ άρχης έφοδον αὐτῶν άμνημόνευτον παραλιπειν ούτε τὰς μετὰ ταθτα πράξεις ούτε τὴν τελευ-5 ταίαν εξανάστασιν, υπολαμβάνοντες οἰκεῖον ίστορίας ύπάρχειν τὰ τοιαθτ' ἐπεισόδια τῆς τύχης εἰς μνή-6 μην άγειν καὶ παράδοσιν τοῖς ἐπιγινομένοις, ΐνα μή τελέως οί μεθ' ήμας ανεννόητοι τούτων υπάρχοντες έκπλήττωνται τὰς αἰφνιδίους καὶ παραλόγους τῶν βαρβάρων εφόδους, άλλ' επί ποσον εν νῷ λαμβάνοντες ώς ολιγοχρόνιον έστι και λίαν ευφθαρτον <τὸ τοιοῦτον>, τὴν ἔφοδον αὐτῶν ὑπομένωσι καὶ πάσας έξελέγχωσι τὰς σφετέρας έλπίδας πρότερον 7 η παραχωρήσαί τινος των αναγκαίων. και γαρ τούς την Περσων έφοδον έπι την Ελλάδα και Γαλατών έπὶ Δελφούς εἰς μνήμην καὶ παράδοσιν ἡμῖν ἀγαγόντας οὐ μικρά, μεγάλα δ' οἴομαι συμβεβλησθαι πρὸς 8 τους ύπερ της κοινης των Ελλήνων έλευθερίας άγωνας. οὖτε γὰρ χορηγιῶν οὖθ' ὅπλων οὖτ' ἀνδρῶν πληθος καταπλαγείς αν τις αποσταίη της τελευταίας έλπίδος, τοῦ διαγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῆς σφετέρας χώρας καὶ πατρίδος, λαμβάνων προ οφθαλμῶν το παράδοξον τῶν τότε γενομένων, καὶ μνημονεύσας όσας μυριάδας καὶ τίνας τόλμας καὶ πηλίκας παρασκευάς ή τῶν σὺν νῷ καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ κινδυνευόντων 9 αιρεσις και δύναμις καθειλεν. ό δ' άπό Γαλατών φόβος οὐ μόνον τὸ παλαιόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς 10 ήδη πλεονάκις εξέπληξε τους Ελληνας. διό καὶ



every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. As I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few communities close under the Alps, I did not think it right to make no mention either of their original invasion or of their subsequent conduct and their final expulsion: for I think it is the proper task of History to record and hand down to future generations such episodes of Fortune, that those who live after us may not, owing to entire ignorance of these incidents, be unduly terrified by sudden and unexpected invasions of barbarians, but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. For there is no one whom hosts of men or abundance of arms or vast resources could frighten into abandoning his last hope, that is to fight to the end for his native land, if he kept before his eyes what part the unexpected played in those events, and bore in mind how many myriads of men, what determined courage and what armaments were brought to nought by the resolve and power of those who faced the danger with intelligence and coolness. It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gaulish invasion; and this especially

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μαλλον έγωγε παρωρμήθην έπὶ τὸ κεφαλαιώδη μέν, ανέκαθεν δε ποιήσασθαι την ύπερ τούτων εξήγησιν. 'Ασδρούβας δ' ό τῶν Καρχηδονίων στρατηγός, από γάρ τούτων παρεξέβημεν τῆς έξηγήσεως, έτη χειρίσας όκτὼ τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἐτελεύτησε δολοφονηθείς έν τοῖς έαυτοῦ καταλύμασι νυκτὸς ὑπό τινος Κελτοῦ τὸ γένος ιδίων ένεκεν άδικημάτων, 2 οὐ μικράν, ἀλλὰ μεγάλην ποιήσας ἐπίδοσιν τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις πράγμασιν, ούχ ούτω διά τῶν πολε-3 μίων έργων ώς διά της πρός τους δυνάστας όμιλίας. την δέ στρατηγίαν οι Καρχηδόνιοι των κατά την 'Ιβηρίαν 'Αννίβα περιέθεσαν, όντι νέω, διά την ύποφαινομένην έκ των πράξεων αγχίνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ 4 τόλμαν. δs παραλαβών την άρχην εὐθέως δηλος ην έκ των επινοημάτων πόλεμον έξοίσων 'Ρωμαίοις. δ δή και τέλος εποίησε, πάνυ βραχύν επισχών χρό-5 νον. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Καρχηδονίους καὶ Ῥωμαίους άπὸ τούτων ήδη των καιρών εν ύποψίαις ήν πρὸς β άλλήλους καὶ παρατριβαῖς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπεβούλευον, αμύνασθαι σπεύδοντες δια τας περί Σικελίαν έλαττώσεις, οί δὲ 'Ρωμαῖοι διηπίστουν, θεωροῦντες αὐ-7 των τας επιβολάς. Εξ ων δηλον ήν τοις ορθως σκοπουμένοις ὅτι μέλλουσι πολεμεῖν ἀλλήλοις οὐ μετά πολύν χρόνον. 37 Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς 'Αχαιοὶ καὶ Φίλιππος ο βασιλεύς αμα τοις άλλοις συμμάχοις συνίσταντο τὸν πρὸς Αἰτωλούς πόλεμον τὸν προσαγο-2 ρευθέντα συμμαχικόν. ήμεις δ' έπειδή τάς τε περί Σικελίαν και Λιβύην και τας έξης πράξεις διεξιόντες κατά τὸ συνεχές τῆς προκατασκευῆς ἥκομεν ἐπὶ την άρχην του τε συμμαχικού και του δευτέρου συστάντος μέν 'Ρωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις πολέμου. 330

was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the

beginnings.

36. This digression has led us away from the 221 B.C. affairs of Spain, where Hasdrubal, after governing the country for eight years, was assassinated at night in his lodging by a certain Celt owing to wrongs of a private nature. He had largely increased the power of Carthage, not so much by military action as by friendly intercourse with the chiefs. The Carthaginians appointed Hannibal to the chief command in Spain, although he was still young, owing to the shrewdness and courage he had evinced in their From the moment that he assumed the command, it was evident from the measures he took that he intended to make war on Rome, as indeed he finished by doing, and that very shortly. The relations between Carthage and Rome were henceforth characterized by mutual suspicion and friction. The Carthaginians continued to form designs against Rome as they were eager to be revenged for their reverses in Sicily, while the Romans, detecting their projects, mistrusted them profoundly. It was therefore evident to all competent judges that it would not be long before war broke out between them.

37. It was about this same time that the Achaeans 220 B.C. and King Philip began the war against the Aetolians known as the Social War. I have now given a continuous sketch, suitable to this preliminary part of my book, of events in Sicily, Libya and so forth down to the beginning of the Social War and that second war between the Romans and Carthaginians

προσαγορευθέντος δέ παρά τοῖς πλείστοις 'Αννιβιακοῦ, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν ἀπὸ τούτων των καιρών έπηγγειλάμεθα ποιήσασθαι την άργην 3 της έαυτων συντάξεως, πρέπον αν είη τούτων άφεμένους επί τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ελλάδα μεταβαίνειν πράξεις, ΐνα πανταχόθεν όμοίαν ποιησάμενοι την προκατασκευήν και την έφοδον έπι τους αυτούς καιρούς οὔτως ήδη [τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ] τῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς 4 ιστορίας αρχώμεθα. έπει γαρ ου τινάς πράξεις, καθάπερ οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, οἱον τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς ἢ Περσικάς, όμοῦ δὲ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γνωριζομένοις μέρεσι τῆς οἰκουμένης ἀναγράφειν ἐπικεχειρήκαμεν, διὰ τὸ πρός τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἴδιόν τι συμβεβλησθαι τοὺς καθ' ήμας καιρούς, ὑπὲρ ὧν σα-5 φέστερον ἐν ἐτέροις δηλώσομεν, δέον αν εἴη καὶ πρό της κατασκευης επί βραχύ των επιφανεστάτων καὶ γνωριζομένων έθνων καὶ τόπων έφάψασθαι τῆς β οἰκουμένης. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν κατὰ τὴν 'Ασίαν καὶ των κατά την Αίγυπτον άρκούντως αν έχοι ποιείσθαι τὴν ἀνάμνησιν ἀπὸ τῶν νῦν ρηθέντων καιρῶν, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν προγεγονότων παρ' αὐτοῖς ἱστορίαν ὑπὸ πλειόνων ἐκδεδόσθαι καὶ γνώριμον ὑπάρχειν ἄπασιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς και-ροῖς μηδὲν αὐτοῖς ἐξηλλαγμένον ἀπηντῆσθαι μηδὲ παράλογον ύπο της τύχης, ώστε προσδεισθαι της η τῶν προγεγονότων ὑπομνήσεως. περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν Αχαιών έθνους καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας άρμόσει διά βραχέων άναδραμεῖν τοῖς χρόνοις, 8 έπειδή περί μεν ταύτην όλοσχερής έπαναίρεσις, περί δὲ τοὺς 'Αχαιούς, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, παράδοξος αξήποις και συμφρόνησις έν τοις καθ' ήμας 9 καιροίς γέγονε. πολλών γάρ ἐπιβαλομένων ἐν τοίς 332

usually known as the Hannibalic War. This, as I stated at the outset, is the date at which I purpose to begin my history itself, and, now bidding goodbye for the present to the West, I must turn to the affairs of Greece, so that everywhere alike I may bring down this preliminary or introductory sketch to the same date, and, having done so, start on my detailed narrative. For as I am not, like former historians, dealing with the history of one nation, such as Greece or Persia, but have undertaken to describe the events occurring in all known parts of the world-my own times having, as I will more clearly explain elsewhere, materially contributed to my purpose—I must, before entering on the main portion of my work, touch briefly on the state of the principal and best known nations and countries of the world. As for Asia and Egypt, it will suffice to mention what took place there after the above date, since their previous history has been written by many and is familiar to all, besides which in our own times Fortune has wrought no such surprising change in these countries as to render any notice of their past necessary. But as regards the Achaean nation and the royal house of Macedon it will be proper to refer briefly to earlier events, since our times have seen, in the case of the latter, its complete destruction, and in the case of the Achaeans, as I said above, a growth of power and a political union in the highest degree remarkable. For while many

παρεληλυθόσι χρόνοις έπὶ ταὐτὸ συμφέρον ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, οὐδενὸς δὲ καθικέσθαι δυνηθέντος, διά τὸ μὴ τῆς κοινῆς ἐλευθερίας ἔνεκεν, ἀλλά της σφετέρας δυναστείας χάριν έκάστους ποιεῖσθαι 10 την σπουδήν, τοιαύτην καί τηλικαύτην έν τοις καθ' ήμας καιροίς έσχε προκοπήν καὶ συντέλειαν τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ώστε μη μόνον συμμαχικήν καὶ φιλικήν κοινωνίαν γεγονέναι πραγμάτων περί αὐτούς, άλλὰ καὶ νόμοις χρησθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ σταθμοῖς καὶ μέτροις καί νομίσμασι, πρός δὲ τούτοις ἄρχουσι, 11 βουλευταίς, δικασταίς τοίς αὐτοίς, καθόλου δὲ τούτω μόνω διαλλάττειν τοῦ μὴ μιᾶς πόλεως διάθεσιν έχειν σχεδον την σύμπασαν Πελοπόννησον τῷ μή τον αὐτον περίβολον υπάρχειν τοις κατοικούσιν αὐτήν, τἄλλα δ' είναι καὶ κοινη καὶ κατὰ πόλεις έκάστοις ταὐτὰ καὶ παραπλήσια. 38 Πρώτον δὲ πῶς ἐπεκράτησε καὶ τίνι τρόπω τὸ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ὄνομα κατὰ πάντων Πελοποννησίων 2 οὐκ ἄχρηστον μαθεῖν. οὕτε γὰρ χώρας καὶ πόλεων πλήθει διαφέρουσιν οί πάτριον έξ άρχης έχοντες την προσηγορίαν ταύτην οὖτε πλούτοις οὖτε ταῖς τῶν 3 ἀνδρῶν ἀρεταῖς. τό τε γὰρ τῶν ᾿Αρκάδων ἔθνος, όμοίως δέ καὶ τὸ τῶν Λακώνων, πλήθει μὲν ἀνδρῶν και χώρας οὐδὲ παρὰ μικρὸν ὑπερέχει και μὴν οὐδε τῶν τῆς ἀνδραγαθίας πρωτείων οὐδενὶ τῶν Έλλήνων οδοί τ' είσιν ουδέποτε παραχωρείν οι 4 προειρημένοι. πως οὖν καὶ διὰ τί νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὖτοί τε καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν πληθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων, άμα την πολιτείαν των 'Αχαιών και την προσηγορίαν 5 μετειληφότες; δηλον ώς τύχην μεν λέγειν οὐδαμῶς αν είη πρέπον· φαῦλον γάρ· αἰτίαν δὲ μαλλον ζητεῖν. χωρὶς γὰρ ταύτης οὔτε τῶν κατὰ λόγον

have attempted in the past to induce the Peloponnesians to adopt a common policy, no one ever succeeding, as each was working not in the cause of general liberty, but for his own aggrandizement, this object has been so much advanced, and so nearly attained, in my own time that not only do they form an allied and friendly community, but they have the same laws, weights, measures and coinage, as well as the same magistrates, senate, and courts of justice, and the whole Peloponnesus only falls short of being a single city in the fact of its inhabitants not being enclosed by one wall, all other things being, both as regards the whole and as regards each separate town, very nearly identical.

38. In the first place it is of some service to learn how and by what means all the Peloponnesians came to be called Achaeans. For the people whose original and ancestral name this was were distinguished neither by the extent of their territory, nor by the number of their cities, nor by exceptional wealth or the exceptional valour of their citizens. Both the Arcadian and Laconian nations far exceed them, indeed, in population and the size of their countries, and certainly neither of the two could ever bring themselves to yield to any Greek people the palm for military valour. How is it, then, that both these two peoples and the rest of the Peloponnesians have consented to change not only their political institutions for those of the Achaeans, but even their name? It is evident that we should not say it is the result of chance, for that is a poor explanation. We must rather seek for a cause, for every event whether probable or improbable must

οὖτε τῶν παρὰ λόγον είναι δοκούντων οὐδὲν οίόν τε συντελεσθήναι. έστι δ' οῦν, ώς έμη δόξα, τοι-6 αύτη τις. ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας άληθινης σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλι-κρινεστέραν οὐκ ἄν εὔροι τις της παρὰ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς 7 ύπαρχούσης. αυτη τινάς μέν έθελοντὴν αίρετιστάς ευρε Πελοποννησίων, πολλούς δὲ πειθοῦ καὶ λόγω προσηγάγετο τινας δε βιασαμένη συν καιρώ παραχρημα πάλιν εὐδοκεῖν ἐποίησεν αὐτη τοὺς ἀναγκα-8 σθέντας. οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδεν ὑπολειπομένη πλεονέκτημα των έξ άρχης, ἴσα δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ προσλαμβανομένοις, ταχέως καθικνεῖτο τῆς προκειμένης ἐπιβολης, δύο συνεργοίς χρωμένη τοίς ἰσχυ-9 ροτάτοις, ἰσότητι καὶ φιλανθρωπία. διὸ ταύτην άρχηγον καὶ αἰτίαν ἡγητέον τοῦ συμφρονήσαντας Πελοποννησίους την υπάρχουσαν αυτοις ευδαιμονίαν καταστήσασθαι. 10 Τὰ μέν οὖν τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας ιδίωμα τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον καὶ πρότερον 11 ὑπῆρχε παρὰ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ δι' ἐτέρων μὲν πλειόνων, πρὸς δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἀρκέσει πίστεως χάριν εν η και δεύτερον ληφθέν μαρτύριον. 39 καθ' οθς γὰρ καιρούς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν τόποις κατὰ τὴν Μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα τότε προσαγορευομένην ένεπρήσθη τὰ συνέδρια τῶν Πυθαγορείων, 2 μετά ταθτα γενομένου κινήματος όλοσχεροθς περί τὰς πολιτείας, ὅπερ εἰκός, ὡς ἄν τῶν πρώτων άνδρων έξ έκάστης πόλεως ούτω παραλόγως δια-3 φθαρέντων, συνέβη τὰς κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς τόπους Ελληνικὰς πόλεις ἀναπλησθῆναι φόνου καὶ στάσεως 4 καὶ παντοδαπῆς ταραχῆς. ἐν οἰς καιροῖς ἀπὸ τῶν



πλείστων μερών της Ελλάδος πρεσβευόντων επί

have some cause. The cause here, I believe to be more or less the following. One could not find a political system and principle so favourable to equality and freedom of speech, in a word so sincerely democratic, as that of the Achaean league. Owing to this, while some of the Peloponnesians chose to join it of their own free will, it won many others by persuasion and argument, and those whom it forced to adhere to it when the occasion presented itself suddenly underwent a change and became quite reconciled to their position. For by reserving no special privileges for original members, and putting all new adherents exactly on the same footing, it soon attained the aim it had set itself, being aided by two very powerful coadjutors, equality and humanity. We must therefore look upon this as the initiator and cause of that union that has established the present prosperity of the Peloponnese.

These characteristic principles and constitution had existed in Achaea from an early date. There is abundant testimony of this, but for the present it will suffice to cite one or two instances in confirmation of this assertion. 39. When, in the district of Italy, then known as Greater Hellas,^a the clubhouses of the Pythagoreans were burnt down, there ensued, as was natural, a general revolutionary movement, the leading citizens of each city having thus unexpectedly perished, and in all the Greek towns of the district murder, sedition, and every kind of disturbance were rife. Embassies arrived from most parts of Greece offering their services as peace-

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a "Magna Graecia" in Latin. When the name was first given, Hellas cannot have meant the whole of Greece.

τας διαλύσεις, 'Αχαιοίς και τη τούτων πίστει συνεχρήσαντο πρός την των παρόντων κακών έξαγωγήν. οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιροὺς 5 ἀπεδέξαντο τὴν αἵρεσιν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετά τινας χρόνους όλοσχερως ώρμησαν έπὶ τὸ μιμηταὶ β γενέσθαι της πολιτείας αὐτῶν. παρακαλέσαντες γάρ σφας καὶ συμφρονήσαντες Κροτωνιαται, Συβαριται, Καυλωνιαται, πρώτον μέν ἀπέδειξαν Διὸς 'Αμαρίου κοινον ίερον και τόπον, εν ώ τάς τε συνόδους και τὰ διαβούλια συνετέλουν, δεύτερον τοὺς έθισμοὺς καὶ νόμους ἐκλαβόντες τοὺς τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐπεβάλοντο χρησθαι καὶ διοικεῖν κατά τούτους την 7 πολιτείαν. ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς Διονυσίου Συρακοσίου δυναστείας, έτι δὲ τῆς τῶν περιοικούντων βαρβάρων έπικρατείας έμποδισθέντες, οὐχ έκουσίως, ἀλλὰ κατ' 8 ανάγκην αὐτῶν ἀπέστησαν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Λακεδαιμονίων μέν παραδόξως πταισάντων περί την έν Λεύκτροις μάχην, Θηβαίων δ' ανελπίστως αντιποιησαμένων της των Ελλήνων ήγεμονίας, ήν ακρισία περί πάντας μέν τούς "Ελληνας, μάλιστα δέ περί τούς προειρημένους, ώς αν των μεν μή συγχωρούντων ήττησθαι, των δέ μή πιστευόντων ότι νενικήκασιν. ο οὐ μὴν ἀλλά γε περί τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἐπέτρεψαν Θηβαῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι μόνοις τῶν Ἑλλή-10 νων 'Αχαιοίς, οὐ πρὸς τὴν δύναμιν ἀποβλέψαντες. σχεδον γὰρ ἐλαχίστην τότε δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων είχον. το δε πλείον είς την πίστιν και την όλην καλοκάγαθίαν. δμολογουμένως γάρ δή τότε ταύτην περί αὐτῶν πάντες είχον τὴν δόξαν.

makers, but it was the Achaeans on whom these cities placed most reliance and to whom they committed the task of putting an end to their present troubles. And it was not only at this period that they showed their approval of Achaean political principles; but a short time afterwards. they resolved to model their own constitution exactly on that of the League. The Crotonians, Sybarites and Caulonians, having called a conference and formed a league, first of all established a common temple and holy place of Zeus Amarius a in which to hold their meetings and debates, and next, adopting the customs and laws of the Achaeans, decided to conduct their government according to them. It was only indeed the tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse and their subjection to the barbarian tribes around them which defeated this purpose and forced them to abandon these institutions, much against their will. Again, subsequently, when the Lacedaemonians 371 B.C. were unexpectedly defeated at Leuctra, and the Thebans, as unexpectedly, aspired to the hegemony of Greece, great uncertainty prevailed in the whole country and especially among these two peoples, the Lacedaemonians not acknowledging their defeat, and the Thebans not wholly believing in their victory. They, however, referred the points in dispute to the Achaeans alone among all the Greeks, not taking their power into consideration, for they were then almost the weakest state in Greece, but in view of their trustworthiness and high character in every respect. For indeed this opinion of them was at that time, as is generally acknowledged, held by all.

^a Such as the Achaean League had.

11 Τότε μεν οθν ψιλώς αὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ τὴν προ-αίρεσιν ὑπῆρχε παρ' αὐτοις· ἀποτέλεσμα δ' ἢ πραξις αξιόλογος πρός αυξησιν των ιδίων ανήκουσα 12 πραγμάτων οὐκ ἐγίνετο, τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι φῦναι προστάτην ἄξιον της προαιρέσεως, ἀεὶ δὲ τὸν ὑποδείξαντα ποτέ μεν ύπο της Λακεδαιμονίων άρχης έπισκοτείσθαι καὶ κωλύεσθαι, ποτὲ δὲ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ 40 της Μακεδόνων. ἐπεὶ δέ ποτε σὺν καιρῶ προστάτας άξιόχρεως εδρε, ταχέως την αυτής δύναμιν έποίησε φανεράν, επιτελεσαμένη το κάλλιστον έρ-2 γον, την Πελοποννησίων δμόνοιαν. ής άρχηγον μεν και καθηγεμόνα της όλης επιβολής "Αρατον νομιστέον τον Σικυώνιον, αγωνιστην δε και τελεσιουργόν της πράξεως Φιλοποίμενα τον Μεγαλοπολίτην, βεβαιωτήν δε τοῦ μόνιμον αὐτήν ἐπὶ ποσὸν γενέσθαι Λυκόρταν καὶ τοὺς ταὐτὰ τούτω προελομέ-3 νους ἄνδρας. τίνα δ' ήν έκάστοις τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ πως καὶ κατὰ ποίους καιρούς πειρασόμεθα δηλοῦν, άεὶ κατὰ τὸ πρέπον τῆ γραφῆ ποιούμενοι τὴν 4 ἐπίστασιν. τῶν μέντοι γ ᾿ Αράτῳ διῳκημένων καὶ νθν καὶ μετά ταθτα πάλιν επικεφαλαιούμενοι μνησθησόμεθα διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν άληθινούς καὶ σαφεῖς έκεινον περί των ιδίων συντεταγέναι πράξεων ύπο-5 μνηματισμούς, των δέ τοις άλλοις ακριβεστέραν κα**ι** μετά διαστολής ποιησόμεθα την εξήγησιν. ύπολαμβάνω δε ράστην εμοί τ' αν γενέσθαι την διήγησιν καὶ τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εὐπαρακολούθητον τὴν μάθησιν, εὶ ποιησαίμεθα τὴν ἐπίστασιν ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν οίς κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ των 'Αχαιων έθνους ύπο των έκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων ἀρχή πάλιν ἐγένετο καὶ σύννευσις τῶν πόλεων 6 προς άλλήλας. άφ' ής αυξανόμενον κατά το συν-340

Up to now, these principles of government had merely existed amongst them, but had resulted in no practical steps worthy of mention for the increase of the Achaean power, since the country seemed unable to produce a statesman worthy of these principles, anyone who showed a tendency to act so being thrown into the dark and hampered either by the Lacedaemonian power or still more by that of Macedon. 40. When, however, in due time, they found statesmen capable of enforcing them, their power at once became manifest, and the League achieved the splendid result of uniting all the Peloponnesian states. Aratus of Sicyon should be regarded as the initiator and conceiver of the project; it was Philopoemen of Megalopolis who promoted and finally realized it, while Lycortas a and his party were those who assured the permanency, for a time at least, of this union. I will attempt to indicate how and at what date each of the three contributed to the result, without transgressing the limits I have set to this part of my work. Aratus' government, however, may be dealt with here and in future quite summarily, as he published a most valuable and clearly written memoir of his own career; but the achievements of the two others must be narrated in greater detail and at more length. I think it will be easiest for myself to set forth the narrative and for my readers to follow it if I begin from the period when, after the dissolution of the Achaean League by the kings of Macedonia, the cities began again to approach each other with a view to its renewal. Henceforward the League continued to grow until

^a The father of Polybius.

εχὲς τὸ ἔθνος εἰς ταύτην ήλθε τὴν συντέλειαν, ἐν ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἦν, ὑπὲρ ἡς κατὰ μέρος ἀρτίως εἶπον.

'Ολυμπιάς μεν ήν είκοστή και τετάρτη πρός ταις έκατόν, ότε Πατρείς ήρξαντο συμφρονείν καὶ Δυ-2 μαΐοι, καιροί δὲ καθ' ους Πτολεμαΐος ὁ Λάγου καὶ Λυσίμαγος, έτι δε Σέλευκος καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Κεραυνός μετήλλαξαν τον βίον. πάντες γάρ οδτοι περί τὴν προειρημένην ολυμπιάδα τὸ ζῆν ἐξέλιπον. 3 τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἀνώτερον τούτων χρόνους τοιαύτη 4 τις ην ή περί το προειρημένον έθνος διάθεσις. ἀπό γάρ Τισαμενοῦ βασιλευθέντες, δς ήν 'Ορέστου μεν υίός, κατά δὲ τὴν τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν κάθοδον ἐκπεσων της Σπάρτης κατέσχε τους περί 'Αχαΐαν τόπους, 5 ἀπὸ τούτου κατὰ τὸ συνεχές καὶ κατὰ τὸ γένος εως 'Ωγύγου βασιλευθέντες, μετά ταθτα δυσαρεστήσαντες τοις του προειρημένου παισίν έπι τῷ μὴ νομίμως. άλλα δεσποτικώς αὐτών ἄρχειν, μετέστησαν είς 6 δημοκρατίαν την πολιτείαν. λοιπόν ήδη τους έξης χρόνους μέχρι της 'Αλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυναστείας ἄλλοτε μεν ἄλλως εχώρει τὰ πράγματ' αὐτοῖς κατά τὰς περιστάσεις, τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατία συνέχειν ἐπει-7 ρῶντο. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλην 'Ωλένου καὶ Ελίκης της πρό των Λευκτρικών ύπο της θαλάττης κατ-8 αποθείσης· αύται δ' εἰσὶ Πάτραι, Δύμη, Φαραί, Τριταία, Λεόντιον, Αίγιον, Αίγειρα, Πελλήνη, 9 Βοῦρα, Καρύνεια. κατά δὲ τοὺς ὑστέρους μὲν τῶν κατ' 'Αλέξανδρον καιρών, προτέρους δὲ τῆς ἄρτι ρηθείσης όλυμπιάδος, είς τοιαύτην διαφοράν καὶ καχεξίαν ενέπεσον, καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τῶν ἐκ Μακε-342

it reached in my own time the state of completion I have just been describing.

41. It was in the 124th Olympiad that Patrae 284-280 and Dyme took the initiative, by entering into B.C. a league, just about the date of the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy Ceraunus, which all occurred in this Olympiad. The condition of the Achaean nation before this date had been more or less as follows. Their first king was Tisamenus the son of Orestes, who, when expelled from Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, occupied Achaea, and they continued to be ruled by kings of his house down to Ogyges. Being dissatisfied with the rule of Ogyges' sons, which was despotical and not constitutional, they changed their government to a democracy. After this, down to the reigns of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes varied according to circumstances, but they always endeavoured, as I said, to keep their League a democracy. This consisted of twelve cities, which still all exist with the exception of Olenus and of Helice which was engulfed by the sea a little before the battle of Leuctra. These cities are Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegira, Pellene, Bura, and Carvneia. After the time of Alexander and previous to the above Olympiad they fell, chiefly thanks to the kings of Macedon, into such a state

δονίας βασιλέων, ἐν ἢ συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον 10 ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις. ἐξ οὖ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρούρους αὐτῶν γενέσθαι διά τε Δημητρίου καὶ Κασσάνδρου, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα δι' ᾿Αντιγόνου τοῦ Γονατᾶ, τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρ-11 νους οὖτος ἐμφιτεῦσαι λοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλησι. περὶ

11 χους οὖτος ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἑλλησι. περὶ δὲ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρτην ὀλυμπιάδα πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατόν, καθάπερ ἐπάνω προεῖπον, αὖθις ἤρξαντο μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν. ταῦτα δ' ἦν κατὰ τὴν

12 Πύρρου διάβασιν είς 'Ιταλίαν. καὶ πρῶτοι μέν συνέστησαν Δυμαῖοι, Πατρεῖς, Τριταιεῖς, Φαραιεῖς διόπερ οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων 13 τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα

13 τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα μάλιστά πως ἔτει πέμπτω τὴν φρουρὰν ἐκβαλόντες Αἰγιεῖς μετέσχον τῆς συμπολιτείας · ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις

14 Βούριοι, τον τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες. ἄμα δὲ τούτοις Καρυνεῖς ἀποκατέστησαν. συνιδών γὰρ Ἰσέας δ τῆς Καρυνείας τότε τυραννεύων ἐκπεπτωκυῖαν μὲν ἐξ Αἰγίου τὴν φρουράν, ἀπολωλότα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῆ Βούρα μόναρχον διὰ Μάργου καὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, ἐαυτὸν δὲ πανταχόθεν ὁρῶν ὅσον οὐκ ἤδη πολετοίν.

15 μηθησόμενον, ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν σύστημα.

42 Τίνος οὖν χάριν ἐπὶ τοὺς χρόνους τούτους ἀνέδραμον; ἴνα πρῶτον μὲν γένηται συμφανὲς πῶς
καὶ κατὰ ποίους καιροὺς καὶ τίνες πρῶτοι τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ᾿Αχαιῶν αὖθις ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἐπιβολὴν τῆς
² νῦν συστάσεως, δεύτερον δ᾽ ἴνα καὶ τὰ τῆς προαιρέσεως μὴ μόνον διὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἀποφάσεως, ἀλλὰ
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of discord and ill-feeling that all the cities separated from the League and began to act against each others' interests. The consequence was that some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more tyrannies in Greece than any other king. But, as I said, about the 124th Olympiad they began to repent and form fresh leagues. (This was just about the date of Pyrrhus' crossing to Italy.) The first cities to do so were Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, and for this reason we do not even find any formal inscribed record of their adherence to the League. About five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their garrison and joined the League, and the Burians were the next to do so, after putting their tyrant to death. Caryneia joined almost at the same time, for Iseas, its tyrant, when he saw the garrison expelled from Aegium, and the tyrant of Bura killed by Margus and the Achaeans, and war just about to be made on himself by all the towns round, abdicated and, on receiving an assurance from the Achaeans that his life would be spared, added his city to the League.

42. Why, the reader will ask, do I go back to these times? It is, firstly, to show which of the original Achaean cities took the first steps to re-form the League and at what dates, and, secondly, that my assertion regarding their political principle may



καὶ δι' αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων πίστεως τυγχάνη, 3 διότι μία τις ἀεὶ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν αἴρεσις ὑπῆρχε, καθ' ην προτείνοντες μεν την παρ' αύτοις ισηγορίαν και παρρησίαν, πολεμοῦντες δὲ καὶ καταγωνιζόμενοι συνεχώς τους η δι' αυτών η διά των βασιλέων τάς σφετέρας πατρίδας καταδουλουμένους, τούτω τῶ τρόπω καὶ ταύτη τῆ προθέσει τοῦτο τοῦργον ἐπ-ετέλεσαν, τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν συμ-4 μάχων. καὶ γὰρ τὰ δι' ἐκείνων συνεργήματα γεγονότα προς τοῦτο το μέρος εν τοῖς έξης χρόνοις επί 5 την των 'Αχαιων προαίρεσιν ανοιστέον, πολλοίς γάρ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων, πλείστων δε καί καλλίστων 'Ρωμαίοις, οὐδέποτε τὸ παράπαν ἐπεθύμησαν έκ των κατορθωμάτων ούδενος ίδία λυσιτεβ λους, άλλ' άντι πάσης της ξαυτών φιλοτιμίας, ην παρείχοντο τοις συμμάχοις αντικατηλλάττοντο την έκάστων έλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν δμόνοιαν Πελο-7 ποννησίων. σαφέστερον δ' ὑπὲρ τούτων ἔσται διαλαμβάνειν έξ αὐτῶν τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἐνεργημάτων. 43 Είκοσι μέν οὖν ἔτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συνεπολιτεύσαντο μεθ' έαυτων αί προειρημέναι πόλεις, γραμματέα κοινον έκ περιόδου προχειριζόμεναι καί 2 δύο στρατηγούς. μετά δε ταῦτα πάλιν εδοξεν αὐτοις ένα καθιστάνειν και τούτω πιστεύειν ύπερ των ολων. καὶ πρώτος έτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάργος 3 ὁ Καρυνεύς. τετάρτω δ' υστερον έτει τοῦ προει-

ρημένου στρατηγοῦντος "Αρατος ὁ Σικυώνιος, ἔτη μὲν ἔχων εἴκοσι, τυραννουμένην δ' ἐλευθερώσας τὴν πατρίδα διὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τόλμης, προσένειμε πρὸς τὴν τῶν 'Αχαιῶν πολιτείαν, ἀρχῆθεν εὐθὺς ἐραστὴς γενόμενος τῆς προαιρέσεως 346

be confirmed by the actual evidence of facts. What I asserted was that the Achaeans always followed one single policy, ever attracting others by the offer of their own equality and liberty and ever making war on and crushing those who either themselves or through the kings attempted to enslave their native cities, and that, in this manner and pursuing this purpose, they accomplished their task in part unaided and in part with the help of allies. For the Achaean political principle must be credited also with the results furthering their end, to which their allies in subsequent years contributed. Though they took so much part in the enterprises of others, and especially in many of those of the Romans which resulted brilliantly, they never showed the least desire to gain any private profit from their success, but demanded, in exchange for the zealous aid they rendered their allies, nothing beyond the liberty and concord of the Peloponnesians. will be more clearly evident when we come to see the League in active operation.

43. For twenty-five years, then, this league of cities continued, electing for a certain period a Secretary of state and two Strategi. After this they decided to elect one Strategus and entrust him with the general direction of their affairs, the first to be nominated to this honourable office being Margus of Caryneia. Four years later during his 255 B.C. term of office, Aratus of Sicyon, then only twenty 251 B.C. years of age, freed his city from its tyrant by his enterprise and courage, and, having always been a passionate admirer of the Achaean polity, made his 248 B.C. own city a member of the League. Eight years

4 αὐτῶν. ὀγδόφ δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἰρεθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ πραξικοπήσας τὸν ᾿Ακροκόρινθον, ᾿Αντιγόνου κυριεύοντος, καὶ γενόμενος ἐγκρατής, μεγάλου μεν απέλυσε φόβου τους την Πελοπόννησον κατοικοῦντας, έλευθερώσας δὲ Κορινθίους προσ-5 ηγάγετο πρὸς τὴν τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν πολιτείαν. ἐπὶ δὲ της αὐτης ἀρχης καὶ την τῶν Μεγαρέων πόλιν δια-6 πραξάμενος προσένειμε τοις 'Αγαιοις. ταθτά τ' έγίνετο τῷ πρότερον ἔτει τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἥττης, ἐν ῇ καθόλου Σικελίας ἐκχωρήσαντες πρῶτον ὑπέμειναν η τότε φόρους ενεγκεῖν Ρωμαίοις. μεγάλην δε προκοπην ποιήσας της έπιβολης έν ολίγω χρόνω, λοιπον ήδη διετέλει προστατών μέν τοῦ τῶν 'Αχαιών έθνους, πάσας δὲ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς 8 εν τέλος ἀναφέρων· τοῦτο δ' ήν τὸ Μακεδόνας μεν εκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλύσαι, βεβαιώσαι δ' έκάστοις την κοινήν καὶ πάο τριον έλευθερίαν. μέχρι μέν οδν ήν Αντίγονος ό Γονατας, πρός τε την εκείνου πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ πρός την Αιτωλών πλεονεξίαν αντιταττόμενος δι-10 ετέλει, πραγματικώς έκαστα χειρίζων, καίπερ είς τοῦτο προβάντων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδικίας καὶ τόλμης ωστε ποιήσασθαι συνθήκας πρός άλλήλους ύπερ 44 διαιρέσεως τοῦ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν ἔθνους. 'Αντιγόνου δὲ μεταλλάξαντος, καὶ συνθεμένων τῶν 'Αχαιῶν καὶ συμμαχίαν πρός Αίτωλούς και μετασχόντων εύγενως σφίσι του πρός Δημήτριον πολέμου, τὰ μέν της άλλοτριότητος και δυσμενείας ήρθη κατά τὸ παρόν, ὑπεγένετο δὲ κοινωνική και φιλική τις αὐ-2 τοις διάθεσις. Δημητρίου δε βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον έτη, και μεταλλάξαντος τον βίον περι την πρώτην διάβασιν εις την 'Ιλλυρίδα 'Ρωμαίων, εγέ-

after this, during his second term of office as Strategus, he contrived to get into his hands the citadel of Corinth which was held by Antigonus, thus delivering the Peloponnesians from a great source of fear, and induced the city he had liberated to join the League. He next obtained the adhesion of Megara by the same means. These events took place in the year before that defeat of the Carthaginians which forced them to evacuate Sicily and submit for the first time to pay tribute to Rome. Having in so short a space of time thus materially advanced his projects, he continued to govern the Achaean nation, all his schemes and action being directed to one object, the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state. During the life of Antigonus Gonatas he continued to offer a most effectual opposition both to the meddlesomeness of this king and the lust for power of the Aetolians, although the two were so unscrupulous and venturesome that they entered into an arrangement for the purpose of dissolving the Achaean League. 44. But, on the death of 230 B.C. Antigonus, the Achaeans even made an alliance with the Aetolians and supported them ungrudgingly in the war against Demetrius, so that, for the time at least, their estrangement and hostility ceased, and a more or less friendly and sociable feeling sprang up between them. Demetrius only reigned for ten years, his death taking place at the time the Romans 229 B.O. first crossed to Illyria, and after this the tide of

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νετό τις ευροια πραγμάτων πρός την έξ άρχης έπι-3 βολην τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. οἱ γὰρ ἐν τῆ Πελοποννήσω μόναρχοι, δυσελπιστήσαντες ἐπὶ τῷ μετηλλαχέναι μὲν τὸν Δημήτριον, δς ῆν αὐτοῖς οἶον ἰ χορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν "Αρατον, οἰόμενον δείν σφας αποτίθεσθαι τὰς τυραννίδας, καὶ τοίς μέν πεισθείσι μεγάλας δωρεάς και τιμάς προτείνοντος, τοις δε μη προσέχουσιν έτι μείζους έπανατεινομένου φόβους καὶ κινδύνους διὰ τῶν 4 'Αχαιῶν, ιρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ πεισθέντες ἀποθέσθαι μὲν

τας τυραννίδας, έλευθερώσαι δέ τας έαυτων πατρί-

5 δας, μετασχείν δὲ τῆς τῶν 'Αχαιῶν πολιτείας. Λυδιάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος Δημητρίου, κατά την αύτοῦ προαίρεσιν, πάνυ πραγματικώς καὶ φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον, ἀπετέθειτο τὴν τυραννίδα, καὶ μετεσχήκει τῆς 6 ἐθνικῆς συμπολιτείας. 'Αριστόμαχος δ' ὁ τῶν

'Αργείων τύραννος καὶ Ξένων ὁ τῶν 'Ερμιονέων καὶ Κλεώνυμος ὁ τῶν Φλιασίων τότ' ἀποθέμενοι τὰς μοναρχίας ἐκοινώνησαν τῆς τῶν 'Αχαιῶν δημο-

κρατίας.

45 'Ολοσχερεστέρας δε γενομένης αὐξήσεως διὰ ταῦτα καὶ προκοπῆς περὶ τὸ ἔθνος, Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, τὸ δε πλειον ελπίσαντες καταδιελέσθαι τὰς πόλεις. καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον τὰς μὲν 'Ακαρνάνων διενείμαντο πρός 'Αλέξανδρον, τὰς δὲ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν ἐπ-

2 εβάλοντο πρὸς ᾿Αντίγονον τὸν Γονατᾶν, καὶ τότε παραπλησίαις ἐλπίσιν ἐπαρθέντες, ἀπετόλμησαν ᾿Αντιγόνω τε τῷ κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς προεστώτι Μακεδόνων, επιτροπεύοντι δε Φιλίππου παιδὸς ὄντος, καὶ Κλεομένει τῶ βασιλεῖ Λακεδαιμονίων 350

events seemed to flow for a time in favour of the Achaeans' constant purpose; for the Peloponnesian tyrants were much cast down by the death of Demetrius, who had been, so to speak, their furnisher and paymaster, and equally so by the threatening attitude of Aratus, who demanded that they should depose themselves, offering abundance of gifts and honours to those who consented to do so. and menacing those who turned a deaf ear to him with still more abundant chastisement on the part of the Achaeans. They therefore hurried to accede to his demand, laying down their tyrannies, setting their respective cities free, and joining the Achaean League. Lydiades of Megalopolis had even foreseen what was likely to happen, and with great wisdom and good sense had forestalled the death of Demetrius and of his own free will laid down his tyranny and adhered to the national government. Afterwards Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also resigned and joined the League.

45. The League being thus materially increased in extent and power, the Aetolians, owing to that unprincipled passion for aggrandizement which is natural to them, either out of envy or rather in the hope of partitioning the cities, as they had partitioned those of Acarnania with Alexander and had previously proposed to do regarding Achaea with Antigonus Gonatas, went so far as to join hands with Antigonus, then regent of Macedonia and guardian to Philip,

κοινωνείν, καὶ συμπλέκειν ἀμφοτέροις ἄμα τὰς χεί-3 ρας. όρωντες γάρ τὸν 'Αντίγονον, κυριεύοντα μέν τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἀσφαλῶς, ὁμολογούμενον δὲ καὶ πρόδηλον ἐχθρὸν ὄντα τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν διὰ τὸ 4 τον 'Ακροκόρινθον πραξι (κοπήσαντας καταλαβείν). ύπέλαβον, εί τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους προσλαβόντες έτι κοινωνούς σφίσι της επιβολης προεμβιβάσαιεν είς τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος ἀπέχθειαν, ραδίως αν καταγωνίσασθαι τους 'Αγαιους έν καιρώ συνεπιθέμενοι και 5 πανταχόθεν περιστήσαντες αὐτοῖς τὸν πόλεμον. δ δή καί ταχέως αν έκ των κατά λόγον επετέλεσαν, εί μη το κυριώτατον παρείδον της προθέσεως, οὐ συλλογισάμενοι διότι ταις επιβολαις "Αρατον εξου-σιν ανταγωνιστήν, ανδρα δυνάμενον πάσης εὐστοβ χείν περιστάσεως. τοιγαρούν δρμήσαντες έπὶ τὸ πολυπραγμονεῖν καὶ χειρών ἄρχειν ἀδίκων οὐχ οἶον ἥνυσάν τι τῶν ἐπινοηθέντων, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον καὶ τὸν Αρατον τότε προεστώτα καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐσωματοποίησαν, πραγματικώς αντιπερισπάσαντος έκείνου καί 7 λυμηναμένου τὰς ἐπιβολὰς αὐτῶν. ὡς δ' ἐχειρίσθη τὰ ὅλα δῆλον ἔσται διὰ τῶν λέγεσθαι μελλόντων. 46 Θεωρών γάρ τους Αιτωλούς ό προειρημένος ανήρ τον μέν πόλεμον τον προς αὐτους αἰσχυνομένους αναλαβείν εκ τοῦ φανεροῦ διὰ τὸ καὶ λίαν είναι προσφάτους τὰς ἐκ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν εὐεργεσίας 2 περί τον Δημητριακον πόλεμον είς αὐτούς, συμβουλευομένους δέ τοις Λακεδαιμονίοις και φθονουντας τοις 'Αχαιοις έπι τοσούτον ώστε Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπηκότος αὐτοὺς καὶ παρηρημένου Τεγέαν, Μαντίνειαν, 'Ορχομενόν, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον

συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολίτευομένας τότε πόλεις, οὐχ οδον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ

who was still a child, and Cleomenes, king of Sparta. They saw that Antigonus was undisputed master of Macedonia and at the same time the open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to their seizure by treachery of the Acrocorinthus, and they supposed that if they could get the Lacedaemonians also to join them in their project, exciting first their animosity against the League, they could easily crush the Achaeans by attacking them at the proper time all at once and from all quarters. This indeed they would in all probability soon have done, but for the most important factor which they had overlooked in their plans. They never took into consideration that in this undertaking they would have Aratus as their opponent, a man capable of meeting any emergency. Consequently the result of their intrigues and unjust aggression was that not only did they entirely fail in their designs, but on the contrary consolidated the power of the League, and of Aratus who was then Strategus, as he most adroitly diverted and spoilt all their plans. he managed this the following narrative will show.

46. Aratus saw that the Aetolians were ashamed of openly declaring war on them, as it was so very recently that the Achaeans had helped them in their war against Demetrius, but that they were so much of one mind with the Lacedaemonians and so jealous of the Achaeans that when Cleomenes broke faith with them and possessed himself of Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus, cities which were not only allies of the Aetolians, but at the time members of their league, they not only showed no resentment, but

3 τούτοις, άλλά καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῶ τὴν παράληψιν,

καὶ τοὺς πρότερον κατὰ τῶν μηδὲν ἀδικούντων πασαν ίκανην ποιουμένους πρόφασιν είς τὸ πολεμεῖν διά την πλεονεξίαν τότε συνορών έκουσίως παρασπονδουμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλύντας πόλεις εθελοντήν εφ' ώ μόνον ίδειν αξιόχρεων γενόμενον 4 ανταγωνιστήν Κλεομένη τοις 'Αχαιοις, έγνω δείν είς ταθτα βλέπων οδτός τε και πάντες όμοίως οί προεστώτες τοῦ τῶν 'Αγαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μέν πρός μηδένα κατάρχειν, ενίστασθαι δε ταις των 5 Λακεδαιμονίων επιβολαίς. το μεν οθν πρώτον επί τούτων ήσαν των διαλήψεων θεωροῦντες δε κατά τοὺς έξης χρόνους τὸν Κλεομένη θρασέως ἐποικοδομοθντα μέν τὸ καλούμενον 'Αθήναιον έν τῆ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτών χώρα, πρόδηλον δέ καὶ πικρον ἀνα-6 δεικνύντα σφίσι πολέμιον έαυτόν, τότε δή συναθροίσαντες τους 'Αχαιούς έκριναν μετά της βουλης άναλαμβάνειν φανερώς την πρός τους Λακεδαιμονίους απέχθειαν. 7 'Ο μέν οὖν Κλεομενικός προσαγορευθείς πόλε-

ΤΟ μεν ουν Κλεομενικός προσαγορευσεις πολεμος τοιαύτην έλαβε την άρχην καὶ κατά τούτους 47 τους καιρούς. οἱ δ' 'Αχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διὰ τῆς ιδίας δυνάμεως ὤρμησαν ἀντοφθαλμεῖν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἄμα μὲν ὑπολαμβάνοντες κάλλιστον εἶναι τὸ μὴ δι' ἐτέρων σφίσι πορίζεσθαι τὴν σωτηρίαν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς δι' αὐτῶν σώζειν τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἄμα δὲ βουλόμενοι καὶ τὴν πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον τηρεῖν φιλίαν διὰ τὰς προγεγενημένας εὐεργεσίας καὶ μὴ φαίνεσθαι πρὸς ἑτέρους ἐκτείνον-3 τες τὰς χεῖρας, ἤδη δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν τοῦ πολέμου προβαίνοντος, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένους τό τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος καὶ τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν 354

actually set their seal to his occupation. It was evident that they, who on previous occasions, owing to their lust of aggrandizement, found any pretext adequate for making war on those who had done them no wrong, now allowed themselves to be treacherously attacked and to suffer the loss of some of their largest cities simply in order to see Cleomenes become a really formidable antagonist of the Achaeans. Aratus, therefore, and all the leading men of the Achaean League decided not to take the initiative in going to war with anyone, but to resist Spartan aggression. This at least was their first resolve; but when shortly afterwards Cleomenes began to fortify against them the socalled Athenaeum in the territory of Megalopolis, and to show himself their avowed and bitter enemy, they called the Council of the League together and decided on open war with Sparta.

This was the date at which the war known as 227 B.C. the Cleomenic war began; and such was its origin.

47. The Achaeans at first decided to face the Lacedaemonians single-handed, considering it in the first place most honourable not to owe their safety to others but to protect their cities and country unaided, and also desiring to maintain their friendship with Ptolemy owing to the obligations they were under to him, and not to appear to him to be seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had lasted for some time, and Cleomenes, having overthrown the ancient polity at Sparta and changed the constitutional 225 B.C.

είς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένου δέ καὶ τῷ 4 πολέμω πρακτικώς και παραβόλως, προορώμενος "Αρατος τὸ μέλλον, καὶ δεδιώς τήν τε τῶν Αἰτωλων απόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν, ἔκρινε πρὸ πολλοῦ λυ-5 μαίνεσθαι την επιβολήν αυτών. κατανοών δε τον 'Αντίγονον καὶ πρᾶξιν έχοντα καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ πίστεως αντιποιούμενον, τούς δε βασιλείς σαφώς είδως φύσει μέν οὐδένα νομίζοντας οὔτε φίλιον ούτε πολέμιον, ταις δε του συμφέροντος ψήφοις αίει μετρούντας τὰς έχθρας και τὰς φιλίας, η έπεβάλετο λαλείν πρός τον είρημένον βασιλέα καί συμπλέκειν τὰς γείρας, ὑποδεικνύων αὐτῶ τὸ συμη βησόμενον έκ τῶν πραγμάτων. προδήλως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ πράττειν ἀσύμφορον ἡγεῖτο διὰ πλείους αἰτίας. τόν τε γάρ Κλεομένη καὶ τούς Αἰτωλούς άνταγωνι-8 στας παρασκευάζειν ήμελλε προς την επιβολήν, τούς τε πολλούς των 'Αγαιών διατρέψειν, καταφεύγων έπὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ δοκῶν όλοσχερῶς ἀπεγνωκέναι τας έν αὐτοῖς έλπίδας. ὅπερ ηκιστα φαίνεσθαι πράτ-9 των έβούλετο. διόπερ έχων τοιαύτην πρόθεσιν άδή-10 λως αὐτὰ διενοεῖτο χειρίζειν. έξ οδ πολλά παρά την έαυτοῦ γνώμην ηναγκάζετο καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιείν πρός τους έκτός, δι' ών ημελλε την εναντίαν εμφασιν ύποδεικνύων ταύτην επικρύψεσθαι την οί-11 κονομίαν. ὧν χάριν ἔνια τούτων οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατέταξεν.

48 Είδως δε τούς Μεγαλοπολίτας κακοπαθούντας μέν τῶ πολέμω διὰ τὸ παρακειμένους τῆ Λακεδαίμονι προπολεμείν των άλλων, ου τυγχάνοντας δέ



kingship into a tyranny, showed great energy and daring in the conduct of the campaign, Aratus, foreseeing what was likely to happen and dreading the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, determined to be beforehand with them and spoil their plans. He perceived that Antigonus was a man of energy and sound sense, and that he claimed to be a man of honour, but he knew that kings do not regard anyone as their natural foe or friend, but measure enmity and friendship by the sole standard of expediency. He therefore decided to approach that monarch and put himself on confidential terms with him, pointing out to him to what the present course of affairs would probably lead. Now for several reasons he did not think it expedient to do this overtly. In the first place he would thus expose himself to being outbidden in his project by Cleomenes and the Aetolians, and next he would damage the spirit of the Achaean troops by thus appealing to an enemy and appearing to have entirely abandoned the hopes he had placed in them—this being the very last thing he wished them to think. Therefore, having formed this plan, he decided to carry it out by covert means. was consequently compelled in public both to do and to say many things quite contrary to his real intention, so as to keep his design concealed by creating the exactly opposite impression. For this reason there are some such matters that he does not even refer to in his Memoirs.

48. He knew that the people of Megalopolis were suffering severely from the war, as, owing to their being on the Lacedaemonian border, they had to bear the full brunt of it, and could not receive proper

της καθηκούσης επικουρίας ύπο των 'Αχαιών διά το κάκείνους δυσχρηστείσθαι θλιβομένους ύπο της 2 περιστάσεως, σαφως δε γινώσκων οἰκείως διακειμένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν 3 κατὰ τὸν ᾿Αμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν, διειλήφει διότι ταγέως αν ύπο τοῦ Κλεομένους πιεζόμενοι καταφύγοιεν έπὶ τὸν 'Αντίγονον καὶ τὰς Μακεδόνων 4 ελπίδας κοινολογηθείς οδν δι' απορρήτων περί της όλης ἐπιβολῆς Νικοφάνει καὶ Κερκιδα τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, οίτινες ήσαν αὐτοῦ πατρικοὶ ξένοι καὶ 5 προς την επιβολην ευφυείς, ραδίως δια τούτων δρμην παρέστησε τοίς Μεγαλοπολίταις είς το πρεσβεύειν πρός τους 'Αχαιούς και παρακαλείν πρός 6 τον 'Αντίγονον ύπερ βοηθείας. οι μεν ούν Μεγαλοπολίται κατέστησαν αὐτούς τούς περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδαν πρεσβευτας πρός τε τους Αγαιούς κάκεῖθεν εὐθέως πρός τὸν 'Αντίγονον, αν 7 αὐτοῖς συγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. οἱ δ' 'Αγαιοὶ συν-8 εχώρησαν πρεσβεύειν τοις Μεγαλοπολίταις. σπουδη δέ συμμίξαντες οι περί τον Νικοφάνη τῶ βασιλεῖ διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἐαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ 49 πολλά περί των όλων κατά τὰς έντολὰς τὰς 'Αράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις. αὖται δ' ἦσαν ὑποδεικνύναι τὴν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Κλεομένους κοινοπραγίαν τί δύναται καὶ ποῖ τείνει, καὶ δηλοῦν ὅτι πρώτοις μὲν 2 αὐτοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς εὐλαβητέον, έξῆς δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον 'Αντιγόνω. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς 'Αχαιοὶ τὸν έξ ἀμφοιν πόλεμον οὐκ αν ὑπενέγκαιεν εὐθεώρητον είναι πασι, τοῦτο δ' ώς Αἰτωλοὶ καὶ Κλεομένης κρατήσαντες τούτων οὐκ εὐδοκήσουσιν οὐδὲ μὴ μείνωσιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔτι τοῦ πρόσθεν βάον εἶναι τῷ 358

assistance from the Achaeans, as the latter were themselves in difficulties and distress. As he also knew for a surety that they were well disposed to the royal house of Macedon ever since the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas, he felt sure that, hard pressed as they were by Cleomenes, they would be very ready to take refuge in Antigonus and hopes of safety from Macedonia. He therefore communicated his project confidentially to Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis who were family friends of his own and well suited for the business, and he had no difficulty through them in inciting the Megalopolitans to send an embassy to the Achaeans begging them to appeal to Antigonus for help. Nicophanes and Cercidas themselves were appointed envoys by the Megalopolitans, in the first place to the Achaeans and next, if the League consented, with orders to proceed at once to Antigonus. The League gave its permission and the ambassadors hastened to meet the king. They said no more than was strictly necessary on the subject of their own city, treating this matter briefly and summarily, but dwelt at length on the general situation, in the sense that Aratus had directed and prompted. 49. He had charged them to point out the importance and the probable consequences of the common action of the Aetolians and Cleomenes, representing that in the first place the Achaeans were imperilled by it and next and in a larger measure Antigonus himself. For it was perfectly evident to all that the Achaeans could not hold out against both adversaries, and it was still more easy for any person of intelligence to see that, if the Aetolians and Cleomenes were successful, they

3 νοῦν ἔχοντι συνιδεῖν. τήν τε γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν πλεονεξίαν οὐχ οἱον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων ὅροις εὐδοκησαί ποτ' αν περιληφθείσαν, άλλ' οὐδέ τοῖς της 4 Έλλάδος, τήν τε Κλεομένους φιλοδοξίαν καὶ τήν όλην επιβολήν κατά μεν το παρον αυτής εφίεσθαι της Πελοποννησίων άρχης, τυχόντα δε ταύτης τον προειρημένον κατά πόδας ανθέξεσθαι της των Ελλήδ νων ήγεμονίας. ής ούχ οδόν τε καθικέσθαι μή ού 6 πρόσθεν καταλύσαντα την Μακεδόνων άρχην. σκοπειν οὖν αὐτὸν ήξίουν, προορώμενον τὸ μέλλον, πότερον συμφέρει τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι μετ 'Αχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσω πρὸς Κλεομένη πολεμείν ύπερ της των Ελλήνων ήγεμονίας ή προέμενον το μέγιστον έθνος διακινδυνεύειν έν Θετταλία προς Αίτωλους και Βοιωτούς, έτι δ' 'Αχαιους καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδόνων ἀρχῆς. 7 εαν μεν ούν Αιτωλοί την έκ των 'Αχαιων είς αὐτούς γεγενημένην εΰνοιαν έν τοῖς κατὰ Δημήτριον καιροῖς έντρεπόμενοι την ήσυχίαν άγειν ύποκρίνωνται, καθάπερ καὶ νῦν, πολεμήσειν αὐτοὺς ἔφασαν τοὺς 'Αχαιούς πρός τον Κλεομένη· καν μέν ή τύχη συνεπιλαμβάνηται, μη δεισθαι χρείας των βοηθησόντων· 8 αν δ' αντιπίπτη τὰ της τύχης, Αἰτωλοὶ δέ συνεπιτίθωνται, προσέχειν αὐτὸν παρεκάλουν τοῖς πράγμασιν, ίνα μη πρόηται τους καιρούς, έτι δε δυνα-9 μένοις σώζεσθαι Πελοποννησίοις έπαρκέση περί δέ πίστεως καὶ χάριτος ἀποδόσεως ραθυμεῖν αὐτὸν ὤοντο δεῖν τῆς γὰρ χρείας ἐπιτελουμένης αὐτὸν εύρήσειν τὸν "Αρατον" εὐδοκουμένας ἀμφοτέροις 10 ύπισχνοῦντο πίστεις. όμοίως δ' ἔφασαν καὶ τὸν καιρον της βοηθείας αὐτον ὑποδείξειν.

would push their advantage further. The Aetolian schemes of territorial aggrandizement would never stop short of the boundaries of the Peloponnese or even those of Greece itself, while Cleomenes' personal ambition, and far-reaching projects, though for the present he aimed only at supremacy in the Peloponnese, would, on his attaining this, at once develop into a claim to be over-lord of all Hellas, a thing impossible without his first putting an end to the dominion of Macedon. They implored him then to look to the future and consider which was most in his interest, to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes for the supremacy of Greece with the support of the Achaeans and Boeotians, or to abandon the greatest of the Greek nations to its fate and then do battle in Thessaly for the throne of Macedonia with the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans all at once. Should the Aetolians, still pretending to have scruples owing to the benefits received from the Achaeans in their war with Demetrius, continue their present inaction, the Achaeans alone, they said, would fight against Cleomenes, and, if Fortune favoured them, would require no help; but should they meet with ill-success and be attacked by the Aetolians also, they entreated him to take good heed and not let the opportunity slip, but come to the aid of the Peloponnesians while it was still possible to save them. As for conditions of alliance and the return they could offer him for his support, they said he need not concern himself, for once the service they demanded was being actually rendered, they promised him that Aratus would find terms satisfactory to both parties. Aratus himself, they said, would also indicate the date at which they required his aid.

50 ΄Ο μεν οὖν 'Αντίγονος ἀκούσας ταῦτα, καὶ δόξας άληθινῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς ὑποδεικνύναι τὸν Αρατον, προσείχε τοις έξης πραττομένοις ἐπιμελῶς. 2 ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοις Μεγαλοπολίταις, ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσειν, έὰν καὶ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλο-3 μένοις ή. των δὲ περί τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ Κερκιδαν ἐπανελθόντων εἰς οἶκον, καὶ τάς τε παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως έπιστολάς αποδόντων και την λοιπην ευ-4 νοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ προθυμίαν διασαφούντων, μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολίται προθύμως ἔσχον ἰέναι πρός την σύνοδον των 'Αχαιών καὶ παρακαλειν έπισπάσασθαι τὸν 'Αντίγονον καὶ τὰ πράγματα κατὰ 5 σπουδην εγχειρίζειν αὐτῷ. ὁ δ' "Αρατος, διακούσας κατ' ιδίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως αίρεσιν, ην έχοι πρός τε τους 'Αχαιους καί πρός αὐτόν, περιχαρής ην τῷ μη διακενης πεποιη-σθαι την ἐπίνοιαν μηδ' εὐρησθαι κατὰ την τῶν Αἰ-τωλῶν ἐλπίδα τὸν ᾿Αντίγονον εἰς τέλος ἀπηλλοτριω-6 μένον έαυτοῦ. πάνυ δὲ πρὸς λόγον ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προθύμους είναι διὰ των 'Αχαιων φέρειν έπὶ τὸν 'Αντίγονον τὰ πράγματα. 7 μάλιστα μεν γάρ, ώς επάνω προειπον, εσπευδε μή προσδεηθήναι τής βοηθείας εί δ' εξ ανάγκης επί τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἠβούλετο δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλησιν, ἔτι δὲ μαλλον έξ ἀπάν-8 των τῶν 'Αχαιῶν. ἡγωνία γάρ, εἰ παραγενόμενος ό βασιλεύς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμω τοῦ Κλεομένους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλοιότερόν τι βουλεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μήποθ' όμο-λογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβη τὴν 9 αἰτίαν, δόξαντος δικαίως τοῦτο πράττειν διὰ τὴν έξ αὐτοῦ προγεγενημένην άδικίαν περὶ τὸν 'Ακροκό-362

50. Antigonus, having listened to them, felt convinced that Aratus took a true and practical view of the situation, and carefully considered the next steps to be taken, promising the Megalopolitans by letter to come to their assistance if such was the wish of the Achaeans too. Upon Nicophanes and Cercidas returning home and delivering the king's letter. assuring at the same time their people of his goodwill towards them and readiness to be of service, the Megalopolitans were much elated and most ready to go to the Council of the League and beg them to invite the aid of Antigonus and at once put the direction of affairs in his hands. Aratus had private information from Nicophanes of the king's favourable inclination towards the League and himself, and was much gratified to find that his project had not been futile, and that he had not, as the Aetolians had hoped, found Antigonus entirely alienated from him. He considered it a great advantage that the Megalopolitans had readily consented to approach Antigonus through the Achaeans; for, as I said above, what he chiefly desired was not to be in need of asking for help, but if it became necessary to resort to this, he wished the appeal to come not only from himself personally, but from the League as a For he was afraid that if the king appeared on the scene and, after conquering Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians, took any measures the reverse of welcome regarding the League, he himself would be universally blamed for what happened, as the king would seem to have justice on his side owing to Aratus' offence against the house of Macedon in

10 ρινθον είς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. διόπερ ἄμα τῷ παρελθόντας τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας εἰς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευτήριον τά τε γράμματα τοις 'Αχαιοις έπιδεικνύναι και διασαφείν την όλην εύνοιαν του βασιλέως, προς δε τούτοις άξιοῦν επισπάσασθαι τον 'Αντίγονον τὴν ταχίστην, είναι δὲ καὶ τὸ πληθος ἐπὶ τῆς 11 αὐτης όρμης, προελθών "Αρατος, καὶ τήν τε τοῦ βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας, παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν σώζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν· οὐδὲν γὰρ είναι τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον ἐὰν δ' ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνη τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε 51 καταφεύγειν έπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας. ἐπισημηναμένου δὲ τοῦ πλήθους, ἔδοξε μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν ἐπιτελεῖν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα 2 πόλεμον. ἐπεὶ δὲ Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνούς μὲν τὸ έθνος Κλεομένει χορηγείν ἐπεβάλετο, βουλόμενος αὐτὸν ἐπαλείφειν ἐπὶ τὸν 'Αντίγονον διὰ τὸ πλείους έλπίδας έχειν έν τοις Λακεδαιμονίοις ήπερ έν τοις 'Αχαιοῖς τοῦ δύνασθαι διακατέχειν τὰς τῶν ἐν Μακε-3 δονία βασιλέων ἐπιβολάς, οἱ δ' 'Αχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον, συμπλακέντες κατά πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον έκ παρατάξεως ήττήθησαν έν τοις Λαδοκείοις καλουμένοις της Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ότε καὶ Λυδιάδας έπεσε, το δε τρίτον ολοσχερώς έπταισαν εν τῆ Δυμαία περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἑκατόμβαιον, παν-4 δημεὶ διακινδυνεύοντες, τότ' ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν ἢνάγκαζε τὰ περι-



the case of the Acrocorinthus. Therefore, when the Megalopolitans appeared before the General Council of the League, and showing the king's letter, assured them of his friendly sentiments, at the same time begging the Achaeans to ask for his intervention at once, and when Aratus saw that this was the inclination of the Achaeans also, he rose, and after expressing his gratification at the king's readiness to assist them and his approval of the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them at some length, begging them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts, that being the most honourable and advantageous course, but, should adverse fortune prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends for aid. 51. The people applauded his speech, and a decree was passed to leave things as they were for the present and conduct the war unaided. But a series of disasters overtook them. In the first place Ptolemy threw over the League and began to give financial support to Cleomenes with a view of setting him on to attack Antigonus, as he hoped to be able to keep in check more effectually the projects of the Macedonian kings with the support of the Lacedaemonians than with that of the Achaeans. Next the Achaeans were worsted by Cleomenes while on the march near the Lycaeum and again in a pitched battle at a place in the territory of Megalopolis called Ladoceia, Lydiades falling here, and finally their whole force met with utter defeat at the Hecatombaeum in the territory of Dyme. Circumstances now no longer permitting delay, they were compelled by their position to

εστωτα καταφεύγειν όμοθυμαδόν έπὶ τὸν 'Αντίγονον. 5 εν ω καιρώ πρεσβευτήν τον υίον εξαποστείλας "Αρατος πρός 'Αντίγονον έβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς 6 βοηθείας. παρεῖχε δ' αὐτοῖς ἀπορίαν καὶ δυσχρη-στίαν μεγίστην τὸ μήτε τὸν βασιλέα δοκεῖν αν βοηθησαί χωρίς τοῦ κομίσασθαί τὸν 'Ακροκόρινθον καὶ λαβεῖν δρμητήριον πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον την τῶν Κορινθίων πόλιν, μήτε τους 'Αχαιους αν τολμήσαι Κορινθίους άκοντας έγχειρίσαι Μακεδόσι. 7 διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπέρθεσιν ἔσχε τὸ διαβούλιον

χάριν της περί των πίστεων επισκέψεως. Ο δε Κλεομένης, καταπληξάμενος τοις προειρημένοις εὐτυχήμασι, λοιπον άδεως ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ας μεν πείθων, αις δε τον φόβον ανατεινό-2 μενος. προσλαβών δε τῷ τρόπω τούτω Καφύας, Πελλήνην, Φενεόν, "Αργος, Φλιοῦντα, Κλεωνάς, Έπίδαυρον, Έρμιόνα, Τροίζηνα, τελευταῖον Κόρινθον, αὐτὸς μέν προσεστρατοπέδευσε τῆ τῶν Σικυωνίων πόλει, τούς δ' Αχαιούς απέλυσε τοῦ 3 μεγίστου προβλήματος. τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ 'Αράτω στρατηγούντι καὶ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς παραγγειλάντων έκ της πόλεως απαλλάττεσθαι, πρός δέ τον Κλεομένη διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλούντων, παρεδόθη τοις 'Αχαιοις άφορμη και πρόφασις 4 εύλογος. ής επιλαβόμενος "Αρατος καὶ προτείνας 'Αντιγόνω τὸν 'Ακροκόρινθον, κατεχόντων 'Αχαιῶν τότε τὸν τόπον τοῦτον, έλυσε μεν τὸ γεγονὸς έγκλημα πρός την οἰκίαν, ίκανην δὲ πίστιν παρέσχετο της πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα κοινωνίας, τὸ δὲ συνέχον, δρμητήριον παρεσκεύασεν 'Αντιγόνω πρός τον κατά Λακεδαιμονίων πόλεμον.

5 'Ο δέ Κλεομένης, έπιγνούς τούς 'Αχαιούς συν-



appeal with one voice to Antigonus. Aratus on this occasion sent his son as envoy to the king and ratified the terms of the alliance. They were, however, in considerable doubt and difficulty about the Acrocorinthus, as they did not think Antigonus would come to their assistance unless it were restored to him, so that he could use Corinth as a base for the present war, nor could they go to the length of handing over the Corinthians against their will to Macedon. This even caused at first an adjournment of the Council for the consideration of the guarantees they offered.

52. Cleomenes, having inspired terror by the victories I mentioned, henceforth made an unimpeded progress through the cities, gaining some by persuasion and others by threats. He annexed in this manner Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae, Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and finally Corinth. He now sat down in front of Sicyon, but he had solved the chief difficulty of the Achaeans; for the Corinthians by ordering Aratus, who was then Strategus, and the Achaeans to quit Corinth, and by sending to invite Cleomenes, furnished the Achaeans with good and reasonable ground for offering to Antigonus the Acrocorinthus then held by them. Availing himself of this, Aratus not only atoned for his former offence to the royal house, but gave sufficient guarantee of future loyalty, further providing Antigonus with a base for the war against Lacedaemon.

Cleomenes, when he became aware of the under-



τιθεμένους τὰ πρὸς τὸν Αντίγονον, ἀναζεύξας ἀπὸ τοῦ Σικυῶνος, κατεστρατοπέδευσε περὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν, διαλαβών χάρακι καὶ τάφρω τὸν μεταξὺ τόπον τοῦ τ' 'Ακροκορίνθου καὶ τῶν 'Ονείων καλουμένων ὀρῶν, πασαν ήδη βεβαίως περιειληφώς ταις έλπίσι την 6 Πελοποννησίων άρχήν. 'Αντίγονος δὲ πάλαι μὲν ην έν παρασκευή, καραδοκών το μέλλον κατά τάς τ ύποθέσεις τὰς ᾿Αράτου τότε δὲ συλλογιζόμενος ἐκ των προσπιπτόντων όσον ούπω παρείναι τον Κλεομένη μετά της δυνάμεως είς Θετταλίαν, διαπεμψάμενος πρός τε τὸν "Αρατον καὶ τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν ώμολογημένων, ἡκεν ἔχων τὰς δυνάμεις διὰ 8 τῆς Εὐβοίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰσθμόν. οἱ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ πρὸς τοις άλλοις και τότε βουλόμενοι κωλύσαι τον 'Αντίγονον της βοηθείας, ἀπεῖπον αὐτῷ πορεύεσθαι μετά δυνάμεως έντος Πυλών εί δε μή, διότι κωλύσουσι μεθ' όπλων αὐτοῦ τὴν δίοδον. 9 'Ο μέν οὖν 'Αντίγονος καὶ Κλεομένης ἀντεστρατοπέδευον άλλήλοις, ό μεν είσελθείν σπουδάζων είς Πελοπόννησον, ο δε Κλεομένης κωλυσαι της είσ-53 όδου τὸν 'Αντίγονον. οἱ δ' 'Αχαιοί, καίπερ οὐ μετρίως ήλαττωμένοι τοῖς όλοις, όμως οὐκ ἀφίσταντο της προθέσεως οὐδ' εγκατέλειπον τὰς εν αύτοις έλ-2 πίδας, άλλ' αμα τω τον 'Αριστοτέλη τον 'Αργειον έπαναστήναι τοις Κλεομενισταις, βοηθήσαντες καί παρεισπεσόντες μετά Τιμοξένου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ,

παρεισπεσοντες μετα 1 ιμος ενού του στρατηγού, 3 κατέλαβον τὴν τῶν 'Αργείων πόλιν. ὁ δὴ καὶ νομιστέον αἰτιώτατον γεγονέναι πραγμάτων κατορθώσεως. τὸ γὰρ ἐπιλαβόμενον τῆς ὁρμῆς τοῦ Κλεομένους καὶ προηττῆσαν τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δυνάμεων τοῦτ' ἦν, ὡς ἐξ αὐτῶν φανερὸν ἐγένετο τῶν πραγ-4 μάτων. καὶ γὰρ τόπους εὐφυεστέρους προκατέχων, 368

standing between the Achaeans and Antigonus, left Sicyon and encamped on the Isthmus, uniting by a palisade and trench the Acrocorinthus and the mountain called the Ass's Back, regarding confidently the whole Peloponnese as being henceforth his own domain. Antigonus had been for long making his preparations, awaiting the turn of events. as Aratus had recommended, but now, judging from the progress of events that Cleomenes was on the point of appearing in Thessaly with his army, he communicated with Aratus and the Achaeans reminding them of the terms of their treaty, and passing through Euboea with his forces, reached the Isthmus, the Aetolians having, in addition to other measures they took to prevent his assisting the Achaeans. forbidden him to advance with an army beyond Thermopylae, threatening, if he attempted it, to oppose his passage.

Antigonus and Cleomenes now faced each other, 224 a.c. the former bent on penetrating into the Peloponnese and the latter on preventing him. 53. The Achaeans, although they had suffered such serious reverses, yet did not abandon their purpose or their self-reliance, but on Aristoteles of Argos revolting against the partisans of Cleomenes, they sent a force to his assistance and entering the city by surprise under the command of their Strategus, Timoxenus, established themselves there. We should look on this achievement as the principal cause of the improvement in their fortunes which ensued. For events clearly showed that it was this which checked Cleomenes' ardour and subdued in advance the spirit of his troops. Though his position was

καὶ χορηγίαις δαψιλεστέραις 'Αντιγόνου χρώμενος, καὶ τόλμη καὶ φιλοτιμία μείζονι παρωρμημένος, 5 όμως ἄμα τῷ προσπεσεῖν αὐτῷ διότι κατειλῆφθαι συμβαίνει την των 'Αργείων πόλιν ύπο των 'Αχαιων, εὐθὺς ἀνάσπαστος, ἀπολιπών τὰ προδεδηλωμένα προτερήματα, φυγή παραπλησίαν έποιε το την άποχώρησιν, δείσας μη πανταχόθεν αὐτὸν περιστῶσιν 6 οἱ πολέμιοι. παραπεσών δὶ εἰς "Αργος, καὶ κατὰ ποσον αντιποιησάμενος της πόλεως, μετά ταθτα γενναίως μέν των 'Αχαιων, φιλοτίμως δέ των 'Αργείων εκ μεταμελείας αὐτὸν αμυναμένων, αποπεσων καὶ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, καὶ ποιησάμενος τὴν πορείαν διὰ Μαντινείας, οὕτως ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὴν

Σπάρτην. 54 'Ο δ' 'Αντίγονος ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Πελοπόννησον είσελθων παρέλαβε τον 'Ακροκόρινθον, οὐδένα δέ χρόνον μείνας είχετο τῶν προκειμένων καὶ παρῆν 2 εἰς "Αργος. ἐπαινέσας δὲ τοὺς 'Αργείους, καὶ καταστησάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, αὖθις ἐκ ποδὸς ἐκίνει, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπ' 'Αρ-3 καδίας. ἐκβαλων δὲ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐκ τῶν ἐποικο-δομηθέντων χωρίων ὑπὸ Κλεομένους κατά τε τὴν Αἰγῦτιν καὶ Βελμινατιν χώραν, καὶ παραδούς τὰ φρούρια Μεγαλοπολίταις, ήκε πρός την των 'Αχαιων 4 σύνοδον είς Αίγιον. ἀπολογισάμενος δε περί των καθ' αύτὸν καὶ χρηματίσας περὶ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔτι δὲ κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὼν ἁπάντων τῶν συμ-5 μάχων, μετὰ ταῦτα χρόνον μέν τινα παραχειμάζων διέτριβε περί Σικυώνα και Κόρινθον. της δ' έαρι-6 προήγε. καὶ διανύσας τριταίος πρὸς τὴν τῶν Τε-γεατῶν πόλιν, ἀπηντηκότων καὶ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐν-370

νης ώρας ένισταμένης αναλαβών τας δυνάμεις



stronger than that of Antigonus, and he was much better off for supplies, as well as animated by greater courage and ambition, no sooner did the news reach him that Argos had been seized by the Achaeans than he instantly took himself off, abandoning all these advantages, and made a precipitate retreat. fearing to be surrounded on all sides by the enemy. Gaining entrance to Argos he possessed himself of part of the city, but, on the Achaeans making a gallant resistance, in which the Argives joined with all the zeal of renegades, this plan broke down too, and, marching by way of Mantinea, he returned to Sparta.

54. Antigonus now safely entered the Peloponnese and took possession of the Acrocorinthus and, without wasting any time there, pushed on and reached Argos. Having thanked the Argives and put matters in the city on a proper footing, he moved on again at once, making for Arcadia. After having ejected the garrisons from the forts that Cleomenes had built there to command the country in the territory of Aegys and Belbina, and handed over these forts to the Megalopolitans, he returned to Aegium where the Council of the Achaean League was in session. He gave them an account of the measures he had taken and arranged with them for the future conduct of the war. They hereupon appointed him generalissimo of all the allied forces, and after this he retired for a short time to his winter quarters 228 B.C. near Sicyon and Corinth. Early in spring he advanced with his army and reached Tegea in three days. Here the Achaeans joined him, and the

ταθθα, περιστρατοπεδεύσας ήρξατο πολιορκείν αὐ-7 τήν. των δε Μακεδόνων ενεργώς χρωμένων τη τε λοιπή πολιορκία καὶ τοῖς ὀρύγμασι, ταχέως ἀπελπίσαντες οἱ Τεγεᾶται τὴν σωτηρίαν παρέδοσαν αύ-8 τούς. ὁ δ' 'Αντίγονος, ἀσφαλισάμενος τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, είχετο κατά τὸ συνεχές τῶν έξης, καὶ προηγε 9 κατά σπουδήν είς την Λακωνικήν. έγγίσας δε τώ Κλεομένει προκαθημένω της ξαυτοῦ χώρας κατεπεί-10 ραζε, καὶ συνίστατό τινας άκροβολισμούς. προσπεσόντος δε δια των κατασκόπων αὐτω τους εξ 'Ορχομενοῦ στρατιώτας παραβεβοηθηκέναι πρός τὸν Κλεομένη, παραυτίκα ποιησάμενος άναζυγην ήπεί-11 γετο. καὶ τὸν μὲν 'Ορχομενὸν ἐξ ἐφόδου κατὰ κράτος είλε· μετά δὲ ταῦτα περιστρατοπεδεύσας τὴν 12 τῶν Μαντινέων ἐπολιόρκει πόλιν. ταχὺ δὲ καὶ ταύτην καταπληξαμένων των Μακεδόνων καὶ λαβόντων ύποχείριον, αναζεύξας προηγε την έφ' 13 'Ηραίας καὶ Τελφούσης. παραλαβών δέ καὶ ταύτας τας πόλεις, έθελοντην προσχωρησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν κατοικούντων, οὖτως ἤδη συνάπτοντος τοῦ χειμῶνος παρην είς Αίγιον πρός την των 'Αχαιών σύνοδον. 14 καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μακεδόνας ἐπ' οἴκου διαφῆκε πάντας είς την χειμασίαν, αὐτὸς δὲ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς διελέγετο καὶ συνδιενοεῖτο περὶ τῶν ἐνεστώτων. 55 Κατά δε τούς καιρούς τούτους συνθεωρών δ Κλεομένης τὰς μὲν δυνάμεις διαφειμένας, τὸν δ' 'Αντίγονον μετά των μισθοφόρων έν Αιγίω διατρίβοντα, καὶ τριῶν ἡμερῶν όδον ἀφεστῶτα τῆς Μεγά-2 λης πόλεως, την δε πόλιν ταύτην είδως δυσφύλακτον οδσαν διά τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν, τότε δὲ καὶ ραθύμως τηρουμένην διὰ τὴν Αντιγόνου παρουσίαν, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον ἀπολωλότας τοὺς



siege of the city was opened. The Macedonians conducted the siege energetically, especially by mining, and the Tegeans soon gave up all hope of Antigonus, after holding out and surrendered. securing the city, continued to pursue his plan of campaign and advanced rapidly on Laconia. encountered Cleomenes posted on the frontier to defend Laconia and began to harass him, a few skirmishes taking place; but on learning from his scouts that the troops from Orchomenus had left to come to the aid of Cleomenes, he at once hastily abandoned his position and, breaking up his camp, withdrew. He surprised Orchomenus, and captured it by assault, and after this he laid siege to Mantinea which likewise the Macedonians soon frightened into submission, and then he advanced on Heraea and Telphusa which the inhabitants surrendered to The winter was now him of their own accord. approaching. Antigonus came to Aegium to be present at the meeting of the Achaean Synod, and dismissing all his Macedonians to their homes for the winter, occupied himself in discussing the present situation with the Achaeans and making joint plans for the future.

55. Cleomenes at this juncture had observed that Antigonus had dismissed his other troops and, keeping only his mercenaries with him, was spending the time at Aegium at a distance of three days' march from Megalopolis. He knew that this latter city was very difficult to defend, owing to its extent and partial desolation, that it was at present very carelessly guarded owing to the presence of Antigonus in the Peloponnese, and above all that it had lost the

πλείστους των έν ταις ήλικίαις έν τε τη περί τὸ 3 Λύκαιον καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τῆ περὶ Λαδόκεια μάχη, λαβών συνεργούς τινας των έκ Μεσσήνης φυγάδων, οί διατρίβοντες ετύγχανον εν τη Μεγάλη πόλει, παρεισηλθε διὰ τούτων λάθρα νυκτὸς ἐντὸς τῶν της δ' ήμέρας ἐπιγενομένης παρ' ολίγον ηλθε τοῦ μη μόνον εκπεσείν, αλλά καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις κινδυνεῦσαι διά τὴν εὐψυχίαν τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν. 5 δ δή καὶ τρισὶ μησὶ πρότερον αὐτῶ συνέβη παθεῖν παρεισπεσόντι κατά τὸν Κωλαιὸν προσαγορευόμενον 6 τόπον της πόλεως. τότε δε τω πλήθει της δυνάμεως καὶ τῷ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους καθίκετο της επιβολής, και πέρας εκβαλών 7 τους Μεγαλοπολίτας κατέσχε την πόλιν. γενόμενος δ' ἐγκρατὴς οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρε καὶ δυσμενῶς ὥστε μηδ' ἐλπίσαι μηδένα διότι δύναιτ' 8 αν συνοικισθήναι πάλιν. τοῦτο δὲ ποιήσαί μοι δοκεί διά τὸ κατά τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε δυνηθηναι μήθ' αίρετιστην και κοινωνον των ιδίων ο έλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι. το μέν γάρ Κλειτορίων φιλελεύθερον καὶ γενναΐον είς άνηρ κατήσχυνε διά την έαυτοῦ κακίαν, Θεάρκης. ον εικότως έξαρνοθνται Κλειτόριοι μή φθναι παρά σφίσι, γενέσθαι δ' ύποβολιμαῖον έξ 'Ορχομενοῦ τῶν έπηλύδων τινός στρατιωτών.

56 Έπεὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς ᾿Αράτω γεγραφότων παρ' ενίοις ἀποδοχης ἀξιοῦται Φύλαρχος, εν πολλοις ἀντιδοξῶν καὶ τάναντία γράφων 2 αὐτῶ, χρήσιμον ἂν εἴη, μᾶλλον δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν,

'Αράτω προηρημένοις κατακολουθεῖν περὶ τῶν Κλεο-



greater part of its citizens of military age in the battles at the Lycaeum and at Ladoceia. He therefore procured the co-operation of certain Messenian exiles then living in Megalopolis and by their means got inside the walls secretly by night. On day breaking, he came very near not only being driven out, but meeting with complete disaster owing to the bravery of the Megalopolitans, who had indeed expelled and defeated him three months previously when he entered the city by surprise in the quarter called Colaeum. But on this occasion, owing to the strength of his forces, and owing to his having had time to seize on the most advantageous positions, his project succeeded, and finally he drove out the Megalopolitans and occupied their city. On possessing himself of it, he destroyed it with such systematic cruelty and animosity, that nobody would have thought it possible that it could ever be re-inhabited. I believe him to have acted so, because the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only peoples from among whom in the varied circumstances of his career he could never procure himself a single partisan to share in his projects or a single traitor. For in the case of the Clitorians their noble love of freedom was sullied by the malpractices of one man Thearces whom, as one would expect, they naturally deny to have been a native-born citizen, affirming that he was the son of a foreign soldier and foisted in from Orchomenus.

56. Since, among those authors who were contemporaries of Aratus, Phylarchus, who on many points is at variance and in contradiction with him, is by some received as trustworthy, it will be useful or rather necessary for me, as I have chosen to rely on Aratus' narrative for the history of the Cleomenic



μενικών, μή παραλιπειν ἄσκεπτον τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, ίνα μὴ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τοῖς συγγράμμασιν ἰσοδυνα-3 μοῦν ἀπολείπωμεν πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν. καθόλου μεν οὖν ὁ συγγραφεὺς οὖτος πολλὰ παρ' ὅλην τὴν 4 πραγματείαν εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν εἴρηκε. πλὴν περὶ μεν των άλλων ίσως οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπιτιμῶν κατὰ τὸ παρὸν οὐδ' ἐξακριβοῦν όσα δὲ συνεπιβάλλει τοις ύφ' ήμων γραφομένοις καιροις, ταθτα δ' έστι τὰ περὶ τὸν Κλεομενικὸν πόλεμον, ὑπὲρ τούτων 5 αναγκαιόν έστιν ήμιν διευκρινείν. έσται δε πάντως άρκοθντα ταθτα πρός τὸ καὶ τὴν ὅλην αὐτοθ προαίρεσιν και δύναμιν έν τῆ πραγματεία κατα-6 μαθείν. βουλόμενος δη διασαφείν την ωμότητα την 'Αντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων, ἄμα δὲ τούτοις τὴν 'Αράτου καὶ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν, φησὶ τοὺς Μαντινέας γενομένους ὑποχειρίους μεγάλοις περιπεσεῖν ἀτυχήμασι, καὶ τὴν ἀρχαιοτάτην καὶ μεγίστην πόλιν τῶν κατά την 'Αρκαδίαν τηλικαύταις παλαισαι συμφοραις ώστε πάντας είς επίστασιν και δάκρυα τούς 7 Έλληνας άγαγεῖν. σπουδάζων δ' εἰς ἔλεον ἐκκαλεισθαι τους άναγινώσκοντας και συμπαθείς ποιείν τοις λεγομένοις, εισάγει περιπλοκάς γυναικών και κόμας διερριμμένας και μαστών έκβολάς, προς δέ τούτοις δάκρυα καὶ θρήνους ανδρών καὶ γυναικών άναμὶξ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι γηραιοῖς ἀπαγομένων. 8 ποιεῖ δὲ τοῦτο παρ' ὅλην τὴν ἰστορίαν, πειρώμενος εν εκάστοις ἀεὶ πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τιθέναι τὰ δεινά. 9 τὸ μεν οὖν ἀγεννες καὶ γυναικῶδες τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτοῦ παρείσθω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἱστορίας οἰκεῖον ἄμα 10 καὶ χρήσιμον έξεταζέσθω. δεῖ τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐκ-πλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα τερατευόμενον διὰ τῆς ίστορίας τους εντυγχάνοντας ούδε τους ενδεχομέ-376

war, not to leave the question of their relative credibility undiscussed, so that truth and falsehood in their writings may no longer be of equal authority. In general Phylarchus through his whole work makes many random and careless statements; but while perhaps it is not necessary for me at present to criticize in detail the rest of these, I must minutely examine such as relate to events occurring in the period with which I am now dealing, that of the Cleomenic war. This partial examination will however be quite sufficient to convey an idea of the general purpose and character of his work. Wishing, for instance, to insist on the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians and also on that of Aratus and the Achaeans, he tells us that the Mantineans, when they surrendered, were exposed to terrible sufferings and that such were the misfortunes that overtook this, the most ancient and greatest city in Arcadia, as to impress deeply and move to tears all the Greeks. In his eagerness to arouse the pity and attention of his readers he treats us to a picture of clinging women a with their hair dishevelled and their breasts bare, or again of crowds of both sexes together with their children and aged parents weeping and lamenting as they are led away to slavery. This sort of thing he keeps up throughout his history, always trying to bring horrors vividly before our eyes. Leaving aside the ignoble and womanish character of such a treatment of his subject, let us consider how far it is proper or serviceable to history. A historical author not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures, nor should he, like a tragic

^a Clinging either to each other or to the altars of their gods.
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νους λόγους ζητείν καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοίς ύποκειμένοις έξαριθμεῖσθαι, καθάπερ οι τραγωδιογράφοι. των δέ πραχθέντων καὶ ρηθέντων κατ' άλήθειαν αὐτῶν μνημονεύειν πάμπαν, κᾶν πάνυ μέτρια 11 τυγχάνωσιν όντα. τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγωδίας οὐ ταὐτόν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν νὰρ δει δια των πιθανωτάτων λόγων εκπληξαι και ψυχαγωγήσαι κατά τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δέ διά τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πεῖσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦν-12 τας, επειδήπερ εν εκείνοις μεν ήγειται το πιθανόν, καν ή ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν δε τούτοις τάληθες διά την ωφέλειαν των φιλο-13 μαθούντων. χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς πλείστας ἡμιν έξηγείται των περιπετειών, ούχ ύποτιθείς αίτίαν καί τρόπον τοις γινομένοις, ών χωρις ουτ' έλεειν εὐλόγως ουτ' οργίζεσθαι καθηκόντως δυνατόν έπ' 14 οὐδενὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἐπεὶ τίς ἀνθρώπων οὐ δεινον ήγειται τύπτεσθαι τους έλευθέρους; άλλ' όμως, έὰν μὲν ἄρχων ἀδίκων χειρῶν πάθη τις τοῦτο, δικαίως κρίνεται πεπονθέναι· ἐὰν δ' ἐπὶ διορθώσει καὶ μαθήσει ταὐτὸ τοῦτο γίνηται, προσέτι καὶ τιμῆς καὶ χάριτος οἱ τύπτοντες τοὺς έλευ-15 θέρους άξιοῦνται. καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀποκτεινύναι μέγιστον ασέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων άξιον προστίμων καίτοι γε προφανώς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην ἢ μοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθώός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην η τύραννον τιμών και προεδρίας τυγ-16 χάνει παρά πασιν. ούτως έν παντί το τέλος κείται

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a Literally "a reserved seat in the theatre or elsewhere."

poet, try to imagine the probable utterances of his characters or reckon up all the consequences probably incidental to the occurrences with which he deals. but simply record what really happened and what really was said, however commonplace. For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners. from this, Phylarchus simply narrates most of such catastrophes and does not even suggest their causes or the nature of these causes, without which it is impossible in any case to feel either legitimate pity or proper anger. Who, for instance, does not think it an outrage for a free man to be beaten? but if this happen to one who was the first to resort to violence, we consider that he got only his desert, while where it is done for the purpose of correction or discipline, those who strike free men are not only excused but deemed worthy of thanks and praise. Again, to kill a citizen is considered the greatest of crimes and that deserving the highest penalty, but obviously he who kills a thief or adulterer is guiltless, and the slaver of a traitor or tyrant everywhere meets with honour and distinction." So in every such case the final criterion

της διαλήψεως ύπερ τούτων οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τελου-

μένοις, άλλ' έν ταις αιτίαις και προαιρέσεσι τῶν πραττόντων και ταις τούτων διαφοραις.
57 Μαντινεις τοίνυν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐγκαταλιπόντες την μετά των 'Αχαιών πολιτείαν εθελοντην Αίτωλοις ενεχείρισαν αύτους και την πατρίδα, μετά 2 δε ταθτα Κλεομένει. γεγονότες δ' επί τοιαύτης προαιρέσεως καὶ μετέχοντες τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας έτει τετάρτω πρότερον της 'Αντιγόνου πα-ρουσίας εάλωσαν κατά κράτος υπό των 'Αχαιων, 3 'Αράτου πραξικοπήσαντος αυτών την πόλιν. Εν Ε καιρώ τοσούτον ἀπέσχον τοῦ παθείν τι δεινόν διά την προειρημένην άμαρτίαν, ώς καὶ περιβόητον συνέβη γενέσθαι τὸ πραχθέν διὰ τὴν ὀξύτητα τῆς κατὰ 4 τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀμφοτέρων μεταβολῆς. ἄμα γὰρ τῷ κατασχεῖν τὴν πόλιν "Αρατος παραυτίκα μὲν τοῖς ύφ' αύτον ταττομένοις παρήγγελλε μηδένα μηδενός 5 απτεσθαι των άλλοτρίων, έξης δε τούτοις τους Μαντινέας συναθροίσας παρεκάλεσε θαρρείν και μένειν έπὶ τῶν ἰδίων ὑπάρξειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν 6 πολιτευομένοις μετὰ τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν. τοῖς δὲ Μαντινεῦσιν ἀνυπονοήτου καὶ παραδόξου φανείσης τῆς έλπίδος, παραυτίκα πάντες έπὶ τῆς έναντίας έγέ-7 νοντο γνώμης. καὶ πρὸς οθς μικρῷ πρότερον μαχόμενοι πολλούς μεν των αναγκαίων έπειδον απολλυμένους, οὐκ ὀλίγους δ' αὐτῶν βιαίοις τραύμασι περιπεσόντας, τούτους εἰς τὰς ἰδίας οἰκίας εἰσαγόμενοι καὶ ποιησάμενοι σφίσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀναγκαίοις όμεστίους, οὐδὲν ἀπέλειπον τῆς μετ' ἀλλήλων 8 φιλοφροσύνης. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως ἐποίουν οὐ γὰρ οίδ' εί τινες ανθρώπων εύγνωμονεστέροις ενέτυχον πολεμίοις οὐδ' εἴ τινες ἀβλαβέστερον ἐπάλαισαν τοῖς 380



of good and evil lies not in what is done, but in the different reasons and different purposes of the doer.

57. Now the Mantineans had, in the first instance, deserted the Achaean League, and of their own free will put themselves and their city into the hands first of the Aetolians and then of Cleomenes. They had deliberately ranged themselves on his side and been admitted to Spartan citizenship, when, four years before the invasion of Antigonus, their city was betraved to Aratus and forcibly occupied by the Achaeans. On this occasion, so far from their being cruelly treated owing to their recent delinquency, the circumstances became celebrated because of the sudden revulsion of sentiments on both sides. For immediately Aratus had the city in his hands, he at once issued orders to his troops to keep their hands off the property of others, and next, calling an assembly of the Mantineans, bade them be of good courage and retain possession of all they had; for if they joined the Achaean League he would assure their perfect security. The prospect of safety thus suddenly revealed to them took the Mantineans completely by surprise, and there was an instantaneous and universal reversal of feeling. The very men at whose hands they had seen, in the fight that had just closed, many of their kinsmen slain and many grievously wounded, were now taken into their houses, and received into their families with whom they lived on the kindest possible terms. This was quite natural, for I never heard of any men meeting with kinder enemies or being less injured by what is considered the greatest of

μεγίστοις δοκοῦσιν είναι συμπτώμασι Μαντινέων διά την 'Αράτου καὶ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς φιλαν-58 θρωπίαν. μετά δὲ ταῦτα προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αύτοις στάσεις και τας ύπ' Αιτωλών και Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβουλάς, πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς 2 ἢξίωσαν δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὐτοῖς. οἱ δὲ πεισθέντες ἀπεκλήρωσαν έξ αύτῶν τριακοσίους ἄνδρας. ών οι λαγόντες ώρμησαν απολιπόντες τας ίδιας πατρίδας καὶ τοὺς βίους, καὶ διέτριβον ἐν Μαντινεία, παραφυλάττοντες την εκείνων ελευθερίαν αμα καί 3 σωτηρίαν. σύν δε τούτοις και μισθοφόρους διακοσίους έξέπεμψαν, οι μετά των 'Αχαιων συνδιετήρουν 4 την υποκειμένην αὐτοῖς κατάστασιν. μετ' οὐ πολύ δέ στασιάσαντες πρός σφας οι Μαντινείς, και Λακεδαιμονίους επισπασάμενοι, τήν τε πόλιν ενεχείρισαν καὶ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν διατρίβοντας παρ' αύτοις κατέσφαξαν ου μειζον παρασπόνδημα καί 5 δεινότερον οὐδ' εἰπεῖν εὐμαρές. ἐπειδή γάρ ἔδοξε σφίσι καθόλου την προς το έθνος χάριν και φιλίαν άθετειν, των γε προειρημένων άνδρων έχρην δήπου φεισαμένους έασαι πάντας ύποσπόνδους άπελθειν 6 τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις έθος ἐστὶ συγχωρεῖσθαι κατά τούς κοινούς των άνθρώπων νόμους. 7 οί δ' ΐνα Κλεομένει καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις ίκαν ην παράσχωνται πίστιν πρός την ένεστωσαν έπιβολήν, τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δίκαια παραβάντες τὸ μέγι-8 στον ἀσέβημα κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἐπετέλεσαν. τὸ γὰρ τούτων αὐτόχειρας γενέσθαι καὶ τιμωρούς οἴτινες πρότερον μεν κατά κράτος λαβόντες αὐτοὺς ἀθώους άφηκαν, τότε δε την εκείνων ελευθερίαν καὶ σωτη-9 ρίαν εφύλαττον, πηλίκης οργής εστιν ἄξιον; τί δ' αν παθόντες οθτοι δίκην δόξαιεν άρμόζουσαν δε-382



calamities than the Mantineans, all owing to their humane treatment by Aratus and the Achaeans. 58. Subsequently, as they foresaw discord among themselves and plots by the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians, they sent an embassy to the Achaeans asking for a garrison. The Achaeans consented and chose by lot three hundred of their own citizens. who set forth, abandoning their own houses and possessions, and remained in Mantinea to watch over the liberty and safety of its townsmen. the same time they sent two hundred hired soldiers, who aided this Achaean force in safeguarding the established government. Very soon however the Mantineans fell out with the Achaeans. and, inviting the Lacedaemonians, put the city into their hands and massacred the garrison the Achaeans had sent them. It is difficult to find words to characterize the magnitude and atrocity of this act of treachery. For in resolving to forswear their friendship and gratitude, they should at least have spared the lives of these men and allowed them all to depart under terms. Such treatment is, by the common law of nations, accorded even to enemies; but the Mantineans, simply in order to give Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians a satisfactory guarantee of their good faith in this undertaking, violated the law recognized by all mankind and deliberately committed the most heinous of crimes. Vengeful murderers of the very men who previously on capturing their city had left them unharmed, and who now were guarding their liberties and lives against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation be too strong? What should we consider to be an adequate punishment for them? Someone might

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δωκέναι; τυχὸν ἴσως εἴποι τις ἄν, πραθέντες μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικών, ἐπεὶ κατεπολεμήθησαν. ἀλλά

10 τοῦτό γε καὶ τοῖς μηθὲν ἀσεβὲς ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου νόμους ὑπόκειται παθεῖν. οὐκοῦν όλοσχερεστέρας τινός καὶ μείζονος τυχεῖν

11 ήσαν άξιοι τιμωρίας, ώστ' εἴπερ ἔπαθον ἃ Φύλαρχός φησιν, οὐκ έλεον εἰκὸς ήν συνεξακολουθεῖν αὐτοῖς παρά τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἔπαινον δὲ καὶ συνκατάθεσιν μᾶλλον τοῖς πράττουσι καὶ μεταπορευο-

12 μένοις την ἀσέβειαν αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδενὸς περαιτέρω συνέξακολουθήσαντος Μαντινεῦσι κατά την περιπέτειαν πλην τού διαρπαγήναι τούς βίους καὶ πραθήναι τοὺς έλευθέρους, ὁ συγγραφεὺς αὐτής της τερατείας χάριν ου μόνον ψεύδος εισήνενκε τὸ

13 όλον, άλλὰ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἀπίθανον, καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολήν της άγνοίας οὐδὲ τὸ παρακείμενον ήδυνήθη συνεπιστήσαι, πως οί αὐτοὶ κατά τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς κυριεύσαντες Τεγεατών κατά κράτος οὐδέν

14 τῶν ὁμοίων ἔπραξαν. καίτοι γ' εἰ μὲν ἡ «τῶν πρατ-τόντων ὦμότης ἦν αἰτία, καὶ τούτους εἰκὸς ἦν πεπονθέναι ταὐτὰ τοῖς ὑπὸ τὸν αὐτὸν ὑποπεπτωκόσι

15 καιρόν. εἰ δὲ περὶ μόνους γέγονε Μαντινεῖς ἡ διαφορά, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς

ανάγκη διαφέρουσαν γεγονέναι περί τούτους.

59 Πάλιν 'Αριστόμαχον τον 'Αργειόν φησιν άνδρα της επιφανεστάτης οικίας υπάρχοντα, και τετυραννηκότα μεν 'Αργείων, πεφυκότα δ' έκ τυράννων, ύποχείριον 'Αντιγόνω καὶ τοῖς 'Αχαιοῖς γενόμενον, είς Κεγχρεάς ἀπαχθηναι καὶ στρεβλούμενον ἀποθανείν, άδικώτατα και δεινότατα παθόντα πάντων 2 ανθρώπων. τηρών δέ καὶ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξιν ό συγγραφεύς τὸ καθ' αύτὸν ιδίωμα, φωνάς τινας 384

perhaps say that now when they were crushed by armed force they should have been sold into slavery with their wives and children. But to this fate the usage of war exposes those who have been guilty of no such impious crime. These men therefore were worthy of some far heavier and more extreme penalty; so that had they suffered what Phylarchus alleges, it was not to be expected that they should have met with pity from the Greeks, but rather that approval and assent should have been accorded to those who executed judgement on them for their wickedness. Yet, while nothing more serious befel the Mantineans, in this their hour of calamity, than the pillage of their property and the enslavement of the male citizens, Phylarchus, all for the sake of making his narrative sensational, composed a tissue not only of falsehoods, but of improbable falsehoods, and, owing to his gross ignorance, was not even able to compare an analogous case and explain how the same people at the same time, on taking Tegea by force, did not commit any such excesses. For if the cause lay in the barbarity of the perpetrators, the Tegeans should have met with the same treatment as those who were conquered at the same time. If only the Mantineans were thus exceptionally treated, we must evidently infer that there was some exceptional cause for anger against them.

59. Again he tells us that Aristomachus of Argos, a man of most noble birth, having himself been tyrant of Argos and being descended from tyrants, was led away captive to Cenchreae and there racked to death, no man deserving less such a terrible fate. Exercising in this case too his peculiar talent, the

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πλάττει διὰ τῆς νυκτὸς αὐτοῦ στρεβλουμένου προσπιπτούσας τοῖς σύνεγγυς κατοικοῦσιν, ὧν τοὺς μέν ἐκπληττομένους τὴν ἀσέβειαν, τοὺς δ' ἀπιστοῦντας, τους δ' άγανακτουντας έπι τοις γινομένοις προσ-3 τρέχειν πρός την οἰκίαν φησί. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς τοιαύτης τερατείας παρείσθω· δεδήλωται γὰρ ἀρ- 4 κούντως. ἐγὼ δ' ᾿Αριστόμαχον, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τους 'Αχαιούς έτερον ημαρτε, κατά γε την του βίου προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς πατρίδα παρανομίαν τῆς 5 μεγίστης άξιον κρίνω τιμωρίας. καίπερ ο συγγραφεύς, βουλόμενος αυξειν αυτοῦ τὴν δόξαν καὶ παραστήσασθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰς τὸ μᾶλλον αὐτῶ συναγανακτείν εφ' οίς επαθεν, ου μόνον αυτόν φησι γεγονέναι τύραννον, άλλα κάκ τυράννων πεφυκέ-6 ναι. ταύτης δε μείζω κατηγορίαν ἢ πικροτέραν οὐδ' αν εἰπεῖν ράδίως δύναιτ' οὐδείς. αὐτό γάρ τούνομα περιέχει την ασεβεστάτην εμφασιν καί πάσας περιείληφε τας εν ανθρώποις αδικίας καὶ 7 παρανομίας. 'Αριστόμαχος δ' εί τὰς δεινοτάτας ὑπέμεινε τιμωρίας, ώς οδτός φησιν, όμως ούχ ίκανην 8 έδωκεν δίκην μιας ήμέρας, εν ή παρεισπεσόντος εις την πόλιν 'Αράτου μετά των 'Αχαιων, καὶ μεγάλους άγωνας καὶ κινδύνους ύπομείναντος ύπερ της 'Αργείων ελευθερίας, τέλος δ' εκπεσόντος δια το μηδένα συγκινηθήναι τῶν ἔσωθεν αὐτῷ ταξα-9 μένων, διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου φόβον, ᾿Αριστόμαχος, άφορμη ταύτη καὶ προφάσει χρησάμενος, ώς τινων συνειδότων τὰ περὶ τὴν εἰσοδον τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν, ὀγδοήκοντα τοὺς πρώτους τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἀδικήσαντας στρεβλώσας έναντίον τῶν ἀναγκαίων κατ-10 έσφαξε. παρίημι τὰ παρ' όλον τὸν βίον αὐτοῦ καὶ

author gives us a made-up story of his cries when on the rack having reached the ears of the neighbours, some of whom, horrified at the crime, others scarcely crediting their senses and others in hot indignation ran to the house. About Phylarchus' vice of sensationalism I need say no more, for I have given sufficient evidence of it: but as for Aristomachus, even if he had been guilty of no other offence to the Achaeans, I consider that the general tenor of his life and his lawless violence at Argos rendered him worthy of the most severe punishment. Our author, it is true, with the view of magnifying his importance and moving his readers to share his own indignation at his fate, tells us that he "not only had been a tyrant himself but was descended from tyrants." It would be difficult for anyone to bring a graver or more bitter accusation against a man. Why! the very word "tyrant" alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice. Aristomachus, if it is true that he was subjected to the most terrible punishment, as Phylarchus tells us, did not get his full deserts for the doings of one day; I mean the day on which when Aratus with the Achaeans had gained entrance to the town and fought hard to free the Argives at great risk, but was finally driven out, because none of those inside the city who had agreed to join him ventured to stir owing to their fear of the tyrant, Aristomachus, availing himself of the pretext that certain persons were cognisant of the entrance of the Achaeans, put to death eighty of the leading citizens who were quite innocent, after torturing them before the eyes of their relatives. I say nothing of the crimes that he and his ancestor were

60 των προγόνων ἀσεβήματα μακρόν γάρ. διόπερ οὐκ εί τινι των όμοίων περιέπεσε δεινόν ήγητέον, πολύ δὲ δεινότερον, εἰ μηδενὸς τούτων πεῖραν λαβών 2 ἀθῷος ἀπέθανεν. οὐδ' ᾿Αντιγόνῳ προσαπτέον οὐδ' ᾿Αράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ύποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες απέκτειναν, ον γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελοῦσι καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις έπαινος καὶ τιμή συνεξηκολούθει 3 παρά τοις όρθως λογιζομένοις. ὅτε δὲ χωρίς τῶν προειρημένων καὶ τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς παρεσπόνδησε, τί 4 παθείν ήν άξιος; έκείνος γάρ ἀπέθετο μέν την τυραννίδα χρόνοις οὐ πολλοῖς πρότερον, ὑπὸ τῶν καιρών συγκλειόμενος διά τὸν Δημητρίου θάνατον, άνελπίστως δε της ασφαλείας έτυχε περισταλείς ύπο 5 της των 'Αχαιών πραότητος καὶ καλοκάγαθίας· οίτινες οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ἀσεβημάτων άζήμιον ἐποίησαν, άλλὰ καὶ προσλαβόντες είς την πολιτείαν την μεγίστην τιμην περιέθεσαν. ήγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν. 6 δ δ' επιλαθόμενος των προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρά πόδας, έπεὶ μικρον έπικυδεστέρας έσχε τὰς έλπίδας ύπερ τοῦ μέλλοντος έν Κλεομένει, τήν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν έαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ των 'Αχαιών έν τοις άναγκαιοτάτοις καιροίς προση ένειμε τοις έχθροις. Ον ύποχείριον γενόμενον ούκ έν Κεγχρεαίς έδει την νύκτα στρεβλούμενον άποθανείν, ώς Φύλαρχός φησι, περιαγόμενον δ' είς την Πελοπόννησον καὶ μετὰ τιμωρίας παραδειγματιζόο μενον ούτως εκλιπείν το ζην. άλλ' όμως τοιούτος 388

guilty of all through their lives: it would be too long a story. 60. We must not therefore think it shocking if he met with treatment similar to what he had inflicted: it would have been much more so had he died in peace, without experiencing any such. Nor should we charge Antigonus and Aratus with criminal conduct, if having captured him in war they had tortured and put to death a tyrant, any man who killed and punished whom even in time of peace would have been applauded and honoured by all right-thinking people. When I add that in addition to all his other offences he broke his faith with the Achaeans, what fate shall we say was too bad for him? Not many years previously he had laid down his tyranny, finding himself in an embarrassed position owing to the death of Demetrius, and quite contrary to his expectation suffered no harm, being protected by the Achaeans, who showed themselves most lenient and generous; for not only did they inflict no punishment on him for the crimes he had committed during his tyranny, but receiving him into their League they invested him with the highest dignity, making him their Strategus and Commander-in-chief. But instantly dismissing from his mind all these benefits, the moment it seemed to him that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country. Surely when they got him into their hands, he should not have been racked to death at night in Cenchreae, as Phylarchus says, but should have been led round the whole Peloponnesus and tortured as a spectacle for the public until dead.

ων ουδενός έτυχε δεινοῦ πλήν τοῦ καταποντισθήναι

διά των έπὶ ταις Κεγχρεαις τεταγμένων.

61 Χωρίς τε τούτων τὰς μεν Μαντινέων ἡμῖν συμφορὰς μετ' αὐξήσεως καὶ διαθέσεως εξηγήσατο, δῆλον ότι καθήκειν ύπολαμβάνων τοῖς συγγραφεῦσι 2 τὰς παρανόμους τῶν πράξεων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, τῆς δὲ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν γενναιότητος, ή περὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχρήσαντο καιρούς, οὐδὲ κατὰ ποσὸν ἐποιή-3 σατο μνήμην, ώσπερ τὸ τὰς άμαρτίας ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι των πραξάντων οἰκειότερον ὑπάρχον τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι, η τούς εντυγχάνοντας τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ήττόν τι διορθουμένους ύπο των σπουδαίων και ζηλωτων έργων ήπερ ύπο των παρανόμων καὶ φευκτών πρά-4 ξεων. ὁ δὲ πῶς μὲν ἔλαβε Κλεομένης τὴν πόλιν καὶ πῶς ἀκέραιον διαφυλάξας ἐξαπέστειλε παραχρημα πρός τους Μεγαλοπολίτας είς την Μεσσήνην γραμματοφόρους, άξιων αυτους άβλαβη κομισαμένους την έαυτων πατρίδα κοινωνησαι των ίδίων πραγμάτων, ταθτα μεν ήμιν εδήλωσε, βουλόμενος ύποδείξαι την Κλεομένους μεγαλοψυχίαν καὶ μετριό-5 τητα πρός τους πολεμίους. έτι δε πως οι Μεγαλοπολίται της επιστολής αναγινωσκομένης οὐκ εάσαιεν είς τέλος αναγνωσθηναι, μικρού δέ καταλεύσαιεν τούς γραμματοφόρους, εως τούτου διεσάφησε. η τὸ δ' ἀκόλουθον καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἴδιον ἀφεῖλε, τον έπαινον καὶ τὴν ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ μνήμην τῶν ἀξιο-η λόγων προαιρέσεων. καίτοι γ' ἐμποδὼν ἢν. εἰ γὰρ τους λόγω και δόγματι μόνον υπομείναντας πόλεμον ύπερ φίλων καὶ συμμάχων ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς νομί-ζομεν, τοῖς δὲ καὶ χώρας καταφθορὰν καὶ πολιορκίαν αναδεξαμένοις ου μόνον έπαινον, άλλα καί 390

Yet notwithstanding his abominable character, all the harm he suffered was to be drowned in the sea

by the officers in command at Cenchreae.

61. To take another instance. Phylarchus, while narrating with exaggeration and elaboration the calamities of the Mantineans, evidently deeming it a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts, does not even make mention of the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at nearly the same date, as if it were rather the proper function of history to chronicle the commission of sins than to call attention to right and honourable actions, or as if it were less improving to read of that good conduct which we should emulate than of that criminal conduct which we should shun. He tells us how Cleomenes took the city, and before doing any damage to it, sent at once a post to the Megalopolitans at Messene offering to hand it back to them uninjured on condition of their throwing in their lot with him. So much he lets us know, wishing to show the magnanimity of Cleomenes and his moderation to his enemies, and he goes on to tell how when the letter was being read out they would not allow the reader to continue until the end, and how they came very near stoning the letter-bearers. So far he makes everything quite clear to us, but he deprives us of what should follow and what is the special virtue of history, I mean praise and honourable mention of conduct noteworthy for its excellence. And yet this was obviously demanded here. For if we consider those men to be good who by speeches and resolutions only expose themselves to war for the sake of their friends and allies, and if we bestow not only praise but lavish thanks and

8 χάριτας καὶ δωρεὰς τὰς μεγίστας ἀπονέμομεν, τίνα γε χρη περὶ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν ἔχειν διάληψιν; ἄρ' 9 οὐχὶ την σεμνοτάτην καὶ βελτίστην; οι πρῶτον μεν την χώραν Κλεομένει προείντο, μετά δε ταθτα πάλιν όλοσχερως έπταισαν τῆ πατρίδι διὰ τὴν πρὸς 10 τοὺς 'Αχαιοὺς αἴρεσιν, τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον, δοθείσης ανελπίστως καὶ παραδόξως αὐτοῖς έξουσίας άβλαβη ταύτην ἀπολαβεῖν, προείλαντο στέρεσθαι χώρας, τάφων, ίερων, πατρίδος, των ύπαρχόντων, άπάντων συλλήβδην των έν άνθρώποις άναγκαιοτάτων, χάριν τοῦ μὴ προδοῦναι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους 11 πίστιν. οῦ τί κάλλιον ἔργον ἢ γέγονεν ἢ γένοιτ' ἄν; ἐπὶ τί δ' ἄν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς άκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἄν παρορμήσαι πρός φυλακήν πίστεως καὶ πρός άληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν; ὧν οὐδεμίαν 12 έποιήσατο μνήμην Φύλαρχος, τυφλώττων, ως γ' έμοὶ δοκεῖ, περὶ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα συγ-γραφεῖ καθήκοντα τῶν ἔργων. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τούτοις έξης φησιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ της Μεγάλης πόλεως λαφύρων έξακισχίλια τάλαντα τοις Λακεδαιμονίοις πεσείν, ών τὰ δισχίλια Κλεο-2 μένει δοθήναι κατά τους έθισμούς. έν δε τούτοις πρώτον μέν τίς οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσειε τὴν ἀπειρίαν καὶ την άγνοιαν της κοινης έννοίας ύπερ της των Ελληνικών πραγμάτων χορηγίας καὶ δυνάμεως; ην μά-3 λιστα δεί παρά τοις ιστοριογράφοις υπάρχειν. έγω γάρ οὐ λέγω κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, ἐν οἷς ύπό τε τῶν ἐν Μακεδονία βασιλέων, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ύπο της συνεχείας των προς αλλήλους πολέμων άρ-4 δην κατέφθαρτο τὰ Πελοποννησίων, άλλ' εν τοις

καθ' ήμας καιροίς, εν οίς πάντες εν καὶ ταὐτὸ λέ-

gifts on those who have suffered their country to be laid waste and their city besieged, what should we feel for the Megalopolitans? Surely the deepest reverence and the highest regard. In the first place they left their lands at the mercy of Cleomenes, next they utterly lost their city owing to their support of the Achaeans, and finally, when quite unexpectedly it was put in their power to get it back undamaged, they preferred to lose their land, their tombs, their temples, their homes, and their possessions, all in fact that is dearest to men, rather than break faith with their allies. What more poble conduct has there ever been or could there be? To what could an author with more advantage call the attention of his readers, and how could he better stimulate them to loyalty to their engagements and to true and faithful comradeship? But Phylarchus, blind, as it seems to me, to the most noble actions and those most worthy of an author's attention, has not said a single word on the subject.

62. Further he tells us that from the booty of Megalopolis six thousand talents fell to the Lacedae-monians, of which two thousand were given to Cleomenes according to usage. Now in this statement one marvels first at his lack of practical experience and of that general notion of the wealth and power of Greece so essential to a historian. For, not speaking of those times, when the Peloponnese had been utterly ruined by the Macedonian kings and still more by continued intestinal wars, but in our own times, when all are in complete

γοντες μεγίστην καρπουσθαι δοκουσιν ευδαιμονίαν, όμως εκ Πελοποννήσου πάσης εξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐπίπλων χωρίς σωμάτων ούχ οίόν τε συναχθηναι το-5 σοῦτο πλήθος χρημάτων. καὶ διότι τοῦτο νῦν οὐκ είκη, λόγω δέ τινι μαλλον αποφαινόμεθα, δηλον έκ 6 τούτων. τίς γὰρ ὑπὲρ ᾿Αθηναίων οὐχ ἱστόρηκε δι-ότι καθ' οὖς καιροὺς μετὰ Θηβαίων εἰς τὸν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ένέβαινον πόλεμον, καὶ μυρίους μέν εξέπεμπον στρατιώτας, έκατὸν δ' ἐπλήρουν τριή-7 ρεις, ὅτι τότε κρίναντες ἀπὸ τῆς ἀξίας ποιεῦσθαι τας είς τον πόλεμον είσφορας έτιμήσαντο τήν τε χώραν την 'Αττικήν απασαν καὶ τὰς οἰκίας, όμοίως δέ και την λοιπην ουσίαν· άλλ' όμως το σύμπαν τίμημα της άξίας ενέλιπε των έξακισχιλίων διακο-8 σίοις καὶ πεντήκοντα ταλάντοις. έξ ὧν οὐκ ἀπεοικὸς ἄν φανείη τὸ περὶ Πελοποννησίων ἄρτι ρηθὲν 9 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ. κατὰ δ' ἐκείνους τοὺς καιροὺς ἐξ αὐτῆς της Μεγάλης πόλεως υπερβολικώς αποφαινόμενος οὐκ ἄν τις εἰπεῖν τολμήσειε πλείω γενέσθαι τρια-10 κοσίων, επειδήπερ δμολογούμενον έστι διότι καὶ των έλευθέρων και των δουλικών σωμάτων τα πλειστα συνέβη διαφυγείν εἰς τὴν Μεσσήνην. μέγιστον 11 δὲ τῶν προειρημένων τεκμήριον οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὄντες δεύτεροι τῶν ᾿Αρκάδων Μαντινεῖς οὕτε κατὰ την δύναμιν οὔτε κατὰ την περιουσίαν, ώς αὐτὸς οὖτός φησιν, ἐκ πολιορκίας δὲ καὶ παραδόσεως άλόντες, ώστε μήτε διαφυγείν μηδένα μήτε διακλαπή-12 ναι ραδίως μηδέν, όμως τὸ πᾶν λάφυρον ἐποίησαν μετά τῶν σωμάτων κατά τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς τάλαντα τριακόσια.

63 Τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς τούτω τίς οὐκ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον θαυμάσειε; ταῦτα γὰρ ἀποφαινόμενος λέγει πρὸ τῆς



unison and enjoy, it is thought, very great prosperity, I assert that a sale of all the goods and chattels, apart from slaves, in the whole Peloponnese would not bring in such a sum. That I do not make this assertion lightly but after due estimate will be evident from the following consideration. has not read that when the Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered on the war against Sparta, sending out a force of ten thousand men and manning a hundred triremes, they decided to meet the war expenses by a property-tax and made a valuation for this purpose of the whole of Attica including the houses and other property. estimate, however, fell short of 6000 talents by 250. from which it would seem that my assertion about the Peloponnese at the present day is not far wide of the mark. But as regards the times of which we are dealing, no one, even if he were exaggerating, would venture to say that more than three hundred talents could be got out of Megalopolis, since it is an acknowledged fact that most of the free population and the slaves had escaped to Messene. But the best proof of what I say is the following: Mantinea, both in wealth and power, was second to no city in Arcadia, as Phylarchus himself says, and it surrendered after a siege, so that it was not easy for anyone to escape or for anything to be stolen, but vet the value of the whole booty together with slaves amounted at this very period to but three hundred talents.

63. What he tells us next is still more astounding; for after this assertion about the booty, he

παρατάξεως δέχ' ήμέραις μάλιστα τὸν παρά Πτολεμαίου πρεσβευτήν έλθειν άγγελλοντα προς τον Κλεομένη διότι Πτολεμαίος το μέν χορηγείν άπολέγει, διαλύεσθαι δὲ παρακαλεῖ προς τον 'Αντί-2 γονον. τὸν δ' ἀκούσαντά φησι κρίναι διότι δεῖ τὴν ταχίστην εκκυβεύειν τοις όλοις πρό του συνειναι τὰ προσπεπτωκότα τὰς δυνάμεις, διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν ύπάρχειν έν τοῖς ίδίοις πράγμασιν έλπίδα τοῦ δύνα-3 σθαι μισθοδοτείν. άλλ' είπερ έξακισχιλίων έγκρατης έγεγόνει ταλάντων κατά τούς αὐτούς καιρούς. τον Πτολεμαΐον αὐτον ήδύνατο ταις χορηγίαις ὑπερ-4 θέσθαι. πρός δὲ τὸν ἀντίγονον, εἶ μόνον τριακοσίων ύπηρχε κύριος, καὶ λίαν ίκανὸς ήν ἀσφαλῶς 5 ύπομένων τρίβειν τὸν πόλεμον. τὸ δ' ἄμα μεν πάσας ἀποφαίνειν τῶ Κλεομένει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἐν Πτολεμαίω διὰ τὰς χορηγίας, ἄμα δὲ τοσούτων χρημάτων αὐτὸν φάναι κύριον γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιρούς, πῶς οὐ τῆς μεγίστης ἀλογίας, ἔτι 6 δ' ἀσκεψίας ἐστὶ σημεῖον; πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἔτερα τῷ συγγραφεί τοιαῦτα, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιρούς και παρ' όλην την πραγματείαν κατατέτακται, περί ων άρκειν ύπολαμβάνω κατά την έξ άρχης πρόθεσιν καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα. 64 Μετά δὲ τὴν τῆς Μεγάλης πόλεως ἄλωσιν 'Αντιγόνου παραχειμάζοντος έν τῆ τῶν ᾿Αργείων πόλει, συναγαγών Κλεομένης αμα τῷ τὴν ἐαρινὴν ώραν ἐνίστασθαι καὶ παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς καιροις, έξαγαγών την στρατιάν ένέβαλεν είς την των 2 Αργείων χώραν, ώς μεν τοις πολλοις εδόκει, παραβόλως και τολμηρως δια την όχυρότητα των κατά τας εἰσόδους τόπων, ως δε τοις ὀρθως λογιζομένοις, 3 άσφαλώς καὶ νουνεχώς, όρων γάρ τὸν Αντίγονον

states that just ten days before the battle an envoy from Ptolemy reached Cleomenes informing him that that king withdrew his subvention and requested him to come to terms with Antigonus. He says that Cleomenes on hearing this resolved to stake his all on a battle before it reached the ears of his troops, as he had no hope of being able to meet their pay from his own resources. But if at this very time he had six thousand talents at his command, he could have been more generous than Ptolemy himself in the matter of subventions; and if he could only dispose of three hundred talents it was enough to enable him to continue the war against Antigonus with absolute financial security. But to state in one breath that Cleomenes depended entirely on Ptolemy for money and that at the very same time he was in possession of such a large sum, is a sign of the greatest levity and want of reflection. Phylarchus has made many similar statements not only about this period but all through his work. I think, however, that what I have said at such length as the plan of this history allows should suffice.

64. After the capture of Megalopolis, while 222 B.O. Antigonus was still in winter quarters at Argos, Cleomenes at the beginning of spring collected his troops, and after addressing them in terms suitable to the occasion, led them out and invaded Argolis. Most people think that this was rash and hazardous on his part, owing to the strength of the frontier, but if we judge rightly it was really a safe and wise course. For as he saw that Antigonus had dis-

διαφεικότα τὰς δυνάμεις, ήδει σαφῶς ὡς πρῶτον μὲν την είσβολην ακινδύνως ποιήσεται, δεύτερον έτι της χώρας καταφθειρομένης έως των τειχων ανάγκη τους 'Αργείους θεωροῦντας το γινόμενον ἀσχάλλειν 4 και καταμέμφεσθαι τον 'Αντίγονον. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίη μη δυνάμενον αὐτὸν ὑποφέρειν τὸν ἐπιρραπισμόν τῶν ὄχλων έξελθεῖν καὶ διακινδυνεῦσαι τοῖς παρούσι, πρόδηλον έκ των κατά λόγον ήν αὐτω 5 διότι νικήσει ραδίως. εί δ' έμμείνας τοῖς λογισμοῖς άφησυχάζοι, καταπληξάμενος τούς ύπεναντίους καὶ ταις ιδίαις δυνάμεσι θάρσος ένεργασάμενος ασφαλώς ύπέλαβε ποιήσασθαι την άναχώρησιν είς την οἰκείαν. 6 δ καὶ συνέβη γενέσθαι. τῆς γὰρ χώρας δηουμένης
 οἱ μὲν ὅχλοι συστρεφόμενοι τὸν ᾿Αντίγονον ἐλοιδόρουν. δ δε και λίαν ήγεμονικώς και βασιλικώς ούδεν περί πλείονος ποιούμενος τοῦ κατά λόγον η <χρήσασθαι τοις > πράγμασιν ήγε την ήσυχίαν. ό δε Κλεομένης κατά την εξ άρχης πρόθεσιν καταφθείρας μέν την χώραν, καταπληξάμενος δέ τούς ύπεναντίους, εύθαρσεις δέ πεποιηκώς τάς έαυτοῦ δυνάμεις πρός τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον κίνδυνον, ασφαλώς είς την οίκείαν έπανηλθε. Τοῦ δὲ θέρους ἐνισταμένου καὶ συνελθόντων

τῶν Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν ἐκ τῆς χειμασίας ἀναλαβῶν τὴν στρατιὰν 'Αντίγονος προῆγε μετὰ τῶν 2 συμμάχων εἰς τὴν Λακωνικήν, ἔχων Μακεδόνας μὲν τοὺς εἰς τὴν φάλαγγα μυρίους, πελταστὰς δὲ τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, 'Αγριᾶνας δὲ σὺν τούτοις χιλίους καὶ Γαλάτας ἄλλους τοσούτους, μισθοφόρους δὲ τοὺς πάντας πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, 3 ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, 'Αχαιῶν δ' ἐπιλέκτους πεζοὺς μὲν τρισχιλίους, ἱππεῖς δὲ τριακοσίους, καὶ Μεγαλο-398

missed his forces, he knew well that, in the first place, he would be exposed to no danger in invading, and secondly, that, if the country were laid waste up to the walls, the Argives on seeing it would certainly be much vexed and lay the blame on Antigonus. If, therefore, unable to support the reproaches of the people, he marched out and risked a battle with such forces as he had, the probabilities were in favour of Cleomenes gaining an easy victory; but if, adhering to his plan, he remained quiet, he thought he could, after terrifying his enemies and inspiring his own troops with fresh courage, effect a safe retreat to Laconia, as actually happened. For when the country was being laid waste, the populace held meetings in which they heaped abuse on Antigonus; but he, like a true general and prince, paid no attention to anything but a wise conduct of affairs, and remained quiet, while Cleomenes, having carried out his intention of devastating the country and thus striking terror into the enemy and encouraging his own troops to face the coming danger, retired in safety to his own country.

65. Early in summer, on the Macedonians and Achaeans rejoining from their winter quarters, Antigonus advanced with his own army and the allies into Laconia. His Macedonian forces consisted of ten thousand to form the phalanx, three thousand peltasts, and three hundred horse. He had besides a thousand Agrianians, and a thousand Gauls, while his mercenary force numbered three thousand foot and three hundred horse. The Achaeans furnished three thousand picked infantry and three hundred horse. There were also a

πολίτας γιλίους είς τον Μακεδονικόν τρόπον κα ωπλισμένους, ων ήγειτο Κερκιδας Μεγαλοπολίτη 4 τῶν δὲ συμμάχων Βοιωτῶν μὲν πεζοὺς δισχιλίοι ἱππεῖς δὲ διακοσίους, Ἡπειρωτῶν πεζοὺς χιλίοι ἱππεῖς πεντήκοντα, ᾿Ακαρνάνων ἄλλους τοσούτου 'Ιλλυριῶν χιλίους έξακοσίους, ἐφ' ὧν ἦν Δημήτρα 5 ο Φάριος, ωστ' είναι πασαν την δύναμιν πεζοι μεν είς δισμυρίους οκτακισχιλίους, ίππεις δε χιλίοι 6 καὶ διακοσίους. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, προσδοκών τη έφοδον, τὰς μὲν ἄλλας τὰς εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσβολά ησφαλίσατο φυλακαῖς καὶ τάφροις καὶ δένδρων έκ 7 κοπαις, αὐτὸς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Σελλασίαν καλουμένη μετά της δυνάμεως έστρατοπέδευε, της πάσης ύπαρ χούσης αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς εἰς δύο μυριάδας, στοχαζό μενος έκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ταύτη ποιήσασθαι τοὺ 8 ύπεναντίους την εἰσβολήν ο και συνεκύρησε. δύο δὲ λόφων ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς εἰσόδου κειμένων, ὧν τὸς μὲν Εὔαν, τὸν δ' ἔτερον "Ολυμπον καλεῖσθαι συμ-9 βαίνει, της δ' όδοῦ μεταξύ τούτων παρά τον Οινοῦντα ποταμόν φερούσης εις την Σπάρτην, δ μεν Κλεομένης, των προειρημένων λόφων συνάμφω τάφρον καὶ χάρακα προβαλόμενος, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸν Εὐαν έταξε τους περιοίκους και συμμάχους, εφ' ών επέστησε τον άδελφον Ευκλείδαν, αὐτος δε τον "Ολυμπον κατείχε μετά Λακεδαιμονίων και τών μισθο-10 φόρων. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις παρὰ τὸν ποταμὸν έφ' έκάτερα της όδοῦ τοὺς ἱππεῖς μετὰ μέρους τινὸς τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. ᾿Αντίγονος δὲ 11 τινὸς τῶν μισθοφόρων παρενέβαλεν. παραγενόμενος καὶ συνθεωρήσας τήν τε τῶν τόπων ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὸν Κλεομένη πᾶσι τοῖς οἰκείοις μέ-ρεσι τῆς δυνάμεως οὕτως εὐστόχως προκατειληφότα τας εύκαιρίας ώστε παραπλήσιον είναι το σύμπαν 400

thousand Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner under the command of Cercidas of Mega-The allies consisted of two thousand lopolis. Boeotian foot and two hundred horse, a thousand Epirot foot and fifty horse, the same number of Acarnanians, and one thousand six hundred Illyrians under the command of Demetrius of Pharos. total force thus amounted to twenty-eight thousand foot and one thousand two hundred horse. Cleomenes, who expected the invasion, had occupied the other passes into Laconia, placing garrisons in them and fortifying them by means of trenches and barricades of trees, and himself encamped at a place called Sellasia, with a force of twenty thousand men. as he conjectured that the invaders would most likely take this route, as in fact they did. At the actual pass there are two hills, one called Euas and the other Olympus, the road to Sparta running between these along the bank of the river Oenous. Cleomenes, having fortified both of these hills with a trench and palisade, posted on Euas the perioeci and allies under the command of his brother Eucleides, while he himself held Olympus with the Spartans and mercenaries. On the low ground beside b the river on each side of the road he drew up his cavalry and a certain portion of the mercenaries. Antigonus on his arrival observed the great natural strength of the position and how Cleomenes had so cleverly occupied the advantageous points with the portions of his force suitable in each case, that his

1¹ VOL. I

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σχήμα της στρατοπεδείας της των άγαθων όπλο-12 μάχων προβολής· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπέλειπε τῶν πρὸς ἐπίθεσιν ἄμα καὶ φυλακήν, ἀλλ' ἦν ὁμοῦ παράταξις 66 ένεργος και παρεμβολή δυσπρόσοδος διό και τό μεν εξ εφόδου καταπειράζειν και συμπλέκεσθαι προχείρως απέγνω, στρατοπεδεύσας δ' έν βραχεῖ διαστήματι, καὶ λαβών πρόβλημα τὸν Γοργύλον καλούμενον ποταμόν, τινάς μεν ήμερας επιμένων συνεθεώρει τάς τε των τόπων ιδιότητας καὶ τὰς 2 τῶν δυνάμεων διαφοράς, ἄμα δὲ καὶ προδεικνύων τινάς επιβολάς πρός το μελλον εξεκαλείτο τάς των 3 ύπεναντίων επινοίας. οὐ δυνάμενος δε λαβεῖν οὐδεν ἀργὸν οὐδ' ἔξοπλον διὰ τὸ πρὸς πῶν ετοίμως 4 άντικινεισθαι τὸν Κλεομένη, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης ἐπινοίας ἀπέστη, τέλος δ' έξ ὁμολόγου διὰ μάχης ἀμφότεροι προέθεντο κρίνεις τὰς πράξεις πάνυ γὰρ ευφυείς και παραπλησίους ήγεμόνας ή τύχη συν-5 έβαλε τούτους τους ανδρας. πρός μέν οὖν τοὺς κατά τὸν Εύαν ὁ βασιλεύς ἀντέταξε τῶν τε Μακεδόνων τους χαλκάσπιδας και τους 'Ιλλυριούς, κατά σπείρας εναλλάξ τεταγμένους, 'Αλέξανδρον τον 6 'Ακμήτου καὶ Δημήτριον τὸν Φάριον ἐπιστήσας. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις τοὺς 'Ακαρνανας καὶ Κρῆτας ἐπέβαλε· τούτων δε κατόπιν ήσαν δισχίλιοι των 'Αχαιων, 7 εφεδρείας λαμβάνοντες τάξιν. τους δ' ίππεις περί τον Οινούντα ποταμον αντέθηκε τῷ τῶν πολεμίων ίππικώ, συστήσας αὐτοῖς 'Αλέξανδρον ήγεμόνα καὶ συμπαραθείς πεζούς τῶν 'Αχαϊκῶν χιλίους καὶ Με-8 γαλοπολίτας τοὺς ἴσους. αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς μισθοφόρους έχων καὶ τοὺς Μακεδόνας κατὰ τὸν "Ολυμπον πρός τούς περί τον Κλεομένη διέγνω ποιείσθαι την η μάχην. προτάξας ούν τους μισθοφόρους επέστησε 402

whole formation resembled the attitude of a good heavy-armed fighter ready for combat. For attack and defence alike nothing was wanting, the position being at one and the same time a fortified camp difficult to approach and a line of battle ready for action. 66. Antigonus therefore decided to make no hasty attempt to force the position and come to blows with the enemy, but encamped at a short distance with the river Gorgylus on his front, and for several days remained there noting the peculiar features of the country and the character of the forces, while at the same time, by threatening certain movements, he attempted to make the enemy show his hand. But being unable to find any weak or unprotected spot, since Cleomenes always checked him at once by a counter-movement, he abandoned this project, and finally the kings agreed to try issues in a battle: for they were very gifted and evenly-matched, these two generals whom Fortune had thus brought face to face. To confront those on Euas Antigonus drew up the brazenshielded Macedonians and the Illyrians in alternate lines, placing them under the command of Alexander son of Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos. Behind these stood the Acarnanians and Cretans, and in the rear as a reserve were two thousand Achaeans. His cavalry he opposed to that of the enemy by the river Oenous under the command of Alexander and supported by a thousand Achaean and as many Megalopolitan infantry. He himself in person decided to attack Cleomenes on Olympus with the mercenaries and the rest of the Macedonians. Putting

διφαλαγγίαν ἐπάλληλον τῶν Μακεδόνων· ἐποίει δὲ 10 τοῦτο διὰ τὴν στενότητα τῶν τόπων. σύνθημα δ' ἢν τοῖς μὲν Ἰλλυριοῖς τότε ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς πρὸς τὸν λόφον προσβολῆς, ὅταν ἔδωσιν ἀρθεῖσαν ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τὸν "Ολυμπον τόπων σινδόνα· προσηρτημένοι γὰρ ἦσαν οὖτοι νυκτὸς ἐν τῷ Γοργύλω 11 ποταμῷ πρὸς αὐτῆ τῆ τοῦ λόφου ρίζη· τοῖς δὲ Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ τοῖς ἱππεῦσι παραπλησίως,

ἐπειδὰν φοινικὶς ἐξαρθῆ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.
67 Ἐπειδὴ δ' ὁ μὲν καιρὸς ἦκε τῆς χρείας, τὸ δὲ σύνθημα τοῖς Ἰλλυριοῖς ἀπεδόθη, παρήγγειλαν δὲ ποιεῖν τὸ δέον οῖς ἦν ἐπιμελές, πάντες εὐθέως ἀναδείξαντες αὐτοὺς κατήρχοντο τῆς πρὸς τὸν βουνὸν 2 προσβολῆς. οἱ δὲ μετὰ τῶν Κλεομένους ἱππέων ἐξ

προσρολης. οι σε μετά των Κλεομενους ιππεων ες άρχης ταχθέντες εὕζωνοι, θεωροῦντες τὰς σπείρας τῶν ᾿Αχαιῶν ἐρήμους ἐκ τῶν κατόπιν οὕσας, κατ᾽ οὐρὰν προσπίπτοντες εἰς όλοσχερη κίνδυνον ῆγον 3 τοὺς πρὸς τὸν λόφον βιαζομένους, ὡς ἄν τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν ἐξ ὑπερδεξίου κατὰ πρόσωπον

ατους προς τον ποφον ριαζομένους, ως αν των μεν περί τον Εὐκλείδαν έξ ύπερδεξίου κατά πρόσωπον αὐτοις έφεστώτων, τῶν δὲ μισθοφόρων κατόπιν ἐπικειμένων καὶ προσφερόντων τὰς χειρας ἐρρωμένως. 4 ἐν ῷ καιρῷ συννοήσας τὸ γινόμενον, ἄμα δὲ προ-

4 εν φ καιρφ συννόησας το γινομένον, αμα σε προσρώμενος το μέλλον, Φιλοποίμην ο Μεγαλοπολίτης το μέν πρώτον ύποδεικνύειν ἐπεβάλλετο τοῖς προσεσπώσι τὸ συμβησόμενον οὐδενὸς δὲ προσέχοντος αὐτῷ διὰ τὸ μήτ' ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τετάχθαι μηδεπώποτε κομιδῆ τε νέον ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν, παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πολίτας ἐνέβαλε τοῖς πολεμίοις τολμη-

6 ρως. οδ γενομένου ταχέως οἱ προσκείμενοι μισθοφόροι κατ' οδραν τοῖς προσβαίνουσιν, ἀκούσαντες τῆς κραυγῆς καὶ συνιδόντες τὴν των ἱππέων συμπλο-

the mercenaries in front, he drew up the Macedonians behind them in two phalanxes with no interval between, the narrowness of the space rendering this necessary. It was arranged that the Illyrians were to begin their assault on the hill upon seeing a white flag waved from the neighbourhood of Olympus, for in the night they had succeeded in taking up a position close under the hill in the bed of the river Gorgylus. The signal for the Megalopolitans and cavalry was to be a red cloak

waved by the king.

67. When the time to begin the action came, the signal was given to the Illyrians, and, the officers calling on their men to do their duty, they all instantly showed themselves and began the attack on the hill. The light-armed mercenaries, who had been posted near Cleomenes' cavalry, upon seeing that the rear of the Achaean line was exposed, attacked them from behind, and the whole force that was pressing on to the hill was thus threatened with a serious disaster, as Eucleides' troops were facing them from above while the mercenaries were vigorously attacking their rear. At this critical moment Philopoemen of Megalopolis, who saw what was happening and foresaw what was likely to happen, first attempted to call the attention of the commanding officers to it, but as no one paid any attention to him, since he had never held any command and was quite a young man, he called on his own fellow-citizens to follow him and boldly fell upon the enemy. Upon this the mercenaries who were attacking the assailants of the hill in the rear, hearing the clamour and seeing the

κήν, ἀφέμενοι τῶν προκειμένων ἀνέτρεχον εἰς τὰς ἐξ άργης τάξεις καὶ προσεβοήθουν τοῖς παρ' αὐτῶν ίππεθσι. τούτου δε συμβάντος, ἀπερίσπαστον γενό-7 μενον τό τε των Ἰλλυριων καὶ Μακεδόνων καὶ των αμα τούτοις προσβαινόντων πληθος εκθύμως ώρη μησε καὶ τεθαρρηκότως ἐπὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους. ἐξ οδ καὶ μετὰ ταθτα φανερὸν ἐγενήθη διότι τοθ κατὰ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν προτερήματος αΐτιος έγίνετο Φιλοποίμην. 68 οθεν καὶ τὸν 'Αντίγονόν φασι μετὰ ταῦτα καταπειράζοντα πυνθάνεσθαι τοῦ ταχθέντος ἐπὶ τῶν ἱππέων 'Αλεξάνδρου διὰ τί πρὸ τοῦ παραδοθηναι τὸ 2 σύνθημα τοῦ κινδύνου κατάρξαιτο, τοῦ δ' άρνουμένου, φάσκοντος δὲ μειράκιόν τι Μεγαλοπολίτικὸν προεγχειρήσαι παρά την έαυτοῦ γνώμην, εἰπεῖν διότι τὸ μεν μειράκιον ήγεμόνος έργον αγαθοῦ ποιήσαι, συνθεασάμενον τὸν καιρόν, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἡγεμων ὑπάργων μειρακίου τοῦ τυχόντος. Ου μην άλλ' οι γε περί τον Ευκλείδαν δρώντες προσβαινούσας τὰς σπείρας, ἀφέμενοι τοῦ χρησθαι 4 ταις των τόπων εὐκαιρίαις τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ πολλοῦ συναντώντας καὶ προσπίπτοντας τοῖς πολεμίοις τὰ μεν εκείνων στίφη συνταράττειν καὶ διαλύειν, αὐτοὺς δ' ὑποχωρείν ἐπὶ πόδα καὶ μεθίστασθαι πρὸς κ τοὺς ὑπερδεξίους ἀεὶ τόπους ἀσφαλῶς Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν προλυμηνάμενοι καὶ συγχέαντες τὸ τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως ιδίωμα των ὑπεναντίων ραδίως 6 αὐτοὺς ἐτρέψαντο διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων εὐφυταν τούτων μέν οὐδεν εποίησαν, καθάπερ δ' εξ ετοίμου 7 σφίσι τῆς νίκης ὑπαρχούσης τοὐναντίον ἔπραξαν. κατά γάρ τὴν έξ άρχης στάσιν έμενον έπὶ τῶν άκρων, ώς άνωτάτω σπεύδοντες λαβείν τους ύπ-

εναντίους, είς τὸ τὴν φυγὴν ἐπὶ πολύ καταφερῆ

cavalry engaged, abandoned what they had in hand and running back to their original position came to the aid of their cavalry. The Illyrians and Macedonians and the rest of this attacking force were now disengaged, and threw themselves with great dash and courage on the enemy. Thus, as became evident afterwards, the success of the attack on Eucleides was due to Philopoemen. 68. Hence it is said that subsequently Antigonus asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, to tease him, why he had begun the battle before the signal was given. On Alexander denying this and saying that a stripling from Megalopolis had begun it contrary to his own judgement, the king said that this stripling had acted like a good general and Alexander himself, the general, like an ordinary stripling.

To continue our narrative, Eucleides' troops, on seeing the enemy's lines advancing, cast away the advantage the ground gave them. They should have charged the enemy while still at a distance, thus breaking his ranks and throwing them into disorder, and then retreating slowly, have returned in safety to the higher ground. Thus having in the first instance spoilt and broken up that peculiar serried formation of the enemy so well adapted to their special equipment, they would easily have put them to flight owing to their favourable position. Instead of doing this, they acted as if the victory were already in their hand and did exactly the opposite. They remained, that is, at the summit in their original position with the view of getting the enemy as high up the hill as possible so that their flight would be for a long distance down the steep and precipitous

8 καὶ κρημνώδη γενέσθαι τοῖς πολεμίοις. συνέβη δ', ὅπερ εἰκὸς ἢν, τοὐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἀπολιπόντες αὐτοῖς ἀναχώρησιν, προσδεξάμενοι δ' ἀκεραίους ἄμα καὶ συνεστώσας τὰς σπείρας, εἰς τοῦτο δυσχρηστίας ἢλθον ὥστε δι' αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ λόφου κορυφῆς δια-9 μάχεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς βιαζομένους. λοιπὸν ὅσον ἐκ ποδὸς ἐπιέσθησαν τῷ βάρει τοῦ καθοπλισμοῦ καὶ τῆς συντάξεως, εὐθέως οἱ μὲν Ἰλλυριοὶ τὴν κατάστασιν ἐλάμβανον, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Εὐκλείδαν τὴν ὑπὸ πόδα, διὰ τὸ μὴ καταλείπεσθαι τόπον εἰς ἀναχώρη-10 σιν καὶ μετάστασιν ἐαυτοῖς. ἐξ οῦ ταχέως συνέβη τραπέντας αὐτοὺς ὀλεθρίω χρήσασθαι ψυγῆ, κρημνώδη καὶ δύσβατον ἐχόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ τὴν ἀνα-

χώρησιν τῶν τόπων.

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39 "Αμα δὲ τούτοις ὁ περὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς συνετελεῖτο κίνδυνος, ἐκπρεπῆ ποιουμένων τὴν χρείαν τῶν 'Αχαϊκῶν ἱππέων ἀπάντων, μάλιστα δὲ Φιλοποίμενος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῆς αὐτῶν ἐλευθερίας συνεστάναι τὸν 2 ὅλον ἀγῶνα. καθ' ὅν καιρὸν τῷ προειρημένω συνέβη τὸν μὲν ἔππον πεσεῖν πληγέντα καιρίως, αὐτὸν δὲ πεζομαχοῦντα περιπεσεῖν τραύματι βιαίω δι' ἀμπον τοῦ μὲν πρῶτον ἐποιοῦντο διὰ τῶν εὐζώνων καὶ μισθοφόρων τὴν συμπλοκήν, παρ' ἐκατέροις σχεδὸν ὑπαρχόντων τούτων εἰς πεντακισχιλίους. ὧν ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ μέρη, ποτὲ δ' ὁλοσχερῶς συμπιπτόντων, διαφέρουσαν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐξ ἀμφοῦν χρείαν, ὁμοῦ τῶν τε βασιλέων καὶ τῶν στρατοπέδων ἐν συνόψει ποιουμένων τὴν μάχην. ἡμιλλῶντο δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς καὶ κατ' ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τάγμα

6 ταις εὐψυχίαις. ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης, δρῶν τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν πεφευγότας, τοὺς δ' ἐν τοις ἐπι-

As might have been expected, the result was iust the reverse. They had left themselves no means of retreat and on being charged by the Macedonian cohorts which were still fresh and in good order, they were so hard put to it that they had to fight with the assailants for the possession of the extreme summit. From now onwards, wherever they were forced back by the weight of their adversaries' weapons and formation, the Illyrians at once occupied the place where they had stood, while each backward step they took was on to lower ground, since they had not left themselves any room for orderly retreat or change of formation. The consequence was that very soon they had to turn and take to a flight which proved disastrous, as, for a long distance, it was over difficult and precipitous ground.

69. At this same time the cavalry action was going on, all the Achaean horsemen, and especially Philopoemen, rendering most distinguished service, as the whole struggle was for their liberty. Philopoemen's horse fell mortally wounded, and he, fighting on foot, received a serious wound through both thighs. Meanwhile the two kings at Olympus opened the battle with their light-armed troops and mercenaries, of which each had about five thousand. These, now attacking each other in detachments and now along the whole line, exhibited the greatest gallantry on both sides, all the more so as they were fighting under the eyes of the kings and their armies. Man therefore vied with man and regiment with regiment in a display of courage. Cleomenes, seeing his brother's troops in flight and the cavalry on the

πέδοις ίππεις όσον ούπω κλίνοντας, καταπλαγής ών μη πανταχόθεν προσδέξηται τούς πολεμίους, ήναγκάζετο διασπαν τα προτειχίσματα και πασαν την δύναμιν εξάγειν μετωπηδον κατά μίαν πλευράν της η στρατοπεδείας. άνακληθέντων δε τών παρ' έκατέροις εὐζώνων ἐκ τοῦ μεταξὺ τόπου διὰ τῆς σάλπιγγος, συναλαλάξασαι καὶ καταβαλοῦσαι τὰς σαρίε σας συνέβαλλον αί φάλαγγες άλλήλαις. άγῶνος δὲ νενομένου κραταιοῦ, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ πόδα ποιουμένων την αναχώρησιν και πιεζομένων έπι πολύ των Μακεδόνων ύπο τής των Λακώνων εύψυχίας, ποτέ δε των Λακεδαιμονίων εξωθουμένων ύπο τοῦ βάο ρους της των Μακεδόνων τάξεως, τέλος οἱ περὶ τὸν Αντίγονον συμφράξαντες τὰς σαρίσας, καὶ χρησάμενοι τῷ τῆς ἐπαλλήλου φάλαγγος ιδιώματι, βία προσπεσόντες εξέωσαν εκ τῶν ὀχυρωμάτων τοὺς 10 Λακεδαιμονίους. το μέν οὖν ἄλλο πληθος ἔφευγε προτροπάδην φονευόμενον ο δε Κλεομένης ίππεις τινας έχων περί έαυτον απεχώρησε μετά τούτων 11 ἀσφαλῶς εἰς τὴν Σπάρτην. ἐπιγενομένης δὲ τῆς νυκτός καταβάς είς Γύθιον, ήτοιμασμένων αὐτῷ τῶν πρός τον πλοῦν ἐκ πλείονος χρόνου πρός τὸ συμβαΐνον, ἀπηρε μετὰ τῶν φίλων εἰς ᾿Αλεξάνδρειαν. 'Αντίγονος δ' έγκρατης γενόμενος έξ έφόδου της Σπάρτης, τά τε λοιπὰ μεγαλοψύχως καὶ φιλανθρώπως έχρήσατο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, τό τε πολίτευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἀποκαταστήσας ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ανέζευξε μετά των δυνάμεων έκ της πόλεως, προσαγγελθέντος αὐτῷ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς εἰσβεβληκότας 2 εἰς Μακεδονίαν πορθεῖν τὴν χώραν. οὕτως ἀεί ποθ' ή τύχη τὰ μέγιστα τῶν πραγμάτων παρὰ λό-3 γον είωθε κρίνειν. καὶ γὰρ τότε Κλεομένης, είτε 410

level ground on the point of giving way, was afraid of being charged from all sides and was compelled to pull down part of his defences and to lead out his whole force in line from one side of the camp. Each side now recalled by bugle their light-armed troops from the space between them, and shouting their war-cry and lowering their lances, the two phalanxes met. A stubborn struggle followed. At one time the Macedonians gradually fell back facing the enemy, giving way for a long distance before the courage of the Lacedaemonians, at another the latter were pushed from their ground by the weight of the Macedonian phalanx, until, on Antigonus ordering the Macedonians to close up in the peculiar formation of the double phalanx with its serried line of pikes, they delivered a charge which finally forced the Lacedaemonians from their stronghold. The whole Spartan army now fled in rout, followed and cut down by the enemy; but Cleomenes with a few horsemen reached Sparta in safety. At nightfall he went down to Gythion. where all had been prepared some time previously for the voyage in view of contingencies, and set sail with his friends for Alexandria.

70. Antigonus having attacked and taken Sparta, treated the Lacedaemonians in all respects with great generosity and humanity, and, after restoring the ancient form of government, left the city in a few days with his whole army, as he had received news that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were ravaging the country. Thus ever is it the way of Fortune to decide the most weighty issues against rule and reason. For on this occasion Cleomenes,

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τὰ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον παρείλκυσε τελέως ολίγας ήμέρας, είτ' ἀναχωρήσας ἀπὸ τῆς μάχης εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ βραχύ τῶν καιρῶν ἀντεποιήσατο, δια-

κατέσχεν αν την άρχην. 4 Οὐ μην άλλ' ο γ' Αντίγονος παραγενόμενος εἰς Τεγέαν, καὶ τούτοις ἀποδούς την πάτριον πολιτείαν, δευτεραίος έντευθεν είς "Αργος έπ' αὐτην ήλθε την 5 τῶν Νεμέων πανήγυριν. ἐν ἡ τυχὼν πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀθάνατον δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ἀνηκόντων ὑπό τε τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν ᾿Αγαιῶν καὶ κατ' ιδίαν έκάστης τῶν πόλεων, ὧρμησε κατὰ σπουδὴν εἰς Μακεδονίαν. 6 καταλαβών δὲ τοὺς Ἰλλυριοὺς ἐν τῆ χώρα καὶ συμβαλών έκ παρατάξεως, τῆ μὲν μάχη κατώρθωσε, τῆ δὲ παρακλήσει καὶ κραυγῆ τῆ κατ' αὐτὸν τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκθύμως χρησάμενος εἰς αἴματος ἀναγωγὴν καί τινα τοιαύτην διάθεσιν έμπεσών μετ' οὐ πολύ γ νόσω τὸν βίον μετήλλαξε, καλὰς ἐλπίδας ὑποδείξας ἐν αὐτῷ πᾶσι τοῖς Ελλησιν, οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὑπαίθροις χρείαν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον κατὰ τὴν ὅλην 8 αίρεσιν καὶ καλοκάγαθίαν. την δε Μακεδόνων

βασιλείαν ἀπέλιπε Φιλίππω τῷ Δημητρίου.

Τίνος δε χάριν εποιησάμεθα την επὶ πλειον 2 ύπερ τοῦ προειρημένου πολέμου μνήμην; διότι τῶν καιρων τούτων συναπτόντων τοις ύφ' ύμων ιστορεισθαι μέλλουσι χρήσιμον έδόκει, μαλλον δ' άναγκαιον είναι κατά την έξ άρχης πρόθεσιν το ποιησαι πασιν έναργη και γνώριμον την υπάρχουσαν περί 3 Μακεδόνας και τους Ελληνας τότε κατάστασιν. περί δέ τους αὐτους καιρους καὶ Πτολεμαίου νόσω

τον βίον μεταλλάξαντος Πτολεμαΐος δ κληθείς 4 Φιλοπάτωρ διεδέξατο την βασιλείαν. μετήλλαξε δε και Σέλευκος ο Σελεύκου τοῦ Καλλινίκου καὶ

BOOK II

had he deferred giving battle for merely a few days, or had he, on returning to Sparta after the battle, waited ever so short a time to avail himself of the turn of events, would have saved his crown.

Antigonus however, on reaching Tegea, restored the old form of government there also, and two days later arrived at Argos just in time for the Nemean festival, at which the Achaean League and each several city heaped on him every honour they could think of to immortalize his memory. He then hastily left for Macedonia, where he found the Illyrians. Engaging them in a pitched battle, he was victorious, but in the course of the fight he strained himself so much by shouting to his troops to cheer them on that from a rupture of a bloodvessel or some such accident he fell sick and died 200 BC shortly afterwards. He had aroused high hopes of himself throughout Greece, not so much by his success in the field as by his general high principles He was succeeded on the throne and excellence. of Macedon by Philip son of Demetrius.

71. Now to explain why I have dealt with this war at such length. As this period immediately precedes those times, the history of which I am about to write, I thought it would be of service, or rather that the original plan of this work made it necessary for me, to make clearly known to everyone the state of affairs in Macedonia and Greece at this time. Just about the same time Ptolemy Euergetes fell sick and died, being succeeded by Ptolemy surnamed Philopator. Seleucus, the son of the Seleucus surnamed Callinicus or Pogon, also died at this

THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS

Πώγωνος επικληθέντος 'Αντίοχος δε διεδέξατο την δ εν Συρία βασιλείαν, άδελφος ων αὐτοῦ. παραπλήσοιον γὰρ δή τι συνέβη τούτοις καὶ τοῖς πρώτοις μετὰ τὴν 'Αλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν κατασχοῦσι τὰς ἀρχὰς ταύτας, λέγω δὲ Σελεύκω, Πτολεμαίω, Λυσιμάχω. 6 ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πάντες περὶ τὴν εἰκοστὴν καὶ τετάρ-την πρὸς ταῖς ἐκατὸν ὀλυμπιάδα μετήλλαξαν, καθά-

περ επάνω προείπον, οδτοί τε περί την ενάτην καί

τριακοστήν.

7 ' Ημεις δ' επειδή την επίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευήν της όλης ιστορίας διέληλύθαμεν, δι' ης υποδέδεικται πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι' ας αἰτίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κρατήσαντες 'Ρωμαΐοι πρώτον έγχειρείν ήρξαντο τοις έξω πράγμασι, και πρώτον ετόλμησαν αμφισβη-8 τεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῆς θαλάττης, ἄμα δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν περὶ τοὺς Ελληνας καὶ Μακεδόνας, ὁμοίως 9 δε και περί Καρχηδονίους υπάρχουσαν τότε κατάστασιν δεδηλώκαμεν, καθήκον αν είη παραγεγονότας έπὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους κατὰ τὴν έξ ἀρχης πρόθεσιν, εν οίς εμελλον οι μεν Ελληνες τον συμμαχικόν, 'Ρωμαΐοι δέ τον 'Αννιβιακόν, οί δέ κατὰ τὴν ᾿Ασίαν βασιλεῖς τὸν περὶ Κοίλης Συρίας 10 ἐνίστασθαι πόλεμον, καὶ τὴν βύβλον ταύτην

άφορίζειν ἀκολούθως τῆ τε τῶν προγεγονότων πραγμάτων περιγραφή και τή των κεχειρικότων τα προ

τοῦ δυναστών καταστροφή.

BOOK II

time, his brother Antiochus succeeding him. The same thing in fact occurred in the case of these three kings, as in that of the first successors of Alexander in the three kingdoms, Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus, who all, as I stated above, died in the 124th Olympiad, while these kings 284-280 died in the 139th.

I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my History. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans first entered on enterprises outside Italy and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians, and next I have dealt with the state of Greece and Macedonia and with that of Carthage. So having, as was my original purpose, reached the date at which the Greeks were on the eve of the Social War, the Romans on the eve of the Hannibalic War, and the kings of Asia about to enter on the war for Coele-Syria, I must now bring this Book to its close, which coincides with the final events preceding these wars and the death of the three kings who had up to now directed affairs.

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